Japan's Relations with Independent Siam up to 1933:
Prelude to Pan-Asian Solidarity

by

IIDA JUNZO

A dissertation submitted for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL

January 1991
Abstract

This study consists of two parts. Part one comprises chapters 1 to 5. Part two goes from chapters 6 to 9. Chapter 1 concerns the nineteenth century resumption of relations between Japan and Siam, with a description of the conclusion of the 'Declaration of Amity and Commerce between Japan and Siam' of 1887. Chapter 2 traces Japan's awareness of Western imperialism in the late 19th century, and the Japanese sense of solidarity with Asian countries including Southeast Asia and the South Seas region. Chapter 3 focuses on Inagaki Manjiro, who became the first Japanese Minister to Siam, and contributed to the conclusion of Japan's unequal treaty with Siam of 1898. In Chapter 4, the course of the negotiation concerning 'The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and Protocol between Japan and Siam in 1898' will be considered. Chapter 5 deals with various Japanese advisers to the Siamese government who contributed to the relations between Siam and Japan after the conclusion of the 1898 treaty.

In Chapter 6, as a background to changes in the relationship, Japanese Pan-Asianism and 'Nanshin-Ron' (Southward View) will be examined. Chapter 7 will deal with Japan's surrender of extraterritoriality in Siam, considering the revision of the 1898 treaty in 1920-24, with examination of Masao Tokichi and Yada Chonosuke's roles in the negotiation. In Chapter 8, the development of Japan's interest in Siam in economic terms, especially in the post-1924 period will be focused upon. Attention will be paid to the role of the 'Siam Society' established in Tokyo in 1928, the Japanese military in Southeast Asia during 1920-30, and Siamese King Prachathipok's feeling about Japan at that time. Chapter 9 investigates the activities of another Japanese Minister to Siam, Yatabe Yasukichi, and his efforts to get on friendly terms first with the old Siamese government, and then the new Siam's leaders after the 1932/33 revolution.
TO YUKIKO
MEMORANDUM

I declare that this thesis represents my own unaided work except where otherwise acknowledged.

[Signature]

IIDA Junzo
Department of History
University of Bristol
# Table of Contents

*Preface*  
*Acknowledgements*  
*Abbreviations*  

## Introduction

1. Situation of the study of Japan's relations with Siam  
2. Why is the study of Japan's diplomatic relations with Siam before the 1930's neglected?  
3. The significance of this study  
   3-1. Bringing people involved in Japan-Siam relations into relief  
   3-2. A Study in perspective on 'Japanese imperialism'  
   3-2-1. Motives or causes of Imperialism  
   3-2-2. Definition of imperialism in this study  
   3-2-3. Arguments about 'Japanese imperialism'  
3-3. 'Japanese Pan-Asianism'  
4. Structure of this study  
5. Sources  

## Part One

Japan and Siam up to the early Taisho era: An age of pure idealism?  

### Chapter 1

Meiji Japan's resumption of relations with Siam  

1-1. The early relations between Japan and Siam  
1-2. The Siamese approach to Japan  
1-3. Otori Keisuke's meeting with King Chulalongkorn  
1-4. The Origins of the 1887 Japan-Siam Declaration  
   1-4-1. Inoue Kaoru's deliberations  
   1-4-2. Siamese vacillation  
   1-4-3. The Thewawong Mission  
   1-4-4. The signing of the treaty  
1-5. Phraya Phatsakorawong in Japan  
1-6. Prince Phanurangsi's visit to Japan  

### Chapter 2

Development of Japanese Asian Interest  

2-1. Japanese awareness of Western Imperialism  
   2-1-1. Japan's confrontation with the Western Powers  
   2-1-2. Japan's involvement in Chinese and Korean affairs  
2-2. Development of a Japanese sense of solidarity with Asian countries  
   2-2-1. The Koa Kai  
   2-2-2. The Asian solidarity sense of the 'Jiyuminken Undo'  
   2-2-3. Fukuzawa Yukichi and Asia  
   2-2-4. Tarui's unique views of Asian solidarity  
   2-3-1. Meiji 'shishi'; Sugita and Arao, nationalists and romanticists  
   2-3-2. The 'Tenyukyo' in Korea, Miyazaki Toten in China  
2-4. Japan's attitude towards Southeast Asia and the South Seas region  
   2-4-1. Meiji advocates of the South  
   2-4-2. The 'Nunobiki Maru' incident  
2-5. The Toho Kyokai or Oriental Society
3-1. Political situation of Japan in the late 1800's
3-2. A brief sketch of Inagaki's life
  3-2-1. Inagaki and Cambridge
  3-2-2. Inagaki, orator, writer, and diplomat
3-3. Inagaki and his first published work 'Japan and the Pacific'
3-4. Inagaki's view of Japan's foreign policy
3-5. Did Inagaki influence the Japanese government?

Chapter 4
Japan's Concluding of the 1898 unequal treaty with Siam

4-1. Japanese emigration to Siam: A trigger to the 1898 treaty
  4-1-1. Ex-Soldier Iwamoto and Revolutionist Ishibashi
  4-1-2. Pan-Asianist Miyazaki's involvement in the issue of Siam
4-2. Saito's reports regarding Japanese emigration projects
4-3. Inagaki's preparatory negotiation for a treaty with the Siamese government
  4-3-1. Inagaki's first approaches to Thewawong
  4-3-2. The attitude of General Adviser Rolin-Jaquetemyns
  4-3-3. Inagaki's views on his visit to Siam
4-4. The beginning of negotiations for the 1897 treaty between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Siamese government
4-4-1. Proposals of the Toho Kyokai
4-4-2. Towards ending French protection of the Japanese in Siam: Japan's revenge for the Triple Intervention?
4-4-3. Siam Legal Adviser Kirkpatrick's visit to Japan
4-5. General Kawakami's observation tour to Southeast Asia
4-6. Okuma Shigenobu's policy on Siam
4-7. General Kawakami meets King Chulalongkorn
4-8. Inagaki in Bangkok as envoy for negotiation
  4-8-1. Controversy over Siam's counter draft
  4-8-2. Inagaki presses Thewawong
4-9. The meaning of the 1898 treaty

Chapter 5
Japanese advisers in Siam

5-1. Masao Tokichi: a western educated Japanese legal adviser in the Siamese government
  5-1-1. Masao's brief profile
  5-1-2. Masao's encounter with Komura Jutaro
5-1-3. Masao compared with Inagaki
5-1-4. Masao's scholastic life
5-1-5. New life as M.P.
5-2. Masao's contribution to the Siamese codification work
  5-2-1. Masao among Belgian advisers
  5-2-2. Rolin-Jaquetemyns's confidence in Masao
  5-2-3. The efforts of Masao and Belgian lawyers in drafting the Siamese modern criminal code
  5-2-4. Masao versus Padoux
  5-2-5. Masao's resignation
5-3. Other Japanese advisers to the Siamese Government
  5-3-1. Japanese sericulture adviser: Toyama Kametaro
  5-3-2. Japanese educational adviser: Yasui Tetsu
## Chapter 6

**Siam, Pan-Asianism, and the Nanshin-Ron: the idea of Japanese southward advance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-1.</td>
<td>The meaning of Pan-Asianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-2.</td>
<td>Britain's concern about Japanese Pan-Asianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-3.</td>
<td>Meiji romantic Nanshin-Ron; an original view of Southward Advance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-4.</td>
<td>Taisho Nanshin-Ron and Japan's southward economic tendency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-5.</td>
<td>Impact of Nanshin-Ron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-6.</td>
<td>The activities of the Japanese military in 'Nan'yo'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-6-1.</td>
<td>Indifferent attitude of the Japanese military to Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-6-2.</td>
<td>The small role of Japanese intelligence in Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7.</td>
<td>Admiration or apprehension? King Wachirawut's variable attitude towards Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7-1.</td>
<td>Japanese desire for investment in Siam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7-2.</td>
<td>Embarrassment of King Wachirawut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7-3.</td>
<td>King Wachirawut's approach to the Japanese Emperor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7-4.</td>
<td>Masao's secret meeting with the Siamese government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 7

**The end of Japan's extraterritoriality in Siam**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7-1.</td>
<td>Amada Rokuro: a witness of the Gaimusho's attitude to Siam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-2.</td>
<td>Arita Hachiro's five months' experience in Siam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-3.</td>
<td>Masao Tokichi's embarrassment and the pro-Siam line over the negotiation for the revision of the 1898 Siam-Japan Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-3-1.</td>
<td>Optimism of the Gaimusho in the treaty negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-3-2.</td>
<td>Seeking the contents of the new Siamese-American treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-3-3.</td>
<td>Masao's dilemma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-3-4.</td>
<td>The negotiation suspended by Masao's death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-4.</td>
<td>Resumption of the negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-4-1.</td>
<td>Yada Chonosuke's taking over of the negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-4-2.</td>
<td>Arguments between Yada and the Gaimusho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-4-3.</td>
<td>The question of the Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-4-4.</td>
<td>The dispute between Yada and Prince Traithot over the question of the most-favoured nation clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-4-5.</td>
<td>Eventual Gaimusho compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-5.</td>
<td>The significance of the 1924 treaty negotiation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 8
Economic and political relations between Japan and Siam following the 1924 Treaty

8-1. 'The Gaimusho' and the Japanese military, 'Gunbu': economic rationalism or national defence?
   8-1-1. Shidehara diplomacy
   8-1-2. Rise of Tanaka Giichi
   8-2. A token of Gaimusho economic interest in Siam
   8-3. The First South Seas Trade Conference in Tokyo
   8-4. Establishment of the Japan 'Siam Society'
   8-5. Siamese apprehension of Japanese economic interest in Southeast Asia
   8-6. The Japan Siam society's relations with the Japanese military
      8-6-1. Unenthusiastic Japanese military in Southeast Asia
      8-6-2. The faint Japanese Army interest in Siam
      8-6-3. Matsui in Siam, Alongkot in Japan
      8-6-4. The Japanese military attachés in Siam

Chapter 9
The Siamese revolution in 1932/33, a spring-board for closer relations between Japan and the new Siam

9-1. The political and economic situation of Japan during 1930's
9-2. The political and economic situation of the new Siam
9-3. Japanese Minister Yatabe and Siam's second abstention at the League of Nations
   9-3-1. Yatabe and the 1932 coup d'état
   9-3-2. Neutrality or solidarity? Yatabe's views on Siam's abstention
9-4. Yatabe's scheme of inviting a pro-Japanese Siamese politician to Japan
9-5. Yatabe and the 1933 coup d'état
   9-5-1. Yatabe in deliberation
   9-5-2. Yatabe's lecture on the changes in Siam
9-6. A re-examination of the Iizuka Affair

Conclusion
Appendixes
Bibliography
The present world is increasingly growing into a more interdependent international community. The Cold War is over, and a strong European Community with a united Germany is to emerge in 1992. The Western Pacific region is also evolving into a distinct economic unit, comprising Japan, the NIEs (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong), and ASEAN (Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei). For instance, prior to the Gulf Crisis in 1990, the NIEs and the ASEAN countries were expected to account for 23 percent of the real growth in world GNP between since 1986. In the same period, they were expected to contribute 42 percent of the growth in world trade. Notwithstanding the Gulf crisis this economic trend concerning these developing countries is likely to remain at this general level until at least around 1995.1

In such circumstances, Japan has emerged as a big economy country. For instance, Japan's overseas direct investment has been increased rapidly. Japan's investment in the NIEs increased from $ 1,531 million in the year 1986, to $ 3,264 million in 1988, while investment in the ASEAN countries surged from $ 553 million in 1986 to $ 1,966 million in 1988, against a total Japanese overseas direct investment of $ 47,022 million in 1988.2 Among the ASEAN countries, Thailand seems to be the most attractive place for Japanese investors; Japan's direct investment in Thailand reached the top place in the ASEAN region. In 1987, Japan's direct investment in over 200 new projects in Thailand cost $ 144 million which equalled the amount Japan had invested in the whole of the previous 14 years in Thailand.3 1988 saw the figure increase by a massive 600 % to $ 859 million. This increase in investment directed towards Thailand has been partly at the expense of other ASEAN countries, as can be seen by the Japanese investment of a mere $ 586 million in Indonesia in 1988;4 Indonesia, because of its natural resources, has been a country of keen interest to a resource-starved Japan and in consequence had hitherto received the largest share of Japanese investment in the region.5 Thus it can be seen that Japan's economic relations with Thailand are growing.

2 Ibid., pp. 168-169.
4 Watanabe, op. cit., p. 168.
Despite such close, economic and trade, relations between Japan and Thailand, the Thai image of Japan will not satisfy the Japanese. According to a 1987 survey by The Bangkok Post, 46.2 percent of 885 persons polled, felt Japan was not a true friend, while only 30.3 percent thought otherwise. However, 47.5 percent believed that Thailand should continue to promote Japanese investment in Thailand. 67.7 percent believed that Japan would never become a military superpower, while 21.4 percent thought that it would. But 69.8 percent felt that Japan's interest in Thailand was of an imperialistic nature, with 48.2 percent thinking that Japanese economic assistance benefited Japan more than Thailand. Further, the results of this survey show that the Thai wish the Japanese to know much more about Thailand than at present.6 This survey tends to show that the Japanese need to make themselves and their attitude clear to the Thai, and also to broaden their knowledge and contacts with the Thai so as to overcome Thai misgivings concerning Japanese involvement in Thailand.

I began studying Thailand, its language and history, in 1980, when I became an overseas post-graduate student at Thammasat University in Bangkok. Since then, my interest in Thai-Japanese relations has developed. The more I investigated, the more historical facts I discovered. Some of them were already known. This study represents the fruits of my ten years involvement with Thailand.

---

Acknowledgements

In the completion of this thesis, I have benefited greatly from the assistance, advice, and encouragement of a substantial number of people.

In particular, I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Nigel J. Brailey, for his patient supervising of my work from the outset, which made this study possible. I wish also to thank Mrs. Somsap Brailey, Mr. Stephen Hill and Mrs. Tomiko Hill for their sincere assistance, warmth, and encouragement which have made my Bristol life so comfortable. I wish also to express my deep gratitude to Vice-Rector, Professor Komuro Kin'nosuke of Soka University, for his sincere encouragement. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my trustworthy friends, Mr. Horii Reiichi and Mr. Kikuchi Minoru, for their wholehearted encouragement. I wish to give thanks to the former Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies of Kyoto University, Professor Ishii Yoneo, Professor Yoshikawa Toshiharu and Professor Akagi Isao of Osaka University of Foreign Languages, Professor Chiba Masaji of Tokai University, Professor Hatuse Ryuhei of Kobe University, for their valuable criticism and generous assistance. Special thanks must go to Mrs. Olive Checkland, Honorary Fellow of Glasgow University, and Mr. Hattori Reijiro, the President of the Seiko Watch Company, for their kind help. I am particularly indebted to Mr. Masao Kichiro, and Mr. Yoshikawa Hideo and Mrs. Yoshikawa who kindly loaned valuable materials, and allowed me to do interview work with them. Appreciation is also extended to the officials of the National Archives Office in Bangkok and the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, in which I carried out my research.

xi
Abbreviations

FO. = United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Series.


K.T. = Thai Foreign Office Diplomatic Archives, National Archives Office in Bangkok.

P. = Miscellaneous collection of Thai National Archives.

R.5 = National Archives in the reign of King Chulalongkorn.

R.6 = National Archives in the reign of King Wachirawut.

R.7 T. = Thai National Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Reign of King Prachathipok.

R.7 K. = Thai National Archives of the Siamese Ministry of Defence in the Reign of King Prachathipok.

R7. RL. = Thai National Archives of the Royal Secretariat in the Reign of King Prachathipok.

T. = Foreign Office collection of Thai National Archives.

Y. = Ministry of Justice collection of Thai National Archives.
1. Situation of the study of Japan's relations with Siam

Since Edward Thadeus Flood's 'Japan's Relations with Thailand, 1928-41 (Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1967), few other historical studies of relations between Japan and Siam (or Thailand as it has been known since 1939), have been made due to a lack of interest by historians. Recently though, two new English-language theses on this subject have appeared, i.e. William L. Swan, 'Japanese Economic Relations with Siam: Aspects of Their Historical Development 1884 to 1942' (Australian National University, 1986), and E. Bruce Reynolds, 'Ambivalent Allies: Japan and Thailand 1941-1945' (University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1988).

Flood's voluminous work was indeed a pioneering achievement on the subject. In particular, his use of Japanese archives to analyse Japan-Siam relations before the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 had not been done before, even by Japanese. Swan's work also deserves to be seen as a pioneering work in the field of economic relations between Japan and Southeast Asia. As Swan says, "Because of its insignificance this aspect of Siam-Japan economic relations has never been explored. It has been all but ignored in postwar studies of relations between the two countries."¹ He succeeded in clarifying Japan's economic relations with Siam before and during the Second World War. He also presents new interpretations of the relationship on the eve of the Pacific War. More, due to Swan's work several misunderstandings and incorrect information introduced in Flood's thesis were corrected. Reynolds' work is something like a sequel to Flood's thesis, but it presents valuable new documents and fresh interpretations pertaining to Japan-Thai relations in the period before and during the Pacific War.

Despite these recent noteworthy academic works which pay much attention to Japan's diplomatic and economic relations with Siam around the period of the Pacific War, even less examination of the period up to the 1932/33 Siamese revolution has been attempted by scholars. Swan allotted a substantial part of his thesis to dealing with the pre-1930's relations between both countries, but it is focused mainly on economic aspects. Regarding the early relations between Meiji Japan and Siam under King Chulalongkorn, as Swan only dealt with it to a degree, there is much more evidence to be adduced to enable us to discuss the matter more fully. Swan's introduction of statistical sources made his discussions more objective and persuasive,

yet as he admits, little information on Siamese and Japanese government policy and decision-making regarding economic relations is referred to.\textsuperscript{2} This implies that Japan's 'diplomatic' relations with Siam before the 1930's have not been fully studied. Of course, Flood did not attempt to go back seriously before 1928.

Apart from these three theses, two survey-style books are available in Japanese. Nishino Junjiro, \textit{Four Hundred Years of Japan-Thai Relations} (1972), and Ishii Yoneo and Yoshikawa Toshiharu, \textit{Six Hundred Years of Japan-Thai Relations} (1987).\textsuperscript{3} The former seems to be just a compilation mainly based on secondary sources, but also partly on the author's personal experience; he served as a Japanese diplomat in Bangkok during the Pacific war. In particular, his description of wartime relations between Japan and Siam is noteworthy. However, due to his unprofessionalism in the study of history, hardly any primary documents are employed. Ishii and Yoshikawa's work is, on the other hand, largely based on their long-standing historical study of Thailand using archives and other primary sources as well as secondary studies. On the Thai side, Surangsri Tonsiengson 'Thai-Japan Relations during the Reigns of Kings Rama V, VI, and VII' (M.A. thesis, Chulalongkom University, 1977) uses a considerable number of Thai archives but no Japanese, and is a rather narrative work covering the period 1868-1935.

The present study is designed as a contribution to the historical examination of Japan-Siam relations, focusing on Japan's attitude towards Siam up to the 1932/33 Siamese revolution, years not much covered by Flood or Reynolds, and aspects not much dealt with even by Swan, and not fully examined by Ishii and Yoshikawa. This study is based substantially on Japanese and Thai archives, as well as British archives and secondary sources.

2. Why is the study of Japan's diplomatic relations with Siam before the 1930's neglected?

Firstly, it is worth reviewing why relations between Japan and Siam before the 1930's have not been very much explored. To take an example from the present-day Japanese attitude towards Southeast Asia, among the Japanese in general, the name of a seventeenth century Japanese warrior-merchant of the Ayutthaya period, 'Yamada Nagamasa', and the term 'Nihon Jin Machi (Japanese community in Ayutthaya)' are well known. But despite the recent close economic relations between Japan and Thailand, the Japanese people have little knowledge of

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p. vii.

\textsuperscript{3} It was also published in Thai. See Khwam sampanh Thai-Jipun hokrori pi (Bangkok, 1987).
the history of Japan's relations with Thailand. In contrast, the relations between Japan and the Western world are a matter of fascination to the Japanese people, and they are quite knowledgeable on the subject. This unbalanced attitude of the Japanese to historical recognition of other Asian countries can also be seen in the academic world. Many scholars are busy doing research on western countries. Even China and Korea are thought of as important countries because of Japan's special historical relations with them. Yet, Japan's relations with Southeast Asia have not been paid much attention, with the result that study of Southeast Asia in Japan is not substantial. Many books dealing with Japan's relations with the Western Powers have been produced while the number of those covering the relationship between the Japanese and the peoples of Southeast Asia is extremely small. And when one looks at the subject before the 1930's, things are even worse.

There is another reason why relations between Japan and Siam, in particular pre-1930, have not attracted historians. It relates to the historical background. Before the 1930's not only was Japanese policy towards Siam not well-defined, neither was there a national policy towards Southeast Asian countries in general. As Swan says, the Southeast Asian region (often called Nan'yo, the South Seas region) was not strategic to Japan. He also argues that "In contrast to the remarkable success ultimately achieved in Japan's trade with Siam, Japanese capital and other non-trading investment in Siam [even] by the time of the Pacific war was negligible." Also, he concluded that "The noteworthy feature of Japan's economic relations with Siam for much of the period before World War II was the relative unimportance of those relations." This implies, as the whole of his thesis does, that Japan's diplomatic relations with Siam, especially before the 1930's, were negligible and not worth discussing. Many scholars tend to share the same feelings. I do not agree with this view at all. In the field of diplomatic relations, the two countries became closer after the 1932/33 Siamese revolution, thus their relations during the 1930's up to the outbreak of the Pacific War were not negligible. But in my view there were at least three important diplomatic events in the earlier period, i.e. the conclusion of the Declaration of Friendship in 1887, the conclusion of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1898, and the revision of the 1898 treaty in 1924, whereby Japan's

---

5 Ibid., p. iv.
6 Ibid., p. 216.
extraterritoriality was relinquished. These three events raise many issues which we should discuss.

3. The significance of this study

3-1. Bringing people involved in Japan-Siam relations into relief

The first point of importance in discussing Japan's diplomatic relations with Siam before the 1930's is the following. Despite there being no definite Japanese foreign policy towards Siam, it is a fact that there were people who made exhaustive efforts in order to maintain friendly terms between Japan and Siam; e.g. Inagaki Manjiro, Prince Thewawong, Sir Ernest Satow, Masao Tokichi, Yada Chonosuke, Arita Hachiro, Amada Rokuro, Yatabe Yasukichi, etc. Such endeavours were not often recorded in official documents. These people and also some Siamese have as yet received little credit for their efforts. The present study attempts to focus on such people involved in Japan-Siam relations.

3-2. A study in perspective on 'Japanese imperialism'

The second point of importance in discussing Japan's diplomatic relations with Siam before the 1930's, is the fact that there was no definite Japanese foreign policy towards Siam. This is highly significant in the study of Japanese foreign policy. Why were pre-1930's Japan's relations with independent Siam so calm in contrast with its relations with China and Korea? In other words, Japan's attitude towards Siam before the 1930's shows a clear contrast with contemporary Japanese policy towards China and Korea. It still seems to involve a number of arguable or considerably debatable points regarding the axiomatic term, 'Japanese imperialism'.

Many historians in both Japan and the West, ascribing aggression and brutality to Japan, seem to be convinced that Japan, since the beginning of its modernization in the 19th century up to 1945, was imperialist. And indeed, Japan's modernization process following its 1853 forcible opening, after a long, self-determined, closed-country policy (Sakoku), has to be considered as something closely linked with its aggressive and expansionist attitude towards other Asian neighbours, mainly Korea and China. However, as Marius B. Jansen pointed out, in recent years the attention of scholars studying Japan has shifted from 'Japan as aggressor and Japan as modernizer to a recognition of the complexities and ambiguities of the historical process.\(^7\)

In my view, when the terms 'imperialist' or 'imperialism' are applied to Japan's modern history, contrary to the case of Western countries, their relevance seems to be lost. They are irrelevant to Japan's expansionist behaviour, and have even caused distracting controversy among a number of historians in the past decade. One British historian of Japanese history even acknowledges that the study of Japanese diplomacy should be assessed in a way in which Japan's relations with countries other than the Western Powers would be taken into account. I would like to add the following qualification: Japanese diplomacy should be examined by considering her relations with Asian countries apart from China and Korea.

If one looks to each definition or view of imperialism, one might be lost in maze. It can be said that there are as many definitions of imperialism as there are scholars.

3-2-1. Motives or causes of Imperialism

The arguments regarding cause or motive or sometime value of imperialism, are also considerably debatable issues. Various arguments have been attempted in much the same way as the attempts to define imperialism. Imperialism can be understood by examining approaches. The first approach emphasises economic arguments which point to the human and material resources and the outlets for goods, investment capital, and surplus population provided by an empire. Hobson, Lenin and Bukharin can be categorised as belonging to this group. The second group of theorists relate imperialism to the nature of human beings and human groups, such as the state. Imperialism to them is part of the natural struggle for survival. Machiavelli, Bacon, Gumplowicz, are generally classified as forming this group. The third group of arguments has to do with strategy and security. Its champions believe that nations are urged to obtain bases, strategic materials, and buffer states for reason of security, or to prevent other states from obtaining them. The fourth group of arguments is based on moral grounds, sometimes with strong missionary implications. Imperialism is viewed as the means of liberating peoples from tyrannical rule or of bringing them the blessings of a superior way of life.

---

9 Beasley, op. cit., p. 10.
3-2-2. Definition of imperialism in this study

A certain definition of imperialism should be attempted in this study so as not to make readers confused at my terminology of 'imperialism'. In the present study I would like to limit the term 'imperialism' to capitalism-imperialism, i.e. both 'mercantile imperialism' and 'new imperialism'.\(^{11}\) There are two reasons: first, the present study is designed to present Japan-Siam relations in historical perspective, not to argue imperialism itself in its theoretical, political or economic perspectives. Second, if imperialism is interpreted in a most broad definition, which attempts to analyse all socio-political and economic phenomena,\(^ {12}\) the following arguments on Japanese imperialism should cover Japan after 1933 and the Second World War as well. But the period which the present study deals with is the late 19th century up to 1932/33. Previous to that time, it was the middle of 19th century which was the turning point from 'mercantile imperialism' to 'new imperialism', at which time Japan became a part of the modern world. I would like to call capitalism-imperialism 'Western Imperialism', because it has distinct features attributable to Western culture and its industrial progress. On the other hand, so-called 'Japanese imperialism' had its own character and nature, and has been distinguished from Western imperialism by many historians, as will be described below.

3-2-3. Arguments about 'Japanese imperialism'

'Japanese imperialism' has induced many historians to argue its nature and features. While David Bergamini saw the whole epoch of Japanese expansion as an 'imperial

---

11 Imperialism with economic exploitation and adventures, which includes Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth century, and Holland, Britain, and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I call it 'mercantile imperialism'. From the late nineteenth century until the Great War can be called the age of the 'new imperialism' of the Western industrial countries. It is said that in addition to the above five, new imperialist countries, Russia, Italy, Germany and the United States were added in this period. See The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, op. cit., p. 272. And Leonard Sidney Woolf, 'Imperialism' in Chambers's Encyclopaedia. New Revised Edition vol. VII (London, 1970), pp. 399-403.

12 A Japanese authority divides the concept 'imperialism' into four elements. He says the core concept of imperialism is expansionism. And in terms of social phenomena there are three features in imperialistic behaviour. First, imperialism stems from authoritarian activity having as a background a gap in national power compared with other countries. Second, imperialism is the process of subordination which is exercised beyond the country's boundaries in order to establish permanent control over other countries, races or territories. Third, imperialism has in general an ideology which tries to justify these above conducts. I call it 'the most broad definition of imperialism'. Ishikawa Kazuo, 'Imperialism' in Britannica International Encyclopaedia (in Japanese) (Tokyo, 1974), p. 573. In Japan, the term imperialism began to appear in dictionaries in the early 1900's. Definitions of imperialism in those dictionaries, though very likely being translated from foreign books, were much similar to those of the present. Yet it is interesting that one of the dictionaries stressed not economic aspects but more the political aspect of imperialism. See Futsu jutsugo jiten (Dictionary of common terminology) (Tokyo, 1905), and Jirin (The Dictionary) (Tokyo, 1911).
'conspiracy', James Crowley thought the central theme of 'Japanese imperialism' was a 'quest for autonomy'. More specifically, Meiji 'Japanese imperialism' has prompted much argument. Bonnie B. Oh holds that Meiji expansionism was imperialistic and 'phenomenally rapid'. Ann M. Harrington construes it as 'not based on preordained design'. Hilary Conroy interprets Meiji imperialism as 'mostly ad hoc' phenomena.

On the other hand, Mark R. Peattie and Marius B. Jansen analyse the nature and character of Japanese imperialism in general, viewing it as quite unique and distinguishable from Western imperialism. As most scholars do, they also seem implicitly to use the term 'colonialism' as synonymous with imperialism, or maybe the consequences of imperialism. Their argument repeatedly moves on to Japanese 'colonialism', and then returns to Japanese 'imperialism' in general. Imperialism and colonialism in their terminology appear to be the same thing. Yet their attention to 'Japanese colonialism' or 'imperialism' brings up many debatable points. In comparison with Western imperialism, 'Japanese imperialism' (Peattie uses 'Japanese colonial empire') had distinct features historically and geographically different from those of Western countries. Historically, Japan herself can be said to have had experience of narrowly avoiding being colonised by Western countries. Geographically, because of Japan's limited

17 Hilary Conroy 'Meiji Imperialism: "Mostly Ad Hoc"' in ibid., pp. 136-140.
18 Colonialism has been treated as almost the same concept as imperialism because the former has an attribution of authoritarianism and subordination over other countries and people just as the same as imperialism. One source says colonialism is the result of an area and its people being subjected by an external sovereignty pursuing a policy of imperialism. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary (California: Longman, fourth edition, 1988), p. 26. But differences between both concepts can be seen when saying that colonialism should be distinguished from expansion towards 'neighbouring countries'. Colonialism means expansion to remote areas. Thus Colonialism is one kind of expansionist behaviour but does not include expansion in all directions. Ishikawa Kazuo, 'Imperialism', p. 573. Also explanations are prepared for colonialism in socio-political aspects; it is 'a form of imperialism based on maintaining a sharp and fundamental distinction (expressed often in law as well as in fact) between the ruling nation and the subordinate (colonial) populations. Such arrangement arises most naturally in consequence of a conquest of a remote territory with a population of a conspicuously different physique and culture, and colonialism always entails unequal rights.' Alan Bullock, Oliver Stallybrass, and Stephen Trombley (ed.), The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (London, second ed., 1986), p. 410. In other words, in the concept of colonialism, 'only citizens or subjects of the original "homeland" can be seen as citizens of the empire, and the rest of the inhabitants are no more than subject people with no hope of political power or legal protection.' David Robertson, The Penguin Dictionary of Politics (London, 1985), p. 155.
19 This is not generally acknowledged in the West but it was certainly vulnerable to the same right up to the outset of the Russo-Japanese war, which Russia was widely expected to win. See Jean Pierre Lehmann, The Roots of Modern Japan (London, 1982), p. 290. "In the beginning Japan was a kind of semi-Western colony." Also see Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942 (London, 1977), p. 12, and Richard Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894-1943 (London, 1979), pp. 16-17.
political, military, and economic resources, the Meiji government simply created its empire by exploiting its domination in areas close to home, not going to unclaimed jungle or desert. Those neighbouring territories also had a cultural affinity with the Japanese.\(^{20}\)

As for motive or cause of 'Japanese imperialism', it might be argued that there were various motivations and causes behind Japan's historical attitude in the East Asian region, though the conventional clear-cut view of Japanese 'imperialism' holds, as has already been pointed out by many scholars, that Japanese expansionism was strongly determined by economic factors.\(^{21}\) By contrast, Peattie, sharing Jansen's view, holds that Japanese imperialism was the result of an overriding concern for Japan's insular security: "Japan's expansion on the continent was in large part undertaken to guarantee the nation's strategic frontiers at the flood tide of Western advance in Asia."\(^{22}\) Conroy concluded that Japanese Meiji oligarchs' main objective was Japanese security.\(^{23}\) And he said that "The [Japanese] realists were practical, cautiously progressive, but concerned above all else with Japanese security and national interest, thoughtful, careful players in the chess game of international politics."\(^{24}\) Harrington also points to this factor, saying that "Unless she achieved equal status with the Western Powers, Japan thought she would be unable to maintain her independence. These fears [for Japan's national security] were partially responsible for the acquisition of Korea and the control of the Liaotung Peninsula [the latter being a result of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5]."\(^{25}\)

In my view, this aspect of Japan's national security seems to be a very crucial element of her foreign policy after the Meiji Restoration. 'Japanese imperialism', as it was expressed in expansionistic behaviour in the late 19th century, was motivated by perceptions of vulnerability and encirclement by hostile forces; above all Japan was concerned from the outset of the Meiji era with Russian eastward and southward expansionism in Eastern Asia.

\(^{21}\) Lehmann, op. cit., p. 304.
\(^{24}\) Ibid., p. 493. Also see Storry, op. cit., p. 17.
\(^{25}\) Ann M. Harrington, 'Meiji Imperialism: "Not Based on Preordained Design" in Japan Examined. p. 135. For an interesting work regarding Japanese feelings towards Russia since the Edo era, see Shimizu Hayao, Nihonjin no Roshia Konplekkus (The Japanese Complex towards Russia) (Tokyo, 1984).
In this respect, some recent academic works on Japanese history appear to pose a question, in a similar way to this author, about the popular opinion on Japanese imperialism, for example:

While there was an element of imitation of Western territorial imperialism, Japan essentially regarded control of neighbouring territories and resources as fundamental to her own safety and well-being, either for reasons of economic security, or because their weakness and backwardness rendered Japan militarily vulnerable and politically isolated, since such countries were easy prey to third party aggression. 26

Another writer suggested that:

if one can talk of the Soviet Union under Stalin adopting a 'Socialism in one country' line, and the post-war United States a 'democracy in one country' equivalent, meaning that to both, their own respective national security takes precedence over proselytization of their respective ideologies or values abroad, by the same token, to all Japanese going back to the insecurity of the 1890s, the survival of the Japanese homeland was the ultimate justification for activities overseas. 27

These opinions indicate that so-called 'Japanese imperialism' could be examined much more carefully in the broad perspective of Japan's self-defence and national security. Not only the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and Japan's annexation of Formosa, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), and Japan's annexation of Korea (1910), but also later Japanese aggressive acts in Manchuria and mainland China during the 1930s, seem still open to discussion from the angle of Japan's national defence and security.

Furthermore, when one looks to Japan's attitude towards not only China and Korea but also Southeast Asian countries, in particular Siam, before the 1930's, a crucial problem arises. Can the term 'imperialism' really be applied to Japan? Can such a very ambiguous term, which had mostly explained Western expansionism, be applied to Japan? Some political scientists are reluctant anyhow to use the term 'imperialism' at all as a tool-concept to analyse political-social-economic phenomena, saying that "Currently, the term imperialism is an emotion-laden concept used in a variety of circumstances and therefore difficult to define and apply. — Because the term imperialism has been used loosely to describe a bewildering variety of dissimilar

motivations, policies, and situations by propagandists and ideologues, it has lost much of its
descriptive utility in political analysis.  

A recent article by a historian of Southeast Asia, N. J. Brailey, cautiously analysing
Japan's relations with Southeast Asian countries, displays reluctance to accept at all the
application of the term 'imperialist' to Japan's foreign policy before the Second World War. In
this respect, one Japanese source supports this argument by showing that Japan's investment in
Southeast Asia as of 1937, accounted for only 1.7 percent of all investment in the region
including that of the western countries (47.3 percent to the Netherlands, 25.4 percent to France,
9.2 percent to Britain, 7.8 percent to China and 6.1 percent to the United States). And the editor
of this source concluded blandly that in this sense Japanese economic expansion towards
Southeast Asia was not necessarily regarded as imperialist. Professor Yano Toru decided that
this speculation may not be wrong.

It is not an immediate task of this study to pursue a conclusive answer to such an
intractable question as to whether or not Japan on the whole was imperialist all along after the
1868 Meiji Restoration. Neither is this study a justification of Japan's expansion and its
aggressive conduct in China and Korea. This study presents in broad perspective a case-study of
Japan's foreign relations and her attitude towards another independent Asian country, namely
Thailand, called Siam before 1939, rather than the already well studied relations with China and
Korea. It is necessary to emphasise the importance of 'independent' Siam. Apart from Japan, by
the end of nineteenth century there were only three other countries in Eastern Asia free of
Western control and able to decide their own attitudes to Japan, namely China, Korea, Siam. In
so far as the study of Japanese diplomacy is concerned, Japan's expansionist attitude, in
particular before the 1930's, can be seen as based primarily on its foreign policy towards Korea
and China. It is hard to find references before the 1930's dealing with Japan's foreign relations
towards Asian countries other than Korea and China, even the independent countries, Siam,

29 Brailey, 'Southeast Asia and Japan's Road to War', pp. 995-1011. He also holds that "The nature of her [Japan's]
policies hitherto in close neighbour territories such as the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), Taiwan, and Korea, annexed,
albeit somewhat ambiguously, to the metropolitan Japanese state in 1895 and 1910 respectively, does not seem
convincingly to identify her as imperialist in the sense of a commitment to the building of empire." , ibid., p. 1006.
30 Okura sho kanrikyoku (The Administration Bureau, the Japanese Ministry of Finance), Nihonjin no kaigai katsudo
ni kansuru rekishiteki chosa (A Historical Survey concerning Japanese Overseas Activities) (Tokyo, 1947), vol. 30,
Section of the South Region, first book, p. 135, p. 136, pp. 172-3, quoted from Yano Toru, Nanshin no keifu (A
Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey. Leaving aside the latter three because of their location or distance from Japan, an approach taking account of Siam should benefit further discussion of so-called Japanese 'imperialism'. Further, the one-sided academic attitude above-mentioned has produced recent comment on our next question, i.e. Japanese Pan-Asianism, which has been discussed by Beasley, also mainly in the context of Japan's involvement with China and Southeast Asia after 1930.  

Taking Siam into account will give us more general understanding of the features of Japanese Pan-Asianism as well.

3-3. 'Japanese Pan-Asianism'

The third point of importance in discussing Japan's relations with Siam before the 1930's is related to Japanese Pan-Asianism. In my opinion, Japan's 'imperialistic' attitude and her expansion, e.g. towards Korea and China, seems not to have been motivated solely by economic and security reasons as described above. There seem to have been other, idealistic elements to such Japanese expansionistic conduct. Conroy implied that initial Japanese involvement in Korea prior to annexation was motivated by 'steady idealism' to try to enlighten the Korean people.  

I prefer viewing such idealism in terms of 'Asian solidarity', or 'Pan-Asianism'. (Since the term Pan-Asianism covers an extremely broad and complex set of meanings, the meaning of it in this study is defined as a sense of Asian solidarity. For detailed arguments, see Chapter 6.) It has from time to time been asserted that Japan's expansionism should be understood in terms of a national motivation to compete with the West. A French scholar of Japanese history called attention to this point, saying that "Japan was small, Japan was comparatively weak, Japan was being discriminated against by the Westerners, thus there developed what one might term a sense of frustrated machismo. Japanese expansionism, therefore, was among other factors, strongly motivated by a reaction against Western policies and attitudes."  

It might be said that this 'reaction' was reflected in Japanese sentiment towards other Asian countries in an 'Asia for the Asians' sense. In respect of such an argument, the eminent scholar Eto Shinkichi questioned 'Why, from the waning days of the Tokugawa regime on, were the Japanese so interested in overseas expansion?', and 'Was the expansion of its

33 Lehmann, op. cit., p. 296.
commercial market the basic "incentive" for Japan's overseas adventure? He argued that there were many Japanese in the Meiji era with the dream of emancipating mainland China with respect to both the West and the ruling Manchu dynasty as a kind of client regime of the West, motivated by a sense of a Pan-Asianism rather than dreams of economic expansion. He suggested that more research was needed on this desire to emancipate Asia.34 Also Peter B. Oblas points out that "in discussing Thai-Japanese relations in the 1930s or 40s, or even today, how important is it to better understand the roots of Meiji, to consider the intensity of a less self-seeking element, a pure commodity, within the Pan-Asianism genre?"35

This argument is relevant, for the sentimental motivation of Japan's overseas expansion could be applied when one explains Japan's southward expansion to Southeast Asia during the Second World War, though other elements should not be neglected. Bailey, examining Japanese expansion in particular towards Southeast Asia, points out that Pan-Asianism is one of two contending themes "which lie at the heart of any debate about Japanese policies post-1930"36 and accepts that "a sincere interest in freeing colonial Southeast Asia from Western dominance was even a major motive behind the Japanese embarking on a war that was really quite distinct from that in Europe."37

Take an example of this argument. In the Thailand-Indochina border dispute in 1940-41, Japan became a mediator in favour of Thailand because the former was concerned about Thai pro-British inclinations. Japan wanted to maintain pro-Japanese elements in the Thai government.38 The word 'pro-Japanese' in this context appears to have been used and understood by the Japanese as synonymous with the term 'Asia for the Asians', because the Japanese government, in particular the military, at that time was pursuing the goal of 'Asia for the Asians' under the slogan of a 'New Order in East Asia' or 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'.

36 Brailey, 'Southeast Asia and Japan's Road to War', p. 1002. He suggested that Pan-Asianism is the positive theme of post-1930 Japanese policies, and the negative theme is the Japanese 'self-defence state' with particular reference to the long-feared threat of Russia. See above fn. 27.
37 Ibid., p. 996. For a different view, see Beasley, 'Japan and Pan-Asianism', op. cit., pp. 10-13.
Although it was often argued by opponents that 'Asia for the Asians' was actually 'Asia for the Japanese', it cannot be said that the Japanese sentiment, 'Asia for the Asians' can be exclusively denied. Thus, though the Thai government evinced a Janus-faced attitude towards Japan, at least one Japanese adviser to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo at that time believed that the Thai were Asian brothers whose minds were essentially pro-Japanese or 'sympathetic to Japan', and that probably in their hearts, they desired to trust and rely on Japan, but they failed to support Japan because of British pressure and propaganda. When Western influences were removed, the Thai would "certainly" show their "true" pro-Japanese colours. What do the above views indicate? The answer cannot be given so easily, but it can surely be said that behind the Japanese southward movement in the 1930's, and even their path to the outbreak of the Pacific War, there was some sentiment of Asian solidarity or Pan-Asianism. However, Reynolds argues that

In earlier years Japanese leaders generally had shown scant interest in Thailand, but in the 1930's Japan faced possible diplomatic isolation, Great Depression-induced trade barriers had restricted the markets for her products, and certain elements had begun dreaming of expanding the Japanese Empire deeper into the South Seas. Such factors as these, not shared pan-Asianist sentiments, paved the way for intensified bilateral relations between Japan and Thailand in the years leading up to the war.

And the same author declares "whatever the propaganda line, Japan did not go to war to 'liberate' Asia in any true sense of the term and the Thai certainly viewed Japan as an aggressive, imperial power whose advance posed a grave threat to Thailand's sovereignty."

These views seem not to represent a thorough understanding of the Japanese ethos. As Reynolds points out, it was a fact that the Japanese in general took an indifferent attitude towards Southeast Asia and the South Seas, but important Japanese leaders had been interested in Siam since Meiji times not only from economic aspects but the aspects of Asian sentiment, for instance, Okuma Shigenobu, Aoki Shuzo and Soejima Taneomi, who will be described in

---

39 See Beasley, 'Japan and Pan-Asianism', op. cit., p. 5.
40 R. A. Scalapino points out that "Even amongst the militarists, the hope was expressed from time to time that Japan's basic objectives in East Asia could be attained without a war between Japan and the United States. --- The concept of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was not tacked on to Japanese policy as an afterthought. By this period.... it had become central to Japanese Asian policy. Both implicitly and explicitly, its thrust was in the direction of excluding the West from east Asia. Japan wanted its Monroe Doctrine." in Japan's Road to the Pacific War, J. W. Morley (ed.) (New York: Colombia University Press, 1980) vol. IV: The Fateful Choice, Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-41, pp. 118, 122, quoted from Brailey, 'Southeast Asia and Japan's Road to War' p. 999, and fn. 15.
43 Ibid., p. 81.
It is also a fact that after the Great Depression, in the 1930’s, Japan turned its economic interest to Southeast Asia and the South Seas. But this does not mean that the Japanese did not possess any Pan-Asianist sentiments. Can it not be said that the Japanese economic interest and its sentiment of Asian solidarity or Pan-Asianism co-existed?

At the same time the Thai leaders' attitude towards Japan is debatable. While Reynolds maintains that Japan was regarded as an aggressive country, Brailey comments that "It might well be claimed that, without the assurance of a fairly sympathetic reception for their troops in Thailand, the Japanese would never have risked their southward advance into Southeast Asia proper in its sudden blitzkrieg fashion."44 There are many questions arising from Japanese Pan-Asianism. Flood left a meaningful passage in his pioneer work: "It is the task of the historian to seek the deeper, more remote causes behind such events [in Japan-Siam relations]."45 For this matter, it is necessary to examine Pan-Asianism by looking back to the Meiji era of its development. This study, taking up Japan-Siam relations before 1932/33, will give us a fresh perspective.

To sum up, the present study is designed as an examination of Japan's modern history related mainly to the only continuously independent Southeast Asian country, Siam/Thailand. Apart from Siam, the rest, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Singapore, all became colonies or protectorates of the Western Powers. Siam, the so-called buffer and semi-colonized state of the two powers Britain and France, had previously maintained close relations with Japan's Tokugawa rulers in the 17th century. As one of Japan's Asian neighbours, Thailand, as it was renamed in 1939, finally concluded a Thai-Japanese treaty of alliance in December 1941, though it can be argued that this alliance was caused by overwhelming Japanese military power that threatened Thailand. In this respect again, however, account should be taken of Japan's sense of Asia for the Asians.46 What this study suggests is that when Japan's attitude towards Southeast Asia at the turn of the 19th century comes up for consideration as Japanese imperialism or Pan-Asianism, Japan's modern

44 Brailey, 'Southeast Asia and Japan's Road to War' p. 1009.
46 Such argument can be seen in Brailey Thailand and the Fall of Singapore: A Frustrated Asian Revolution, p. 2. and p. 19. An opposite view is Reynolds', see his 'Aftermath of Alliance: The Wartime Legacy in Thai-Japanese Relations', p. 81.
history of expansion can be better clarified. The purpose of this study will be achieved if it can add a new dimension to discussion of these issues.

4. Structure of this study

The present study is divided into two parts: one pre-1910 but covering some topics during the 1910's, and the second post-1920. There are two reasons for this division; 1. chronologically, Japan's relations with Siam during 1910-20 were quite quiet without remarkable diplomatic incident, 2. more importantly, in the 1920's, Japan and Siam resumed friendly relations triggered by their new 1924 treaty, and behind this changing situation there seems to have been a revival of the Japanese Pan-Asianist attitude towards Siam.

Part one goes from chapter 1 to 5. Here, relations between the two countries in the Meiji period in particular, will be concentrated on. During the Meiji and early Taisho era, up to the latter stages of the Great War (1914-17/Taisho year 3-7), Japan was generally regarded by the leading Western Powers as a trifling country in the Far East, though her national development since the Meiji Restoration, through the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, had been rapid and caught the eye of Westerners. There was no serious confrontation between Japan and any of the Western Powers except Russia. Japan led by the Genro oligarchy government maintained fairly good relations with the West. On the contrary though, Japan's relations with China and Korea were both troublesome and confrontational.

In such diplomatic circumstances, the relations between Japan and Siam through the Meiji and up to the early Taisho era is the major theme of Part one. How and why did relations between Japan and Siam resume after a gap since the seventeenth century? The conclusion of the 'Declaration of Amity and Commerce between Japan and Siam' of 1887 and its ratification in 1888 are the first noteworthy diplomatic events in this period. To examine the subject in a broad perspective, Japan's awareness of Western imperialism, its sense of solidarity with other Asian countries, and its awareness of Southeast Asia and the South Seas region at that time also needs to be described. Attention will be focused on Inagaki Manjiro who became the first Japanese Minister to Siam, and contributed substantially to both the conclusion of Japan's unequal treaty with Siam of 1898, and the subsequent friendly relations of the two countries. The course of negotiation concerning 'The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and Protocol between Japan and Siam in 1898' will be considered in detail. In doing so, Japanese
Army Chief of Staff General Kawakami's visit to Siam in 1896 prior to Inagaki's appointment as Minister to Siam, and Okuma Shigenobu's view on Siam will be examined. Various Japanese advisers to the Siamese government and their contribution to maintaining the warm relations between Siam and Japan after the conclusion of the 1898 treaty need to be described.

Part two includes chapters 6 to 9. After the Great War, with in particular, termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921 and the signing of the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922, the Western Powers began considering Japan as threat to their interests in the Far East. Japan's relations with America were deteriorating through 1920-24 with anti-Japanese immigration acts. The Japanese military, whose influence was gradually expanding into Japanese diplomacy, were provoked by this series of anti-Japanese moves by the Western Powers, which led them and the Japanese in general to feelings of Asian solidarity.

Part two starts with Japanese Pan-Asianism and the onset of Japan's 1920's serious interest in Southeast Asia, 'Nanshin-Ron' (Southward View). The next purpose will be to look at the Japanese military's interest in Southeast Asia. The question will be posed as to whether or not the Japanese military really intended at this juncture to promote a strategy to involve Southeast Asia. Attention will be extended to King Wachirawut of Siam's attitude to Japan and her economic activity in Southeast Asia. Japan's surrender of extraterritoriality in Siam, considering re-negotiation of the 1898 treaty between Siam and Japan in 1920-24, will examined in detail. The basic attitude of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the negotiations before they began, and its general attitude towards Siam around the early 1920's, are analysed. Development of Japan's interest in Siam in economic terms especially post-1924, will be examined through the First South Seas Trade Conference held in Tokyo in 1926. It is essential following this conference to examine the role of the 'Siam Society' established in Tokyo in 1928, because it was set up by leading political and military figures in Japan. It is also significant to consider the question of whether there was real interest in Southeast Asia during 1920-30 among the Japanese military, about to become so influential in Japan after 1931. Siamese King Prachathipok's feelings about Japan at that time need attention. Another Japanese Minister to Siam, Yatabe Yasukichi, and his efforts to get on friendly terms with the old Siamese government and the new Siamese leaders after the 1932/33 revolution, are also vital matters for this study. To this end, a general historical description of the political situations in both Japan and Siam during the 1930's will be provided as context.
Regarding sources for this study, the author relies to a great extent on the Japanese diplomatic archives at the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. In particular, chapters one and four were based on these archives, some of which were identified by Flood as he noted that in the Japanese Foreign Office files there was a large amount of correspondence.\(^{47}\) Previously these archives have not been very much utilised in this connection. And Chapters seven and eight were, too, the outcome of study of these archives. Chapter nine shows readers of this study previously unused documents of the Diplomatic Record Office in Tokyo. Other Japanese primary sources used in this study are the Okuma Shigenobu Archives which are kept at Waseda University, the Matsukata Masayoshi Archives which were collected and published by Daito Bunka University, etc.

Furthermore, the Thai national archives, which are available for researchers at the National Archives Office of the Department of Fine Arts in Thailand, were employed mainly for chapters six and eight, and partly for Chapter five. But it is unfortunate that for the accounts of the conclusion of the 1888 declaration, the 1898 treaty, and the 1924 treaty, between Japan and Siam respectively, the Thai archives on these matters had only been sent in September 1989 from the Foreign Ministry where they had been kept for years, to the National Archives Office. Thus they have remained unavailable to the public and the officials of the Archives Office indicate that their classification will take one or two years more. Thus the author could but rely on the documents on the Japanese side on these matters. Some British diplomatic archives in the Public Record Office in London including the Satow Diaries, and the Diaries in George N. Curzon Papers in India Office Library in London, are also referred to in this study. The present author should like to acknowledge the kind permission of Dr. Nigel J. Brailey to refer to the outcome of his patient study of these two Diaries.

Secondary books are main sources in chapters two and five, and part of six. In particular, Inagaki Manjiro's publications, which have not been very much examined before simply because Inagaki himself was an unfamiliar figure in the study of Japanese diplomatic history, were employed for chapter three. Newspapers both in Japanese and Thai were also referred to.

In addition to written materials, interview work was done for chapters five, seven, eight and nine.
Part One

Japan and Siam up to the early Taisho era: An age of pure idealism?
Chapter 1

Meiji Japan’s resumption of relations with Siam

Relations between Japan and Siam took on a new character with the 1887 declaration concluded between the two countries. This chapter is designed to explore the attitudes of both governments towards each other, approaching a point at which Western imperial hegemony was at its zenith in Asia.

This zenith of Western imperialism in the 19th century began about the year 1880. In 1800 practically none of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Australasia were subject to the rule or control of Western Powers. Between 1800 and 1880 the main changes were the establishment of the British empire in India, the growth of the British colonies in Australia and New Zealand, and the subjection of Algeria by France. But after 1880 one can see the Western imperial powers in real competition; England annexed Burma in 1885. France established its Indo-China Union in 1887. And even Germany occupied the Marshall Islands in the Pacific in 1885. Africa was partitioned largely between these three Powers. The intensity of this imperialism is perceived from the fact that in the last quarter of the 19th century Britain acquired nearly 5 million square miles of new territory with a population of nearly 90 million, France 3.5 million square miles with a population of nearly 40 million, and Germany 1 million square miles with a population of about 15 million.¹

In as far as it is possible to reach a conclusion from the documentary evidence, it was the Siamese King Mongkut (1851-68) who first approached Japan in the mid-nineteenth century to resume diplomatic relations. But despite the Siamese desire to resume diplomatic relations, there was no progress until 1875 when the Japanese mission led by Otori Keisuke was sent to Siam. It was an important event, because from it we can see the attitude of the early Meiji government towards Siam on the one hand, and the attitude of the Siamese government to Japan, on the other. However, it was not until 1887 that actual diplomatic relations between the two countries were resumed. In that year, a declaration of friendship was concluded by their governments. Accordingly, the course of the negotiations for the 1887 declaration and its ratification will be examined. Why was it concluded? And what was the meaning of this first

declaration between them? Concerning both the Otori mission and the 1887 declaration, Flood wrote short accounts, but more detailed examination will contribute to better understanding of this turning-point.

Before proceeding to these issues, it is helpful for our further discussion to summarise the history of Japan-Siam relations up to the late 19th century.

1-1. The early relations between Japan and Siam

Korean documentation of early Japan-Siam relations shows that at the end of the 14th century the King of Siam ordered the dispatch of a royal junk to Japan and then to Korea, though the exact date of their sojourn has not yet been determined. Other historical documentation further indicates that from the third decade of the 15th century, Japan and Siam had commercial relations via the Kingdom of Ryukyu (Okinawa). It is likely that the Ryukyuans continued to be active in trade with Southeast Asia including Siam throughout the 15th and the 16th centuries. It was in the early 17th century that the names of the Japanese community and of its residents in Ayutthaya in Siam appeared in Japanese and Dutch documents, including that of the Japanese warrior-merchant Yamada Nagamasa. It was 1612 when the first Siamese ship entered Nagasaki and its supercargoes met Shogun Ieyasu, though it is not known whether it was a Siamese 'embassy'. Four years later, the first recorded Siamese envoy with a letter from Okya Phraklang, the Siamese Foreign-Financial Minister, landed in Japan. And in the following years, in 1621, 1623, 1626, 1629, Siamese envoys visited the Shogunate.

However, because of the annihilation of the Japanese community in Ayutthaya by the Siamese King Prasat Thong, in 1630, and Japan's adoption of a closed-country policy (Sakoku) in 1635, whereby only Dutch and Chinese ships were allowed to call at the single port of Nagasaki, official intercourse between Japan and Siam was discontinued. But it did not mean that King Prasat Thong, a ruler who strongly promoted Siam's trade, wished to halt the trading with Japan. In 1635, 1636, 1637, 1643, 1654, and 1656, he sent envoys to Japan but they were

---

2 On the Otori mission, see Flood, 'Japan's Relations with Thailand', pp. 7-8, and Flood, 'Shishi Interlude', pp. 80, 101 fn.6. Also see Swan, 'Japanese Economic Relations with Siam', p. 7; on the 1887 declaration Flood, 'Japan's Relations with Thailand, p. 8, and Swan ibid, pp. 7-8.

refused the right to land by Nagasaki officials. The later Siamese King Narai (1656-1688), following a policy of international trade not only with the Dutch but also with the English, Denmark, and France, sent Siamese junkos to Japan. The Shogunate itself needed Siamese exports, for instance, silk goods, deer-skins, and shark and ray-skins (for sword-hilts), sappanwood, etc.. The Siamese ships thus were classed as a kind of Chinese ship, because Siamese junks were manned by Chinese crews with only a small number of Siamese officials in command. Therefore even during the 'Sakoku' period, Siam-Japan trade seems to have continued right up to the middle of the 19th century, despite the lack of official relations.4

From this, it might be assumed that the Siamese monarchy could to some extent obtain general information on Japan and its political-economic situation through the small door of Nagasaki, and Deshima (Dejima) island in its harbour. It can at least be said that there was a degree of continuity in the relations between Siam and Japan from the 14th century though informal and limited. That such informal relations carried on until the middle of the 19th century has significance for the further relations between the two countries, which is the next purpose of this study.

1-2. The Siamese approach to Japan

In April 1861, a Japanese Foreign Affairs official of the Shogunate of the Yokohama Port Office (Gaikoku-Bugyo) received a letter from the Dutch vice-Consul at Yokohama, D. de. Graeff Van Polsbroek. As it was written in Dutch, it was translated into Japanese as follows:

A few days ago, I received a letter from our Consul at Bangkok indicating that the Siamese king and Ministers wish to conclude a treaty with Japan. The Siamese government then asked our Consul to contact me to get some information on Japan's trading conditions for the Siamese king. I am going to send a report on it to the King of Siam. I think I might be invested with full authority to negotiate with your country by the Siamese king, if occasion required. Therefore please report about this to the senior foreign official and ask whether the Japanese government will accept this proposal.5

---

4 Ishii Yoneo and Yoshikawa Yoshiharu, Nittai roppayaku nenbi (Six hundred Years of Japan-Thai Relations) (Tokyo, 1987), p. 107. Hereafter cited under, 'Ishii and Yoshikawa'. For more details of pre-modern history of Japan-Siam relations, see part one (pp. 3-112) of this book, and Khien Theeravit, 'Japanese-Siamese Relations, 1606-1629' in Chaiwat Khamchoo and E. Bruce Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 17-44.

5 Keio Gijuku, Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshu (The Complete Works of Fukuzawa Yukichi), vol.20, (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 497-498, Gaimusho (the Japanese Foreign Ministry), Zoku tsushin zenran ruishu (The Second Series of Collection of Correspondence), no.25, (Tokyo, 1986), pp. 3-5, and Hattori Reijiro, 'Fukuzawa Yukichi to shamu (Fukuzawa Yukichi and Siam)', in Fukuzawa Yukichi kyo kai, Fukuzawa techo (Notebook on Fukuzawa), vol.55, (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 4-11. As of 1990, the author, Mr. Hattori, the president of the Seiko Watch Company and the vice president of the Japan-Thai Association, concluded that the letter written in Dutch was translated into Japanese by the great journalist and opinion leader in the Meiji period, Fukuzawa Yukichi. From 1860 until 1868, Fukuzawa was serving as official.
This letter ended with a list of about 35 items of Siam's main exports. In reply, the Shogunate Foreign Ministry refused Siam's proposal with the argument that the time for Japan doing so had not yet come. It was probably the beginning of intercourse between the two countries. King Mongkut might well have had the intention to re-open diplomatic relations with Japan.

At any rate, it was not until the mid-1870's that Japan's new Meiji government seemed to pay real attention to Siam. The Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai, Shinagawa Yajiro, reported to the Meiji government in 1880 that the Austrian Vice-Consul at Shanghai, Joseph Hazz, had told him that the Siamese Foreign Minister was prepared to conclude a treaty between Japan and Siam. But when Japanese officials had been sent to Siam, Japan did not disclose her position on the reopening of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

While this document does not mention exactly when they were sent to Siam, there is another source showing that, 5 years before Shinagawa's report was sent, Japanese officials had had an audience of King Chulalongkorn. Therefore, it is presumed that the proposal for a new treaty mentioned in Shinagawa's report refers to that occasion. For better understanding the early intercourse of the Meiji period between the two countries, it will be helpful to describe the 1875 visit to Siam of the Japanese officials.

1-3. Otori Keisuke's meeting with King Chulalongkorn

In 1875, four Japanese officials, Otori Keisuke of the Ministry of Industry (Kobu Sho), who later became the Japanese Minister to China (1889-1893), and Kawaji Kando and two others of the Ministry of Finance, accompanied Herr Sepher, the Austrian Minister to Japan, China and Siam, to Siam. Otori afterwards reported the situation of Siam to the Meiji government, and this report was published by the Ministry of Industry. The preface of this report observed as follows:


6 Gaimusho, op. cit., p. 4. On the other hand, the Thai archives do not reveal King Mongkut's intention, whether or not he really wanted new relations with Japan.

7 He considered making Siam a British protectorate in order to secure the nation from its predicament. See Swan, op. cit., p. 2.

8 Japanese diplomatic archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan (hereafter cited JDA.), Shinagawa Yajiro to Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru, January 20, 1880, no.7 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.

9 Otori Keisuke, Shamu kiko (An account of a trip to Siam) (Tokyo, 1875). Flood claimed that Aoki Shuzo, who later became the Japanese Foreign Minister (1889-1891, 1898-1900), also went to Siam with Otori. (Flood, 'Japan's Relations with Thailand', p. 7.) But this information is incorrect. At the time of Otori's visit to Siam, Aoki was
The relations between Japan and Siam have been broken since Japan closed the country. However, in recent years, Siam's government has entered into diplomatic relations with foreign countries and thus its trading condition tends to progress. Although the Japanese government has been intending to inspect the state of Siam, there was no opportunity to do so so far. Now, we had a good occasion, for the Austrian Minister to Japan visited Siam. We were able to accompany him. 10

Why was Otori appointed for the inspection? In this respect, a Japanese legal adviser to the Siamese government during late Meiji to early Taisho Era, later Japanese Minister Plenipotentiary to Siam, Masao Tokichi, disclosed that the first British Minister to Japan, Sir Harry Smith Parkes, when he had the honour of dining with the Meiji Emperor (date unknown), suggested the Emperor send an official to Siam, an independent country in Asia like Japan. At that time, Otori was in charge, as principal, of the School of Emigration which belonged to the Kaitakushi in Hokkaido (the Hokkaido Exploitation Office). The Meiji Emperor sent him an Imperial order to go to observe the state of Siam. 11

It is interesting that Britain, having introduced Siam to the modern treaty system in 1856, through Parkes, may also have had such a link with the resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and Siam. It could probably be said that even though this trip was the only such observation tour without imperial credentials, it paved the way for the reopening of relations between Japan and Siam after the long-time closed country policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate came to an end. And as this tour took 76 days, covering Hong Kong, Manila, Bangkok and Singapore, it could be characterised as the first observation tour of Southeast Asia as a whole by the Meiji government. In fact, Otori sent short reports on his way to Siam, and from Bangkok, to the then Minister of Industry, Ito Hirobumi, and the Minister of Finance, Okuma Shigenobu. 12

Otori and others left for Hong Kong from Yokohama port in January 1875. At Hong Kong, they boarded an Austrian warship, named Fledelesh, to go first to Manila because at that


10 Ibid., p. 1.
particular time the so-called Front Palace Incident crisis was taking place in Bangkok. On 18th February, they finally arrived in Siam, and on the 24th they met the Siamese Foreign Minister, Chaophraya Phanuwong (Thuam Bunnag). Otori writes in the report on that occasion as follows:

His son, Suchai, a person who studied in England before, was about 25 years old. We spoke to the Minister through this young man. The Minister expressed his hope at first that the two countries could be on good relations. Then he asked us about the population of Japan, the number of military personnel, the export and import figures, and the Japanese educational system. As I answered about the actual situations straight-forwardly, the Minister seemed to be not a little surprised as if he had not expected it before.

It is an interesting point that the Siamese Foreign Minister asked several questions relating to the same problems in Siam at that time. That he asked about the Japanese educational system in particular implies that Siam, confronted with the Western way of thinking, must have been groping for a suitable educational system for Siam.

On the first of March, Otori and his companions had an audience with the King of Siam, Chulalongkorn. But they only accompanied the Austrian Minister, not as formal representatives of the Japanese government, and this meeting was a mere ceremonial one. On 5th March, Otori met Siam's so-called Second King, or Uparat, Krom Phrarachawang Bowonwichaichan. Otori gives a vivid description as follows:

In the afternoon, we arrived at the residence of the Second King with the Austrian Minister. It was located to the north of Chulalongkorn's palace and was quite a big building but an old one. It was not so beautiful as Chulalongkorn's. Being guided by the Foreign Minister of the Second King, we had an audience with the Second King. We sat at the table in a circle and had Western tea, talking to each other for a short time. The Second King was about 35 years old. His skin was pitch-black colour. He spoke quietly and appeared to be of staid character. He was attended by only two close associates.

From this description, we cannot know what they talked of, but it might be said that it was only a courtesy conversation and therefore probably no important matter such as the conclusion of a treaty between Japan and Siam could have been taken up at this moment even if Otori would have wished to do so; for the Austrian Minister was also present there.

---

15 See Wyatt, op. cit., pp. 63-83.
16 Otori Keisuke, op. cit., pp. 29-31.
17 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
On the 7th, Otori, after visiting the Ministry of Finance and the Museum, was granted a private audience with King Chulalongkorn:

On my way back to the hotel, I was received in private audience with the King of Siam in the Palace Garden. (I was informed before, thus I could almost not express my gratitude!) While I took a turn in the Garden, I heard the sound of trumpets. Preceded by cavalry soldiers, the King's coach came through the gate. As soon as the King got out, a follower opened the red sunshade. The King walked to the centre of the garden with about twenty young princes and other followers. I saluted then stepped up to the King. The King extended his thanks to me for my long journey.18

This time, the Austrian Minister was not there. Why did Chulalongkorn wish to talk to Otori without any other foreign person present? One explanation can be derived from the following verbatim conversation in English between the two of them:

The king: I heard your country already has a railway line.
Otori: Yes. We are making extension of that.
The King: The "reformation" of your country is quite rapid. Do the people want it?
Otori: At the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, we had a civil war but due to this Restoration the reform of our country is being carried out speedily. The people are at present tending to adopt "civilization" voluntarily.
The King: It is a heavy task to stabilize a political struggle, isn't it?
Otori: That's right. It is very difficult to break down the conventional custom.
The King: Who is your prime Minister?
Otori: Sanjo Sanetomi is.
The King: Is it true that an assassination plot against the Prime Minister was attempted?
Otori: Yes. It is true.
The King: What are the largest exports of Japan?
Otori: They are silk, lacquer ware and ceramics.
The King: Japan is a beautiful country.
Otori: Siam is an affluent country. (The King then smiled.)
The King: I heard Japan already concluded a treaty with China.
Otori: Yes.
The King: Japan is facing conflict with China, isn't it?
Otori: That is caused by the Taiwan affair but at present it is being settled peacefully.19

We can note some important points from this conversation. First, King Chulalongkorn seems to have been considerably interested in Japan's internal affairs. Second, the King already had some information not only on Japan's internal matters, such as the assassination plot against the prime minister, but also diplomatic affairs; the 1874 treaty between Japan and China. Third, there is no mention whether or not talk of a treaty between the two countries, Japan and Siam, was brought up in that conversation.

18 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
19 Ibid., pp. 44-46. For details of the Taiwan affair, see Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910, pp. 54-60.
However, the King seems to have had something to say to Otori privately. What was it? We have no evidence with which to answer this question but at least it could be assumed from this conversation, ending in the topic of the Japanese-Chinese treaty and Taiwan affair, that certain interest on either side, regarding the conclusion of a treaty, or something in the way of a joint declaration, was expressed on this occasion.

The Meiji government at this time (8 years after the Meiji Restoration) was in the midst of a domestic political feud, that is, the "Seikan Ron", with a view to the conquest of Korea, which had started two years earlier (1873), and in 1877 a rebellion broke out led by the most influential figure of this time, Saigo Takamori. At the time, the leaders of the Japanese government were devoting themselves, above everything, to stabilize this political situation. It can be said therefore, that even though having an interest in reopening relations with Siam, the Meiji government could not afford to make a concrete approach in this matter until 1880, when the letter of the Consul-General, Shinagawa, mentioned above, was sent to the Japanese government.

1-4. The Origins of the 1887 Japan-Siam Declaration

1-4-1. Inoue Kaoru's deliberations

The Shinagawa letter arrived at the Japanese Foreign Ministry on 29 January 1880. The Foreign Minister, Inoue Kaoru, who had taken over in 1879, decided to respond to Siam's proposal. On 17 March, Inoue asked imperial sanction to inform the Siamese government, by way of Joseph Hazz the Austrian Vice-Consul at Shanghai, that the Japanese government also had the intention to conclude a treaty with Siam. This imperial sanction was approved by the Premier, Sanjo Sanetomi, 6 days later. Inoue then gave instructions to Shinagawa to ask Hazz to announce Japan's intention to the Siamese government.

Doubtless, that the Austrian Joseph Hazz, became a mediator between Japan and Siam can be ascribed to the fact that it was thanks to the Austrian Minister, Herr Sepher, that Otori Keisuke had met the Siamese King five years before. But if so, it could be questioned why Inoue decided to put forward the issue of reopening diplomatic relations with Siam when the former Foreign Minister, Terajima Munenori, had not shown any interest in this matter at all.

20 Inoue to Sanjo, March 17, 1880, no.63 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
21 Inoue to Shinagawa, March 31, 1880, no.5 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
A possible answer could be derived from the fact that Inoue's principal assignment then was to revise the so-called unequal treaties with the Powers, and during the period from September 1879, when he took over the post, until July 1880, when he proposed treaty revision to the Powers, he devoted himself to somehow make a draft model revised treaty. Thus, when the proposal of the Siamese government regarding concluding a treaty with Japan came to Inoue's notice, it seems that he thought of availing himself of it, in the form of an unequal or perhaps equal treaty with Siam, to assert Japan's importance. It might be said that Inoue calculated on a derivative effect from the conclusion of a Siamese-Japanese treaty regarding revision negotiation with the Powers.

However, from the middle of 1880, Foreign Minister Inoue became preoccupied with the following: 1. the Korean riots in Seoul in 1882, and the unsuccessful coup d'état in 1884 led by the Korean Independence party with the support of the Japanese Minister resident in Seoul. (see Ch. 2-2-2) 2. the actual treaty revision negotiations with the Western Powers. It is likely that Inoue's intention of concluding a treaty with Siam was prevented by these incidents.

Another comparable case clearly shows how much Inoue and probably most of the rest of the members of the Meiji government engrossed themselves in the treaty revision issue. This was the three approaches by the King of Hawaii, Kalakaua. He visited Japan in 1881, and on that occasion he offered to renounce Hawaii's extraterritoriality in Japan which was stipulated in the 1871 treaty between the two countries. King Kalakaua also proposed the marriage of his niece to a Japanese prince in order to forge a bond between the two countries. He finally encouraged Japan to organize and lead a federation of Asian nations of which Hawaii would become a member. However, the Meiji government politely declined all three of Kalakaua's proposals. As for his first offer, the Japanese government now realized that it would not be negotiations with Hawaii or Siam but the consent of Britain that would probably be crucial in achieving comprehensive revision of the unequal treaties. As for Kalakaua's second and third proposals, the Meiji statesmen regarded them as premature. Generally, the Meiji leaders gave priority to the treaty revision issue with the Western Powers.

Meanwhile, another step for reopening diplomatic relations between Japan and Siam was taken in 1884, at which time a Siamese ship of three hundred tons appeared, via Shanghai, at Nagasaki harbour hoping to sell commercial goods. The Japanese local authority at first

refused its request to sell its cargo because Japan did not have diplomatic relations with Siam. However, the Siamese were at last permitted to do so on promising to obey Japanese laws. The newspaper reporting this suggested the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Siam as soon as possible. It was reported that the Siamese wanted to conclude a commercial treaty with Japan.\(^\text{23}\) Perhaps the Siamese believed that like the traditional (Bakufu) Japanese government pre-1868, its successor preferred to contact foreign ships at Nagasaki harbour first. It is not clear either, whether the Japanese Foreign Ministry was informed at all of these Siamese ships. This incident indicated clearly that the Siamese government still desired to open diplomatic relations with Japan.

It is often claimed that the Japanese prince, Komatsu no Miya [Akihito], on his way from England to Japan, met King Chulalongkorn in Bangkok in 1884 and exchanged views on future relations.\(^\text{24}\) However, no archive evidence for this has been found. And Komatsu no Miya Akihito's first tour to Europe actually took place in 1887, as will be described in the Section 1-4-4.\(^\text{25}\)

**1-4-2. Siamese vacillation**

However, it needed two more years before the two countries, after all, entered into diplomatic relations. This time, it was Siam again that put forward the suggestion. A telegram from the Japanese chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg, Nishi Tokujiro, arrived at the Japanese Foreign Ministry in July 1887, reporting that Siam's Foreign Minister since 1885, Prince Thewawong Waropakan, would leave Vancouver on 20 August and arrive in Japan probably in September.\(^\text{26}\) He had been invested with full powers for negotiation of a Siamese-Japanese treaty, and was bringing an autograph letter from King Chulalongkorn. Three days later, Inoue announced this to the Prime Minister, Ito Hirobumi.\(^\text{27}\) Thus it was Siam again that contacted Japan to conclude a treaty. Why did Siam do so? There seem to be two factors.

\(^\text{23}\) Chinzei Nippo (The Newspaper Chinzei), March 25, and 27, 1884. And Nippon Rikken Seito Shinbun (The Newspaper Nippon Rikken Party), May 2, 1884.


\(^\text{25}\) See JDA. 6-4-4-13.

\(^\text{26}\) Nishi to Inoue, July 18, 1887, no. 280 in JDA. 2-5-1-17, including a copy of the autograph letter of the Siamese King.

\(^\text{27}\) Inoue to Ito, July 21, 1887, no.6476 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
The first factor was proposals on national reform of Siam presented by certain Siamese princes. In January 1885, various European-based Thai diplomats, including three of Chulalongkorn's half-brothers, presented a petition for governmental change to the King maintaining that Siam should follow Japan's example, which led temporarily to the disgrace of two of the petitioners, Princes Naret and Sawat, and more permanently of a third Prince Pritsdang. In March of the same year, another leading official, Phraya Surasak Montri (Choem Saeng-Xuto), also made representation to the King rather more moderately, suggesting a plan for building up 'a rich country with a strong army' on the model of Japan. Two years earlier, the ex-regent, Somdet Chaophraya Sisuriyawong, a top leader of the conservative group, who had remained still an influential person even after Chulalongkorn's second coronation as an adult in 1873, had died. And the second King, Krom Phrarachawang Bowon Wichaichan, also died in 1885. These two incidents made it much easier for Chulalongkorn to exercise his real power.

It could be assumed that the above proposals to some extent influenced Chulalongkorn's decision to make the next approach to Japan. Indeed as of September 1884, the new British diplomatic representative in Bangkok, Ernest Satow, previously himself twenty years in Japan, had observed that King Chulalongkorn had a clear desire to renew relations with Japan. The second factor was the encouragement of Satow on the issue as described below, and the interest of Inoue's new deputy in Tokyo, Aoki Shuzo.

In April 1886, Satow seems to have received a letter from his acquaintance, the Japanese vice-Foreign Minister Aoki Shuzo, enclosing a letter to the real master-mind of the petition to the Siamese King in previous year (1885), Prince Pritsdang. (Aoki and Pritsdang had known each other in Berlin when Pritsdang, Siam's first native diplomat in the West, was transferred, in 1884, from London to the Continent.) Three weeks later, Satow was told by Prince Thewawong that the Japanese government would be happy to receive an embassy from

---

28 N. J. Brailey, Two Views of Siam on the Eve of the Chakri Reformation (Ar ran and Edinburgh, 1989), pp. 17-19, 70, 82, 83-84. Also Yoshikawa Toshiharu, 'Ajia shugisha no taikoku shinshutsu (The entry into Thailand of Pan-Asianists) in Kyoto University, South East Asian Studies, vol.XVI, no.1, June, 1978, p. 83. Though under something of a cloud after his return to Bangkok in 1886, and refused any further diplomatic positions, Pritsdang's full exile only commenced in 1890, due to problems that arose at the time of his visit to Japan with Prince Phanurangsi. See below 1-6.
29 Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., p. 126.
30 Satow Diaries, September 15 1884 in PRO. 30/33/15.
31 Ibid., 1 April 1886.
Aoki Shuzo probably played an important role in this decision of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. About one month before the letter arrived in Bangkok, Aoki had been appointed as the Japanese vice-Foreign Minister, in March 1886. Probably he knew Siam's diplomatic situation through Prince Pritsdang. Considering Aoki's relatively sympathetic attitude (see section 1-5 and Ch. 4-3-3), it can be presumed that Foreign Minister Inoue was influenced by Aoki and encouraged to take up the Siam issue again. But this time, Tokyo's decision seems not to have anticipated a derived effect from the conclusion of a treaty with Siam, because already in 1881, when the Hawaiian King Kalakaua offered to renounce Hawaii's extraterritoriality in Japan, Inoue declined it on the grounds that Britain's consent was crucial to achieve that objective. Therefore, it might be said that the above decision of the Japanese Foreign Ministry was no more than the result of Japanese perceptions of Japan-Siam friendly relations.

On the other hand, the Siamese government faced another diplomatic dilemma; the resumption of relations with China. Siam had not yet entered into a modern relationship with China. It was no longer Siam's desire to admit Chinese claims to suzerainty as had been allowed up to 1855, when she signed her (Bowring) model treaty with a Western power, Britain. Thus when the Chinese Minister in Europe, Marquis Tseng Chi-tse, encouraged his Siamese counterpart Prince Naret to resume relations with China, the latter replied that Siam would be most happy, but only on the same footing as other powers. Tseng said that he was afraid that China would not like to admit Siam to an equality. Naret's answer was that Siam would never again admit Chinese suzerainty. What is important here is that after Naret's return to Bangkok in 1886, Satow suggested to him that Siam enter into a treaty with Japan so that the question would be settled once for all. Indeed, Japan had been against Chinese suzerainty over Korea, and the Tientsin treaty of 1885 relieved the crisis situation there for a while. Therefore, if Siam concluded a treaty of either equal or unequal character with Japan which also denied China's superiority, the authenticity of the Chinese claim to suzerainty would finally disappear. And China consequently should come to the negotiating table with each of its Asian neighbours.

After receiving Aoki's letter, King Chulalongkorn and Prince Thewawong must have considered the issue very deliberately. Thewawong disclosed to Satow that he wished to send a

---

32 Ibid., 21 April 1886.
33 Ibid., 1 May 1886.
embassy, but dismissing Pritsdang's qualifications, claimed he had no man for it. Satow suggested that the Minister's deputy, Phatsakorawong, could be suitable, but Thewawong was reluctant to choose him. Satow again suggested that any brother of the King could be chief, with Phatsakorawong as second. Eventually, Chulalongkom and Thewawong failed to send any envoy to Japan at this juncture. Satow then seems to have become something of a promoter of a treaty between Japan and Siam. When he went to Japan on his leave from June to September 1886, he had an opportunity to meet Premier Ito Hirobumi, and talked a great deal about Siam. He also met vice-Foreign Minister, Aoki. Probably Satow again talked about the treaty issue.

From May 1886 until April 1887, no progress took place on the treaty issue for reasons unknown. It seems likely that King Chulalongkom and Prince Thewawong during this period might have been making careful consideration of the matter, and waiting for an appropriate time to take the next step.

1-4-3. The Thewawong Mission

In 1887, such a time finally came. Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee was due to be held in London. This seems to have been another decisive factor which induced Chulalongkom to initiate the Japan link. Prince Thewawong proposed in April to Satow that they should go to London in the same steamer, and come back to Siam via America and then make acquaintance with the Japanese. Before his departure from Bangkok, Prince Thewawong along with King Chulalongkom seems to have been preparing concrete measures for his visit to Japan; the king wrote an autograph letter for the Japanese Emperor. It should not be overlooked that Chulalongkom had already made a decision to approach Japan in order to conclude a treaty without waiting for Thewawong's observation report on Japan; his autograph letter was dated the 5th May 1887, which was the day before Prince Thewawong's departure from Bangkok.

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 2 July 1886.
36 Ibid., 17 August 1886.
37 Ibid., 7 April 1887.
38 This is a copy of the autograph letter, dated 5 May, written by hand at the Japanese Foreign Ministry in Nishi to Inoue, July 18, 1887, no.280 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
39 Ibid.
40 Satow Diaries, May 1887. Satow and Thewawong travelled separately from Bangkok, meeting again in Singapore.
Prince Thewawong was anxious about whether or not there would be any difficulty in getting Japan to sign a treaty with Siam. Satow was rather pessimistic, saying that possibly Japan would not do so before the signature of the treaties then being negotiated with the Western Powers. It is unclear whether or not Satow was told that Prince Thewawong was going to bring the autograph letter. From the Satow Diaries it seems that Thewawong concealed it. It is important that at this stage Prince Thewawong intended not to ask for jurisdiction on either side. In other words, he might have expected that a treaty with Japan would stipulate extraterritoriality conceded reciprocally by both countries. Satow dismissed this possibility. But the actual treaty was later concluded on such lines.

Satow and Thewawong arrived in London 10 June 1887. Despite Satow's pessimism now on the treaty issue between Japan and Siam, he seems to have wished that Japan and Siam enter into friendly relations; three days later he called on Prince Thewawong and the Japanese Prince, Komatsu no Miya, who had also come to London to attend the jubilee, who were staying at the same hotel. And the British Foreign Office thereafter organized a reception, perhaps at Satow's suggestion, for the Siamese and Japanese delegates together. On that occasion, Prince Thewawong may have realized that Japan at that moment was not really eager to conclude a commercial treaty, or even perhaps resume diplomatic relations, with Siam. Before leaving London, he revealed to Satow whose leave in London was extended, that he would postpone commercial questions to a more convenient opportunity. It is evident that Thewawong discarded concluding a commercial treaty with Japan, but still maintained his intention to resume diplomatic relations. He told Satow that he was going to try to revive the ancient relations.

What King Chulalongkorn's attitude was on this matter is perceived to some extent from the following part of his autograph letter in English.

41 Ibid., 24 April 1887.
42 Ibid., 13 June 1887. On the same day, Satow was told by the Siamese Legation Secretary in London, Fredk Verney, that he had urged that Siam should conclude a commercial treaty with Japan.
43 Ibid., 14 June 1887.
44 By this time, Satow's general relations with Thewawong had so deteriorated that the Foreign Office was proposing to transfer him to another post. See Nigel J. Brailey, 'Sir Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: The Trial of A Diplomat in The Age of High Imperialism', forthcoming in Historical Journal of Cambridge. This is an historical analysis of the Satow Diaries.
45 Satow Diaries, 21 July 1887.
We have [had] constantly at heart to reestablish the good relations between Siam and Japan, and being moved by a sincere desire to bring to an end any misunderstanding which might have existed between Us, We have thought it expedient to commit this care to a person who enjoys Our confidence.

For this purpose we have selected, nominated and authorized Our Blood and Trusted Brother, Krom Luang Devawongse Varoprakar, [Prince Thewawong], Minister for Foreign Affairs, Knight of the Most Sacred and Ancient Order of the Nine Gems,—as We select, nominate and authorize him by these presents in Order to attain this gain to enter into negotiations with him or them, who are specially authorized on the part of the Japanese government to conclude and sign with them such Treaties, Declarations or Agreements which he shall deem serviceable to insure and confirm Our good Relations.\(^\text{46}\)

From this we know that the Siamese king apparently desired to conclude a treaty or at least some kind of an agreement with Japan.

On the other hand, Japan's Foreign Minister, Inoue, at the time was facing severe criticism of his policy on treaty revision from inside and outside of the government. Due to these political attacks on Inoue, he was forced to put off his treaty revision work indefinitely and resigned his post in September 1887. Premier Ito was able to resolve this crucial situation only by means of promising to the anti-Inoue opinion that Okuma, the leader of the Opposition Party, Rikken Kaishin, would be appointed in the very near future as the next Foreign Minister, while he, Ito himself, took charge for a transitional period until February 1888.

\[1-4-4. \text{The signing of the treaty.}\]

Under these circumstances in Japan, Thewawong met the Japanese Emperor on 19 September 1887, just 2 days after Inoue left the Foreign Ministry. Thewawong presented Chulalongkorn's autograph letter and the White Elephant Decoration to the Emperor,\(^\text{47}\) and was then invited to a luncheon party hosted by the Emperor, including Premier Ito and his wife, the Interior Minister, Sanjo and wife, and the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aoki Shuzo, among others.\(^\text{48}\) This reception may have been designed to establish rapport and good relations between the two sides. Premier Ito, however, as he was devoting himself to completing the first Japanese Constitution at that time, left Siamese affairs entirely to Vice-Minister Aoki's direction.

It was in fact fortunate for Siam in terms of diplomatic success that Thewawong arrived in Japan at this very moment, as it represented an interlude in domestic politics and relations

\[\text{\(^{46}\)} \text{Nishi to Inoue, July 18, 1887, no. 280 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.}\]
\[\text{\(^{47}\)} \text{Inoue to Ito, July 21, 1887, no. 6476 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.}\]
\[\text{\(^{48}\)} \text{Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun. September 20, 1887.}\]

34
with the Western Powers. When Okuma entered office as Foreign Minister in February 1888, the Japanese Foreign Ministry would come to be very busy with the treaty revision work suspended following Inoue's downfall. The negotiation for some kind of agreement between Thewawong and Aoki was begun immediately. On 24 September, seven days after the reception of welcome, one outcome was reached in the form of a declaration, "the Declaration of Amity and Commerce between Japan and Siam." This declaration was ratified without any difficulty by King Chulalongkorn on 18 December 1887, and by the Japanese Emperor on 20 January 1888 respectively.

Between the signing of the 1887 treaty and the exchange of ratifications in 1888, Japan-Siam relations received a further boost from Japanese Prince Komatsu no Miya's visit to Siam.

In 1887, following attendance at Queen Victoria Jubilee, Prince Komatsu visited Europe and on his way back to Japan stopped at Singapore and Bangkok. It is important to notice that his visit to Siam was in fact in response to the Siamese invitation. The Siamese government was eager for Prince Komatsu's stop over at Bangkok. It thought that in return for Japan's warm welcome for Prince Thewawong's visit to Japan about three months before, the Siamese government should show its hospitality to Prince Komatsu, and Prince Pritsdang, still Siam's most experienced diplomat, was given charge of his reception. Prince Komatsu arrived in Singapore on November 3, 1887 on a French ship called Melbourne, and next afternoon he left for Bangkok on a Siamese warship. No information on conversations between Prince Komatsu and the Siamese king or other Siamese politicians is available. But the Siamese government's behaviour clearly indicates its concern to maintain friendly relations with the Japanese government.

1-5. Phraya Phatsakorawong in Japan

The exchange ceremony of ratification was held in Tokyo on 23 January 1888 in the presence of Siam's latest Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Deputy Foreign

---

49 JDA. TH 1.
50 Ito (temporary Foreign Minister) to Ito (as premier), January 23, 1888, no.42 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
51 The Siamese Minister at the court of Berlin, Phraya Damrong Rachapholakan, to Prince Thewawong, September 29, 1887 in KT. 33.6.6/2. 52 Acting Foreign Minister, Phraya Phatsakorawong, to Consul-General for Siam in Singapore, Phraya Anukan Siamkit, October 27, 1887 in KT. 33.6.6/1. And Prince Pritsdang Chumsai, Prawat Yor (Short Autobiography) in Thai (Bangkok, 1970, ed.), p. 66.
53 Phraya Anukan to Prince Thewawong, November 5, 1887 in KT. 33. 6.6/1.
Minister Phraya Phatsakorawong. Before that, the Siamese Ambassador met the Japanese Emperor on 21 January 1888. He stayed at Tokyo for two weeks, and on 15 February he left for Osaka. While staying at Tokyo, he had another audience with the Emperor. And according to his wish, the Ministry of the Imperial Household issued permission to him to have an audience with the Empress as well. After about one month staying in Japan and completing his commission, the Siamese envoy left from Kobe port to return to Bangkok on 27 February, leaving a message for Okuma, the new Foreign Minister just being inaugurated, trusting that "The relations of Friendship which are so happily renewed will be more closely maintained." From the fact that the Siamese envoy stayed in Japan for one month, it might be said that this ratification exchange ceremony included, in a sense, an observation tour of Japan for the Siamese government.

This declaration was the first firm diplomatic link between the two countries after diplomatic relations had been severed for about 230 years. It declared in English that:

[The two countries] being desirous to re-establish the friendly relations and the close intimacy which in former days existed between the two Powers and for the purpose of arriving at an understanding as to the basis upon which future negotiations may be conducted have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries __. Due to this declaration, the two countries became able to open their own Consulates at the ports and towns of the other, and engaged themselves to endeavour to facilitate and encourage as far as possible commerce and navigation, while this declaration might be characterised as a transitional step towards future negotiation as stated in it.

It is important in this study to point out that this declaration granted extraterritoriality agreed reciprocally, although as mentioned above (see section 1-4-3), the former British Minister in Bangkok, Satow, had been pessimistic as to the probability of conclusion of such a treaty on the grounds that Japan at that time was busy trying to abolish the extraterritoriality of the Western Powers. What does it indicate? It might be fair to say that it was fortunate for Siam that Inoue's treaty revision negotiation scheme, which had been launched in May the previous

---

54 Ito (temporary Foreign Minister) to Ito (as premier), January 23, 1888, no.42 in JDA. 2-5-1-17. Thus Phatsakorawong, considered a figure of unprepossessing countenance, was permitted at least this diplomatic role. See Satow Diaries, 1 April 1886 in PRO. 30/33/15. 55 The Minister of the Imperial Household, Hijikata Kyugen, to Ito, January 18, 1888, no.112 in JDA. 6-4-4-12-1. 56 Phatsakorawong to Okuma, February 7, 1888, no.1277 in JDA. 6-4-4-12-1. 57 The Lord Steward to Her Imperial Majesty, Kagawa Keizo, to Okuma, February 10, 1888, no.427 in JDA. 6-4-4-12-1. 58 Phatsakorawong to Okuma, February 27, 1888, no.2187 in JDA. 6-4-4-12-1. 59 JDA. TH 1. 60 Ibid.
year (1886), failed due to criticism of his strategy, and he had announced on 29 July 1887 that it was postponed indefinitely. If these treaty negotiations had continued, probably the Japanese Foreign Ministry would not have been willing to conclude a treaty with Siam reciprocally conceding extraterritoriality, because Japan was trying to eliminate such privilege of the Powers.

Then why did Prince Thewawong and the Japanese vice-Foreign Minister, Aoki, who had charge of the negotiations with Prince Thewawong, not agree to an equal-based treaty aimed at ending extraterritoriality, so that Japan and Siam could take some advantage of the treaty revision negotiations with the Western Powers. A possible explanation is that Prince Thewawong himself did not desire such rapid advance, because he had to consider Britain and France. He had to take their reaction to such hasty acts into account. It will be recalled that he had disclosed to Satow that he intended not to ask for jurisdiction on either side. (see 1-4-3) Thewawong might have thought that simply entering into diplomatic relations with Japan anyhow had priority. Further, it might be said that although Aoki himself might have been sympathetic to Siam, the Japanese government could not conclude an entirely equal treaty eliminating extraterritoriality with Siam, because Siam had not yet a sufficiently Western style judicial system.61 (Aoki's sympathetic attitude became evident after the France-Siam Crisis in 1893, see Ch. 4-3-3.) Therefore, it can be concluded that the 1887 declaration, agreeing reciprocal extraterritoriality, was something like a compromise product, and was in a sense an equal treaty.

What is more, it can be presumed that the Japanese government, more specifically vice-Foreign Minister, Aoki Shuzo, rather than Premier Ito Hirobumi, wanted to resume relations with Siam as still an independent country in Asia, so that Japan and Siam would be able to demonstrate their 'independence' to the Western Powers. The 1887 declaration might be interpreted as representing Japan-Siam solidarity sentiment.

Indeed, after the conclusion of the 1887 declaration, friendly relations were maintained between the two governments as described in the last section of this chapter.

In 1890 the Siamese government sent the new Siamese Minister of War, Prince Phanurangsi, to Japan in order to observe the situation of Japan's national development.\(^{62}\) He was accompanied by Prince Pritsdang, Phraya Si Rachadecho, Phra Si Karasamut, Luang Phaisansilapasat, and another prince.\(^{63}\) Details of their journey can be seen in the report written by Luang Phaisansilapasat.\(^{64}\) They left Bangkok on June 27, 1890, and arrived in Yokohama port via Hong Kong and Shanghai on July 19, 1890. On the way to Yokohama from Shanghai, in the early morning of July 18th, they were impressed by their first sight of Mount Fuji. They landed at Yokohama port July 19. On the following day, the Siamese party left for Tokyo, and Prince Komatsu no Miya, War Minister Oyama Iwao, and others were waiting for them at the Shinbashi station. On the same day, the Siamese party met Aoki Shuzo now full Foreign Minister. During their stay in Tokyo they had a chance to observe the manoeuvre of the Japanese Imperial Guards, commanded by Prince Komatsu, and to visit the Mint Bureau, the Military Museum, the Printing Office, the shipyard, the military school, and the Tokyo Imperial University. On July 26, they had an audience with the Meiji Emperor. Their trip extended to Nikko, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and finally Kobe, where they left for Bangkok on August 19, 1890.

Apart from having an audience with the Meiji Emperor, the other significant event of the Siamese visit was that they were invited by Foreign Minister Aoki Shuzo to his house to take dinner with him. He probably invited them because of his previous private acquaintance with Prince Pritsdang. From this, it can be said that Aoki's attitude towards Siam was relatively warm. However, Pritsdang's detachment from the party on the way home, and subsequent decision to go into exile in British Malay and Ceylon, must have cast a blight on its reception on its final return.\(^{65}\)

One other question arises from this Siamese visit to Japan. The head of the Siamese party was War Minister Prince Phanurangsi, and he exchanged friendly messages with War Minister Oyama and Prince Komatsu, the Commander of the Imperial Guards. this suggests that

---


\(^{63}\) Thai archives give the name of this prince as Phraongchao Phanuwong, but it seems to be incorrect. No such prince can be traced.

\(^{64}\) 'A Report of Prince Phanurangsi's journey to Japan' in R.5 T.12.3.

\(^{65}\) For details of Pritsdang's exile and his last years, see Brailey, *Two Views of Siam on the Eve of the Chakri Reformation*, pp. 19-24.
the Siamese government sent Phanurangsi because it also wanted to strengthen military relations with Japan. It is likely that Siam might have anticipated that Japan, as a country still very weak in Western military terms, might eventually become a good military ally in Asia. The fact that this party was led by the Siamese War Minister may have alerted the Japanese government to Siamese military aims, and it can be inferred that their response was a negative one in that they chose to treat Siam as an inferior Asian country and tried to channel their interests into other directions. But the Phanurangsi party was encouraged to join a Japanese so-called 'Asiatic Society', though this is only according to the Phanurangsi Report and it is unclear what this organization was. But the famous Toho Kyokai, or 'Oriental Society', was being formed at that time (see Ch. 2-5).

When one looks at the relations between the two countries up to the conclusion of the 1887 declaration, one might conclude that for a while in the 1870's, Japan was interested in Siam, which was shown by the Otori mission and Inoue's intention of concluding a treaty with Siam. And the Siamese government also took a rather positive attitude towards Japan from the reign of King Mongkut on. But afterwards, up to 1886, the Japanese government as a whole lost its enthusiasm for Siam if only because of Japanese preoccupation with treaty revision with the Western Powers. On the other hand, the Siamese government's desire to enter diplomatic relations with Japan persisted, except perhaps for about a year in 1886-7, and after conclusion of the 1887 declaration Siam's attitude developed even more.

Despite the 1887 declaration, it was not until 1897 that each country actually opened consulate offices in the other. Why was this so? There seem to have been several factors on the part of Japan. First of all, it has been pointed out that the Japanese government at the time hastened to revise unequal treaties with the Powers. In fact, soon after the said declaration was enforced, the new Foreign Minister, Okuma, installed in February 1888, and his Foreign Ministry officials became very busy with this matter until, in July 1894, under his next successor but one, Mutsu Munemitsu, Britain and Japan agreed a new treaty.

In addition, the 1888 treaty between Japan and Mexico, the first on an equal basis eliminating extraterritoriality, seems to have lessened the necessity of concluding a Japanese-Siamese treaty on the part of the Japanese government, as it must have led Japan to consider Japan-Siamese relations as being a much less urgent issue. Second, rather significantly, the
Korean affair, and the succeeding Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) engrossed all the attention of the Japanese government so that the possible development of diplomatic relations between Siam and Japan was prevented for the time being.

But perhaps more striking, if it can be said that most of the early initiative for closer Japan-Siam relations stemmed from Bangkok, is the apparent Siamese loss of interest in Japan following the Phanurangsi mission. The fate of Prince Pritsdang may partly explain this: he personally was not to return to Japan until 1919, some eight years after he returned to Siam from Ceylon. But during the early 1890's, even Foreign Minister Prince Thewawong seems to have been entirely preoccupied with the growing French and English imperial threat to Siam, and to have seen other Western Powers, for instance Russia, as the most promising counterweights.66

It is therefore to Tokyo that one must look for the next efforts to develop the relationship, in the aftermath of the threatening Western imperial combination of Russia, Germany and France in the Triple Intervention of April 1895, directed at Japan. Indeed, 1895 was a critical year for both Japan and Siam, perhaps facing each with the very real prospect of national extinction.

Four years earlier, in 1891, Tokyo had seen the foundation of the Toho Kyokai or Oriental Society, and the emergence thereafter of one of its members, an intellectual figure, later the first Japanese Minister to Siam, Inagaki Manjiro. It is probably not excessive to say that the 1898 Japanese-Siamese Treaty was concluded very much due to the personal endeavour of Inagaki, and if Inagaki had not got involved with the Siam issue, the first treaty between the two countries would not have been concluded even at this time. Before any discussion of Inagaki's role in the conclusion of the 1898 treaty, it would be helpful for this matter to understand the various ideas on diplomatic issues in Japan at that time regarding international relations, focusing in particular on the development of Japanese Asian interest generally.

Chapter 2
Development of Japanese Asian Interest

The Japanese concept of 'Asia for the Asians' created unique Meiji Japanese individuals. This concept had not been familiar explicitly to the Japanese before the Meiji era. It flourished when the Japanese faced the threat of western imperialism in Asia. A sense of shared Asian suffering and hardship inspired some Meiji Japanese to attempt increasingly to secure China, Korea, the Philippines and Siam from Western imperialism. This was seen as a Japanese mission. Although it has been said that this was the beginning of Japanese imperialism, the present author does not believe that commitment to these countries was motivated entirely by imperialistic designs.

The main purpose of this chapter is to show the development by the Meiji Japanese of an interest in their Asian neighbours. It then goes on to list some examples of Meiji Japanese activities in these Asian countries and looks at the various attitudes provoked by such countries. It will help to clarify the background to the resumption of Meiji diplomatic relations with Siam.

The last part of this chapter will focus on the Toho Kyokai or Oriental Society in Japan. This organisation needs to be examined because it was the Toho Kyokai that advocated a Japanese sense of solidarity with other Asians and the importance of Southeast Asia and the South Seas for Japan's foreign policy. It also promoted the resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and Siam.

2-1. Japanese awareness of Western Imperialism

2-1-1. Japan's confrontation with the Western Powers

In 1639, Japan had completed its policy of national isolation: Sakoku. From then until 1854, although a mainly closed country, Japan still kept relations with some foreigners; ie Korea, China, and the Dutch, in order to trade and get information on the world situation; all of these limited their presence to a particular place, Nagasaki harbour. However, during the Edo era, Japan belonged largely to the Chinese cultural sphere. Confucianism was then Japan's ideal system. Clear-cut concepts of Japanese identity as a whole were not seriously realized in ordinary life. It was after the disintegration of the conventional cultural thought of the Japanese people that they distinguished between themselves and other Asian counties. And it was western
imperialism gradually advancing on the Eastern world that led Japan to begin to be conscious of her identity as a nation-state.

Among European powers, Japan encountered Russia previous to the others. The Lebedev-Lastochkin mission in 1778, the Eric Laxman mission in 1792, and the Nikolai Rezanov mission in 1804, all reached Japan's shores, but failed to open up the country thanks to the Tokugawa Shogunate.\(^1\) Competition among the imperialist powers of Europe at last extended to the Far East. In 1808, a British warship trying to seize a Dutch ship suddenly appeared in Nagasaki harbour, demanding firewood, water, and so on but was refused. By the mid-nineteenth century, the United States and France also came in sight of the Japanese. In particular, the Opium War in 1840-42, and the defeat of the Chinese Empire, shocked traditionalist Japanese intellectuals, ie. Sakuma Shozan, Yoshida Shoin, Hashimoto Sanai, and so forth. Inevitably, those events created rapidly a new perception of the world among the Japanese. The decisive moment marking the end of Japan's isolation was the appearance of the 'black ships' of the United States commanded by Commodore Matthew C. Perry in 1853, and the conclusion of a treaty with America.

The year 1858 was a busy time because various commercial treaties between Japan and the Powers were concluded: in July with the United States, in August with Holland, Russia, and Britain, and in October with France. Japan turned into a country like China and Siam, integrated into the so-called treaty port system of Western commercial and legal advantage. The subsequent decade saw the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate as well as the Japanese traditional view of the Western world. The Japanese could no longer regard Westerners as barbarian. The image of barbarian countries turned to that of powerful and militarily strong countries, so those feelings prompted fear. And such fear promoted a desire for Asian solidarity. Noting western inroads into China, some Japanese warned that they should not ignore the Chinese crisis. However, such fear at the same time reflected a feeling of awe of western civilization. And their adjustment to it induced in the Japanese a sense of superiority regarding other Asians. It might be said that subsequent Japanese foreign policy towards Asian countries, in particular China and Korea, was formulated with such mixed sentiment.

---

Another important element which influenced Japan's foreign policy decision-making towards China and Korea and other Asian countries was without doubt the vigorous extension of western imperialism itself to the Far East. In particular, Russia, with its confrontation with Britain in this region rather than just political entanglement in China, had much more constant influence on the Meiji government leaders in their choice of diplomatic direction.

In fact, even before the Meiji era started, the Russian threat had been established. Japan and Russia concluded a Friendship Treaty in 1855, but the boundary issue of Sakhalin Island and the Kuriles did not reach settlement. On the west coast of Japan, a Russian threat appeared with the so-called Tsushima incident in 1861. It is notable that after this incident, a certain officer of the Tsushima clan highlighted the importance of Korea's geographical position for future Japanese strategies regarding Russia. It was with the crucial diplomatic issue of Russian expansion in Sakhalin Island that the Meiji government had first to be concerned.

It was a French adviser to Japan's Foreign Ministry, Comte des Cantons de Montblanc who suggested in October 1869, that the Meiji government had come to realize very well Korea's geopolitical significance in the context of the future Russian threat to Japan. Montblanc maintained that the purpose of the Russian occupation of Sakhalin island was more to strengthen its strategic position in the Far East against Britain. If Japan overlooked this Russian behaviour, he warned, the next Russian ambition would be to reach Korea and then the Russian occupation of Sakhalin and Korea would be the basis of a substantial threat to Japan's territorial independence. Therefore, it is probably not exaggerating to say that the issue with Russia over Sakhalin, which soon after became a part of the general relations with Russia, was a primary cause leading Japan to take a strong line over Korea. Although the succeeding Japanese hardline attitude to Korea was considered from the point of Japanese-Korean relations itself, it should not be overlooked that behind the relations of both countries there was Japanese apprehension.

---

2 Tsushima island is located west of Japan and midway between Korea and Kyushu. In March 1861, the Russians appeared in Tsushima Bay and despite the fact that they had not been officially admitted, started to survey the island, cut down timber and built a lodging for a long-term stay. It was a British Minister to Japan, Alcock who, intending to take the initiative in relations between the Powers and Japan, intervened to relieved this crisis for Japan in August 1861. British warships went to Tsushima and challenged the Russians with the result that they left in September. Key-Hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire (California: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 89-94.

3 Fujimura Michio, 'Selkan Ron ni okeru gaiin to naiin (External and Internal Causes in the Argument on Conquering Korea)', in Kokusai seiji (International Politics) no.37, October 1968, p. 184.
of a Russian threat. The issue of the potential threat of Russia's expansion came to be linked with Japan's foreign policy towards Korea.

The Meiji government thus faced the need for an explicit policy towards Korea in the face of the Russian threat. In April 1870, the Japanese Foreign Ministry drew up the following 3 alternative proposals concerning the Korean issue: 1) until Japan had sufficient national power, any effort to negotiate with Korea would be suspended, and in the case of a Russian occupation of Korea, Japan would take no more than a bystander's position on Russian action. 2) a Japanese envoy would be sent in order to compel Korea to open itself up and conclude a trade treaty, 3) Japan should conclude a friendship treaty with China. This was because historically Korea had subordinate status to China, and if Japan was able to conclude a treaty with China, Korea might accept Japan's demands. Consequently, the third choice was chosen as the most feasible policy by the Meiji leaders.4

It should be noted that already at this stage, the Korean issue came to be linked with Japan's relations with China. It might be said again that Japanese policy towards Korea and China originally largely related to the actual and potential Russian threat to Japan. Nevertheless, one might certainly argue that Japan's foreign policy afterwards was imperialist. But it could also said that Japan's instinctive fear of Russia since the Edo era always hovered in its history and dogged its foreign policy-making even up to the end of the Second World War.

A fairly conciliatory approach was taken in Chinese affairs as mentioned above. A draft prepared for negotiation with China was an imitation of the Commercial Treaty between China and Prussia, which prescribed the number of interest rights which the Powers had obtained in China, since the 1858 so-called Tientsin Treaties which reduced China to a humiliating quasi-colonized status. The Meiji government justified itself in that the Powers had imposed unequal treaties on Japan because of her 'uncivilised' condition, but since Japan had opened herself to foreign intercourse and thus became a 'civilised' country, Japan could or even should request, with good reason in the name of civilization, an unequal treaty with China. Here we can see Japanese confusing sentiment with their awe of western civilization mentioned before. It seems that the Meiji leaders in this early phase might not have aimed at an aggressive policy in their attitude towards China, but were simply re-applying their humiliating experience suffered at the hands of the Powers, and when they perceived that they might be able to get something more.

4 Ibid., p. 185.
than they had estimated from this treaty with China over the Korea issue, their attitude towards China quickly became more aggressive.

Contrary to Japan's expectation, China refused Japan's draft and proposed its own treaty and negotiation was carried on following the Chinese initiative. Why did Japan yield to China so easily, and accept equal status in the relations between the two countries? For one thing, this 1871 Sino-Japanese treaty gave Japan a more positive and clear position against Korea. It also encouraged in the minds of Japanese rulers a sense of superiority of their own, an increasingly arrogant attitude towards Korea. However, we have hints that Japan's attitude towards China at this stage was rather different from that to Korea. It might perhaps be argued instead that the 1871 treaty between Japan and China in which the mutual recognition of extraterritoriality was stipulated, was an event symbolic of Japanese sentiments of solidarity. Thus it was a prevailing idea at that time that Japan and China should cooperate together against western imperialism for the sake of Asia. Indeed, from about the 1870s onward, this sentiment created a number of organizations campaigning for Asian independence and Japan's emancipation of Asia from the Westerners as described in the following section.

2-2. Development of a Japanese sense of solidarity with Asian countries

2-2-1. The Koa Kai

Among the organizations promoting the spirit of cooperation with Asians, and in particular with China, the Koa Kai or Rise Asia Society was relatively early established. It was first called Shin-A Sha or the Encourage Asia Organization founded by Sone Toshitora and other comrades. Afterwards Sone planned the establishment of a Chinese language school, and he was supported by other people having sympathy with his purpose. Changing its name from Shin-A Sha to Koa Kai, and electing president, vice-president, secretary, and so on, the Koa Kai was inaugurated in March 1880.

The first President was a Foreign Ministry official, Nagaoka Yoshimi. The spirit of the Koa Kai was expressed at its first meeting by the vice-president of the society: friendly relations

6 Sone was born in 1847. He afterwards supported Sun Yat-Sen. See short biography of Sone in Toa sengaku shishi ki den (Asian Pioneer Activists) (Tokyo, 1966).
7 Ito Teruo, 'Meiji shoki no koa ron ni tsuite' (Concerning the Interest in Reviving Asia in the Early Meiji Era) in Yokohama shiritu daijiraku ronso jinmon kagaku keiretsu (A Collection of Treatises of Yokohama City University), March 1982, p. 74.
with other countries should not be promoted only by the government. It was necessary for such relations that patriots of each country would exchange views, and understand each other. That was the reason why the Koa Kai hoped to be on friendly terms with Asian patriots, and to exchange information on the situation of each country.\(^8\)

The practical activities of this society were to hold meetings and exchange opinion to gain deeper understanding of Asian countries, and to publish the Koa Kai Report. Further, the opening of a school of Chinese language was also one of the activities of the society.\(^9\)

One distinct feature of the Koa Kai was its report. It was printed in both Japanese and Chinese. Some issues were printed completely in Chinese. The reason for this was that when a member of the Society would go to China or Korea, and have a chance to introduce the Koa Kai to them, it was obvious that a Report written in Chinese was useful. Koreans also read Chinese at that time because the Chinese language had been the scholarly language for a long time not only for Japan but also Korea. Another feature of the society was the composition of its members. It included not only Japanese, Koreans and Chinese, but also Persians and Turks resident in Tokyo as well. Further, the Koa Kai taught the Korean language too.\(^10\)

However, the Koa Kai was sometimes criticised, it being said that its real activity was no more than running a Chinese language school. Chinese members of the society also insinuated that while the Koa Kai had great aspirations, it was difficult for it to deal with current political problems between Japan and China, and getting competence in the Chinese language might be utilized by the Japanese for spying on their neighbour country.\(^11\)

Indeed, at that time Japan's relations with China were deteriorating over the matter of Formosa and the Ryukyu islands. Formosa, as a territory of China, was in danger of being conquered by Japan due to a Japanese ship-wreck there in 1871, and China's failure to protect the survivors. The then American Minster to Japan, Charles E. Delong, along with the American adviser to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Charles LeGendre, encouraged the Meiji government to occupy Formosa.\(^12\) At the same time, the Ryukyuans had been for a long time tributary to China under the so-called tribute system. In 1879, the King of Ryukyu was brought to Tokyo by

---


\(^9\) Ito Teruo, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

\(^10\) Ibid., pp. 76-77, p. 79.

\(^11\) Ibid., p. 78.


46
Japanese police officers in order to put an end to any continuing acknowledgment of the suzerainty of the Chinese empire by the Ryukyuans. Certainly, this action of Japan caused Chinese resentment. Both sides were preparing for war, but China was distracted by the Russian threat to the northern part of China. Japan was not yet ready with sufficient military force. Thus the two countries considered a diplomatic settlement: Japan delivered a draft of agreement on the Ryukyu issue along with a revised draft of the 1871 Treaty, but China refused it. This led to the two governments again taking a more hostile attitude to each other. What defused the crisis was Korea's unpredictable political condition in 1882, with an anti-Japanese riot in Seoul, and Korea's consequent concession by which Japan was allowed to station military force there, the first time that Meiji Japan had stationed forces abroad. As a countermeasure, China, being against Japan's expansion into Korea, concluded a commercial treaty with Korea. By this treaty, China's political penetration in Korea, led by Li Hung-Chang with Yuan Shih-k'ai as Resident General in Korea after 1885, increased remarkably in the domain of both domestic affairs and foreign policy-making.

It was in such circumstances that the Koa Kai was operating. The Koa Kai from its origin thus felt vulnerable to such actual political conflicts despite seeking friendship between Japan and China. Nevertheless, the Koa Kai deserves notice for its very existence in such a trying political situation, though there was a gap between its ambition and activities. It might be said that the Koa Kai at least represented Japanese solidarity sentiment towards China and other Asian countries in the early Meiji era.

2-2-2. The Asian solidarity sense of the 'Jiyuminken Undo'

A view on Asian solidarity is also found in the early liberal People's Rights movement in Japan circa 1870-80.13 While Meiji liberals were against government oppression domestically, and were externally energetic interventionists, they persisted with the idea of solidarity between Korea, China and Japan in order to resist western imperialism. Ueki Emori, one of the distinguished theorists of the People's Rights movement, contributed an article to a newspaper when the 1875 incident between Japan and Korea took place. He condemned the Meiji government which had sent troops to Korea, saying that anyone who advocated

conquering Korea was a fool or a lunatic because Eastern peoples should instead strengthen their solidarity line against Western pressure.

In the critical situation between Japan and China over the Ryukyu islands, the newspaper Toyo Jiyu Shinbun (Eastern Liberal Newspaper), chief editor Nakae Chomin, introducer of Rousseau to Japan, maintained that Japan should not force war on China; on the contrary, the two countries should band themselves together against aggressive Western expansionism.14

Just after the 1882 Korean riot occurred in Seoul, one of the principal members of the Rikken Kaishin Party (a liberal organization formed in 1882 by Okuma Shigenobu), Ono Azusa, published a book, Gaiko Ron (A View of Diplomacy). Ono argued that Japan should not demand an indemnity from Korea, but should promote close relations among the three countries (Japan, China, and Korea) in order to protect East from West. It was important, he insisted, that there was solidarity between the three countries and maintaining the peace in the East.15

Again, it should be stated here that the early Genyosha, founded in 1881, can be attributed to the Liberal Democratic movement. Previously, it was named 'Koyosha', founded in 1879 by those in Fukuoka who insisted on the view of conquering Korea. It has often been misapprehended that the Genyosha was expansionist all along. But this view has to be reconsidered. After President Hakoda Rokusuke's death in 1885, Shindo Kiheita became its president. At the same time, the attitude of foreign countries towards Japan, in particular China, provoked the Genyosha. It was those things that made the Genyosha turn explicitly expansionist. And this changing of the Genyosha's fundamental policy only occurred around 1887.18

At any rate, during 1882-84, the People's Rights movement rapidly declined. It was triggered by the scandal of Itagaki Taisuke, the President of the Jiyu Party, and subsequent

15 Ibid., p. 181. For details of Ono's view on Asian countries and his later apostasy to became an advocate of aggressive policy, see Nakamura Naomi, 'Jiyu minkenka no ajia kan' (Views on Asia of liberal democratic activists) in Rekishigaku kongyku (Historical Studies), February 1986, no.551, pp. 1-15.
conflict between the Kaishin and Jiyu parties. In 1884, the Jiyu Party was dissolved, and the Kaishin Party was weakened because of the secession of Okuma Shigenobu. In the same year, influenced by the aggressive attitude of the French, i.e. the Sino-French War, some Japanese diplomats resident in Seoul conspired with a pro-Japan Korean faction to stir up an incident there. Chinese troops faced Japanese. Relations were aggravated.

It was the Meiji government's political strategy to distract the confused liberals by foreign crisis to make the liberals hostile to China. The liberals, like Oi Kentaro, Ozaki Yukio, and Ono Azusa, now discarded their solidarity sentiments, and took up entirely expansionist attitudes towards Korea. It could be said that when the liberals were faced by the deteriorating situation between Japan, China, and Korea, their support for Asian solidarity could no longer last intact as they were firstly passionate nationalists.

2-2-3. Fukuzawa Yukichi and Asia

There was another Japanese figure who might be categorized as one who sought prosperity for Asia. That was Fukuzawa Yukichi, philosopher, educator, and journalist. As far as his early works are concerned, before publishing his famous book Datsu A-Ron (On leaving Asia) in 1885, Fukuzawa Yukichi favoured Asian independence of western countries. But this does not mean that he could be regarded as the same as a member of the Koa Kai or the liberal activists. Fukuzawa's stress was on the national independence of each country. His Asian solidarity sentiment was rooted in his thought that Japan was already in a hegemonic position in the East and able to transmit Western civilization to Asian countries. Thus, on the matter of Korea which was uncertain of its independence, he actually supported the pro-Japan Korean, Kim Ok-kyun, rather more actively than the Koa Kai.

His insistence on introducing 'Western' civilization to Korea and China was, on the other hand, because of his anxiety about Western seizure of these two countries, because the matter would inevitably link with Japan's own position in the East. In this sense, Fukuzawa was apparently a nationalist and expansionist. Therefore, once his commitment to 'civilizing' Korea failed in 1884, Fukuzawa was faced with an ideological stalemate. And when Japan was

---

19 Itagaki and Goto Sbojiro received financial support from Ito Hirobumi, who was then hostile to Itagaki's Jiyu Party, to make a trip to Europe. As a result, the members of the Jiyu Party were provoked by this treacherous behaviour of Itagaki to develop new policies. See Dainihon jinmei jisho (The Great Japan Biographical Dictionary) (Tokyo, 1937), vol.1, p. 210.
threatened by a crucial confrontation between Britain and Russia, quickly conspicuous in 1885, ie. Russian inroads into Afghanistan, and British occupation of Port Hamilton (Komun-do)\textsuperscript{20} in Korea as a counter-measure against Russia's expected advantage in the Far East, Fukuzawa's anxiety about the effect of these conflicts on Japan's independence increased. He seems to have deliberated whether to continue to try to 'civilize' Korea, or to change his view. He chose the latter. This means that he submitted himself also to Japan's then policy towards Korea, military interference.\textsuperscript{21}

2-2-4. Tarui's unique views of Asian solidarity

In contrast to Fukuzawa's inclinations towards western civilization, Tarui Tokichi expressed a different and unique opinion on the relations between Japan and Korea. His uniqueness was in his view of an 'equal' federation of Japan and Korea. He insisted that the two countries should be united in order to (a) settle the problems in the relations between them, (b) to modernize Korea, and (c) to protect Korea from western imperialism, particularly Russian invasion. Tarui drafted this idea in 1885, but dropped it when he got embroiled in the so-called Osaka incident which occurred in the same year. Later, he rewrote it in Chinese, and published it with the title, \textit{Dai To Gappo Ron (A View on the Unification of the Great East)}, in 1893. Although Japanese public response to Tarui's view was critical, his book was much in request in China and Korea. The Chinese reformer, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, reprinted Tarui's book in Shanghai without Tarui's permission. One hundred thousand copies were sold. In Korea, because of the shortage of original copies, one thousand more copies mimeographed from Tarui's original publication were sold.\textsuperscript{22}

As for China, he did not suggest a unification between Japan and China. On the contrary, he thought that Japan could not federate with China. His conclusion was that China should only be connected with a Japan-Korea federation.

\textsuperscript{20} Port Hamilton (Komun-do, or Komun Island) is located off the south coast of Kangjin city in Korea, at the gateway to the Korea Strait.

\textsuperscript{21} Ito Teruo, op. cit., pp. 82-90. And see a series of Aoki Koichi's articles, for instance, 'Fukuzawa Yukichi no chosen ron (A View on Korea of Fukuzawa Yukichi)' in \textit{Yokohama shiritsu daigaku ronso jinmon kagaku keiretsu (The Collection of Treatises of Yokohama City University)}, March, 1982, pp. 99-117.

\textsuperscript{22} Nishio Yotaro, 'Daito gappo ron oboe gaki (A Note on Daito Gappo Ron)' in \textit{Seinan daigaku bunri roshu (Collection of Humanities and Sciences Treatises of Seinan University)}, no.19-1, 1978, p. 51.
It has been argued that Tarui's view became the theoretical framework of Japan's later annexation of Korea.\(^{23}\) It is not easy to find an answer to the question whether or not Tarui himself thought about the annexation of Korea. But it might be enough to say that Tarui's idea of the equal unity of Japan and Korea was an entirely new concept which no one had thought of before, nor anyone afterwards. It is noteworthy that his idea was much more welcomed in Korea and China. In this sense, Tarui's idea was regarded as part of the Asian solidarity movement.


2-3-1. Meiji 'shishi'; Sugita and Arao, nationalists and romanticists

Western imperialism towards China, together with Japan's involvement in Chinese and Korean affairs during 1880-90, produced a set of unique Japanese activists often called 'Minkan shishi' (private high spirit patriots) who crossed the sea to China and Korea.

Sugita Teiichi (1851-1920), author of *Koa Saku* (*Policy for Raising the East*), had the opinion that intellectual exchange among Asian countries was important, and that establishing people's organisations in each Asian country, and organizing cooperation amongst those organizations was requisite for recovering Asian prosperity. He went abroad to China when the 1884 Sino-French War took place. His purpose was farsighted. He thought that it was absolutely essential for China's standing with the Powers to set up a school in China to enlighten Chinese influential figures about the parliamentary system. Shortly after, with the support of Hiraoka Kotaro, Tarui Tokichi, and so on, Sugita established a school named 'Toyo Gakkan' in Shanghai.\(^{24}\) But the teaching subjects were only Chinese and English, and the number of students was only ten. Thus the Toyo Gakkan was at the beginning something like a tutorial class. In no less than one year, the Toyo Gakkan was closed because of its financial difficulties. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Toyo Gakkan was the first educational institution in China run by Japanese.\(^{25}\)

Two years later (1886), another passionate activist crossed the East China Sea, Arao Sei (1859-96). He was an army officer, belonging to the China Section of the General Staff Office. During his military service, he often had opportunities for explaining his views on policy

\(^{23}\) Hosono Koji, 'Daito gappo koso to heikan no kozu (An idea of Great Eastern Unity and Conquering Korea)' in *Shikan* (*Historical View*), 1982, p. 168.
\(^{24}\) Oka Yoshitake, op. cit., p. 27.
\(^{25}\) Omori Chikako, 'Toa Dobun Kai and Toa Dobun Shoin' (in Japanese) in *Aji keizai*, 1978, no.19/6, p. 84.
towards China to War Minister, Lieutenant General Oyama Iwao. 26 Arao had the firm belief that Japan and China should cooperate to defend Asian countries from the Westerners. Characteristically, his major concern was about Russian expansion. 27 Arao and his followers numbering about twenty started their activities in Shanghai in 1886. 28 What they did in Shanghai first was intelligence activity. They opened a head-office in Hankow, and had branches in Hunan, Sichuan, and Beijing. 29

Three years later, Arao returned to Japan with a specific plan; establishing a school in Shanghai. During the year 1889, he spent his time in preparation for it. He proposed to the Meiji government setting up a Japan-China Trading Company, following the example of European countries which were enlarging their markets in China. Although this idea was not adopted, Arao succeeded in obtaining a subsidy for his school, named Nisshin Boeki Kenkyu Sho (Institute of Japan-China Trading). Retiring from the army, Arao again went to Shanghai in 1890, and opened the institute with 150 students. Obviously, this institute was an outcome of Arao's three years experience of intelligence activities. He thought that economic relations between Japan and China should be tight first so that political cooperation would follow. The person who managed this school was Arao's best friend, ex-army officer Nezu Hajime (1860-1927). The curriculum of this school was the same as the Toyo Gakkan mentioned above. However, the school was closed after eighty-nine students completed in 1894 as the first graduates. Ironically, most of them did not afterwards become economists but engaged in intelligence service or interpreting for the Japanese army during the war between China and Japan. 30

It can be debated whether or not Arao was actually sent to China as a General Staff intelligence officer of the Japanese army. It is a fact that he held the rank of lieutenant during his first stay in China in 1886. 31 More, when Arao campaigned in Japan for his plan of setting up a school, it was the vice-Chief of the General Staff, then Lieutenant-General Kawakami Soroku, who strongly supported Arao. It was understandable that Kawakami, the real

---

27 Oka Yoshitake, op. cit., p. 22.
28 Nihon eiyu den kankokai, op. cit., p. 150.
30 Omori Chikako, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
31 Takeuchi Yoshimi, op. cit., p. 22.
commander in the Sino-Japanese War, needed intelligence officers because at that time he was steadily preparing for a future battle between Japan and China. In fact, the graduates of Arao's school would mostly participate actively in such service during the Sino-Japanese War. However, Arao's original concern in Chinese affairs could not be attributed only to Kawakami's preparations for the Sino-Japanese War. Arao's first visit to China was his own idea. Actually, he could have applied instead to go to Europe which would have given him a successful career in the future. Most officers desired to do so, but he was different. He might be regarded as an expansionist, but not only for Japan's benefit; he insisted in the peace conference after the Sino-Japanese War that Japan should not demand any concessions from China.

2-3-2. The 'Tenyukyo' in Korea. Miyazaki Toten in China

Like Arao, there were other enthusiastic Japanese activists who were involved in the Sino-Japanese War. The 'Tenyukyo' (Divine Grace) group was a good example. They acted not in China but in Korea. They supported the Tonghak Rebellion which caused the awkward relations between Japan and China to come to a head in the Sino-Japanese War. The Tenyukyo was regarded after the Second World War as a 'running dog' of the Japanese General Staff Office in China. And it has been said that the Tenyukyo was a secret organ in Korea of the Genyosha. However, recent historical research interprets the Tenyukyo differently.

The Tenyukyo consisted of two groups. One was called 'Pusan Ryozanpaku' which was formed in 1893 by ambitious Japanese activists led by Osaki Masakichi, Yoshikura Osei, Suzuki Tengan, and Takeda Noriyuki. They were a post-liberal democratic generation who had had no direct connection with the liberal People's Rights movement. Ostensibly, Ryozanpaku was a Japanese law firm in Korea. Most of its clients were Japanese who suffered from being unable to recover loans to Koreans. The members of Ryozanpaku were rather wild fellows. They forced payment out of debtors. But they were university graduates or those who gave up a university course halfway. Tenyukyo was organized by both the members of Ryozanpaku and

---

32 Omori Chikako, op. cit., p. 85.
33 Takeuchi Yoshimi, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
35 Takeuchi Yoshimi, op. cit., p. 27.
those who came from Japan, for instance, one member of the Genyosha, Uchida Ryoei. There is an indication that there were certain links between the Tenyukyo and Genyosha; Uchida Ryoei was the leader of Tenyukyo, and Uchida was instructed from Tokyo by the chauvinist, Toyama Mitsuru, and Uchida's uncle, Hiraoka Kotaro. In fact, Hiraoka was also a financial sponsor for the Tenyukyo. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Uchida himself was able to organize all the senior members of Tenyukyo because he was only twenty years old, and he had not visited Korea before. Recent research on relations between Uchida and the Tenyukyo shows that Uchida was rather inspired by the Tenyukyo members who then went to Fukuoka to get some dynamite.

It is not known whether or not the Tenyukyo had a connection with the Japanese army, particularly with Lieutenant-General Kawakami. It is hardly possible that Kawakami did not approach the Tenyukyo. However, the Tenyukyo acted independently, separate from the Japanese Legation, or local agencies of the Japanese army in Korea. What was more, the Tenyukyo had the confidence of the Tonghak rebel leader, Li-Jung-chiu. It can be said that ideally, the members of the Tenyukyo cherished solidarity sentiments with Koreans.

There was also one other figure who might be said to hold Asian solidarity sentiment in the most pure and simple manner. This is Miyazaki Toten or Torazo (1870-1922). He dreamt of Asia for the Asians. His logic was simple. He thought the one thing which would hold sway over the destiny of the whole of Asia was Chinese prosperity. To this end Miyazaki devoted his life energetically. There is no distinct trace of a connection with the Japanese military in Miyazaki's activity. Perhaps Lieutenant-General Kawakami may have approached him through Arao or the Tenyukyo. But Miyazaki himself found it against his conscience to live at Arao's expense when he arrived first in Shanghai. He regarded Arao's group as an aggressor in China.

37 Ibid., pp. 120-126.
38 Miyazaki Toten, Sanju sanren no yume (The thirty-three years' dream), annotated Miyazaki Ryusuke and Eto Shinkichi (Tokyo, 1982), (the first print in 1967), the thirteenth print in 1982, p. 41. This book was translated into English. See Eto Shinkichi and Marius B. Jansen, My Thirty Three Years' Dream (Princeton, 1982), (hereafter cited under Eto and Jansen), p. 53. Miyazaki was friendly with Inukai Tsuyoshi and Toyama Mitsuru.
2-4. Japan’s attitude towards Southeast Asia and the South Seas region

2-4-1. Meiji advocates of the South

As we have seen above, around the 1880s/90s there were many and various Japanese activists in China and Korea. They had an unusual enthusiasm to sustain Asia for the Asians. Some became involved in the Japanese military intelligence service. Some supported the Chinese Revolution of 1911. But those activists’ concern was mainly the Far East, ie. Chinese and Korean issues. Although Miyazaki Toten was involved in Siamese and Philippine affairs, it was largely incidental. One may ask how the Meiji Japanese viewed other Asian countries, ie. Southeast Asian countries, and the South Seas region, apart from China and Korea?

Enomoto Takeaki was one of the early people who paid attention to Southeast Asia and the South Sea islands. His interest in the South Seas region went back to 1877 when he was in Russia as Japanese Minister. In 1879, he established the Tokyo Geographical Society. The Emigration Association was also set up by Enomoto in 1893. Through those organizations, he tried to solve Japan’s pressing population problems at that time. 39

Meiji Japanese conscious of Southeast Asia and the South Seas region can be partly attributed to Japan’s over-population and emigration issues. They were argued about widely around 1887. Publications with respect to Southeast Asia and the South Seas region appeared. 40 Shiga Shigetaka’s Nanyo Jijo (Correct events of the South Seas) of 1887 began with a poem: "Arise! Ye sons of Yamato's Land! A Grand work awaits your hand!" The distinct feature of his book was that he was the first person who presented the definition of the term 'Nan'yo' as the South Seas. According to him, the term Nan'yo meant neither 'Western' nor 'Eastern', but was important as much as these latter. He also expressed his ideas of peaceful economic expansion towards the South Seas. 41

The Spanish Philippines were dealt with by Hattori Tofu in his book Nan'yo Saku, (A Policy for the South Seas) (in 1891). His concern was with continuing western domination of the Philippines if the Spanish were expelled. Afterwards his interest turned to Java. 42 As for

---

39 Yano Toru, Nihon no nan'yo shikan (Japan’s Historical View of the South Seas) (Tokyo, 1979), p. 10. And Mark R. Peattie, Nan’yo The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1945 (Honolulu, 1988), pp. 5-8. Enomoto was the Japanese Foreign Minister during 1891-1892 and the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce during 1894-1897.
40 Yano Toru, op. cit., p. 16.
41 Ibid., pp. 25-27.
Taiwan, Indo-China, Singapore, and the islands of the South Seas, Suganuma Teihu revealed his opinion in his Nihon no Tonan no Yume (New Japan's Dream of Southern Territory). He advocated strongly Japan's expanding to those regions. Agricultural emigration schemes and an emigration company should be launched, he asserted. For these purposes, he proposed enlargement of the Japanese navy. However, Suganuma also talked in terms of solidarity with respect to the Philippines and Korea. It is interesting that Suganuma's view of Japanese expansion was similar to Inagaki Manjiro. (Inagaki's full story will be detailed at length in the next chapter because of his involvement in the relations between Japan and Siam). In fact, Inagaki and Suganuma came from the same home town, Hirado, Nagasaki.

Although some people advocated Japan's expansion towards Southeast Asia and the South Seas islands as mentioned above, their opinions were not adopted into the mainstream of the foreign policy of the Meiji government. Chinese and Korean issues were accorded much more attention at that time. Also the Japanese military was busy in respect of those two countries. Throughout the early 1890s, the only noteworthy record in the Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives of dispatching military officers to Southeast Asia was the General Staff officers' observation trip to Indo-china and Siam in 1893. But their tour seems also linked with Chinese and Korean issues, because in the same year, Lieutenant-General Kawakami himself made an observation tour of Korea and China in preparation for the coming Sino-Japanese war. It might be surprising that in the Meiji era the Japanese military were quite inactive in Southeast Asia and the South Seas region unlike the Taisho and Showa eras.

2-4-2. The 'Nunobiki Maru' incident

However, the Philippines were an exception. It was, in a sense, an issue embarrassing the Meiji leaders. During the Sino-Japanese War, the Spanish government was very nervous about Japan's possible expansion after the war. Japanese newspapers reported Spain's purchase of three warships for future use. When the Philippine revolutionary movement emerged in 1896 led by Emilio Aguinaldo, and when the United States, clashing with Spain in 1898,
refused the revolutionaries' demand for recognition of Philippines independence, the revolutionary leaders reportedly turned to Japan for military support.\textsuperscript{48} The Japanese military in Formosa inclined to support the Filipinos. A Japanese army officer in Formosa who had stayed in Manila to observe the situation of Philippines proposed to the Japanese Taiwan General Office that Japan should support Aguinaldo in order to eliminate America's influence from the Philippines.\textsuperscript{49} The Japanese government instructed the Japanese Taiwan office to keep its policy entirely neutral in this war. At the same time Japan was maintaining her watch on the war through reports of the Japanese navy and army.\textsuperscript{50}

Despite the neutral policy of the Meiji government, the incident of a Japanese vessel called Nunobiki Maru sunk off Shanghai in 1899 troubled the Japanese government. Because it was reported that on that ship there was gunpowder and guns which were being sent to the Philippine revolutionaries, and that the Japanese General Staff Office was involved in this secret plan. It was also revealed that a representative of the Philippine revolutionaries, Mariano Ponce, had come to Japan to obtain arms and ammunition, and he had been helped by among others liberal politician Inukai Tsuyoshi (Inukai Ki), Vice-War Minister Nakamura Yujiro, and the now Chief of the General Staff Office, General Kawakami.\textsuperscript{51}

Aoki Shuzo, Japanese Foreign Minister since November 1898, actually opposed General Kawakami who was in favour of helping Mariano Ponce. Despite Aoki’s interference, Kawakami eventually sold used arms and ammunition to the Okura Gumi (Okura Trading Company, See Chap. 8–4). Those arms and ammunition were finally transferred to Ponce through third persons. But the secret aid did not reach Manila because the vessel was sunk in a hurricane. On the other hand, a Japanese army officer, Captain Ohara, retired voluntarily from the military, and left for Manila with other Japanese officers in order to join the Aguinaldo group.\textsuperscript{52}

The details of this incident were immediately reported to the American Minister in Tokyo by his military attaché, Captain A. L. Key, who was taking a trip around Japan. The

\textsuperscript{48} Japanese Consul at Manila, Mimasu, to Okuma Shigenobu, August 23, 1898 in Okuma Shigenobu Monjo (Okuma Shigenobu Archives), Waseda University, no. A842.
\textsuperscript{50} See ‘A report on protection of Japanese residents in the Philippines, and on military affairs in the Philippines by Captain Endo Kitaro’ (in Japanese) in Okuma Shigenobu Archives, op. cit., no.803 and 804. The Japanese navy and army attachés in Manila also reported on the Spanish-American War to Tokyo. See Okuma Shigenobu Archives, no.805, 826, 833, and 838.
\textsuperscript{51} Jansen, \textit{The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen}, pp. 68–74.
\textsuperscript{52} Inoue Kiyoshi, \textit{Nihon no gunko Shugi}, p. 51.
American Minister filed a stiff protest to the Japanese government about this conduct of the Japanese army. Foreign Minster Aoki enquired about the incident of Interior Minister Saigo Shigemichi, and Finance Minster Matsukata Masayoshi. Eventually, the Meiji government replied to the American Legation officially that this kind of conduct by Japanese would be kept strictly in order, although only the evidence of loading arms on the ship had been confirmed, and the purpose of sending those arms was unclear.53

For the Meiji government, any further conflict with the United States had to be avoided, because the Japanese government at that time was already in a difficult situation with the United States concerning Hawaii. The things which made Japan nervous were the issues of Japanese emigration to Hawaii, and American annexation of Hawaii in 1897. Thus Japan's neutrality policy in the struggle between the United States and Spain was declared immediately in April 1898, and in July, the dispute concerning the Japanese emigrants to Hawaii was settled.

The above Nunobiki Maru incident shows to some extent the early origins of the Japanese dual structure in foreign policy-making caused by the existence of the General Staff Office. And at the same time, it illustrates the vigorous activities of Meiji Japanese who sometimes were called expansionists or imperialists. But it would be an exaggeration to say that all these people were imperialist expansionists. They consisted of various kinds of individuals who had different ideas and motivations towards the above incident. Some apparently had a fear of western imperialism. Others acted from Japan's military strategic point of view. There were some figures who involved themselves in the incident wholeheartedly to sustain Asia for the Asians.54

For understanding the activities of those people, not only those who were involved in the Nunobiki Maru incident but who were concerned with Chinese and Korean affairs in general, it could be emphasised that the sentiment of 'Asia for the Asians' was a key phrase which functioned for each individual activist who endeavoured to preserve 'Asian' identity from western imperialism. And those movements created organizations in the 1890's much more developed than those of the 1880s as described in the last part of this chapter.

53 Meiji nyusu jiten hensan linkai, Meiji nyusu jiten dai 6 kan (Encyclopedia of Meiji News. vol. 6) (Tokyo, 1985), pp. 24-25.
54 Miyazaki Toten was also involved in this incident. See Miyazaki Toten, op. cit., pp. 116-117, 144-145, and 148-149, Eto and Jansen, op. cit., pp. 141-143, 173-176, and 180.
The Toho Kyokai or Oriental Society played a very significant role in the resumption of Japanese-Siamese relations after the Meiji Restoration, which is the main concern in this study. Its importance here lies not in its general activities but in the sense that Inagaki Manjiro, the first Japanese Minister to Siam, took part in the Toho Kyokai as its chief secretary. As details of Inagaki will be given in the next chapter, only general information on the Toho Kyokai is related here.

The Toho Kyokai was founded in 1891. An attempt to establish it had taken place in January of the previous year (1890). Army General Staff officer Ozawa Katsuro, and two individual activists, Fukumoto Makoto and Shirai Shintaro, were father-figures of this Society. Koyama Takeo, Yamaguchi Muneyoshi, Yano Fumio, Minoura Katsuhito, Komura Jutaro, and so on, were supporters. After about one year’s preparation for setting up the new organization, the Toho Kyokai was inaugurated with a temporary office in Tokyo in May 1891. And on 7th July 1891, the first general meeting was held.55

The first President of the Society was former Foreign Minister Count Soejima Taneomi who was installed in 1892. The vice-President was chosen later at the third general meeting in 1893. The first vice-President was Prince Konoe Atsumaro. The regulations of the Society also provided for posts of secretaries who were to be chosen by the President. Inagaki Manjiro was appointed as the first chief secretary.56

The members of the Society may be divided into five groups: (a) Jiyu Party group, ie. Itagaki Taisuke, Kono Hironaka, and so on, (b) Kaishin Party group, ie. Okuma Shigenobu, Inukai Tsuyoshi, Ozaki Yukio, and so on, (c) government officials group, ie. Ito Miyoji, Komura Jutaro, (d) the House of Peers group, ie. Tani Kanjo, Miura Goro, (e) individual activists, Nakano Jiro, Kishida Ginko. Sometime premiers Ito Hirobumi and Matsukata Masayoshi were also members. But because of the factional strife between Ito and Yamagata Aritomo, no government officials of the Yamagata clique can be identified as members. At the

56 Ibid., p. 67. For Soejima’s relations with the Toho Kyokai, see Yasuoka Akio, 'Toho Kyokai to Soejima Taneomi' (The Oriental Society and Soejima Taneomi) in Seiji keizai shigaku, no. 169, pp. 1-12.
beginning, the members of the Society were ninety-nine persons, but in less than one year it reached five hundred. 57

The major concern of the Society was to study Asian countries and the South Sea Islands. And for this purpose, the Society published a report. In particular, information on Southeast Asian countries was to be collected through newspapers, books, magazines. The reasons why a report was published are quite interesting. It was because (a) there were many people who could understand English and French, but few could communicate in Chinese and Korean, (b) many people argued about Germany, France, Britain, and Russia, but still few were interested in relations among the Eastern countries, (c) while many commercial reports about Paris, London, and New York, had been produced, China, Korea, Hong Kong, Amoy, Hanoi, Saigon, Bangkok, Singapore, Manila, Borneo, Sydney, Melbourne, and the Coral Sea Islands, which were in closer reach for Japan's trade, were hardly reported. There was no information even about their import-export figures. Furthermore, the Report of the Oriental Society was expected to contribute to the academic world on matters not only of Japan itself, but also of Japan's neighbour countries. 58

The Toho Kyokai Hokoku (Report of the Oriental Society) was issued from May 1891 until July 1914 (hereafter cited as Toho Kyokai Hokoku). The title of the report was changed from Toho Kyokai Hokoku to Toho Kyokai Kaiho (The Proceedings of the Toho Kyokai; hereafter cited under The Toho Kyokai Kaiho) from the issue of August 1894 onward. In total, 269 issues survive. After July 1914, it is not known whether or not issues of the Society report continued. 59 Also, the Oriental Society had lecture meetings, and sent observation missions to other Asian countries. Other distinct activities of the Oriental Society were as follows.

First, this Society ran a Russian language school. On 11th January 1892, it was opened with three Japanese instructors. The then Russian Minister in Tokyo visited the School eighty days later to extend his congratulations. Within two months, the number of students reached

57 Sakata Masatoshi, op. cit., p. 331. A summary of the members including those who later became members is as follows:
59 Yasuoka Akio, 'Toho Kyokai ni tsuite no kisoteki kenkyu', p. 78.
seventy-eight. Second, the Society exchanged courtesies with foreign ministers and visitors in Tokyo. Those people included the Chinese Minister in Tokyo (in 1895), the former British First Lord of the Admiralty (Navy Minister), Earl Spencer, K.G. (in 1896), British Admiral Sir Charles Beresford (1899), and Dr Sun Yat-Sen (in 1913). Further, the Chinese Minister in Tokyo, Lee Ching-Fang, and the Korean Minister in Tokyo, Lee He-Kuei delivered congratulatory address at the first general meeting in 1891. Also the American Minister in Tokyo, Luke E. Wright, and Russian Minister in Tokyo, George Bakhmeteff participated in the fifteenth general meeting in 1907. An invitation was also made to British Minister Sir E. Satow to attend in 1900.

The Oriental Society published several books, including the translation of two of the American Admiral Mahan's publications, *The influence of sea power upon history 1660-1783* and *The influence of sea power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812*. (See Ch. 3 fn. 64) The Map of the current Chinese situation was edited by Sun-Yat-Sen. The Society also produced a map of Asia.

It is another feature of the Oriental Society that it set up a committee of Chinese studies in 1899. The committee members consisted of representatives of other institutions concerned with Asia, of companies, banks, Chambers of commerce, and commercial and art schools. It seems that it was set up for the purpose of exchanging friendly feelings among participating organizations. What this committee did is not clear, except the publishing of a translation from the French of a book entitled merely *La Chine* whose author was not mentioned but for his initials, M.S..

The Oriental Society was comprised of widely differing institutions and people. It was able to be so probably because it was ostensibly an academic organization. In fact, when the Toakai (Eastern Society) and Dobun Kai (Common Culture Society) were united as the Toa Dobun Kai in 1897, the Toho Kyokai was also expected to merge with the Toa Dobun Kai. However, in consequence of discussion between Prince Konoe and the Toho Kyokai chief secretary, Inagaki Manjiro, the Toho Kyokai kept its distance from the other organizations on

---

60 Ibid., p. 92.
61 'Satow Diaries', 3 December 1896 in PRO. 30/33/15.
62 Yasuoka Akio, 'Toho Kyokai ni tsuite no kisoteki kenkyu', p. 95.
63 Ibid., pp. 93-94.
the ground that the major concern of the Toho Kyokai was in the academic sphere, and the Toho Kyokai should serve as a bridge to other organizations.\textsuperscript{64}

However, the Toho Kyokai was not a real academic organ like university research institutions. Apparently, it was aiming at research with respect to Asian affairs, particularly Southeast Asian countries and the South Sea islands, but this research was expected to be done for the purpose of giving information on Asian countries to those who were engaged in emigration, trading, and shipping in Japan. Furthermore, the Toho Kyokai had a wish to help the Japanese government regarding Asian issues.\textsuperscript{65} It can be said that the Toho Kyokai intended to contribute to Japan's expansion, taking an academic approach to Asian affairs. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the Toho Kyokai was a non-political organization. On the contrary, it consisted of leading political and economic figures. Evidently, the Toho Kyokai gave advice to the government on political issues. (See Ch. 4-4-1) Among these, the proposal for the establishment of a Japanese Legation in Bangkok is noteworthy in this study.

In a sense, the modern relations between Japan and Siam were fostered by the activities of the Toho Kyokai. The person who actually devoted himself to Siamese affairs was the chief secretary of the Toho Kyokai, Inagaki Manjiro, who became afterwards the first Minister to Siam. In the next chapter, we will examine him in detail.

\textsuperscript{64} Sakata Masatoshi, op. cit., p. 345. As for Toakai and Dobun Kai, see ibid., pp. 334-344. For a detailed study of the Toa Dobun Kai, see ibid., pp. 345-352 and Sakata Masatoshi, 'Taigaiko no undo' (Hardline Movement against Foreign Countries) in \textit{Tokyo toritsu daigaku hogakkai zasshi} (The Journal of the Jurisprudence Society of University of Tokyo Metropolitan), vol.11, no.1, 1970.

\textsuperscript{65} Yasuoka Akio, 'Toho Kyokai ni tsuite no kisoteki kenkyu', p. 96.
This chapter deals with a special Meiji Japanese, Inagaki Manjiro. He acted as chief secretary of the Toho Kyokai which has been described in chapter two. As first Japanese Minister in Bangkok he negotiated with the Siamese government and concluded a commerce and friendship treaty. Despite such activities, Inagaki has not generally been considered important by historians, but it may be said that he was the key person in the resumption of Japan's diplomatic relations with Siam.

It can also be said that Inagaki was representative of those Meiji intellectuals who looked to Southeast Asia and the South Seas. His several books and articles concerning these regions have not been examined very much. To investigate Inagaki's views and opinions is to understand what the Meiji intellectuals thought about Southeast Asia and the South Seas.

Before examining Inagaki, aspects of the political situation of the contemporary Meiji government need to be outlined in order to understand the background to Inagaki's activities.

3-1. Political situation of Japan in the late nineteenth century

Japan's relations with China were confused during the first half of the 1880's. The Meiji government, with Inoue Kaoru as Foreign Minister 1879-1887, having insufficient military power, on the one hand decided to increase its military budget despite some public opposition, and on the other, adopted a temporising policy, thus averting an immediate clash with China. Inoue seemed to be adopting a conciliatory political attitude towards China, even though in reality he intended to promote Korean independence of China. He was in a contradictory situation because by adopting this accommodating policy to China, it meant that he had to recognize China's suzerainty over Korea. Despite the 1884 Incident in Seoul, Inoue continued to keep to his policy of compromise with China. Chinese penetration of the Korean government apparently increased. In such a situation, Inoue laid emphasis on the treaty revision issue with the Powers while he was gaining time until Japan had sufficient military force. However, his approaches to the negotiations, characterized simply by the term 'Rokumeikan diplomacy',

---

along with non-public and secret meetings, aroused controversy both outside and within the Government, which led finally to his resignation from his post.

The leader of the Rikken-Kaishin Party, Okuma Shigenobu, was installed as the new Foreign Minister in 1888. Okuma had been strongly opposed to the previous government policy on treaty revision with the Western Powers. He dedicated himself to the task of treaty revision exclusively. However, his absorption in treaty revision work resulted, shortly after, in an attitude of hostility towards him among the other members of the cabinet, for fear of the success of Okuma's party in the forthcoming first national election (1890). The new government's continuation of clandestine meetings on treaty revision sharpened critical public opinion against Okuma. It was, furthermore, in a report of The Times which covered Okuma's treaty draft that a number of Japanese journalists condemned Okuma himself. The climax was a bomb attack on Okuma by a terrorist zealot in October 1889, which cost him a leg.

After Okuma was attacked, the Sanjo cabinet resigned and Yamagata Aritomo became the Prime Minister in 1889 with a new Foreign Minister, Aoki Shuzo. Aoki was known as pro-German and a nationalist, with experience behind him as vice-Minister and Minister to Germany for a total of 16 years. Aoki and the succeeding Foreign Minister, Enomoto Take'aki (1891-1892), previously the Minister to Russia, both seemed to be very conscious of the threat of Russian expansionism involving the status of Korea. In particular, Enomoto, having access to certain information on the Russian Trans-Siberian railway construction plans, predicted the coming of a major international political change. Aoki, on the other hand, circulated an account of his opinions entitled 'Higashi Ajia Rekkoku no Kenko' of 1890 (A Balance of Power in East Asian Countries), in which he stressed simply that Japan, in cooperation with China, should put an end to Russian penetration across Siberia. His opinion on Korea was quite radical, proposing protectorate rights, a drastic change. 2

Aoki's memorandum was originally based on Premier Yamagata's two memoranda 'Gunji Iken Sho' of 1888 (An opinion on military matters) 3 and 'Gaiko Seiryaku Ron' of 1890 (A View of tactical diplomacy). Yamagata suggested that apart from the national boundary line, there was another national line that was an 'Interest line'. In an era of Western imperialism, if

---

one wanted to remain an independent country, this 'Interest line' needed to be protected. For
Japan, he maintained, Korea was apparently within the Interest line. Yamagata thus urged a
policy of increasing the military budget, which was taken up by his successor as premier,
Matsukata Masayoshi, in order to accomplish Yamagata's plan, that is the security of Japan's
'interest' line.

As for treaty revision with the Powers, Aoki and Enomoto both took, in a sense, a tough
line in their support for unilateral denunciation of treaties, according to the theory of
international law supported by the German adviser to the Meiji government, Hermann Roessler.
In contrast to their firm attitude towards treaty revision, however, extremely nervous sentiments
were provoked, not only in the Government but also among the Japanese public in general, by
the announcement by the Russian Emperor Alexander III, that the building of the Trans-
Siberian Railway would begin in March 1891. Added to this, there was the consequent visit of
the Russian Crown Prince (the future tsar, Nicholas II) to Japan, en route to Vladivostok to
attend the first tape-cutting ceremony of this railway. The fear caused by these impending
events was symbolized by the Otsu Incident, an assassination attempt by shooting on the
Russian prince, in Tokyo, in May 1891, which he barely survived. In addition, another visit to
Japan, that of the Chinese Eastern Fleet, in July of the same year, further intensified the anxious
attitude of the Japanese. Meanwhile, the policy of Yamagata and the Matsukata cabinet for
enlarging the armed forces faced stubborn resistance from the opposition, which led later to the
takeover, in August 1892, of the Ito cabinet with, as Foreign Minister, Mutsu Munemitsu,
previously Minister to the United States. Thus during 1892-1894, before the Sino-Japanese War
broke out, the domestic political imbroglio between the Meiji government and the opposition,
including the treaty revision issue, led to instability of authority which seemed to make it
necessary for successive cabinets to find a distraction from the trend towards public loss of
confidence in them.

On the other hand, the military, expecting a future war with China and even Russia,
seemed to be somewhat indifferent to domestic affairs. A proclamation of 'Senji-Daihonei-Jorei'
(an ordinance of the Great Headquarters during wartime) appeared from the Meiji Emperor
which strengthened the power of the General Staff Office (G.S.O.) by means of excluding civil

officers, even the Prime Minister, from the G.S.O. in wartime. This exemplified clearly the attitude of the military at this time. It was in 1893 that the vice-head of the G.S.O., Lieutenant-General Kawakami Soroku, took himself off for a 3 months tour of inspection in China and Korea.

It was the Tonghak Rebellion in Korea that caused the awkward relations existing between Japan and China to come to a head in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Before the Chinese took military action the Meiji government resolved to dispatch troops on the pretext of subduing the riots in Korea. However, it was most likely an embarrassment when the Japanese Minister to China and Korea, Otori Keisuke, on home-leave in Japan, arrived back hastily in Seoul, accompanied by the security forces, to find a peaceful spectacle: the rioters had already agreed to a compromise with the Korean government forces. The reason for the Japanese government dispatching the troops became invalid. Further dispatch of troops should not have been decided upon. However, the Premier, Ito, and the Foreign Minister, Mutsu, under some pressure from the G.S.O., and nervous about the ambitions of the Powers towards Korea, finally decided to dispatch more troops to Seoul, and in fact Mutsu, in league with General Kawakami, sent more than those authorized by premier Ito.

Due to the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty concluded in April 1895, terminating the Sino-Japanese War, and despite the following Western Powers' Triple Intervention, the initiative for which was taken by Russia, Japan achieved at last the overthrow of the suzerainty of the Chinese Empire over Korea, its wish since the beginning of the Meiji government. But although Japan won the war, it turned out that in consequence Russia began to focus its expansion policy in the Far East even more on Korea and Manchuria. Japan now had to face Imperial Russia full-face. Russian military influence in Korea grew until the so-called doctrine of conceding Manchuria for Korea (Man-kan Kokan policy) was openly waged by the new Japanese Foreign Minister, Nishi Tokujiro, with the Russian Minister to Japan, Baron Roman Romanovich Rosen in 1898. This had developed swiftly and substantially, in particular after the Komura-Waeber memorandum of 1896 and the subsequent agreement between Yamagata and Lobanov in June.

---

6 He was the envoy to Bangkok in 1875, see Chapter 1-3.
of the same year, quite invalidating the earlier 1895 effects of the Japanese representatives in 
Korea, to secure a predominance there without any reference to Russia.

3-2. A brief sketch of Inagaki's life

3-2-1. Inagaki and Cambridge

Already, many Meiji diplomats have attracted attention in the study of Japanese modern 
history because of their well-known activities. Inagaki Manjiro, however, is not this kind of star. 
Indeed Inagaki has not been familiar even to present-day Japanese historians.8

Inagaki Manjiro was born in Hirado Han or clan (Hirado city today) in Nagasaki 
prefecture on 26th September 1861, 7 years before the so-called Meiji Ishin or Meiji 
Restoration. His father was a Bushi or Samurai who served Hirado Han and had studied with 
Yoshida Shoin, on his coming down to the Nagasaki area. Yoshida is famous for providing one 
ideological trigger for the overthrow of the Bakufu government of the Tokugawa.

As Inagaki's father died at the age of 40, Inagaki together with his elder brother was 
brought up by their uncle. Until 17 years old, young Inagaki learnt the arts of war in Nagasaki 
and Kagoshima prefectures successively. He worked temporarily at Nagasaki prison where he 
was able to obtain funds for his future study in Tokyo, and afterwards entered Tokyo 
University.9 During his period in the university, there was one episode from which we can learn 
something about the young Inagaki. In October 1883, a graduation ceremony of this University 
was held at the campus. Although it had previously been held in the evening, the 1883 
ceremony was held in day-time. A number of students were not able to attend this ceremony 
because they had a hike which had been planned beforehand. Their complaints about the day­ 
time graduation ceremony having been ignored, the students returned from the hike, and got 
drunk and disorderly that night instigating other students into wild behaviour.10 As a result, 140 
students including Inagaki were dealt with severely by the University, and expelled.11

8 Recent discussion of Inagaki appears in Ishii Yoneo and Yoshikawa Toshiharu, Nittai roppyaku nenshi (Six 
Hundred Years of Japan-Thai Relations), op. cit. But there is little writing in English mentioning Inagaki. Brailey, 
'Sir Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: The Trial of A Diplomat in The Age of High Imperialism', op. cit., which analyses 
the Satow Diaries, gives us previously unknown information on Inagaki. For Inagaki at Cambridge, there is a short 
137 and p. 281. Also Iriye Akira, Pacific Estrangement (Massachusetts, 1972), pp. 35-36, Swan, 'Japanese Economic 
9 Nagasakiken Kyoikuinkai (ed.) Nagasakiken jinbutsu den (The Biographies of Famous People in Nagasaki 
10 Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun (The Newspaper Tokyo Nichinichi), November 11, 1883.
11 Choya Shinbun (The Newspaper Choya), November 25, 1883.
However, 60 students including Inagaki had their expulsion from the University cancelled later because their act was considered a minor offence. On this occasion, what we should not overlook is that Matsukata Kojirō, the second son of Marquis Matsukata Masayoshi who was currently taking a leading part in contemporary Japanese politics, and later became Prime Minister twice (1891-92 and 1896-98), was involved. Thus Inagaki seems to have become acquainted with the second son of Marquis Matsukata while studying at the University, and thereafter throughout his life Inagaki had close relations with Marquis Matsukata. For instance, Inagaki was recommended by Marquis Matsukata to be the first resident Minister to Siam.

At any rate, Inagaki no longer attended Tokyo University because he accompanied his clan's prince, Matsu-Ura Atsushi, to study abroad, at Cambridge University which apparently provided Inagaki with proficiency in English and a knowledge of modern European history. Inagaki started as a student of Caius College under the supervision of Professor Seeley in 1886. What Inagaki did in England apart from his academic work in Cambridge has not yet been revealed. But he must have been devoted to his study before everything. How he devoted himself to academic work in Cambridge is evident from the fact that he submitted two graduation theses, 'Japan and The Pacific. A Japanese View of The Eastern Question', and 'A History of The Migration of Centres of Commercial and Industrial Energies of The World' [sic], and what is more, the former was published later in London by Fisher Unwin in 1890. It was a very unusual occurrence at that time that a Japanese having completed a British university course should publish an English-language book on Japan in the western world.

---

12 Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun, January 21, 1884.
13 Tanaka Yajiro, Inagaki Manjiro to taikoku (Inagaki Manjiro and Thailand) in Kokusai hyoron (The Comment on International Affairs), vol.8, no.8, 1943, p. 52.
15 Oka Jiro, Inagaki seishi den (Biography of Inagaki, a mission from the stars) in Hyoson bunshu (The Collection of Works of Hyoson), vol.2, (Kobunsha, 1940), unpagged book. Oka was Inagaki's old friend, from the same village. Also see Meiji jinbutsu itsuwa jiten, jokan (Biographical Dictionary of Episodes of Famous People in Meiji Era, first book) (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 97-98.
16 Inagaki Manjiro, Japan and the Pacific and A Japanese View of the Eastern Question (London, 1890). Hereafter cited under Japan and the Pacific. He himself mentioned in another book that he sent over 500 copies to western politicians and other leading political figures, the press in England, on the European Continent and in the United States. See Inagaki Manjiro, Tohosaku ketsuron so'an (A Draft concerning conclusive views on Eastern Policy) (Tokyo, 1892), p. 229, and also see Inagaki Manjiro, Tohosaku daiippen (Eastern Policy, vol.1) (Tokyo, 1891). On the opening page of Tohosaku daiippen some letters of thanks were reprinted. One of these is a letter from Lord Salisbury dated June 17 1890, and a number of reviews of Inagaki's first book in both Japanese and foreign newspapers (translated into Japanese) are quoted in pp. 179-206.
Inagaki returned to Japan via America in 1891, gaining some understanding about America. Soon after, for the time being, he got a teaching job at Gakushuin University (from where the Imperial Family usually graduate even at present). In the same year, he published a Japanese version of one of his Cambridge theses adding some new points and supplementary articles. It went through several editions which established his name as a 'Toho Sakushi' or 'eastern tactician', not only within political circles but also among ordinary people. He also authored other books, mostly concerned with Japanese foreign policy. Until 1897, when he was appointed as the first resident minister to Siam, Inagaki took an active part as one of the members, shortly given the post of the chief secretary in 1895, of the Toho Kyokai or Oriental Society dealt with in chapter 2, which was founded in the same year as Inagaki's return to Japan, 1891. He contributed many articles to the Toho Kyokai Hokoku or The Report of the Oriental Society. His views on Japanese foreign policy will be examined from his written works in the following sections. Let us trace his career first.

In early March 1892, Inagaki made a lecture trip around Japan. This tour took four months, until 11th July. After he returned to Tokyo, he wrote to Marquis Matsukata that:

Yesterday, I came back from my lecture tour. I have already reported to you that I have been to the Kansai area [The major cities in Kansai area are Osaka, Kobe and Kyoto]. Then I visited Tsuruga port [in Fukui prefecture], and entered Kanazawa city, where I delivered my views on foreign-policy education to students and teachers from both a five-year boy's school on the higher education level and a teachers college. About five or six hundred people attended the lecture. I believe that they were quite impressed by my lecture. After that, I was invited by the Chamber of Commerce of that region to lecture on the same matter. The audience, of about seven hundred, consisted of members of several political parties, who listened to my address in an attentive manner.

17 Kokumin Shinbun (The Newspaper Kokumin). November 27, 1908.
18 Inagaki Manjiro, Tohosaku daiippen, and ditto dainihen (vol.2) (Tokyo, 1891). One of his supplementary articles was entitled 'A Commercial War between England and America', which seems to be based on his Cambridge thesis, 'A History of The Migration of Centres of Commercial and Industrial Energies of the World'; the other was 'The Political Situation in Eastern Europe'.
19 These Inagaki works are as follows, Siberia tetsudo ron (A View on the Siberian Railways) (Tokyo, 1891), Kizoku ron, daiichi, daini (A View on Aristocracy, vol.1 and 2) (Tokyo, 1891 and 1893 respectively), Taigaisaku (A View on Foreign Affairs) (Tokyo, 1891), Tohosaku ketsuron so'an, op. cit., Kyoiku no taihon (A Fundamental Principle of Education) (Tokyo, 1892), Nan'yo choosei dan (A Tale of the South Seas) (Tokyo, 1893), Gaiko to gaisei (Diplomacy and Expansion) (Tokyo, 1896).
20 Kokumin Shinbun (The Newspaper Kokumin). March 4, 1892.
21 The letter from Inagaki to Marquis Matsukata in Okubo Tatsumasa, vol.6, p. 402.
Inagaki went on with his lecturing in Toyama, Niigata, Akita, Aomori, Hakodate and Sendai regions respectively, in the same way as mentioned above. He concluded his letter as follows:

I am very pleased that the audiences, regardless of any political party loyalty, and the government officials lent an open ear to my lecture, considering Japanese foreign policy to be a national issue. The total number of the audiences reached thirty-eight to forty thousand. I am convinced that my lectures roused support for discussing Japanese foreign policy around the country, by which political debate presently focussed on trifling domestic matters will be turned in its direction.

What he said in each place mostly appeared later in the Toho Kyokai Hokoku. And it should be repeated here that Inagaki must have had close relations with Marquis Matsukata as is evident from the immediate sending of the above personal letter to him.

Before long, Inagaki produced another significant book, Tohosaku ketsuron solan (A Draft concerning conclusive views on Eastern Policy) which he had been compiling for years, and added various points from the above mentioned lecture tour, some of which help us to understand how Inagaki came to be involved in Siamese affairs. From these actions of Inagaki, it could be said that he was showing his talent step by step through his written works, followed by active propagandizing.

Inagaki's active and eloquent personality can be illustrated again by another example. After his lecture tour around Japan, he made observation trips to Australia, various South Seas Islands, Siberia and China in a fashion common to a number of contemporaries. His investigation tour was implemented firstly in Australia and the South Seas in 1892, and he published his experience in the Toho Kyokai Hokoku, titled 'Nan'yo no Jissei (The actual condition of the South Seas). This work soon after appeared in the form of a hard-cover book. According to this book, Inagaki left Nagasaki port on 19th October 1892 for Hong Kong via Taiwan. Then he went to Saigon in French Indo-China. After visiting Singapore, he went down to Australia. Ambitiously, he set out from Queensland, through Townsville, New Caledonia, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, and finally reached Albany in West Australia. Then

---

22 Ibid., p. 403.
23 Ibid., pp. 402-403.
24 See above fn. 16.
25 Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun (The Newspaper Tokyo Nichinichi), July 14, 1892. Inagaki had already mentioned his plans in his first book, Inagaki Manjiro, Japan and the Pacific, Preface, p. II.
27 Inagaki Manjiro, Nan'yo chossei dan, op. cit.
he went up to Java visiting Soerabaja, Semarang and Batavia. He returned to Nagasaki via Macao and Southern Taiwan. Thus it is evident that although the titles of Inagaki’s report and book employed the term ‘South Seas’ which included, according to usual use then, Micronesia, Melanesia, South China, and Southeast Asia, Inagaki’s concept included Australia as well.

The purpose of this journey was, Inagaki wrote, on the one hand, to observe the significance of Nan’yo or the South Seas for the Far East region, and also in relation to the current issue of Japanese emigration.

Meanwhile, during 1893-96, Inagaki seems to have turned his interest to Siamese affairs. Why did Inagaki begin to take an interest in Siam then, when he had almost ignored Siam back in 1891?

To answer this question, it is necessary to examine his published works, in particular his major work, *Tohosaku ketsuron so’an*, in order to find clues, which will be analysed in the following sections.

At the same period that Inagaki began to be interested in Siam, as a ‘Toho Sakushi’ or eastern tactician brought into sudden prominence in Japanese society after 1891, he seems steadily to have received due recognition in the Japanese Foreign Ministry through his series of published works, lectures and travels. Inagaki’s credit with the Meiji government might be distinguished through the following incident; in 1894, Inagaki visited Siam in order to ascertain whether Siam's government had any intention of concluding a treaty with Japan. On this occasion, he went to Bangkok via Singapore where he was joined by the Japanese Consul at Singapore, Saito Miki. Consul Saito asked permission from the Siamese government for his observation tour through the English Consul for Siam at Singapore, John Anderson, for the purpose of checking the possibility of Japan-Siam trade. Saito observed carefully the situation

---

28 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
29 For the concept of Nan’yo (South Seas), see Mark R. Peattie, *Nan’yo The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1945*., pp. xvii-xviii.
31 In 1891 Inagaki had said that “Siam’s population is only 5 millions------ this country should be beneath one’s notice.” in Inagaki Manjiro, *Taigaisaku*, p. 101.
32 Beyond this, it is very probable that Inagaki was supported by Marquis Matsukata Masayoshi, Okuma Shigenobu and Soejima Taneomi. For Inagaki's relations with Matsukata, see above fn. 14. Okuma was one of the leading supporters of the Toho Kyokai and further had connections with Marquis Matsu-Ura, Inagaki’s lord in the Edo era, by marriage of his grand-daughter-in-law with Matsu-ura’s brother, see Meiji jinmei jiten jikan (*The Biographical Dictionary of Meiji Era*) (Tokyo, 1987), section on Okuma Shigenobu. Inagaki’s close relations with Soejima Taneomi are evident from the fact that Soejima was the first president of the Toho Kyokai and expressed his felicitation in the opening pages of Inagaki’s first Japanese book, *Tohosaku daiippzen*. All three like Inagaki came from *Kyuniku*.
33 John Anderson to Thewawong, March 27, 1894, no. 16 and 17 in Thai National Archives, For. Min. files KT. 33.6.6/5.
of trade and commerce in Siam from the standpoint of Japanese emigration policy. At the same time, Inagaki succeeded in securing consent for the conclusion of a treaty between Siam and Japan from various high officials, Siam’s Foreign Minister, Prince Thewawong, and others. Interestingly, Saito’s report, which was an official one, never referred to this consent.

By contrast, Inagaki’s personal report relates only to the treaty issue. The details of Saito’s report, Inagaki’s report, and the process of concluding the treaty between Siam and Japan will be dealt with in the next chapter. The Toho Kyokai or Oriental Society, possibly as a result of Inagaki’s visit, put forth a proposal for concluding a treaty with Siam to the Meiji government. Inagaki himself expressed his support for concluding a treaty with Siam as well. Evidently Inagaki’s dedication to concluding a treaty with Siam was to be a direct reason for his being appointed first resident Minister to Siam. In Japan, it was a time for taking talented men into government service. Rumour had already had it that Inagaki was to be the envoy for negotiating a treaty with Siam. Eventually on 31st March 1897, Inagaki was appointed as the resident Minister to Siam as the public expected. He devoted himself to concluding the treaty. As a result, a treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, and a Protocol between Japan and Siam, was signed in 1898. Until 1903, he remained in Bangkok.

---

34 Whether Inagaki’s observation tour was originally planned by the Meiji government or whether Inagaki himself planned it, approaching Marquis Matsukata Masayoshi ( premier 1891-92) or perhaps Okuma Shigenobu, the Satow Diaries imply that the Meiji government itself had an intention of concluding a treaty with Siam. See Satow Diaries, 5th March 1896 in PRO. 30/33/15. Meanwhile, it is again clear that Inagaki must have had close relations with Okuma because Inagaki personally gave Okuma his report of this journey to Siam. This report was hand-written in Shanghai en route to Japan from Bangkok in June 1894 on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), and entitled, ‘Nansei hidan (A Secret Account of a Visit to the South)’ in ‘Okuma Shigenobu monjo (Archives on Okuma Shigenobu)’, no.770 (unpaged, hereafter cited under ‘p.-’). Further, in the Okuma archives, there is other evidence showing Inagaki’s private relations with Okuma. See letters by Inagaki to Okuma in ditto, no.540-543. Recently (as of 1989), Waseda University (founded by Okuma) discovered a letter sent from Okuma to Inagaki about Yokohama language school, but the details are not clear. Also the date of despatch does not appear.


36 Toho Kyokai Kaiho (The Proceedings of the Oriental Society), no.16, 1895, pp. 2-6. Previously the Toho Kyokai Hokoku was renamed. The new title was The Toho Kyokai Kaiho (The Proceedings of the Oriental Society) from the edition of August 1894. See Ch. 2-5.

37 Ibid., no.25, 1896, pp. 1-3.

38 See Chugai Shogyo (The Newspaper Chugai Shogyo), August 27, 1897.

39 See Kokumin Shinbun (The Newspaper Kokumin), April 1, 1897.

40 At first Inagaki seems to have expected that he would not stick to Siamese affairs for such a long period. Indeed, Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister, Komura Jutaro intended to send Inagaki to Persia and Turkey to arrange treaties. See Satow Diaries, 8 and 24 April 1897 in PRO. 30/33/15, and Brailey, ‘Sir Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: The Trial of A Diplomat in The Age of High Imperialism’, fn.88. Inagaki himself seems to have expected that he would return to Japan in the autumn of 1897, and indeed had already made an observation tour of the Balkan States and met some leading statesmen probably before his return to Japan from Cambridge, and indicated later that Japan should conclude treaties with them and open Japanese legations there. See Inagaki Manjiro, Tobosaku ketsuron so‘an, pp. 322-323. But there is no actual documentation in the Japanese Foreign Ministry about his involvement in treaty negotiation with them.
During his time in Siam, Inagaki was keeping his eyes open for any movement of the Powers in southeast Asia. In 1903, he was promoted to Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Siam.

It is significant that Inagaki's promotion to Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on a level with contemporary Western representation in Japan and China had been requested in March 1900, in 1902, and again in January 1903, not by the Japanese government but the Siamese government. Prince Thewawong and Prince Damrong, his half-brother, wished the Japanese government to promote Inagaki to be Minister Plenipotentiary on the grounds that the Siamese government was undertaking to negotiate with Western Powers about promoting their representatives to be Ministers Plenipotentiary, so that Siam's national prestige would be enhanced. For this purpose, the first Siamese Minister to Japan, Phraya Rithirong Ronachet, had been sent as Minister Plenipotentiary in 1897 when Inagaki had also been sent to Siam, but not given full authority. In the case of 1902, the Siamese Minister in Tokyo, Phraya Rachanupraphan, asked Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro for Inagaki's promotion during a recess of an audience of the Meiji Emperor.

At any rate, for about 10 years, Inagaki played an important part in establishing friendly relations between Siam and Japan. For example, when Prince Wachirawut visited Japan in 1902 Inagaki, staying in Tokyo to welcome the prince, announced a plan for establishing a Japan-Siam Society in Tokyo with support of the Siamese Minister in Tokyo, Phraya Rachanupraphan.

41 Inagaki made efforts to avert the danger of any territorial acquisition for the purpose of building coaling stations in Siamese waters by the Powers, in particular, Russia. See Mr. Archer to the Marquess of Lansdowne, November 29, 1900 in FO. 422/54/no.4, p. 2. In addition, Inagaki was regarded as the source of some important information about Russian interest in Siam. In 1903, Sir Ernest Satow met him on the train in China, between Tientsin and Peking. See Brailey, 'Sir Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: The Trial of A Diplomat in The Age of High Imperialism', fn. 88. The purpose of his trip is unknown.


In the letter in response to Inagaki's presentation of his enlarged credentials to King Chulalongkorn, the king replied that "With extreme pleasure, I receive the Letter of Credence by which His Majesty the Emperor of Japan has graciously promoted you as His Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at this Court. I fully reciprocate His Imperial Majesty's friendly desire to strengthen the cordial relations which so happily exist between Us: and I sincerely thank His Imperial Majesty for the good wishes which have been so kindly conveyed to Me. These signal works of friendship and cordial relations between Us will ever be the chief means of developing and increasing trade and commerce between Siam and Japan for which We so much look forward to, and thus We may happily rely upon an everlasting cordial understanding between Our two Countries." See King Chulalongkorn to Inagaki, November 11, 1903 in JDA. 6-1-5-8-13. In the list of Japanese Ministers to Siam after 1897 in the Nihon gaikōshi jiten edited by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the description of Inagaki's appointment as Envoy and Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in November 1899 (p. 361) is incorrect. The date of Inagaki's appointment as such was October 14 1903. See JDA. 6-1-5-8-13. The present author confirmed it with staff of the Diplomatic Record Office in Tokyo in July 1990.
Although such a society did not come to be realized at that time, it is evident that Inagaki was enthusiastic for promoting friendly Japan-Siam relations. His constantly venturesome mind can be appreciated from the fact that he also asked permission of Tokyo to make observation tours of India and Burma, but in vain.

It seems probable that it would have taken much more time for the Japanese-Siamese treaty to be concluded had Inagaki not turned his interest to the relations between the two countries at this juncture, and had he not been involved in concluding this negotiation.

In February 1905, he discharged his duty. His record after his return to Japan has not been clarified. But in February 1907, just before the completion of the drafting of Siam's first modern criminal code (23rd of March), in which Masao Tokichi, the Japanese legal adviser, played a considerable role as stated in chapter 5, Inagaki was assigned as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary simultaneously to Spain and Portugal (appointed officially, 7 February). He arrived in Madrid on June 3 1907, and on 11th of the same month he presented his credentials from the Japanese Emperor to the King of Spain. However, about one and a half years later, on 25th November 1908, without any full display of his talents in his new place, he died of nephritis at the summer resort, San Sebastian, at the age of 47, which was to prove a very similar case to that of another man who played a role in the early relations between Japan and Siam, the above-mentioned Masao Tokichi. Before returning to Inagaki's role in the Siam-Japan treaty negotiations in chapter 4, more needs to be said of his published work in the context of Japanese foreign relations in the 1890's, so critical in Eastern Asia as elsewhere in the world.

3-3. Inagaki and his first published work 'Japan and the Pacific'

Inagaki's first book was Japan and the Pacific, and a Japanese View of the Eastern Question, written in 1890, based on his Cambridge thesis. This work is the basis of all his later

43 Osaka Asahi Shinbun (The Newspaper Osaka Asahil, 20 December, 1902.
44 Inagaki to Komura, February 28, 1905, no.14 in JDA. 6-1-6-60. For Komura's refusal, see Komura to Inagaki, May 4, 1905 in ditto.
45 Inagaki to Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu, June 13, 1907 in JDA. 6-1-5-8-13. Kokumin Shinbun (The Newspaper Kokumin), November 27, 1908.
46 Yomiuri Shinbun (The Newspaper Yomiuri), November 27, 1908. And Nagasaki-ken Kyoikuinkai, p. 859. Throughout his life, he was decorated three times by the Japanese government with The Third Class of the Sacred Treasure in 1898, The Second Class of the Sacred Treasure in 1905 and posthumously, with The First Class of the Sacred Treasure in 1908, and by the Siamese government, with The First Class of the Royal Family in 1898. Kokumin Shinbun, loc. cit.
published works throughout his life. It is divided into two parts. The first part deals with Japan's relationship to British foreign policy in the Far East region in terms of British geo-politics, strategy and international trade. The second part traces the history of the so-called 'Eastern Question' from its genesis commencing with a historical retrospect of Russian and English policy in Eastern Europe. Inagaki expressed the purpose of this work as follows:

My aim has been twofold: on the one hand, to arouse my own countrymen to a sense of the great part Japan has to play in the coming century; on the other, to call the attention of Englishmen to the important position my country occupies with regard to British interests in the far East.\(^{47}\)

It is clear that his second aim was more compelling not only for the British but also other contemporary western people who could obtain little reliable information of Japan. Therefore Inagaki placed it in the first part of this work, though it accounts for only 30 percent of the book. On the other hand, it might be said that his attention to the Eastern Mediterranean Question dealt with in the second part was pioneering work for a Meiji Japanese. He must have been becoming aware of western imperialism towards the Far East during his historical study in Cambridge. Thus he said:

This I have done [covered] in part two because any movement in Eastern Europe or Central Asia will henceforth infallibly spread northwards to the Baltic and eastwards to the Pacific. An acquaintance with the Eastern Question in all its phases will thus be necessary for the statesmen of Japan in the immediate future.\(^{48}\)

The second part, however, is much more like survey review work, but was, of course, his main achievement in Cambridge. Based on contemporary English academic ideas on the so-called Eastern Question, he wanted to provoke fellow Japanese to recognize the importance of this issue as a struggle between Britain and Russia which would have great repercussions in the Pacific region.

It should be noted that Inagaki explicitly suggested an Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 12 years before it was actually signed in 1902. Further, he insisted that, considering Japan's geographical position, Port Hamilton (Komun Island)\(^{49}\) in Korea occupied by England in 1885 would be useless as a head station for the Trans-Canadian Pacific Railway trade without this Alliance.\(^{50}\) His concern about the potential Russian threat prompted this passage: "it [an Alliance] would be of immense importance in withstanding a Russian attack on the British

\(^{47}\) Inagaki Manjiro, Japan and the Pacific, pp. 9-10.
\(^{48}\) Ibid.
\(^{49}\) See Ch. 2 fn. 20.
\(^{50}\) Inagaki Manjiro, Japan and the Pacific, p. 33.
interests from the Yellow Sea through Mongolia or Manchooria [Manchuria]. He even dared to suggest that Japan was "the Key of the Pacific". While Inagaki emphasized Japan's advantageous position in the Japan Sea and North China Sea because of holding Tsushima Island commanding the connecting Tsushima Straits, he did not forget to allude to Japan's alternative option of alliance with Russia:

She [Japan] would also, if required, have gained other naval stations on the coast of the Japan Sea ready for any emergency. In this manner she would be able to keep out the British fleet from attacking Vladivostock and the Amoor through the Japan Sea. Even if she might not be able to do this single-handed she certainly could by an alliance with Russia.

However, it could not be supposed that Inagaki himself really wished a Japanese alliance with Russia. It should be regarded as simple rhetoric.

Indicating future Russian southward expansion, Inagaki's conclusion returned again to the importance of Japan's position. He described Japanese geographical features, the nature of the Japanese people, the actual condition of both the military and the navy, and the possibilities of trade, and manufacturing. In particular, he focused on the geographical location of Japan as a future "centre of three large markets" i.e. Europe, Asia, and America. In the event of the opening of the Panama Canal or Nicaragua Canal, or the Siberian Railway schemes, and also due to the existing Canadian Pacific Railway, following Seeley Inagaki advocated calling the then era "the railway-oceanic".

---

51 Ibid., p. 34.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 32. This implicit warning seems to have had an effect on George N. Curzon. He forecast that "It is largely by the offer of the alliance of her Navy that Japan hopes in the future to control the balance of power in the Far East." See Problems of the Far East, new revised edition, (London, 1896, the first ed. in 1894), p. 39. He also admitted that "she has no higher ambition than to be the Britain of the Far East. By means of an army strong enough to defend her shores, and to render invasion unlikely, and still more of a navy sufficiently powerful to sweep the seas,—." See George N. Curzon, 'The Destinies of the Far East' in National Review, May 1893, p. 317. Curzon did actually read Inagaki's Japan and the Pacific while coming from Vancouver in 1892. 'Diary' in Curzon Papers, Mss Eur. India Office Library.
54 Inagaki Manjiro, Japan and the Pacific, pp. 42-44.
55 Ibid., p. 47.
56 Ibid., p. 53. A similar argument appeared in Curzon's publications. He opined that "The opening of the Canadian Pacific Railways and Trans-Pacific route on the Eastern side, the prospective completion of the Nicaragua Canal farther to the South, the maritime ambitions of Russia—will in the course of the coming century develop a Pacific Question, the existence of which is now hardly suspected, and the outlines of which can at present be only dimly foreseen. In the solution of such a question Japan, by virtue of her situation, is capable of playing a dominant part." See George N. Curzon, 'The Destinies of the Far East', p. 318, and repeated in his Problems of the Far East, pp. 393-394.
57 Inagaki Manjiro, Japan and the Pacific, p. 52. He quoted this concept from John Robert Seeley, Expansion of England (London, 1883), p. 87. Seeley listed three stages of civilization determined by geographical conditions i.e. the potamic, the thalassic and the oceanic.
Through the first part of Inagaki's first work, it can be concluded that to a great extent he feared Russian activity in the Far East, and to some extent German activity in the Pacific. And he was, needless to say, considerably in favour of England. Evidently he hoped for an Anglo-Japanese alliance. He seemed to have foreseen even an Anglo-Japanese-Chinese triple alliance against Russia specifically and perhaps even Germany. 58

3-4. Inagaki's view of Japan's foreign policy

In 1891, Inagaki started contributing to the Toho Kyokai Hokoku. Most of his articles were based on his addresses to the Toho Kyokai regular meetings. 59

Around that time, Inagaki made a lecture trip around Japan as has already been noted. Deriving new information from this trip, in September 1892, Inagaki issued his Tohosaku ketsuron so'an (A Draft concerning conclusive views on Eastern Policy), in which he revealed his proposals for Japan's foreign policy.

Reviewing Japanese foreign policy towards England, Russia and France on a long-range basis, Inagaki defined his view of 'foreign policy' saying that:

In my definition, the nature of foreign policy never means only ad hoc foreign tactics. It means fundamental principles of diplomacy. It consists of three aspects; 1.political foreign policy, 2.commercial foreign policy and 3.industrial foreign policy. 60

Based on his original view in his first book of 1890, Japan and the Pacific, though to a great extent a visionary opinion at that time, Inagaki insisted that the centre of world commerce and industry would move from the West to the East, and that Japan was in a vital position for that development. Now he proposed that it must be the basis of Japan's commercial policy that Japan should become the centre of the economic distribution of the world. 61

58 It is interesting that Sir. C. Macdonald the British Minister at Peking during 1896-1900, in 1898 actually proposed to the Foreign Office in London which was contemplating occupation of Weihaiwei, an Anglo-Japanese-Chinese alliance against Russian occupation of Port Arthur. See L. K. Young, British Policy in China, 1895-1902 (Oxford, 1970), p. 73.
59 Inagaki Manjiro, 'The question of whether Japan can express dissent in the light of International Law concerning the British occupation of Kyubun Island' (in Japanese) in Toho Kyokai Hokoku, no.6, November, 1891, pp. 31-40. Following his address, the meeting had a discussion on the British occupation of Kyubun Island (Port Hamilton), ditto, extra edition, December, 1891, pp. 1-17. The former article was reprinted in Inagaki Manjiro, Tohosaku ketsuron so'an, appendix, pp. 30-55. The present author referred to this appendix. Also his 'Benefit from Sakhalin and the Kurile Island within the East from a geographical point of view' (in Japanese), in Toho Kyokai Hokoku, no.9, January, 1892, pp. 33-53. This was also reprinted in Tohosaku ketsuron so'an, appendix, pp. 1-30. And his 'The question of which is the better position in the Pacific, Amami-o-shina or Formosa' (in Japanese), in Toho Kyokai Hokoku, no.11, April, 1892, pp. 85-134, or Tohosaku ketsuron so'an, appendix, pp. 55-115.
60 Inagaki Manjiro, Tohosaku ketsuron so'an, p. 9.
61 Ibid., p. 37.
Regarding his opinion on Japan's industrial policy, in particular, the cotton industry, there seems to be some hint as to why Inagaki was to take an interest in Siamese affairs hereafter. It is possible that Inagaki would come to draw attention later to Siamese raw cotton. If its quality was acceptable, it could not be ignored. Then the conclusion arises, Inagaki might have turned his attention to Siam as a country exporting raw cotton and even other raw materials. 62

Also on the topic of the cotton spinning industry of Japan, Inagaki's discussion was carried on to the future development of the Japanese spinning industry by suggesting that Kyushu, the southern island of Japan, should be the centre of Japan's industry, with both silk and cotton spinning mills, and with an iron mill also to be built in Kyushu where it would have easier access to coal. And he forecast that in 5 or 10 years time, an iron mill would be built there. 63

In fact, 9 years later, in 1901, the first government-controlled iron mill, Yahata (Yawata) iron mill, commenced operation.

Inagaki expressed his opinion regarding naval and army policies, laying stress more on the navy than the army. 64 His idea of a feasible policy for the Army was that the Japanese government should station a new army division on the Japan Sea coast for defence against any southern attack. 65

---

62 At a later time, Inagaki made a speech at a dinner party given by the Toho Kyokai in his own honour and that of Megata Tanetaro on 24th January 1906. Inagaki said that "I have always been thinking that it would bring about an interesting outcome if Japan's industry was combined with Siam's raw materials." See Inagaki Manjiro, 'The present condition of Siam' (in Japanese) in Toho Kyokai Hokoku, no.132, February 1906, p. 20. Megata was a high official of the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the first Japanese financial adviser employed by the Korean government as a result of the 1904 agreement between Korea and Japan. See Ki-baik Lee, translated by Edward W. Wagner, A New History of Korea (Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 308.

63 Inagaki Manjiro, Tohosaku ketsuron so'an, p. 180.

64 Ibid., pp. 238-239. It is probable that Admiral A.T. Mahan's well-known volume, The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783, published in London the same year as Inagaki's Japan and the Pacific, influenced Inagaki's naval-based view. On the other hand, Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and the Empire appeared in London in 1893 after Inagaki's Tohosaku ketsuron so'an in September 1892. Marder commented that "Mahan's work enables even laymen to grasp the principles which governed naval warfare.— Mahan became practically the naval Mohammed of England. There was hardly a professional paper of discussion at the Royal United Service Institution which did not quote from Mahan's writings." See Arthur J. Marder, British Naval Policy 1880-1905 (London, 1941), pp. 46-47. The above Mahan two volumes were actually translated into Japanese and published by the Toho Kyokai in 1896 and in 1900 respectively. See Yasuoka Akio, 'Toho Kyokai ni tsuite no kisoteki kenkyu', p. 95. There is no mention of the name of the translator, though an association, Nihon Suiko Sha, sponsored the above books, but it seems likely that Inagaki took some part in this translation work.

65 Inagaki Manjiro, Tohosaku ketsuron so'an, p. 301. He had already expressed this idea in the Toho Kyokai Hokoku. See his 'A proposal for investigating the building of a new port on the coastal area of the northern Japan Sea' (in Japanese), in Toho Kyokai Hokoku, August, 1892, pp. 158-163.
Significantly, Inagaki showed his perception of treaty revision with the Powers, which will give us another clue to the question of why Inagaki was to take an interest in Siamese affairs hereafter. He commented on treaty revision that:

Since at the present day it is quite difficult for Japan to acquire equal status with the Powers, she should take a gradual approach to this matter. The procedure for this is that Japan should conclude treaties with other [non-Western] countries which had already concluded equal treaties with the Powers, and in cases where Japan concludes a treaty with a country where the Powers have obtained extraterritoriality, she should follow the Powers. For example, Turkey has concluded an unequal treaty with the Powers. If Japan concludes an equal treaty with Turkey, it will not only have the effect of depriving Asian countries of their self-respect but also lose Japan international prestige. This strategy is not well advised. It is a more appropriate policy for Japan, in order to progress to equal status to conclude treaties with small countries as one stage, and with the extraterritorial countries as another stage.

Essentially, it might be said that there were two dimensions to Inagaki's approach to Siam, one economic; Siam could be the country to supply raw cotton or other materials for the development of Japan's industry, the other political; concluding a treaty with Siam might effect one step towards Japan's recovery of her full sovereign status.

3-5. Did Inagaki influence the Japanese government?

Inagaki's view of foreign affairs ranges over various issues, sometimes assuming the posture of appeasement, but still for patriotic reasons. Whenever he discussed any topic, his historical and geographical analyses were based on prodigious reading, and other activities were by no means neglected. His style of argument sometimes seemed to be circuitous, but he was not incoherent. His eyes were always riveted upon western imperialism and Japan's destiny.

One might claim that he was an imperialist and he was influenced very much by Britain in terms of his academic experience. However, considering all his writings which mostly

66 Inagaki Manjiro, Tohosaku ketsuron so'an, p. 322.
stressed economic and international trade aspects, it is doubtful whether Inagaki was truly an imperialist.

Although so far there is no clear documentary evidence for Inagaki's influence on the foreign policy-making of Meiji government, it is difficult to conclude that Inagaki's activities, particularly between 1891-97, did not have any impact on the leading Meiji statesmen. Of course he lacked any institutional position. Arguably, because he was outside the political circles of that time, and because of his rather young age (he had returned to Japan from England at the age of 30), he might have been thought a mere enthusiastic political youth by the leading figures of the government. And because of the unusual foresight of his views, his proposals seemed to be regarded as impractical. Criticized by the Meiji statesmen, he appeared to have discarded his involvement in the Toho Kyokai as a propagandist after he left for Bangkok as a minister. It is the fact, however, that Inagaki's role, when he was the chief secretary of the Toho Kyokai during its early period, was not only that of official spokesman. He delivered a number of addresses at the monthly meetings of the Toho Kyokai. He published distinguished books, and expressed significant proposals to the Meiji government on the Toho Kyokai publications. He was something more than a mere propagandist of the Toho Kyokai. It could probably be maintained that Inagaki led the early Toho Kyokai's activities, in particular towards the South Seas region, including southeast Asian countries and the Antipodes. But after Inagaki left for Siam as the Minister, the Toho Kyokai did not pay very much attention to these regions any more.

As stated before, it is also the fact that the chairman of the Toho Kyokai was the ex-Foreign Minister, Soejima Taneomi, and the first deputy chairman appointed in the third general meeting of the Toho Kyokai in 1893 was one of the leading statesmen of the Meiji era, Prince Konoe Atsumaro. Further, the membership of the Toho Kyokai consisted of various kinds of people, from the government, the military, the economic world, the political parties, the academic circle, and many journalists and opinion leaders, including Meiji political leaders such as Okuma Shigenobu, Komura Jutaro, Matsukata Masayoshi, and so on. Therefore, it could be

---

68 Apart from Inagaki's proposals as mentioned above, there were two other noteworthy proposals in the name of the Toho Kyokai to the Government, those were 'A proposal on conclusion of commerce and trade treaties with the countries concerned in the Eastern Question [Balkan States]' in 1895, and 'A proposal on re-opening the Japanese Consulate in Manila' in 1895. They included proposals with respect to opening the Japanese Legations in Madrid and Constantinople. See Yasuoka Akio, 'Toho kyokai ni tsuite no kisoteki kenkyu', p. 92. It is not known who was the original proponent of these two proposals. But it is quite likely that they were drafted originally by Inagaki himself.
maintained that Inagaki kept contact with those people, and that they also noticed Inagaki's activities and his opinions of foreign affairs to such an extent that they were influenced invisibly and implicitly by Inagaki.69

69 In the 11th Diet, December 1897, Okuma delivered a speech saying that "In consequence of the war [the Sino-Japanese War],—it has come to pass that whereas the expression 'The Eastern Question' used to apply only to the world-famed problem of Eastern Europe, it now possesses the dual significance of the Near-Eastern, or the Far-Eastern, Question." See Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942, p. 274. The term 'Eastern Question' with dual meaning was exactly the same as Inagaki's approach.
Japan's Concluding of the 1898 unequal treaty with Siam

Despite the Declaration between Japan and Siam, concluded in 1887, and Prince Phanurangsi's visit to Japan in 1890 as described in chapter 1, relations between the two countries remained relatively stagnant notwithstanding the growing Western imperial threat to the latter. Apparently, the Japanese Foreign Ministry lacked an interest in Siam's affairs.

The second noteworthy incident in their diplomatic relationship was the conclusion of a commerce and friendship treaty in 1898. There are many points pertaining to this treaty which need to be examined. First, what was the trigger for the conclusion of the treaty after there had been an interval of ten years in the active relations between both countries? Why was the treaty concluded? How was the treaty regarded by both governments; in other words, what did they anticipate from the treaty? Who initiated negotiations and for what reason? What was the meaning of the 1898 treaty to both countries?

It is also significant to point out that during the 1890's there were two important events related to the present study, the Franco-Siam Crisis in 1893, and the 1895 Russia-German-France Triple Intervention after the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5. The latter represented humiliation for Japan, and a retreat from the position gained in Manchuria designed to secure Yamagata's 'line of interest', but for some years after 1893, Siam faced total political extinction, perhaps through colonial partition. These were the background to the 1898 treaty between Japan and Siam.

The whole process of the conclusion of the 1898 treaty can be divided chronologically into three periods. The first was, so to speak, the individually inspired period which finally produced the onset of the negotiations. One example, was the Japanese emigrant plan of non-official individuals, i.e. Iwamoto Chizuna, Ishibashi Usaburo, and Miyazaki Torazo (Toten). An account of Japanese emigration plans for Siam was given by Flood and Swan, but more detailed examination is called for. Another contributory factor was an investigation of the general Siamese situation by the Japanese consul in Singapore, Saito Miki. These two background incidents contributed to concluding the 1898 treaty.

The second period involved the preparatory negotiations in which General Kawakami and Inagaki Manjiro played significant roles. The Kawakami mission to Siam was examined by P.Oblas, but to his account new information will be introduced. Inagaki’s preparatory activities have not been properly assessed, because certain documents have only recently come to light.

The third period was the actual negotiation process by the representatives of both governments, i.e. Japanese Minister Inagaki Manjiro and the Siamese Foreign Minister Prince Thewawong. Although Flood and Oblas dealt with this, the course of negotiations needs to be examined more carefully, because no full description of them has been produced. And a more detailed description of the negotiation will make it easier to understand the meaning of the 1898 treaty.

4-1. Japanese emigration to Siam: A trigger to the 1898 treaty

A question that arose in the previous chapter was why Inagaki Manjiro took an interest in Siam's affairs. And two possible clues were identified; partly his patriotism with his background concerned with Japan's economic development, and her recovery from unequal standing with the Powers. But it was also indicated that Inagaki's real interest in Siam's affairs may only have taken off in 1893. Then why did he turn to Siamese affairs in 1893? This chapter starts with this question. In this respect, it is necessary to mention 3 Meiji adventurers; Iwamoto Chizuna, Ishibashi Usaburo and Miyazaki Torazo (Toten). These three figures played preparatory roles in Inagaki's later involvement with the conclusion of the 1898 Japanese-Siamese treaty. But their attitudes were not similar in style to the patriotism of Inagaki. They were rather adventurers with righteous indignation against Western imperialism, mainly over China. Their involvement in Siam's affairs was caused by their concern with the Chinese crisis.

4-1-1. Ex-Soldier Iwamoto and Revolutionist Ishibashi

Firstly, ex-army Lieutenant Iwamoto Chizuna, the figure who probably personally involved Inagaki with Siamese affairs, was born in 1856 in Tosa (Kochi prefecture today in Shikoku), and became a graduate of the Military Academy. His vicissitudes began with his

---

3 Ibid., 51-56. Flood, 'Japan's Relations with Thailand', p. 9 and p. 37 fn. 16.
resignation from the army in 1889, caused by his giving umbrage to a senior officer. Two years later, his passionate temper focused on the Powers involved in Siam, particularly French imperialism there. In 1892, he visited Siam and met the then Siamese Minister of Agriculture, Phraya Surasak Montri (Choem Saeng-Xuto). After his return to Japan in 1893, Iwamoto reported his anxiety about Siam's independence to Toho Kyokai members. He warned that the ongoing life-or-death struggle of Siam would influence China's destiny, so that Japanese should not ignore Siam's future. It was not a mere 'neighbourhood fire'. His interest in Siam appeared to have been caused mainly by his anxiety about China's national security. But his commitment to Siam's fate seems to have created something of a connection between Inagaki and Siamese affairs, for Inagaki at the time, in 1893, was the chief secretary of the Toho Kyokai. Thus it is quite possible that Inagaki was stimulated in his interest in Siamese affairs by Iwamoto.

There was another event which may have influenced Inagaki. In July 1893, the so-called Franco-Siamese Crisis took place. As soon as Iwamoto heard about the crisis and the French naval blockade of the Bangkok river, he left for Siam again. There was another man who also hurried to Siam in order to support Siamese independence. This was Ishibashi Usaburo. Previously, he had studied economics and commerce for two years in America, and fought in Chile's revolution. The most significant thing here is that he came from the same clan as that of Inagaki, Hirado Han. Thus it is presumed that Inagaki and Ishibashi knew each other. And through Ishibashi, Inagaki could have come to notice the Siamese crisis of 1893.

Ishibashi and Iwamoto met casually in Hong Kong en route to Siam. It was somewhat farcical that when they arrived in Bangkok, the Incident was over, and the French blockade raised in return for a variety of Siamese concessions, including the transfer of almost the whole of modern Laos to French Indochina. But they did not return to Japan without any progress. They met Phraya Surasak Montri and succeeded in securing his tentative consent to Japanese

---

4 Miyazaki Toten, Sanju sennen no yume (The thirty-three years' dream), op. cit. The brief biographies at the end of this volume give useful accounts of figures linked with Miyazaki. For the profile of Iwamoto, see p. 2 of these biographies. Also see Eto Shinkichi and Marius B. Jansen, My Thirty Three Years' Dream, see Ch.2. fn.38, not including the biographies.

5 For details of the background to his appointment as Minister of Agriculture, see Wyatt, Politics of Reform in Thailand, pp. 96-97.

6 Iwamoto Chizuna, 'Sharnu dan (An Account of Siam)' in Toho Kyokai Hokoku, no.25, June 1893, p. 64.


8 Brief biography p. 1 in Miyazaki Toten, op. cit.
agricultural emigration to Siam. Establishing the Japan-Siam emigration company in Bangkok, Iwamoto returned alone to Japan in order to recruit Japanese farmers for their plan.

It was the time in Japan when population problems, caused by the so-called 1890 economic crisis, became a serious issue. An enthusiasm for emigration developed. Private emigration agencies were keen to attract emigrants and send them to America, Canada, Australia, and so on. Emigration to Hawaii was being undertaken by the Meiji government itself. But, private emigration to New Caledonia (1892), and to Fiji (1894), failed completely.

The first tentative Japanese farmer emigrants led by Iwamoto left for Bangkok in January 1895. However, mainly because of Iwamoto's sequestration of the expense money of the farmers, the emigrant group was stranded in Bangkok. A few went down to Singapore, seven became trackmen on the Bangkok-Korat railway construction project, and fifteen worked as miners in northeast Siam, but many of the latter died of cholera. Thus, the first agricultural emigration scheme ended in complete failure.

Actually, Iwamoto himself did not arrive in Bangkok. It seems that he did not land in Siam, but returned probably via Hong Kong to Japan where his dishonesty was discovered. Nevertheless, he announced a second agricultural emigration scheme for Siam. Sixty people applied to this. At the same moment, Miyazaki Torazo, on his way to Tokyo, met Iwamoto in Kobe through one of the applicants who came from Miyazaki's home-town. From this, Miyazaki's casual involvement with Siam began.

---

9 Phraya Surasak Montri had strong opinions about Siamese national reform, which were expressed in the form of a proposal to Chulalongkorn in March 1885. He thought that Siamese national reform should follow Japan's policy of developing the wealth and military strength of the nation. See Ishii and Yoshikawa, Nittai roppyaku nenshi (Six Hundred Years of Japan-Thai Relations), pp. 125-126. As for the background to his consent to the Japanese peasant immigration scheme, Phraya Surasak Montri seems to have considered he needed immigrants for cleared land in order to carry on his irrigation scheme. See ibid., pp. 194-195, and for details of irrigation projects in Siam, see David Bruce Johnston, 'Rural Society and the Rice Economy in Thailand, 1880-1930', Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1975, Ch.II, and Ian Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam, c. 1890-1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 8-59.

10 For details of the 1890 economic crisis, see Nagaoka Shinkichi, Meiji kyoko shi josetsu (An Introduction to the Meiji Economic Crisis) (Tokyo, 1971), passim.


13 Ibid., p. 197.

Miyazaki Torazo (Toten) eventually became a famous figure because of his later relations with Sun Yat-Sen and Chinese affairs. Miyazaki's attention was always focussed on Chinese affairs and his concern with Siam was more an accidental event. He was informed by Iwamoto about Chinese residents in Siam and decided to go there in order to attempt to enlighten the Chinese in Siam towards Chinese revolution. At that time, he was not aware of Iwamoto's emigration scheme. Returning to Kobe from Tokyo, Miyazaki met Iwamoto again to make travel arrangements. It was then that Miyazaki became aware of Iwamoto's emigration plan. Shortly after, Miyazaki returned to his home-town, Kumamoto Prefecture, to prepare for his journey to Siam. When he came back to Kobe, Miyazaki found Iwamoto critically ill. While emigrant farmers were waiting to travel to Siam, Iwamoto's condition deteriorated. News of the tragic outcome of the previous Japanese emigration to Siam arrived in Japan. The new applicants were discouraged from leaving for Siam. Forty changed their minds but twenty still insisted on emigrating. Miyazaki decided to leave for Siam alone, but he was entreated by Iwamoto to assume the leadership of the remaining emigrants to Siam and eventually agreed.

The second emigrant group led by Miyazaki left Kobe port on the second of October, 1895. Seventeen days later, they arrived in Bangkok. However, the Japan-Siam emigration company had already been dissolved due to the delayed arrival of the new immigrants. Not knowing about Iwamoto's sickness, Ishibashi attacked Iwamoto's behaviour over the previous emigration. Five of the new migrants became staff in Japanese shops, and fifteen were initially employed by a shipbuilding company, although soon after, eight of this fifteen also went off to Korat as railway construction workers. This was a repeat of the previous experience.

The important thing in Miyazaki's case for the present study is that on his first visit to Siam he met Phraya Surasak Montri. Miyazaki found that Surasak was pro-Japan, his room being decorated with Japanese things. He was asked by Surasak whether it was true that the Japanese government had asked France to protect its nationals in Siam (see Section, 4-4-2), and

---

15 For the relations between Miyazaki and Sun Yat-Sen, see Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen.
16 Miyazaki Toten, op. cit., p. 53. Eto and Jansen, op. cit., pp. 66 and 68.
17 Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., pp. 197-198.
19 Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., pp. 198-199.
20 Miyazaki Toten, op. cit., p. 59. Eto and Jansen, op. cit., p. 75.
21 Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., p. 199.

86
was told that "Your country should open your own legation in Siam." Miyazaki promised to make efforts to arrange it. However, it is not known whether Miyazaki attempted to do so.

The thing Miyazaki actually did after the failure of this Japanese emigration, was to restore the Japan-Siam Emigration Company established by Iwamoto and Ishibashi as mentioned above.

Miyazaki returned to Japan for a while to arrange the revival of the emigration company. It was a familiar situation which Miyazaki returned to in Siam in March 1896; all the migrants who went to Korat caught malaria, and two of them soon died. And malaria attacked Miyazaki himself. Despite Miyazaki's support, this second agricultural emigration scheme also ended in failure. In the following year, Miyazaki became acquainted with Sun Yat-sen who drew him over to Chinese affairs entirely. Miyazaki's involvement in Siam thus came to an end.

4-2. Saito's reports regarding Japanese emigration projects

Since the 1887 Declaration of Friendship between Japan and Siam, with the Foreign Ministry under Okuma from February 1888 until December 1889, and Aoki and Enomoto during 1889-1892, there had been no further significant developments in official Japanese-Siamese relations. What were the concerns of the Japanese Foreign Ministry with respect to the conclusion of a treaty with Siam at that time? According to the documentation, Tokyo's concern with Siam seems to have gradually increased mainly with regard to Japanese emigration. In this context, the observation tour of Inagaki and the Consul in Singapore, Saito Miki, as stated in chapter 3, took place in 1894.

Consul Saito was instructed to make trips in 1893 and 1894 by the Meiji government. Interestingly, Saito actually wrote another report concerning the Malay Peninsula to the Meiji government, 'Junsatsu ki (An account of a tour of inspection)' in 1893. Influenced by this report, in 1896, Ishihara Tetsunosuke launched an emigrant scheme to Johore in Malaya, leading 30 Japanese emigrants there. See Yano Toru, Nihon no nan'yo shikan, p. 137.

It can be said that the Meiji government, before the Sino-Japanese War, had the idea of a

---

23 Miyazaki Toten, Sanju sanen no yume op. cit., p. 63. Eto and Jansen, op. cit., p. 79. Miyazaki confessed that being attracted by Korean affairs, nobody he talked to turned to turned to the Siam emigration scheme. See Miyazaki Toten, Sanju sanen no yume op. cit., p. 66. Eto and Jansen, op. cit., p. 83.
25 Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., p. 201.
26 Interestingly, Saito actually wrote another report concerning the Malay Peninsula to the Meiji government, 'Junsatsu ki (An account of a tour of inspection)' in 1893. Influenced by this report, in 1896, Ishihara Tetsunosuke launched an emigrant scheme to Johore in Malaya, leading 30 Japanese emigrants there. See Yano Toru, Nihon no nan'yo shikan, p. 137.
27 See Consul for Siam in Singapore, John Anderson to Thewawong, March 27, 1894, no. 16 and 17 in KT:33.6.6/5.
Japanese emigration scheme to Southeast Asia along the same lines as the Hawaii emigration which had been operating for years. Saito's report of 1894 on Siam showed this clearly. These regarding the question whether or not Siam was a suitable place to which Japanese could emigrate, Saito opined that Siam would be a place for Japanese farmers to emigrate to if it was decided that the purpose of Japanese emigration was to be a large-scale rice culture scheme with large numbers of Japanese farmers, aiming at securing a major part in rice exporting from Siam. Limited emigration without a specific object would be unproductive. It would definitely be wrong if the object of emigration was made something else than rice culture, Saito urged. He investigated the current situation of rice culture in Siam, the people controlling the rice exporting business, and what should be arranged for Japanese agricultural emigration to Siam. And he pointed out the importance of the Japanese building their own rice mill. More, he suggested a tentative emigration plan.

One could probably say that this Saito report of the Japanese emigration plan in 1894 foreshadowed Iwamoto's emigration plan in 1895, though Iwamoto had already met Phraya Surasak Montri and outlined his emigration plan in 1892. And surely we can presume that there was some connection between Iwamoto's emigration plan and the Japanese Foreign Ministry, although no documentation proves this. But there was of course connection between Consul Saito and the Meiji government, and Iwamoto's emigration plan must have occurred after Saito's visit to Siam.

Saito's report referred further to a positive attitude of the Siamese government towards Japanese agricultural immigration. He observed that Siamese high officials welcomed the Japanese farmers who could contribute to an increase in the Siamese exporting of rice, then the main item of foreign trade. In particular, Siam's Foreign Minister Prince Thewawong Waropakan observed encouragingly that although Japan and Siam had not yet reached satisfactory intimate relations at that time, the Japanese were the same kind of race as the Siamese. Therefore, if Japanese wished to migrate to Siam, they would fully support the Japanese. Another high official proposed a possible suitable place for the Japanese to settle. One official even suggested an immigration project to which he would offer agricultural implements.

28 Saito Miki, 'Saito Miki hokoku shamu shuecho torishirabe hokoku sho (The Saito Miki Report on an Official Investigation Trip to Siam)', 1894, p. 1. See Ch. 3 fn. 35.
29 Ibid., pp. 2-9.
Saito reported. The then Minister of Education, Chaophraya Phatsakorawong (Phon Bunnag) also seemed to agree to the Japanese immigration.

Saito did not meet Siam's King Chulalongkorn who was ill intermittently November 1893-October 1894, and there was no mention of the King's intention about the matter. However, that Thewawong gave Saito an impression of being favourable to Japan could mean that the Siamese government accepted the project of Japanese immigration. Thewawong's friendliness to Japan can be seen again from Inagaki's report to Okuma outlined below.

4-3. Inagaki's preparatory negotiation for a treaty with the Siamese government

4-3-1. Inagaki's first approaches to Thewawong

Inagaki's report is a very interesting work showing Siam's positive attitude to concluding a treaty with Japan including clues as to when Inagaki turned to Siamese affairs.

Inagaki first met Prince Thewawong at 5 pm. on 13th April 1894, at the Siamese Foreign Ministry. Significantly, Inagaki showed Thewawong a letter from the then acting Austrian Minister in Tokyo, Henri de Coudenhove, saying that he had no connection with the Meiji government regarding that observation tour.

I did not bring any letter from Japanese officials or from a person who has any connection with the Japanese government, because I was afraid that this meeting with Siamese officials might bring about unsatisfactory consequences for the relations between the two countries.

However, it could not be argued that Inagaki really had no relations with the Japanese government in this respect. It can be assumed that this visit was a deliberate plan of Inagaki in consultation with Consul Saito.

Showing his sympathy regarding the crisis caused by French imperialism in the previous year, Inagaki then expressed his opinions regarding the immediate concluding of a treaty between Japan and Siam in order to maintain friendly relations. Prince Thewawong, Siam's Foreign Minister, expressing his thanks for Inagaki's understanding of Siam's situation,

30 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
31 Ibid., p. 32.
32 See Brailey, Two Views of Siam on the Eve of the Chakri Reformation, pp. 33, 39, 90-91, and 126 fn.93.
33 Inagaki confessed to Thewawong that he had proposed his Siam visit to Premier Ito Hirobumi in August 1893, after the completion of his observation tour to Siberia and Korea. Ito seemed not to oppose it, but just to be preoccupied with internal reform. Inagaki Manjiro, Nansei hidan (A secret account of a visit to the South), in Okuma Shigenobu monjo (Archives on Okuma Shigenobu), No.770, pp. 17-18.
34 Ibid., p. 3.
replied that it was an urgent necessity that Asian countries should be well aware of each other, and united against the Western Powers. Inagaki hazarded the hope of concluding a commercial treaty between Japan and Siam for friendly relations and understanding between the two countries, and the idea of opening a Japanese Legation in Bangkok. Prince Thewawong was eager for Inagaki's proposals. He offered to Japanese a right of residence in all parts of Siam when Westerners were allowed to reside only in certain areas. What is more, he suggested to Japanese non-restrictive landownership in contrast to the conditions by which the Westerners were confined. These major concessions surprised Inagaki.

As for extraterritoriality, Thewawong again declared that he had no objection to allowing Japanese to obtain that right throughout Siam on the ground that he desired to demonstrate towards the Western Powers the friendly solidarity of Asian countries yielding to and trusting each other. Inagaki seemed not to have been able to believe Thewawong. But in reply to Inagaki's question as to whether these promises were made by him as Siam's Foreign Minister, and whether they could be revealed to other Siamese officials, Thewawong recognised that he was responsible for his word as Foreign Minister. Yet Inagaki wanted to reconfirm it. He asked, 'Does your government have no objection to Japanese authorities having administration of civil and criminal justice in your country?' Thewawong's answer was affirmative.

From Thewawong's attitude above mentioned, it can be said that apparently he considered that the conclusion of a treaty with Japan might bring a result that she would support Siam against French imperialism.

On 14th April, Inagaki met Thewawong again. This time Inagaki was given copies of treaties concluded between Siam and western countries. Two days later, he was invited by the Belgian General Adviser to Siam, G. Rolin-Jaequemyns, to be one of the guests at a dinner party at his house, where Inagaki had another chance to talk with Siam's Foreign Minister. Interestingly, on this occasion, he discovered that Thewawong had not yet been asked about

---

36 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
38 Ibid., p. 21.
concluding a treaty with Japan by his companion on his visit to Siam, Saito, the Japanese Consul at Singapore. 40

The last meeting between Inagaki and Thewawong was held on 23rd April. This time Inagaki moved on, asking new, concrete questions: whether Japanese would be allowed to produce industrial goods in Siam while obeying Siamese law, to have a right of mining in Siam, to deal in Japanese and Siamese goods in Siam, to pay the import tariff at a maximum three percent, to obtain the right to own shares in Siam, and to be given a most-favoured nation clause. To all questions, Siam's Foreign Minister expressed his agreement. 41 Yet Thewawong confessed that he did not expect any direct benefit from a Japanese-Siamese treaty, saying that there was no reason for refusing to Japan the same rights given to the Western Powers, because Japanese and Siamese were not only the same race but also the descendants of the same race. 42 Why was he as full of friendliness? Were his assurances driven only by goodwill? On this matter, a British secretary to the Siamese government, Mr. Hicks, revealed his impression that the Siamese government was hoping for a Siamese-Japanese alliance in terms of both defence and offence. 43 It is evident that this Siamese desire stemmed from the difficult diplomatic situation recently caused by French imperialism. The Siamese government must have anticipated Japan's support against France.

In the last meeting between Inagaki and Thewawong, it was also agreed that a Japanese minister plenipotentiary would be sent to Siam in order to negotiate a treaty, and that Prince Thewawong was to be Siam's representative in the negotiations. 44

Although Inagaki was thoughtful in dealing with the first Japanese-Siamese commercial treaty, he only accomplished his purpose with the consent of Thewawong. During his stay in Siam, he met other Siamese high officials, including a high ranking officer of the Army, in an effort to find what attitudes were towards concluding a treaty with Japan. 45 Inagaki was impressed by their positive attitudes towards Japan, barring surprisingly the Minister of Education, Chaophraya Phatsakorawong (Phon Bunnag), and the General Adviser, Rolin-

40 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
41 Ibid., pp. 28-33.
42 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
43 Ibid., p. 40.
44 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
45 Ibid., pp. 38-44.

91
Jaequemyns. Phatsakorawong did not explicitly oppose a treaty with Japan but wanted to discuss the issue more thoroughly.46

4-3-2. The attitude of General Adviser Rolin-Jaequemyns

However, the Belgian M. Rolin-Jaequemyns seems to have been reluctant to see immediate agreement on concluding a treaty between Inagaki and Thewawong at all.

When Rolin-Jaequemyns himself visited Inagaki at his hotel on 12th April, the day before Inagaki again met Thewawong, Rolin-Jaequemyns agreed with opening a Japanese Legation in Bangkok. However, when Inagaki at the dinner party on 16th April, asked Rolin-Jaequemyns whether he had been asked his advice by Thewawong, Rolin-Jaequemyns replied that no decision had been taken yet, and continued to say that he doubted the benefit of the immediate concluding of a treaty between the two countries. When told that Thewawong had given his consent to Japanese extraterritoriality in Siam to Inagaki, Rolin-Jaequemyns indicated that he would recommend Thewawong reconsider the issue because Siamese codification work on its laws was already in progress. In particular, as to extraterritoriality, Rolin-Jaequemyns argued that although Thewawong conceded Japanese extraterritoriality in Siam in order to show the solidarity of Asian countries towards the Powers, application of extraterritoriality was unnecessary if the two countries were on friendly terms. Finally, Rolin-Jaequemyns suggested that Inagaki postpone his submitting of the treaty issue to the Meiji government, adding that he would probably visit Japan in September 1894.47 In sum, Rolin-Jaequemyns needed time to complete the Siamese codification work, so that negotiations for a treaty with Japan would take a turn favourable to the Siamese government. But Inagaki decided that Rolin-Jaequemyns's real motivation was personal political ambition.48

4-3-3. Inagaki's views on his visit to Siam

In the last 16 pages of his report, Inagaki concluded his work, considering the likely benefit of Japan's immediate concluding of a treaty with Siam. First, considering the uncertain political power balance in the Siamese government, a treaty should be concluded while Prince

46 Ibid., p. 45. For Phatsakorawong's earlier attitude, see Section 4-2.
48 Ibid., pp. 55-56.
Thewawong, who was in favour of Japan, was still the Foreign Minister. Second, a treaty should be concluded before Siamese codification work was accomplished so that Rolin-Jaequemyns would not be able to argue against Japan having extraterritoriality. Third, taking into account the fact that the Siamese King, Chulalongkorn, might not live long because of his poor health, Japan should build her position in Siam through a new treaty before something happened to the king. Fourth, if the Siamese King recovered his health, he might secretly visit Europe, and declare Siam's neutrality to secure its survival. Before that could happen Japan should conclude a treaty. Further, if Japan recognised Siamese neutrality by means of inviting the Siamese King to Japan, Japan could enhance her national prestige. Fifth, after the existing critical situation in Franco-Siamese relations was over, Siam's favourable attitude towards Japan might change. Lastly, with respect to the increasing number of Japanese residents in Siam, if some unpleasant incidents occurred between their respective citizens before the conclusion of a treaty, Japan might not be able to conclude a treaty with the current good conditions conceded by the Siamese Foreign Minister. For these reasons, Inagaki again and again urged an immediate concluding of a treaty with Siam. In addition, he warned that it was England and France, and General Adviser Rolin-Jaequemyns, who would obstruct proceedings for the negotiation of a treaty between Japan and Siam.

Inagaki's visit to Siam had considerable significance for the succeeding process of negotiation for a treaty.

In the meantime, there were other events which seem to have influenced Prince Thewawong's attitude to concluding a treaty with Japan. There was the attitude of the then Japanese Minister in Berlin, Aoki Shuzo, already cited in chapter one for his interest in relations with Siam, and now one of the influential decision-making figures of Japanese foreign policy. In 1893, the Japanese military attache in Berlin, Major Osako Naotoshi (vice-Chief of the Army General Staff Office during 1898-1900), was ordered to return to Japan via Bangkok. On this

49 Ibid., p. 60. There were rumours by 1895 that he might be replaced by his brother, Prince Sawat (Svasti). See Brailey, Two Views of Siam on the Eve of the Chakri Reformation, p. 126 fn. 94.
50 Ibid., p. 63.
51 Ibid., p. 63-65.
52 Ibid., pp. 66-68.
53 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
54 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
55 Ibid., pp. 71-72. As they later opposed a proposal by Financial Adviser C. Rivett-Carnac for an international guarantee of Siam's independence, involving Germany and Russia.
occasion, Minister Aoki entrusted a letter to Thewawong with Major Osako.\textsuperscript{56} Minister Aoki, sympathizing with Siam's vulnerability to French pressure, laid stress on the importance of friendly relations between Japan and Siam.\textsuperscript{57} Prince Thewawong, who was in a difficult situation dealing with French affairs, was impressed by Aoki's letter.\textsuperscript{58} This incident probably had a positive effect when Inagaki visited Siam in the following year for the preparatory negotiation for a treaty.

Another Aoki influence on Thewawong happened in the same year as Inagaki's visit to Siam, 1894. Thewawong received a letter from the Siamese Minister in Berlin, Phraya Nonthaburi. It reported on Prince Thewawong's brother, Sawat-di Sophon's visit to Paris and Berlin, and what Minister Aoki said about Siam to Phraya Nonthaburi. According to Phraya Nonthaburi, Prince Sawat had left a message to Minister Aoki with Phraya Nonthaburi who was about to go back to Berlin from Paris, saying that Prince Sawat wished to meet Aoki in Berlin. Then Phraya Nonthaburi had informed Minister Aoki. Aoki disclosed his sympathy for Siam in face of France. Later Aoki met Prince Sawat, and had a talk regarding Siamese relations with the Powers (Britain and France).\textsuperscript{59} What they actually said we do not know. Yet Prince Sawat gained a good impression of Aoki's attitude to Siam, and as a matter of fact this report influenced Prince Thewawong's foreign policy towards the Powers, apparently confident that Siam and Japan could combine together against the Powers. However, it was not until after the termination of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) that concrete progress in concluding a treaty between Japan and Siam began to be evident.

4-4. The beginning of negotiations for the 1897 treaty between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Siamese government

4-4-1. Proposals of the Toho Kyokai

In November 1895, soon after the Sino-Japanese War, the Toho Kyokai (The Oriental Society) submitted a proposal to Premier Ito Hirobumi for concluding a treaty with Siam. It should be noted that the so-called Triple Intervention led by Russia, Germany, and France,

\textsuperscript{56} Phraya Nonthaburi to Thewawong, September 11, 1893, no.58/112 in KT.33.6.6/3.
\textsuperscript{57} Letter from Aoki to Thewawong, October 11, 1893 (in French and Siamese translation), enclosed in Thewawong to Phanurangsi, November 18, 1893, no.15039 in KT.33.6.6/3.
\textsuperscript{58} Thewawong to Japanese Foreign Minister, Mutsu Munemitsu, December 22, 1893 in KT.33.6.6/4.
\textsuperscript{59} Phraya Nonthaburi to Prince Sawat Si Sophon, November 7, 1894, no.1/112, and Phraya Nonthaburi to Thewawong, November 15, 1894, no.68/112 in KT.33.6.6/4.
claiming Japan's reversion of the Liaotung Peninsula, seems to have triggered this Toho Kyokai proposal. In April 1895, as soon as the contents of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki were announced, Russia formally approached the other powers regarding intervention. In consequence, Japan finally accepted the demand that Liaotung be given up. In November 1895, the same month of the Toho Kyokai proposal, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was revised. It seems that this incident provoked the Toho Kyokai members, and led them to propose a Japan-Siam alliance by concluding a treaty.

This Toho Kyokai proposal is supposed to have been based on Inagaki's report mentioned above, for the detailed reasons for concluding a treaty with Siam, and the actual discussions with Prince Thewawong and other high Siamese officials which were carried out by the Chief Secretary of the Toho Kyokai, Inagaki Manjiro, were attached to it, separately bound.60 In addition to the Toho Kyokai's activity, Iwamoto Chizuna, in the aftermath of the tragedy of his emigrant scheme, approached some members of the Japanese House of Representatives, probably plus Inagaki as well, to ask them to submit to the Diet a bill regarding the opening of a Japanese Legation in Bangkok.61

But premier Ito seems then to have been reluctant to pursue the Siamese issue, replying to the Toho Kyokai proposal that 'Japan could not do everything at once.' However, about three months after the Toho Kyokai proposal, the Foreign Ministry under the interim Foreign Minister Saionji Kinmochi (deputizing for Mutsu Munemitsu since June 1895), pondering a feasible direction of foreign policy towards the Powers and Asian countries following the Triple Intervention, seems to have became rapidly aware of the situation of Siam facing French imperialism. He also considered protecting Japanese residents in Siam and trading with her. It could be supposed that the incident of Japanese immigration in 1895, and the activities of people concerned with the Siamese issue so far, such as Inagaki and Iwamoto, produced an effect on the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The concern of the Foreign Ministry about the

60 Soejima Taneomi, 'A proposal concerning concluding a friendly commercial treaty with Siam' in Toho Kyokai Kibun, no.16, 1895, p. 6.
61 Nakamura Takashi 'Nittai koshoku shiwa--Meiji jidai (An account of the history of intercourse between Japan and Thailand)' in Tai ji-jiyuu no kuni--(The Situation of Thailand--A land of Freedom--), (Tenri, Nara, 1975), p. 181. In consequence, the sixty-sixth bill in 1896 with respect to opening of the Japanese Consulate presented by Yamashita Chiyo'o and other four members (unknown) was passed on 29th February at the ninth meeting of the House of Representative. See Dai kyuukai teikoku gikai shugiin gii sokki roku 10 (The Stenographic Record of the ninth meeting of the Imperial House of Representatives, No.10) (Tokyo, 1979), pp. 416-419. Also see Sir E. Satow to Lord Salisbury, 6 March 1896 in FO. 46/467, with enclosed memorandum.
62 'Satow Diaries', 2nd March 1896, PRO. 30/33/15
protection of Japanese emigrants can be seen from the fact that the first Japanese Emigrant Protection Act was promulgated in 1896.

4-4-2. Towards ending French protection of the Japanese in Siam: Japan's revenge for the Triple Intervention?

There seems to have been another point which influenced Saionji in such a direction. The Japanese residents in Siam at that time were under the protection of the French Legation there. This situation had been created by Saionji himself. But he had been strongly pushed by the French government through the French resident minister in Bangkok, Auguste Pavie, even though the Japanese residents in Siam had previously reached a consensus on entrusting their affairs to the Dutch Legation because they were not happy during the Franco-Siamese Crisis in 1893. The reason why Pavie, like the succeeding French Minister at Bangkok, Albert Defrance, desired the Japanese residents in Siam to be protégés of France, was apparently that they both feared that the Japanese in Siam then and in the future would stand together with the Siamese against France.63

It might be argued therefore, that Saionji himself, after learning the fate of the Japanese migrants to Siam, realized that their being under French protection was insufficient. Consequently, in early February 1896, Saionji decided to put forth the treaty issue. On 8th February, he laid the matter before Premier Ito. Saionji suggested that considering the current increase in trade between Japan and Siam, a commercial treaty should be made. If Siam answered affirmatively to Japan's desire to conclude a treaty, the Foreign Ministry would begin drafting a proposed treaty.64 Saionji's policy was authorised by Premier Ito on 13th February.65

Negotiations for a treaty between the Meiji government and Siam began in very secret manner, because the Meiji government in the aftermath of the Triple Intervention was very cautious about the reaction of the Powers to Japan's concluding a treaty with Siam.

More importantly, it can be presumed that the discontent with the Triple Intervention apparently became a psychological factor of Saionji and other Meiji leaders in dealing with French affairs, and pushed Japan to Siam's camp against France. In fact, Japan herself had faced

---

63 This belief was stressed by a proponent of the Japanese Diet bill, Yamashita Chiyo'o, in his speech in the Diet. Dai kyukai teikoku gikai shupin giji sokki roku 10, pp. 417-418. Also see Sir E. Satow to Lord Salisbury, 6 March 1896 in FO. 46/467.
64 Saionji to Ito, February 8, 1896, no.27, drafted 7th February, 1896 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
65 Ito to Saionji, February 13, 1896, no.157 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
the reality of Western imperialism in the previous year. It may not be incorrect that the Triple Intervention encouraged the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo to consider Siam's affairs in a positive way. It is also likely that during 1894-5, Prince Thewawong must have been thinking of a Siam-Japan military alliance.

4-4-3. Siam Legal Adviser Kirkpatrick's visit to Japan

Having the support of Premier Ito, Saionji promptly prepared a draft letter to Siam's Foreign Minister Thewawong, expressing Japan's desire to conclude a commercial treaty.66 Thewawong's response, dated 6th May 1896, arrived 11th June, accepting Japan's proposal. The Siamese government, however, asked to carry on the negotiations in Japan.67 The following day, another letter from the Siamese Foreign Minister was received. It said that the legal adviser to the Siamese government, R. J. Kirkpatrick, with his new wife, daughter of General Adviser Rolin-Jaequemyns, were travelling to Japan, and the Japanese government could obtain information about Siam from him.68 Ascertaining the positive intention of the Siamese government to conclude a treaty with Japan, Saionji handed over to Kirkpatrick a letter with an aide-memoire addressed to the Siamese Foreign Minister. The letter stated that the Meiji government would welcome a Siamese envoy for the negotiation.69 In the aide-memoire, Japan manifested her desire to secureextraterritoriality in Siam: "the Japanese government would, in addition, be perfectly willing to consent to the insertion in the proposed Treaty of a clause providing that Japanese Consular jurisdiction in Siam shall cease at the same time that the Consular jurisdiction of other Powers is brought to an end."70 The Japanese Foreign Ministry took it for granted that Japan would be given such a right, because the Foreign Ministry had been informed by Inagaki in 1894, that Thewawong conceded Japan's right to extraterritoriality. Yet eventually the Siamese government was not to be happy to concede such a right. Even now Thewawong did not reply immediately. Something must have happened within the Siamese government in the meanwhile.

66 Saionji to Thewawong, February 17, 1896, no.1 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
67 Thewawong to Saionji, May 6, 1896, no.676. in JDA. 2-5-1-17. During April 3-May 29 1896 Mutsu Munemitsu was reinstated as Foreign Minister, but soon after finally resigned because of his deteriorating health. See Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1896-1942, p. 42.
68 Thewawong to Saionji, May 7, 1896 no.6107 in JDA. 2-5-1-17. And Rolin-Jaequemyns to Chulalongkom, April 8, 1900, R.5 P.9/44.
69 JDA. 2-5-1-17, Saionji to Thewawong, June 25, 1896, with an aide-memoire.
70 Ibid.
4-4-4. Positive Inagaki, passive Saionji

During that period, Inagaki had expressed to the Toho Kyokai Kaiho his support for the immediate concluding of treaty with Siam.\(^71\) There were 11 specific points which he enumerated as a guide-line for the expected treaty. Nine points were the same as those previously agreed by Inagaki with Thewawong. But Inagaki now proposed more than these. He urged that Japan should demand the opening of Chantabun and two other Siamese ports to Japanese trade, and that Japanese vessels should be allowed to go up the Chaophraya River beyond Bangkok.\(^72\) The former was an additional point derived from his experience on his 1894 trip to Siam. The latter was in fact something Inagaki was about to propose when he met Thewawong. But he had restrained himself because he confessed that he had asked Thewawong more than was right.\(^73\)

Meanwhile, notwithstanding the lack of any response by the Siamese government to Japan, Saionji instructed the foreign affairs adviser to the Meiji government, H. W. Denison, to draft a treaty. He made a draft in English first, and then it was translated into Japanese.\(^74\) It should not be overlooked that some of Inagaki's suggestions in the Toho Kyokai Kaiho mentioned above, which had already been accepted by Siam's Foreign Minister, Thewawong, in 1894, were not contained in the draft treaty. These were non-restrictive landownership, mining rights, and the right of holding shares. What did this indicate? Certainly, the Meiji Government feared the Powers' suspicions. More, it could be said that the Japanese government was not over-ambitious for concluding a treaty with Siam. In other words, Japan's attitude towards Siam at that time was not strictly comparable in seriousness with that towards Korea and China.

4-5 General Kawakami's observation tour to Southeast Asia

Nothing improved between Tokyo and Bangkok during the middle of 1896. The Meiji government had to take some action. In the meantime, on 29th September 1896, the second Matsukata Masayoshi Cabinet was launched with Okuma Shigenobu as second-time Foreign

\(^{71}\) Inagaki Manjiro, 'Concerning the expected articles of a commercial treaty with Siam' (in Japanese) in Toho Kyokai Kaiho, no.25, 1896, pp. 1-3.

\(^{72}\) Ibid., p. 3.

\(^{73}\) Inagaki Manjiro, 'Nansei Hidan', pp. 34-35.

\(^{74}\) 'A Draft Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Siam', (in Japanese), September 5, 1896. This can be seen in JDA. 2-5-1-17, Okuma to Matsukata, April 1, 1897, no. 49.
Minister, and Enomoto Takeaki as Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. Both Matsukata and Okuma were Inagaki's patrons, and Enomoto was the founder of the Shokumin Kyokai or Association of Emigration, where Inagaki was one of the leading lights as councillor. Siamese affairs were taken over by Okuma. Despite the suspension of the treaty issue, Okuma resolved to sound out the Siamese government again. At that particular time, in October 1896, Vice-Chief of the General Staff, General Kawakami Soroku, and three general staff officers Ijichi Kosuke, Murata Makoto, and Akashi Motojiro informed the Japanese Foreign Ministry of their plan for an observation tour of Formosa, French-Indochina, and Siam. General Kawakami's purpose in making this tour was stated in his later report: to observe Tongking where France had been colonizing over 10 years since 1883, in order to learn from French experience for application to policy in 'Japan's new territory'. It is evident that 'Japan's new territory' meant Formosa, which had become Japanese territory in June 1895 due to the Shimonoseki Treaty with China in April of the same year terminating the First Sino-Japanese War. However, despite Formosa being under the control of Japan since 1895, with Admiral Count Kabayama as first Governor-General, the struggle between the Japanese Army and the native resistance to Japan's annexation occupation was greatly increasing. Indeed, even after March 1896, when Japan established a civil government in Formosa, the Meiji government was still groping for an appropriate policy of administration there. Therefore, General Kawakami's tour was urgent for Japan's policy in Formosa.

More significantly, Kawakami's tour was also designed by Foreign Minister, Okuma, for a preparatory negotiation of a Japanese-Siamese treaty. Kawakami was requested by

---

75 Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., p. 194.
76 Tanaka Yajuro, op. cit., p. 48.
77 Chief of the General Staff, Prince Akihito to Foreign Minister Okuma, 5th October, 1896, no.65-1 in JDA. 5-1-10-4-1.
78 Kawakami Soroku, 'Indo China shisatsu taiyo (A Summary of the observation tour to Indo-China)', April, 1897. This report is available for reading by the public, but only in the rare book collection room at the Japanese Diet Library. It deals only with the issues of colonisation in Indo-China, i.e. politics, economy, military, navy, transportation, and etc. But according to their schedule which was mentioned in other documentation, the mission's members arrived at Amoy in early November, in the middle of November in Hong Kong, in December in Bangkok, and in January in 1897, in Manila and Shanghai. See Chief of the General Staff, Prince Akihito to Foreign Minister Okuma, October 5, 1896, no.65-1 in JDA. 5-1-10-4-1. Thus there seems to have been another purpose to their tour; perhaps contacting Major Kususe Yukihiko who was engaged in an investigation of the situation in Manila where the Philippine Aguinaldo rising against Spain took place in August, 1896. In fact, later, despite the official neutral attitude of the Meiji government, the Japanese General Staff Office led by General Kawakami supported the Philippine independence party. See Inoue Kiyoshi, Nihon no gunkoku shugi, pp. 51-52.
Okuma, before leaving for his tour, to urge the Siamese government to despatch a plenipotentiary, or else Japan would send an envoy for conclusion of the treaty.\textsuperscript{80}

It might be asked why Okuma, taking over from Saionji, put forward the issue of concluding a treaty with Siam, and how he viewed Siamese affairs at that time? Did he intend to forge a kind of political or military alliance with Siam, then a weak country caught between England and France? A possible answer would focus on two different points, one, Okuma's idealistic stance towards other Asian countries, and the other, his realistic recognition of the existing international and internal situation of Japan.

4-6. Okuma Shigenobu's policy on Siam

By 1898, Okuma was considered in his attitude towards China as an idealistic proponent of Pan-Asianism.\textsuperscript{81} Okuma's approach to the treaty negotiation with Siam was also in line with his Pan-Asian outlook, with commercial overtones, but in a pure form. This argument takes into account that, in Okuma's estimation, the Philippines at that time could not become Japan's big market. The total value of Japanese exports at that time was also minimal. And Siam did not then come within range of Japan's economic interest. Therefore, what Okuma showed was his idealistic attitude to the Siam issue.\textsuperscript{82}

Meanwhile, it could be said that Okuma was both an idealist and at the same time a realist, but that he should have been mainly the latter at this particular moment. It was a fact that his concern about Chinese affairs linked with his fear of Japan losing markets.\textsuperscript{83} And when he heard the news of a Philippines rebellion in August 1896, he implied his reluctance to support the rebellion. His attitude towards the Philippines can be interpreted as consent to likely American occupation of the Philippines.\textsuperscript{84} It could be assumed that if the Philippines was not likely to become Japan's big market on the ground of their existing domestic crisis, Siam might

\textsuperscript{80} See 'Satow Diaries', 21st October, 1896, PRO. 30/33/15. And Okuma to Japanese Consul in Singapore, Fujita Toshihiro, December 3, 1896, no.871 in IDA. 2-5-1-17.

\textsuperscript{81} Joyce C. Lebra, \textit{(translated by Shoda Ken'ichiro)}, \textit{Okuma Shigenobu, sono shogai to ningenzo} (Tokyo, 1980), p. 153. This is a translation of Lebra's, \textit{Okuma Shigenobu, Statesman of Meiji Japan} (Australian University Press, 1973). Shoda verified and revised passages in the original book. Hereafter cited as Lebra and Shoda. For Pan-Asianism, see Ch. 6.

\textsuperscript{82} A point argued by Peter B. Oblas, 'Japan's Pro-Thai Policy of the 1890s: Pure Pan-Asianism', a paper presented to the International Conference on Thai Studies, Bangkok 1984, published in Chaiwat Khamchoo and E. Bruce Reynolds (ed.) \textit{Thai-Japanese Relations in Historical Perspective}, pp. 52-53.

\textsuperscript{83} Lebra and Shoda, loc. cit.

\textsuperscript{84} Okuma Archives, op. cit., no. A894, 'Concerning foreign policy towards Korea, China, and the Philippines', in 1898.
come within range of Japan's exports, but not as an urgent issue. However, of course Okuma could never ignore the Powers in the Far East at that time in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War and the Triple Intervention. He had to avoid any confrontation with them. Nor could he face Britain in respect of commerce in Siam. A Diet speech of his of December 1897, expressed nothing but a 'phlegmatic account'. It could not be said that Okuma, even with his sympathy and his self-styled mission towards other Asian countries, was going to make Japan Siam's bosom friend against the Powers by concluding a treaty at the expense of his amicable relationship with Britain.

But there seems to be something more than the idealistic aspect above-mentioned which explains Okuma's approach towards Siam at this time. It is probable that Okuma was influenced by Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, Enomoto Takeaki, who was by now, in his eagerness for a Japanese emigration policy, desirous of extending relations with Australia. Okuma, first arguing the needlessness of Japanese emigration abroad, appeared to have turned to a stance similar to Enomoto's. Inspired by Enomoto's view of emigration, Okuma seems to have contemplated determining the future outcome through concluding a treaty with Siam. It was, of course, to be neither a military alliance, nor desired from the view-point of urgent Japanese commercial policy. It could be conjectured that he was taking account of future Japanese agricultural emigration as part of his long-range foreign policy. In this respect, it should be noted that American-instigated Hawaiian rejection of Japanese immigrants began in March and April in 1897. It is conjecture that this may have accelerated Okuma's concern with Siam's relationship with Japan in terms of emigration policy. For him, Siam might not have been a place where Japanese goods would be retailed on a large scale, but a destination for future Japanese agricultural emigrants, supported by the 1896 Emigrant Protection Act. Indeed, in 1903, 1500 Japanese emigrated to the Philippines. After the Philippines, would not Siam be the second target?

85 Nish, op. cit., pp. 52 and 274.
86 See 'Satow Diaries', 6th July, 1896, PRO. 30/33/15.
87 See 'Satow Diaries', 2nd and 15th October, 1896, PRO. 30/33/15. Already Okuma was privy to a plan for development of the northern part of the Japanese Islands and Hokkaido.
88 For details of this incident, see Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868-1898, pp. 124-130.
89 Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., p. 204.
In this sense, it could be said that General Kawakami's tour had a significant meaning for Okuma's long-range foreign policy. Kawakami arrived at Bangkok early in January 1897, and lodged at the French Legation. He and his entourage made their way from Bangkok to French-Indochina overland. The Siamese Foreign Minister, Prince Thewawong, was informed by the French Minister in Bangkok, A. Defrance, of General Kawakami's arrival in Bangkok and the purpose of his trip. Thewawong met Kawakami January 5, 1897 with the French Minister. On this occasion, General Kawakami talked briefly about the treaty issue between Japan and Siam, but the details would be outlined the day after, he added. This first meeting between Kawakami and Thewawong was promptly reported to King Chulalongkorn. The King, on the same day, replied that he desired to meet Kawakami without the French Minister. King Chulalongkorn seems to have waited until the Japanese government approached Siam on the treaty issue, for he had already been informed by Prince Thewawong that the Japanese Foreign Ministry had a plan to despatch a Japanese Minister to Bangkok. The King had also expressed to Prince Thewawong his desire for the conclusion of a treaty with Japan.

From this, it is apparent that General Kawakami had talks about a Japanese-Siamese treaty with the Siamese government. But the Siamese archives do not show what they talked about on the treaty issue. Japanese documentation reveals only that the Japanese Army General Staff Office informed Okuma that it received a telegram from General Kawakami saying that he would report in detail to Okuma on his return, about Siam's intentions regarding a treaty. Kawakami did not mention Siam at all in his report, probably because his principal purpose was

90 Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury, 2nd March, 1897, no.159 in FO.422/47. Monson referred to the French newspaper Temps reporting that the object of the Mission was to establish a Japanese Consulate in Siam.
91 Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Salisbury, 24th March, 1897, no.60 in FO.422/47. British Minister Satow met General Kawakami on his return to Japan, on 23 March 1897. See ibid, and 'Satow Diaries', 23rd March, 1897, PRO. 30/33/15.
92 A. Defrance to Thewawong, January 4, 1897 in KT. 33. 6.6/8.
93 King Chulalongkorn to Thewawong, January 5, 1897 in ibid.
94 Thewawong to King Chulalongkorn, January 5, 1897 in ibid, and Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Salisbury, 24th March, 1897, no.60 in FO. 422/47. In this respect, Oblas enquired "Did Kawakami meet with Prince Devawoogse [Thewawong] or someone associated with the Ministry of foreign Affairs who had access to the foreign minister? In all likelihood, it appears that he did meet with one or the other." Oblas, 'Nascent Pan-Asianism in Thai-Japanese Relations: The Kawakami Mission and the Treaty of 1898', p. 50. This Oblas assumption is right.
95 King Chulalongkorn to Thewawong, November 11, 1896, no.64951 in R.5 T.3/6.
96 The General Staff Office, to Okuma, 11 January 1897, no.2 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
to observe the situation in French-Indochina, or because the treaty issue was a secret matter, not suitable for publication.

After Kawakami's return to Japan in February 1897, Okuma seems to have been informed by him orally that Siam still had the intention of concluding a treaty with Japan, but would not send an envoy for the negotiation. Okuma, now facing the changing Siamese attitude, had to choose a suitable approach. Eventually, he decided to send a Japanese envoy to Siam. On 10th April 1897, the Cabinet approved Okuma's decision. It was Inagaki who was named as negotiator. This was a prudent decision. However, Okuma himself, when he was shown the report of the talks between Thewawong and Inagaki, may already have made up his mind in the case of Siamese reluctance to send an envoy to Japan.

With respect to Inagaki's nomination, apart from his acquaintance with Thewawong, there seems to have been another reason for his nomination as envoy. After the Triple Intervention, General Kawakami was not only pressing the enlargement of Japan's military budget, but also engaging himself vigorously on a broad scale in intelligence activity preparatory for a war with Russia, regarding himself as the person most responsible for Japan's defence. The intelligence activities of the Japanese army at that time preparatory for a war against Russia were operated also by Kawakami's protégé, Colonel Fukushima Yasumasa, gathering information in Russia. He also came down to Siam in January 1897 and met General Kawakami there. Therefore, it can be supposed that Inagaki, having a channel of information about Russia through his elder brother Yutaro who was living in Vladivostok, was expected by General Kawakami to be the source of some information about Russian interest in Siam. Inagaki's role as such a source would be realized afterwards.

---

97 See Satow Diaries, 18th February, 1897, PRO. 30/33/15.
98 What Kawakami reported to Okuma can be seen in the Satow report to London. See British Minister at Tokyo, E. Satow to Salisbury, February 25, 1897, no.38 in FO.422/47. As for the treaty issue with Siam, Okuma was also informed that the Siamese government was making difficulties about extraterritorial jurisdiction. See ibid.
99 Okuma to Matsukata, April 10, 1897, no.554 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
100 Okuma to Matsukata, April 10, 1897, no.54 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
101 Joho Yoshio, Riku&W1 show kyoku (The Bureau of Military Affairs) (Tokyo, 1979), pp. 238-244.
102 Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (The Newspaper Tokyo Asahi), 7th March, 1897. Colonel Fukushima also met Thewawong and King Chulalongkorn through the Minister Resident of France at Bangkok, A. Defrance, who was informed by General Kawakami. See K.T.33 6.6/6.
103 Inagaki Manjiro, Tohosaku daiippen, p. 46.
104 N. J. Brailey, 'Sir Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: The Trials of A Diplomat in the Age of High Imperialism', p. 43.
At all events, Okuma instructed Inagaki to achieve somehow a commercial treaty with Siam.\(^{105}\) The task of negotiation with Siam was assigned to Inagaki, a thirty-five years old non-professional diplomat, as the first Japanese Minister at Bangkok.

### 4-8. Inagaki in Bangkok as envoy for negotiation

According to Inagaki's report on concluding the Japanese-Siamese Treaty of 1897,\(^{106}\) submitted after the conclusion of the treaty, he seems not to have expected that the negotiation in Bangkok for a treaty between Japan and Siam would take a whole year. But he was well aware that the situation surrounding Japan after the Sino-Japanese War was not like that at the time when he visited Siam in 1894.

At the outset, Inagaki found some difficulties in getting negotiation for a treaty started. First, King Chulalongkorn was travelling in Europe in 1897. Second, the Siamese government was then offended by the fact that Japanese residents in Siam were under the protection of the French Legation. Third, Japanese residents in Siam were generally losing their earlier good reputation because some of them were persons of no resources, or adventurers. Lastly, the Powers seemed to contrive to obstruct the negotiation because they were apprehensive that a treaty between Japan and Siam might upset the existing basis of relations between Siam and them. Nonetheless, Inagaki began the spadework for the negotiations. He tried in particular to establish a rapport with the Siamese Royal Family, to direct Japanese residents to behave themselves in a well mannered way, and conceal from the Powers his negotiations with the Siamese government.\(^{107}\) Two months after Inagaki's arrival in Siam, he enquired of Siam's Foreign Minister the name of his representative for the negotiation.\(^{108}\) The Siamese government, though the King was abroad, decided to start negotiating. Thewawong was given carte-blanche by the Regency Council headed by Queen Saowapha.\(^{109}\) Nevertheless, Inagaki was anxious about whether or not Prince Thewawong alone would be Siam's representative. Inagaki thought that a plurality of Siamese representation would cause the negotiations to fall

---

\(^{105}\) Okuma to Inagaki, April 17, 1897, no.2, drafted on 12th April in JDA. 2-5-1-17.

\(^{106}\) Inagaki Manjiro, 'Nissen joyaku teiketsu danpan tennatsu tekiyo (A Summary of the Negotiation for the Japanese-Siamese Treaty)' unpaged, in JDA. 2-5-1-17, (hereafter, 'A Summary of the Negotiation')

\(^{107}\) Ibid.

\(^{108}\) Inagaki to Thewawong, June 15,1897, no.5 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.

\(^{109}\) Thewawong to Inagaki, June 25, 1897 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
behind his schedule. He tried to avoid such a situation. In consequence, it was confirmed that only Thewawong was to be Siam's representative for the negotiation. 110

On 26th June 1897, Inagaki proposed to Thewawong holding their first meeting on 28th June. 111 They began at 4 p.m. on the 28th at Siam's Foreign Ministry, and Inagaki presented the treaty draft of the Japanese government. 112 On this occasion, he expounded the purport of Japan's treaty draft, stressing the difference between the previous treaties with China or with Korea, and the present treaty draft. He also emphasised that the proposed treaty was based on reciprocity. However, Japan's draft involved extraterritoriality as part of the Protocol, with a reserved passage that Japan would relinquish the extraterritoriality immediately as soon as the Powers did so. Inagaki had to give a clear justification to Thewawong, saying that nothing other than protecting Japanese residents in Siam was intended in insisting on that right, and that the expected treaty could be revised with 12 months notice. He added that the Japanese government would be delighted to help with Siam's treaty revision with the Powers. 113 In sum, Japan's draft was outwardly reciprocal but not equal in a real sense.

On 4th July, the second meeting was held. Thewawong excused his delay in presenting Siam's counter proposal. He promised that it would be ready in a week. 114 Inagaki may have been startled on that occasion that Thewawong voiced Siamese reluctance to concede extraterritoriality to Japan, explaining that the Siamese government was drafting a clause for limited consular jurisdiction following the example of the 1883 Anglo-Siamese treaty. 115 By this treaty, Britain's Asian protégés were placed under Siamese jurisdiction. 116 Inagaki built up a counter argument, that Japan would not be able to protect her citizens in the current condition

110 Inagaki Manjiro, A Summary of the Negotiation, op. cit.
111 Inagaki to Thewawong, June 26, 1897, no.6 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
112 Thewawong to Inagaki, June 27, 1897, and Inagaki to Okuma, June 28, 1897, no.3 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
113 Inagaki Manjiro, A Summary of the Negotiation, op. cit.
114 Inagaki to Okuma, August 22, 1897, no.5 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
115 Inagaki Manjiro, A Summary of the Negotiation, op. cit.. According to Inagaki, Thewawong referred to the '1885' treaty with England. Whether Inagaki made the mistake or Thewawong we do not know, but it should have been the 1883 treaty regarding British subjects in the North of Siam, Chiangmai. Article VIII stipulated that "His Majesty the king of Siam will appoint a proper person or proper persons to be a Commissioner and Judge or Commissioners and Judges in Chiangmai for the purposes hereinafter mentioned. Such Judge or Judges shall, subject to the limitations and provisions contained in the present Treaty, exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction in all cases arising in Chiangmai, Lakon, and Lampoonchi between British subjects, or in which British subjects may be parties as complainants, accused, plaintiff, or defendants, according to Siamese law:" See Brig. Gen. M. L. Manich Jumsai, History of Anglo-Thai Relations, p. 181. And comments of E. Satow, then British Minister in Bangkok in 'Satow Diaries', July 7, 1885, PRO. 30/33/15. See also Rungsaeng Kitayapong, The Origins of Thailand's Modern Ministry of Justice and its Early Development', pp. 76-78.
of Siam's judicial system. Inagaki continued that the Japanese government definitely could not accept such a counter proposal. The Siamese government would be able to require Japan to revise the treaty at 12 months' notice if some clause was found to be unsuitable in practice. Therefore, it was advisable for the two countries that a treaty should be concluded in line with Japan's proposal, Inagaki maintained. 117 Inagaki seems to have hastened the outcome without sufficient serious consideration for Siam's long years of suffering from the unequal treaties with the Powers. On the other hand, the Siamese government appears to have attempted to conclude the treaty with Japan as with Britain in 1883. Thewawong was seeking to recover Siam's judicial autonomy through the new treaty with Japan. Inagaki enquired time after time whether Siam's counter proposal was ready. But it was not until 26 August 1897, at the time of Inagaki's just leaving a tea-party at Court, that Thewawong disclosed Siam's counter draft to him. 118

4-8-1. Controversy over Siam's counter draft

After examining Siam's counter draft thoroughly and swiftly, Inagaki met Thewawong the day following its presentation (27th August), in order to consider its contents. Thewawong stressed that the terms of Siam's draft as to consular jurisdiction were not final. Siam's Foreign Minister also disclosed a new offer: the three ports, i.e. Chantabun, Ligor (Nakhon Sithammarat) and Kelantan (Kota Bharu), could be opened to Japan. 119 Inagaki himself had already suggested the same idea in the Toho Kyokai Kaiho the year before (August, 1896). Thus it could be assumed that Siam's offer was one which had been suggested by Inagaki who thought that Siam's counter draft as it was could not accepted by Tokyo.

---

117 Inagaki Manjiro, A Summary of the Negotiation, op. cit.
118 Ibid. The main issue between the drafts was consular jurisdiction or extraterritoriality. Siam's counter draft deleted the term 'jurisdiction' from the 'most-favoured nation clause' provided for in Japan's draft treaty. (Siam's counter draft still included the 'most-favoured nation clause') This consular jurisdiction was much more manifest in the Protocol of Japan's draft, stipulating that Japan would abandon consular jurisdiction at once when the Powers did so. But Siam's draft Protocol allowed a Japanese consul to decide only the final appeal judgment in a case which had first been tried before Siam's courts, and it had to be a civil or criminal case in which Japanese were defendants. Naturally, the Siamese government tried to get rid of prescribing for consular jurisdiction in the new treaty. See ibid. Indeed, the general adviser to the Siamese government, Rolin-Jaequemyns, opposed Japan's draft, and expected that the new treaty would mark a breakthrough for the abolition of consular jurisdiction of the Powers in Siam. See Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., p. 132. Nevertheless, the Siamese government seems to have realised well that the Siamese judicial system at that time was far from one based on modern western style. Consequently, a limited consular jurisdiction clause was kept by the Siamese government itself in its draft Protocol. Another important point about Siam's counter draft concerns the commission of arbitration. Any dispute coming about due to interpretation, implementation, or contravention of the treaty would be decided by this commission. This was an idea of the Siamese government. See Okuma to Matsukata, April 1, 1897, no.49 in JDA. 2-5-1-17. For more details of Japan's draft, see ibid., to which the English and Japanese versions of Japan's draft are attached. And for details of Siam's counter draft, see Inagaki to Okuma, August 28, 1897, no.6 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
119 Inagaki to Okuma, August 28, 1897, no.6 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
Inagaki had wired to ask instructions of Tokyo, whether he should insist on Japan's draft complete, or whether he should modify it and present another proposal on consular jurisdiction based upon the 1855 Treaty between England and Siam. He thought that the latter was more acceptable to the Siamese government. Inagaki himself, however, seems to have been confident of getting full consular jurisdiction from the Siamese government at this stage. An instruction from the Japanese Foreign Ministry arrived on 12 September 1897. Okuma's directions were that Inagaki's suggestion of consular jurisdiction following the 1855 Agreement between England and Siam was accepted, but should be provided for explicitly in the Protocol. Also, Okuma instructed Inagaki to explain to the Siamese government that the Japanese constitution prohibited any extension of consular jurisdiction and the consular system in Japan, and in consequence, it had been carefully excluded from the terms of all recent treaties. As for an arbitration clause, he simply rejected it. But Siam's offer of opening three new ports was accepted.

On receipt of this instruction, Inagaki had to contrive a new stratagem. Two days later, September 14, he contacted Thewawong again to inform him of Japan's revisions. On this occasion, they had a confidential talk for a compromise. The compromise was that the Japanese government would agree, at once, to abandon the jurisdiction reserved to Japanese Consular officers in Siam, whenever the judicial reform of Siam should have been completed – that was whenever the following codes or law of courts came into force: a civil code, a code of civil procedure, a criminal code, a code of criminal procedure, and organic law on the administration of justice. And a Japanese legal adviser would assist Siamese codification work.

It can be assumed that General Adviser Rolin-Jaequemyns was manoeuvering behind this compromise proposal of the Siamese government. We now recall his talks with Inagaki when the latter visited Siam in 1894. At that time, Rolin-Jaequemyns told Inagaki that he was going to advise Thewawong not to concede extraterritoriality to Japan as Siamese codification work was still in progress. Inagaki, however, had estimated that Siam's judicial reform would

120 Inagaki Manjiro, A Summary of the Negotiation, op. cit. For details of the 1855 Agreement as ratified in 1856, see M. L. Manich Jumsai, King Mongkut and Sir John Bowring (Bangkok, 1970), pp. 141-142.
121 Inagaki to Okuma, September 5, 1897, no.7 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
122 Okuma to Inagaki, September 11, 1897, no.6 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
123 Inagaki Manjiro, A Summary of the Negotiation, op. cit.
124 Inagaki to Okuma, September 17, 1897, no.8 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
take another half-century. Therefore, he argued that accepting this compromise came to the same thing in a practical sense as maintaining Japan's draft. As for arbitration, the Siamese government persisted in its demand on the ground that Siam would never be able to resist Japan when the two countries had a dispute over the expected treaty. Inagaki warned Tokyo that there would be no hope of concluding a treaty if Japan rejected this Siamese demand. Why did Siam want an arbitration clause? It could probably be said that Siam entertained some apprehension of Japan after the Sino-Japanese War and her subsequent occupying of Formosa.

On Inagaki asking again for an immediate instruction, Tokyo wired back that regarding consular jurisdiction the Japanese government consented to the compromise proposal of the Siamese government on condition that the clause 'Japan would abandon the jurisdiction conferred on Japanese Consular officers in Siam, whenever the judicial reform of Siam should have been completed' would be revised as follows: 'whenever satisfactory judicial reform of Siam shall have been completed.' On the arbitration clause, Tokyo eventually accepted it, instructing Inagaki to arrange for it to be stipulated in the Protocol, not in the Treaty.

Three days later, September 25, after Inagaki had received Tokyo's instruction, Siam's Foreign Minister visited the Japanese Legation. Inagaki explained Tokyo's intentions and pressed him for his answer. But Thewawong only replied that the matter would be considered by his Government. It took four days for the Siamese government to reach a conclusion. It refused Japan's revision. Thewawong seemed inclined to wait for Chulalongkorn's return from Europe.

4-8-2. Inagaki presses Thewawong

With Siam's rejection of his terms, Inagaki was about to close the negotiations, saying that they would be worthless unless consular jurisdiction was given, because he would not be able sufficiently to protect Japanese residents. This may have been a stratagem of Inagaki: Thewawong responded casually that Inagaki was to be allowed temporarily to try legal cases regarding Japanese in Siam until a treaty between the two countries was concluded. Inagaki did not ignore the opening. On 3rd October, he handed in an official statement to Thewawong about implementation of Japan's temporary consular jurisdiction following what Thewawong

125 Ibid.
126 Okuma to Inagaki, September 22, 1897, no.7 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
127 Inagaki Manjiro, A Summary of the Negotiation, op. cit.
told him at this last meeting. It declared that the Japanese consul would exercise temporary consular jurisdiction in civil or criminal cases in which either both parties were Japanese citizens, or Japanese were defendants.\textsuperscript{128} Thewawong could not cover his confusion, replying that his answer would be presented later.\textsuperscript{129} Two days later, he lodged a note of protest at Inagaki's statement: what he had told Inagaki the week before had meant that until a treaty was concluded, the Japanese consul could try a case involving their citizens, as 'arbitrator', not judge.\textsuperscript{130}

But the tables were already turning for Inagaki. The following day, Inagaki made a representation to Thewawong. The latter reluctantly took a conciliatory tone, saying that the Japanese consul would be allowed to decide Japanese disputes to conform with rationality. He was reaching his target step by step. In order to get rationality, Inagaki finally asked, should not Japanese law be adopted? In consequence, Thewawong conceded to Inagaki's insistence.\textsuperscript{131}

Behind this, Thewawong had a weak spot regarding Inagaki: he had once in 1894 shown his acceptance of conceding extraterritoriality to Japan. At all events, Okuma telegraphed congratulations to Inagaki on his success in drawing such a compromise from Siam's Foreign Minister, and instructed that consular jurisdiction should be arranged as soon as possible, either by negotiation or by actual exercise of jurisdiction. He promptly appointed a Japanese consul at Bangkok.\textsuperscript{132} Inagaki, taking a cautious approach, outlined what Thewawong had promised to him in the form of his private proposal on 10th October. Thewawong claimed that the Laws of Succession and Marriage were excluded from the Treaty's application. Inagaki's proposal was to be considered in the presence of the Queen Regent again. However, the Siamese government was reluctant to decide the issue. It was still waiting for Chulalongkorn's return from Europe.\textsuperscript{133} Inagaki was thoroughly on the alert. A criminal case involving a Japanese resident occurred, probably deliberately designed to realize Okuma's instruction mentioned above.\textsuperscript{134} Japanese extraterritoriality in Siam became a fait accompli.

\textsuperscript{128} Inagaki to Thewawong, October 2, 1897, no.13 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
\textsuperscript{129} Inagaki Manjiro, A Summary of the Negotiation, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{130} Thewawong to Inagaki, October 5, 1897 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
\textsuperscript{131} Inagaki Manjiro, A Summary of the Negotiation, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{132} Okuma to Inagaki, October 7, 1897, no.8 in JDA. 2-5-1-17. Fujita Toshiro was the first First Class Consul at Bangkok, promoted from Second Class Consul in Singapore.
\textsuperscript{133} Inagaki Manjiro, A Summary of the Negotiation, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{134} Inagaki to Foreign Minister Nishi Tokujiro, November 18, 1897, no.13 in JDA. 2-5-1-17. The case was about theft by a Japanese woman. But no satisfactory evidence was produced.
On 16th December, King Chulalongkorn returned to Siam from his trip to Europe.

Inagaki, with his wish to complete the treaty negotiation, met Thewawong again on the 22nd. The latter asked Inagaki to confirm whether his private proposal already submitted was a proposal authorized by the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{135} Inagaki received instructions from the successor to Okuma as Japanese Foreign Minister, since 6 November 1897, Nishi Tokujiro. Nishi authorized Inagaki's proposal, but he, like Okuma, also insisted on inserting the word 'satisfactory' in the consular jurisdiction clause: Japan would abandon the extraterritoriality whenever satisfactory judicial reform of Siam should have been completed.\textsuperscript{136} Inagaki informed Thewawong about the confirmation of his instructions. Inagaki, however, still had to wait for Siam's answer. The first month of the following year, 1898, was needed for the Siamese government's consideration, being at the same time busy with welcome-home parties held at several places for the King. It was February 1st when the Siamese government disclosed the conclusion of their consideration. Their main point was that they could not accept the word 'satisfactory' in a consular jurisdiction clause.\textsuperscript{137}

Inagaki appealed to Tokyo to delete the word 'satisfactory' from Japan's draft to prevent the failure of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{138} However, the answer from Tokyo disappointed Inagaki. The Japanese Foreign Ministry again recommended that the Japanese government consent to withdraw the word 'satisfactory' providing the words 'one year after' were inserted before words 'the judicial', and words 'shall have been in actual operation for the period of one year' were inserted in place of words 'will come into force'.\textsuperscript{139} Inagaki repeated his fruitless approach. Thewawong refused it point-blank. Inagaki warned Tokyo that there would be no chance of concluding a treaty unless the Imperial government deleted from Japan's draft the word 'satisfactory' in a last additional revision.\textsuperscript{140} Ultimately, the Japanese Foreign Ministry accepted it.\textsuperscript{141} The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Siam and Japan was signed by Inagaki and Thewawong at Bangkok 25 February 1898.\textsuperscript{142} It seems that Inagaki suggested Prince Damrong, Minister of the Interior, should go to Japan to exchange

\textsuperscript{135} Inagaki Manjiro, A Summary of the Negotiation, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{136} For Inagaki's request, see Inagaki to Nishi, December 25, 1897 in JDA. 2-5-1-17. And for Nishi's instruction, see Nishi to Inagaki, December 28, 1897, no.22 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.

\textsuperscript{137} Inagaki Manjiro, A Summary of the Negotiation, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{138} Inagaki to Nishi, February 2, 1898, no.1 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.

\textsuperscript{139} Nishi to Inagaki, February 8, 1898, no.17 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.

\textsuperscript{140} Inagaki to Nishi, February 12, 1898, no.2 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.

\textsuperscript{141} Nishi to Inagaki, February 16, 1898, no.7 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.

\textsuperscript{142} Inagaki to Nishi, February 25, 1898, no.4 in JDA. 2-5-1-17. For the original Treaty, see JDA. TH 2.
ratifications. However, Chulalongkorn opposed it. Ratifications were exchanged at Bangkok 31 May 1898.

4-9. The meaning of the 1898 treaty

The Treaty consisted of 15 Articles, with the Protocol composed of 3 Clauses. The extraterritoriality clause which was the main issue of dispute between the two countries was not to appear in the Treaty but stipulated in Clause 1 of the Protocol. The Arbitration clause was also provided for in the Protocol Clause 3. Most of the ideas Inagaki proposed in the Toho Kyokai Kaiho in 1896 were realized.

As for the opening of three ports at Inagaki's insistence, once offered by the Siamese government and accepted by Okuma, new Foreign Minister Nishi instructed Inagaki that the Japanese government did not accept Siam's offer on the ground that it would cause misgivings among the Powers, particularly France regarding Chantabun. Yet Inagaki attempted to gain Siam's consent to make it clear in the form of a diplomatic note that three ports without specific names would be opened for Japan. However, Siam's Foreign Minister, Thewawong, retorted that Chantabun was actually already operating as an open port, and Japan would be able to secure the same privileges on the ground of its most-favoured nation clause if another port was opened to a third country. Therefore, it was not necessary to make particular diplomatic reference to it.

On the other hand, for the Siamese government, this Treaty produced something like a starting-point for recovering her full judicial autonomy, because this was the first treaty which manifested a prospective end to extraterritoriality in Siam, though in the Protocol and with reservations. Once in 1894 when he met Inagaki, Thewawong had openly conceded Japanese extraterritoriality in Siam. However, after Inagaki's tour, and particularly the Sino-Japanese War, this view was reconsidered, probably on Rolin-Jaequemyns's advice, along the lines of the 1883 Anglo-Siamese treaty, which removed Britain's Asian protégés in North Siam from the jurisdiction of foreign consular courts. It seems that Thewawong hoped that Japan understood

---

143 See British Minister at Bangkok, G. Greville to Salisbury, March 16, 1898, no.13 in FO.422/49.
144 Fujita to Nishi, May 31, 1898, no.15 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
145 See JDA. TH 2.
146 Nishi to Inagaki, December 28, 1897, no.22 in JDA. 2-5-1-17. France was in occupation of Chantabun as a guarantee of the terms of the treaty of 3 October 1893, up to 1903.
147 Inagaki to Nishi, March 8, 1898, no.2 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
Siam's diplomatic complicated situation, thinking that a treaty with Japan would be concluded as a means of an alliance with Japan in order to resist French imperialism in Siam. But he changed his mind. Why? Perhaps, he realized that Japan would not be willing to support Siam because especially after 1895 the Japanese might not want to be involved in Siam-France conflict. In addition, Rolin's suggestion that Siamese codification work would be completed soon so that she did not have to concede extraterritoriality to Japan, was another factor which led Thewawong to reconsider a Siam-Japan treaty.

At any rate, Thewawong apparently expected that he could make a kind of model treaty for the succeeding treaty revision negotiation with the Powers, particularly with Russia whose plenipotentiary was expected to arrive shortly at Bangkok for the purpose of negotiating a treaty. The Siamese government wished to obtain the insertion of a similar article in a treaty with Russia. Nevertheless, although the 1898 Treaty was intended by Thewawong to be a tempting invitation to the other Powers to open negotiations, no countries turned to them. Far from that, the treaty with Russia subsequently concluded was a return to the Bowring-type treaty.

One might question why the Japanese Foreign Ministry was committed to obtaining extraterritoriality in Siam? For one thing, extraterritoriality in Japan was about to be relinquished by the Powers in the following year (due July 17, 1899). When this happened, if the 1898 treaty was to be an entirely equal treaty, Siam would automatically obtain the same diplomatic status in Japan as the Powers on the ground of the most-favoured nation clause of Article 2 of this 1898 Treaty. It might be assumed that the Meiji government, probably not Okuma specifically, but the Japanese government in general, having maintained their superiority over China and Korea through unequal treaties and winning a war, in 1894-95, felt a sense of superiority over Siam as the Powers did practically. However, this does not mean that Japan was planning to extend her influence to Siam in the same manner as towards Korea, China, and Formosa.

It might be said that Japan's attitude to Siam at that time was one of ambivalence, involving the idealism and realism. The former was represented by Okuma's view: he may have

148 See 'Satow Diaries', April 14, 1898. Also, British Minister in Tokyo, E. Satow to Sailsbury, April 15, 1898, no.64 in FO.422/49.
wanted Siam to be a more 'civilised' country by means of demanding 'satisfactory' judicial reform. Although he was going to negotiate a treaty with Siam on terms of reciprocity, he still intended to exercise full extraterritoriality as long as the Powers did. In his mind, Japan was a country whose role was to introduce the civilisation of the Occident to the Orient, and she had a heaven-oriented office, harmonizing the civilization of the East and West. For the realism of Japan's policy towards Siam at that time, Okuma as well as the succeeding Foreign Minster Nishi concluded that Japan after the Triple Intervention did not want to face French imperialism in Siam.

But behind the scenes of the 1898 Japanese-Siamese Treaty, and later relations between these two independent Asian countries, there was a young diplomat, Inagaki Manjiro, who exerted himself to build a friendly and mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.

---

151 See 'Satow Diaries', 7th January, 1897.
This chapter is designed to bring several Japanese advisers in Siam into relief. It is a little known fact in the study of Japanese-Siamese relations that there were Japanese who were employed as advisers by the Siamese government before and after the 1898 treaty. Although the number of these Japanese advisers was small, they should be taken into account in the study of Japanese-Siamese relations, because they were something like 'shadow promoters' in maintaining friendly relations between the two governments.

Above all Masao Tokichi, legal adviser in the Ministry of Justice in Siam, should be taken first in this chapter, because it was Masao who gained Siamese confidence, much more so even than the Japanese Minister, Inagaki Manjiro. As well as Masao's devotion to Siamese judicial and legal reform, he later played a role from the onset of negotiations for revision of the 1898 treaty.

Other Japanese advisers were Yasui Tetsu as educational adviser, and Toyama Kametaro and others as sericultural industry advisers. These people were less influential than Masao, but they did cultivate friendly terms with several Siamese high-ranking officials, for instance, Foreign Minister Prince Thewawong.

5-1. Masao Tokichi: a western educated Japanese legal adviser in the Siamese government

5-1-1. Masao's brief profile

Compared with Inagaki, Masao is probably known to a much greater degree by some modern Japanese historians because of the biography edited by his son, Masao Ryujiro, and the accounts by living descendants of the Masaos. In this section, we look at Masao's career.

1 Masao Ryujiro (ed.), Masao Tokichi tsuito roku (Memories of Masao Tokichi) (Tokyo, 1922). Most writers about Masao thereafter are indebted to this book. In the general description of Masao's life the present author also refers to this work without numbered footnotes with the exception of citing other sources. These are, though, also largely derived from the above book, based on interviews with Masao's relatives or on personal memories of Masao, for example, Miki Sakae, 'Taikoku horitsu komon Masao Tokichi den' (A legal Adviser to Siam, Biography of Masao Tokichi), in Mantetsu toa keizai chosa kyoku, Shin aia (The New Asia), November, 1939, pp. 146-154. Miki Sakae was Japanese adviser to the Art Academy in Thailand, and was an acquaintance of Masao Tokichi. Shin ehime henshu kyoku, Nanyo no gunzo (The Department of Shin Ehime, The People of southern part of Ehime prefecture), April, 1966, pp. 191-194, (hereafter cited Shin Ehime). Kageura Naotaka, 'Nitto shinzen no korosha Masao Tokichi shi no jiseki ni tsuite (An account of a person who contributed to the friendly relations between Japan and Thailand)', in Iyo shidan kai (The History Association of Ehime), Iyo shidan (The Historical Journal of Ehime Prefecture), no.107, June, 1941, pp. 611-621, Amada Rokuro, 'Ko Masao Tokichi koshi no kotodomo (A Note on the Late Minister Masao Tokichi) in Kasumigaseki kai kaiho (The Proceeding of the Kasumigaseki Association), no.2, 17, March, 1964, pp. 9-11.

2 Masao's descendant, Mr. Masao Kichiro, as of 1990, lives in Kamakura city in Kanagawa prefecture. The account of Masao by the present author is due in part to an interview with this Mr. Masao.
briefly, though his remarkable contribution to Siamese legal reform will be dealt with in the next section.

Interestingly, both principal figures in Meiji Siamese-Japanese relations had experience of study in the West. While Inagaki studied in England, Masao Tokichi was educated in America. Younger than Inagaki by 9 years, Masao was born 17 November 1870, in Ozu-machi, Ehime prefecture, Shikoku Island. His father had been an affluent merchant under Shogunate patronage. But since the Meiji Restoration, the family of Masao had declined. His father started working at the district post-office. Having studied English since his first year of primary school, working at the same time as a postman, young Masao attended as well English-language evening school at the local Church. Because of his intellectual appetite and also his father's death, he moved to Osaka at the age of 17 years to learn English at the Mission School.3 But he was not content there, and moved on to the centre of learning, the capital, Tokyo. He registered first at the Keio Gijuku of Fukuzawa Yukichi, the present Keio University, but later transferred by examination to the English course of Waseda College, the predecessor of the present Waseda University founded by Okuma Shigenobu.4 After finishing at Waseda, for a while he taught English at the Mission School in Hiroshima city, but his ambition did not allow him to settle there. He disposed of his inheritance from his father in order to study in America. His studies began at Vanderbildt University in 1889, three years after Inagaki's entrance into Cambridge. Masao transferred to West Virginia University in 1892, and graduated there with a B.A. in 1895. In the same year, he extended his academic career to Yale University. Graduating with honours, he became a Doctor of Civil Law of Yale University in 1896. He continued working as an assistant at Yale for a time, but the American anti-Japanese movement was increasing then,5 so he left America for settlement in the Kingdom of Hawaii, then still maintaining its independence.6 But the increasing anti-Japanese campaign even there led him to decide to return to Japan after all on 29 July 1897.7

3 Shin Ehime, op. cit., p. 192.
5 For details of anti-Japanese feeling and the problem of Japanese immigration in America, see Treat, P. J., Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan 1853-1895 (Gloucester, Mass., 1963), vol.II, Ch. XXXIX (pp. 371-392).
6 For the Kingdom of Hawaii and American annexation, see ibid., vol.I, Ch.III (pp. 25-50), Kuykendall, Ralph S., The Hawaiian Kingdom volume II (Honolulu, 1953), pp. 196-230, Stevens, S.K., American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-98 (Harrisburg, 1945), Ch.X (pp. 230-269).
7 Miki Sakae, op. cit., p. 148. For details of antagonism against Japanese in Hawaii at that time, see Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii 1868-1898, Ch.XI (pp. 119-130).
5-1-2. Masao's encounter with Komura Jutaro

As soon as he came back to Japan, he was invited to be acting chief editor by the first English newspaper in Japan, the Japan Times, which had just begun in the same year as Masao's return. Apparently, this career connected him with political circles in the Meiji government, led by Premier Matsukata Masayoshi (1896-98), Inagaki's patron. Through his career with the press, Masao became acquainted with the then Foreign Minister, Okuma Shigenobu, and the Vice-Foreign Minister, Komura Jutaro.

At the same time, Inagaki, having arrived in Bangkok in the same year as Masao's return to Japan, was taking up treaty negotiation with the Siamese government. In the course of the negotiations, the main question between the two sides was whether or not the Siamese government accepted Japanese extraterritoriality in Siam. A compromise was made at last between Inagaki and Siamese Foreign Minister Prince Thewawong; Japan would surrender her right to extraterritoriality when Siam completed and promulgated codes of criminal law, civil law, and commercial law, criminal and civil procedure laws and law of courts, and a Japanese legal adviser would assist Siamese codification work.\(^8\) (see Ch.4-8-1)

When Tokyo received a Siamese government request for supply of a Japanese legal expert, the Vice-Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro tried to seek out a suitable candidate. Competence in English, legal expertise and diplomatic ability were required, enough to deal with even M. Rolin-Jaequemyns who was at this time the General Adviser to the Siamese government, having great influence with the King,\(^9\) and other western advisers, on the ground that Japan needed to build intimate relations with Siam for the future.\(^10\) It was Masao who was regarded as the person who matched these conditions. In November 1897, just subsequent to his twenty-eighth birthday, Masao landed in Bangkok.\(^11\)

5-1-3. Masao compared with Inagaki

Chronologically, Masao's involvement with Siam began when he was approached by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to be a legal adviser to the Siamese government. Previously,

\(^8\) Inagaki to Okuma, September 17, 1897 in JDA. 2-5-1-17.
\(^9\) For details of Rolin-Jaequemyns, see Christian de Saint-Hubert, 'Rolin-Jaequemyns (Chao Phya Aphay Raja) and the Belgian legal advisers in Siam at the turn of the Century' in The Journal of the Siam Society, July, 1965, part 2, vol., III.
\(^10\) Miki Sakae, op. cit., p. 149.
\(^11\) Ibid.
there seems to have been no reliable evidence of Masao's being concerned with Siamese affairs at all. During his period of study in Osaka and Tokyo, aged 17 to 20, he was nothing but an ordinary needy student. In contrast to Inagaki who was born into a Bushi family at Hirado that was the traditional small gate-way for European civilisation throughout the Edo era, Masao came from a merchant family in a tiny remote city, but thanks to a Mission evening course there, he was able to cultivate his interest in English language.

Inagaki was in a sense from the elite. His higher education started at Tokyo University, a modern bureaucratic-fostered educational institution where he was inspired by political issues. On the other hand, Masao studied temporarily at Keio Gijuku and eventually completed at Waseda College, but his concern seems to have been simply with English language, though both Keio and Waseda were unconventional, novel schools, then attracting many ordinary young men, inspiring their political ambition. In fact, after his study in Tokyo, Masao returned to a local city and got a teaching job at the Mission school. Although he seems not to have been Christian, his study at Vanderbildt University began originally with theology, probably influenced by previous experience at the Mission school. His academic study in the field of law commenced when he transferred to West Virginia University.

Why did his interest turn to legal study? There is nothing to explain this other than deducing that he might have been motivated by hoping to reside permanently in America. Masao might have thought that legal expertise was a practical basis for spending the rest of his life in America. Ultimately, he obtained the Doctor of Civil Law conferred from Yale and was eligible to register as an attorney-at-law. Therefore it is possible to say that unlike Inagaki, Masao's interest in political or diplomatic issues surrounding Japan at the point when he completed at Yale was far less than that of Inagaki. But it is likely that the anti-Japanese campaign which caused his return to Japan might have provoked Masao's concern about being involved in rising political controversy in his homeland. Actually, he chose to make his profession as a prominent journalist with a new, brisk English paper rather than stick to the placid scholarly life. Had he not been selected as adviser to the Siamese government, his subsequent life would have been spent in journalism. Why was he drawn to Siam? Unlike Inagaki who had been concerned with diplomatic affairs for years, and been involved in

12 Masao Ryujiro, op. cit., p. 21.
13 Miki Sakae, op. cit., p. 148.
Siamese affairs with an evident particular object, Masao's motivation in accepting the post of legal adviser seems to have been prompted by nothing but his venturous youthful vigour.

5-1-4. Masao's scholastic life

While serving the Siamese government 16 years as a legal expert, confided in fully by both King Chulalongkorn and his son and successor King Wachirawut, it was Masao's nimble political ability that managed other, western advisers in the Siamese government. Nevertheless, he was a rather scholarly adviser, evident from the fact that during his time as legal adviser, he researched the ancient legal system in Siam and compared it with Indian classical law, and in 1898 and in 1900, on his home-leave,\(^{14}\) Masao delivered his scholarly conclusions to legal scholars of the Imperial University at Tokyo by which he was recommended to present a doctoral thesis. Masao produced his thesis on this topic written in English in 1901, and he was awarded the Doctor of Law of the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1903.\(^{15}\) His topic was a pioneering work in the sphere of comparative legal studies and even of Thai legal history. Later he contributed to law journals in both Japanese and English.\(^{16}\) His scholarly attitude gave rise to another professional work with regard to the Siamese Criminal Code of 1907.\(^{17}\) As the drafting member all along, he was eligible to record how the first Siamese Criminal Code was born. His role in drafting the Siamese Criminal Code will be recounted in the Section 5-2.

5-1-5. New life as M.P.

The latter half of Masao's life started after his return to Japan in 1913, aged 43 years. Since Masao's eldest daughter, Hisako, was wed to Hara Mitsugu who was a son-in-law of Hara

---

\(^{14}\) Masao's home-leave of 1898 was probably for his marriage. Masao was married to a daughter of Baron Kuki Ryuichi in November 1898. See Miki Sakae, op. cit., p. 153.

\(^{15}\) Masao Ryujiro, op. cit., p. 14. According to the Faculty of Law of the present Tokyo University, the original of this thesis was destroyed by the Great Earthquake of 1923. But one of Masao's relatives, Mr. Okai Yoshio seems to have preserved it, see Kageura Naotaka, op. cit., p. 614. It should be noted here that Dr. Masao did not obtain the title of professor.


Takashi, the Premier during 1918-1921, it is evident that Masao had close relations with Hara. Thus it is clear why, two years later, in 1915, Masao entered politics, being elected in the 37th election to the Imperial House of Representatives for the Seiyukai party of Hara Takashi in Ehime prefecture, and in 1917 winning reelection. Masao's role in contemporary Japanese politics appears to have been fairly anonymous except as head of two observation tours by Diet members to America in 1917, and to Formosa, southern China and Southeast Asia including Siam in 1919. His interest in Siam seemed to be concerned rather with trade issues, in particular, a cotton growing project in Siam. But in the early 1920s, he was appointed as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Siam. His main task was to renew the 1898 Japanese-Siam treaty (See Ch.7). However, like Inagaki, Masao died quite young, of apoplexy at the age of 52, only about 6 months after his arrival in Bangkok. His son, Ryujiro, on his way to Bangkok to see his father, was among the passengers on a steamship bound for Singapore at the time of his father's death. The Siamese government honoured his death with a Royal Cremation.

5-2. Masao's contribution to the Siamese codification work

5-2-1. Masao among Belgian advisers

The work of the legal reformation in Siam in conformity with modern Western law began energetically in the reign of King Chulalongkorn. The first drafting work was undertaken in the domain of criminal law. The task of drafting the criminal code of Siam needed almost a decade with some internal and external political change.

In 1897, returning from visiting Europe, King Chulalongkorn made a speech to the Siamese officials. Masao noted what the King said in a letter to him in 1908: "Our common aim

18 Interview with Mr. Masao Kichiro in Tokyo, 27 November 1988.
20 As adviser to the Yamashita Steamship Company, Masao planned to establish a steamship company operating in the Gulf of Siam, under Siamese-Japanese joint management. See R.6.T.3.2/18. On this observation tour to Siam, Masao and the Diet members had an audience of King Wachirawut. See R.6 T3.2/1-25 August 1919. (See Ch.6-7-4) For details of general information on Japanese shipping, see Swan, 'Japanese Economic Relations with Siam', p. 33 onward.
21 He was appointed owing to the recommendation of Premier Hara. See Amada Rokuro, op. cit., p. 9.
22 See R.6.T.3.3/34. Masao was three times decorated by the Siamese government for his contribution to Siamese legal reform, in April 1905 with the Third Class of the White Elephant, in 1908 with The Second Class of the Royal Crown, in 1912 with The Second Class of the Imperial Family, and by the Japanese government, in 1908, with the Second Class of the Rising Sun, in 1915 with The Third Class of the Sacred Treasure.
must be to found the prosperity of Siam on the basis of good laws, good justice and fatherly administration."23 A few weeks later, the King of Siam appointed a Committee on the Codification of Criminal Laws consisting of Prince Raphi, Prince Phichit, General adviser Rolin-Jaequemyns, Phya Precha, Phya Kraisi, Legal adviser Kirkpatrick, and Masao himself.24

It is quite interesting that at the beginning Masao was not placed in the Ministry of Justice as a legal adviser. According to Minister Inagaki's secret conversation with Siamese Foreign Minister Prince Thewawong, the Siamese government made no agreement in advance for the employment of Masao, nor did it work through Rolin-Jaequemyns, which hurt Rolin-Jaequemyns's feelings. Nevertheless, the Siamese government had the intention from that time forth to employ Japanese legal experts instead of Belgian. However, the position of legal adviser was already occupied by another Belgian, R.J.Kirkpatrick, and other Belgian assistants were legal advisers. They had been serving the Siamese government for years. If Masao was appointed legal adviser, they might have complained about it. Therefore, at the beginning of the negotiation for the employment of Masao, from the political balance point of view, Siam preferred to give to Masao the official title of 'Secretary Interpreter to the General Adviser', not Legal Adviser. However, Minister Inagaki would not agree to that official title, because it was rather low in rank. Also Inagaki asked Thewawong to bestow a title which was not connected with the General Adviser.25

It was obviously a timely opportunity for a Japanese to be employed by Siam as an adviser in order to balance the Western Powers which had dominated Siam's administrative system through various adviser positions. Indeed, since the first Japanese Legation was opened in 1897, it is apparent that Minister Inagaki desired to get a post within the Siamese government for the Japanese not as a mere interpreter but with the status of an adviser in the same way as the Western Powers which had already succeeded in this earlier.

23 Masao Tokichi to King Chulalongkom, August 28, 1908 in R.5 T.2.2/31. This document is very valuable for study of Thai legal history. In this letter, Masao summed up the process of drafting the 1908 Siam Criminal Code.
24 Rolin-Jaequemyns, who had an influential role not only in Siamese legal change and the whole modernisation of Siam, but also in saving the Kingdom from any direct colonization, had arrived in Siam in 1892. The new Ministry of Justice was also virtually restarted in 1894 under Prince Phichit, succeeded in 1897 by Prince Raphi. As a result the traditional Siamese court system which had been eroded by corruption was reformed and legal centralization was begun. Shortly after, the Legislative Council was inaugurated in 1895 thanks to M. Rolin. See Wyatt. Politics of Reform in Thailand, p. 99, and the recent work of Rungsaeng Kittayapong, 'The Origins of Thailand's Modern Ministry of Justice and its Early Development', esp. ch. 6 (pp. 166-201).
25 Japanese Minister Inagaki Manjiro to Foreign Minister Nishi Tokujiro, December 4, 1897, no.10 in JDA. 3-8-4-16. Kirkpatrick arrived in Bangkok at the beginning of May 1894 to work for in the Siamese government as assistant legal adviser. He later became a son-in-law of Rolin-Jaequemyns. See Abhai Raja [Rolin-Jaequemyns] to King Chulalongkom, April 8, 1900 in R.5 P.9/44. Also see Rungsaeng Kittayapong, op. cit., pp. 256-258.
Eventually, Masao was given an official title as 'Secretary in the Department of Foreign Affairs', in the Foreign Ministry. Although seemingly Masao thereby belonged to the Foreign Ministry, his task, provided in the employment contract, was to translate Japanese documents and books into English, to give advice in general on matters of law, and even to draft codes, under the instruction of General Adviser. 26 This was substantially the work of a legal adviser in the Ministry of Justice.

5-2-2. Rolin-Jaequemyns's confidence in Masao

Despite his not being entitled an 'adviser', it is probably not too much to say that Minister Inagaki succeeded in securing for Masao an important place in the Siamese government. On the other hand, the relationship between Masao and Rolin soon became closer. The result of this was Masao's appointment as a member of the Committee on the Codification of Criminal Laws as stated above. This was a significant success for Masao and Inagaki on behalf of Japan. From then on, it seems that Siamese confidence in Masao, and the Japanese Legation led by Inagaki, increased amongst not only the high officials but also King Chulalongkorn. In 1901, Masao was assigned as a legal adviser to the Ministry of Justice, and he was expected to devote himself to codification work. 27 Later he became a Judge of the Supreme Court (San Dika). 28

Among the members of the Committee on the Codification of Criminal Laws, it was Masao who was charged with making the original draft of the Penal Code in collaboration with another Belgian legal expert, Cornelle Schlesser. 29 It was probably because the other, Thai members of the committee were extremely busy, as high officers who had to deal with various other national matters involving Siam, so that they could not be engaged substantially in making

26 The copy of the employment contract between Masao and Thewawong is enclosed in Japanese Minister Inagaki Manjiro to Japanese Foreign Minister Nishi Tokuijiro, December 4, 1897, no.10 in JDA. 3-8-4-16, and also in Prince Thewawong to King Chulalongkorn, December 8, 1897, no.152/10116 in R.6. P.5/177. In this secret letter, Thewawong disclosed that 'revising laws [codification work] in the future should follow [the example of] this country [Japan] much more than other countries.'

27 Inagaki to Japanese Foreign Minister, Kato Takaaki, April 2, 1901, no.14 in JDA. 3-8-4-16. During 1901-06, no formal contract regarding Masao's position as legal adviser was arranged. It was only in 1906 when such a contract was exchanged between Masao and Prince Raphi. See interim acting Minister, Tanabe Kumazo, to Foreign Minister, Hayashi Tadasu, November, 28, 1906, no.72 in JDA. 3-8-4-16 with copy of the contract. Also copy of the contract is enclosed in R.6 P.5/177.

28 See R.6 P.5/177, passim.

29 Masao Tokichi to King Chulalongkorn, August 28, 1908 in R.5 T.2.2/31. Schlesser and a fellow Belgian, Leon Orts, were appointed Siamese legal advisers in 1896 because Rolin-Jaequemyns complained to the King through Prince Thewawong that he was too busy and his health was suffering. See Prince Thewawong to King Chulalongkorn, September 25, 1896, no.187135 in R.5 P.9/22.
the original draft. Also, needless to say, drafting by many people might create confusion: 'Too many cooks spoil the broth'. On the other hand, the two senior Belgians, Rolin-Jaequemyns and Kirkpatrick, were both in poor health caused probably by the Siamese climate. In fact the latter died three years later in 1900, and Rolin also often had sick leave for the sake of his health. He died in Belgium in 1902.30 Thus it seems that Masao was thought to be a suitable person for making the basic draft due to his good health and ample time.

It is not presently necessary to discuss in detail the drafting work of the Siamese Penal Code. However, a brief description of the general story would be useful for considering the relationship between Masao and the Siamese government because their relations linked with the Siamese attitude towards Japanese affairs in general, including the treaty revision negotiation of the 1898 Japanese-Siamese treaty.

5-2-3. The efforts of Masao and Belgian lawyers in drafting the Siamese modern criminal code

The first drafting work was started in February 1898 by Masao. It was completed by July in the same year. In August, a part of the draft was examined by the Committee on the Codification of Criminal Laws. Since Masao had home-leave for ten weeks, examination work was stopped. In October, Masao returned to Siam, and the examination could start again. This continued until January 1899. From March to June, Masao was engaged in making a report on the Japanese governmental system on Rolin's orders, so it was not until July that examination was resumed.31 According to the Japanese diplomatic archives, it appears that a complete draft of the Criminal Code was produced between early January and early February 1900.32

In 1900, there was one special incident in Siam. During Rolin-Jaequemyns's home leave, the president of the Criminal Court, Phya Kraisi, made his own draft of the criminal law, and it was admitted by the Legislative Council without any opposition, because he was a member of it, and there were few members attending that meeting. However, King Chulalongkorn recognized it was a serious matter, so he did not approve it, and put it to the

30 Christian de Saint-Hubert, op. cit., p. 186.
31 Letter from Masao Tokichi to Rolin-Jaequemyns, February 10, 1900 in Inagaki to Foreign Minister Aoki Shuzo, April 15, 1900 in JDA. 4-1-1-35.
32 Ibid., and Inagaki to Japanese Foreign Minister, Kato Takaaki, April 2, 1901, no.14 in JDA. 3-8-4-16. Although the complete first draft has not been discovered, it is likely that the draft outline which is enclosed in Inagaki to Foreign Minister Aoki Shuzo, April 15, 1900 in JDA. 4-1-1-35 is the outline of the first draft.

Prince Raphi, third Minister of Justice, later reported to the King that "Masao has worked with much more energy and intelligence than we hoped. [Prince Raphi] feel at ease as if I had been served by an able Westerner." Prince Raphi to King Chulalongkorn, November 28, 1901, no.34/2702 in R.6. P.5/177.
Cabinet members. Prince Thewawong, Prince Damrong, and Prince Raphi advised the King not to approve it. Rolin-Jaequemyns, returning from Europe, made a direct appeal to the King, saying that what Phya Kraisi did was unwarrantable conduct. Eventually, Kraisi's draft seems to have been dropped and the King promised Rolin-Jaequemyns that codification work would not be referred to the Legislative Council. Inagaki, probably informed about this event by Masao, felt that it was quite strange that the Legislative Council would not deal with codification work, and assumed that what Phya Kraisi attempted was to oust the Belgian legal advisers. 33

At any rate, it seems that the Legislative Council was returned its authority because, according to Masao, the first draft made by Masao and Schlesser was revised by the same persons and sent to the Legislative Council in 1901. But drafting work then stopped entirely for about three years. 34 The reason why the Legislative Council did not examine the revised draft is not clear. During this period, the Minister of Justice, Prince Raphi, confessed his despondency about completion of the Criminal code. Prince Raphi was inclining to the opinion of the British adviser to the Ministry of Justice, J. Stewart Black, who suggested, elliptically, applying the traditional Siamese criminal code rather than making a new Code. 35 Prince Damrong shared this idea with Prince Raphi. But this did not mean that both princes despaired of making a new criminal code. 36

As a solution to this difficult situation, in 1902, Prince Raphi indicated that his ministry desired to employ Japanese jurists, one to succeed Schlesser who was due to return to his country in the near future, and another in the next year, whose task would be working on codification. Inagaki promptly cabled to Japanese Foreign Minister Komura to ask him to look for a suitable person. 37 It shows clearly what confidence Prince Raphi had in Japanese, probably due to Masao's performance of his duty. By September, a senior Japanese public

33 Inagaki to Kato, November 30, 1900, no.44 in JDA. 1-6-1-4-4.
34 Masao Tokichi, 'Shamu no shin keiho ni tsuite', p. 1627.
35 Prince Raphi to King Chulalongkom, December 2, 1903 in R.5 Y.23/3. Prince Raphi was an extremely busy man. He confessed to King Chulalongkom how he had been under great pressure of work for years and expressed his wish to resign from the post of judge of supreme court (San Ooa). See Prince Raphi to King Chulalongkom, April 28, 1907, no.6/163 in R.5.Y.10/19. Furthermore, when he attained his 35th birthday (1909), he seems to have been in severe mental depression, to such an extent that he revealed his agony, saying that "I have the most severe dizziness ever and I am absolutely unstable. I feel I am like a madman. There is nothing pleasant in this world. Death would release me from pain—" Prince Raphi to King Chulalongkom (no date) in R.5.Y.10/19. And see Runphaeng Kittayapong, op. cit., pp. 225.
36 Prince Damrong to King Chulalongkom, December 13, 1903 in R.5 Y.23/3.
37 Inagaki to Komura, April 14, 1902, no.11 in JDA. 3-8-4-16.
prosecutor in Osaka was nominated through Masao's father-in-law Baron Kuki Ryuichi. However, it seems that this plan did not reach firm agreement. There is no evidence that a Japanese prosecutor was employed by the Siamese government.

5-2-4. Masao versus Padoux

Influenced very much by international politics, the drafting work was resumed in 1905 when Georges Padoux, a French jurist, arrived in Bangkok as a legislative adviser to Siam. Masao gave as the reason why a Frenchman was adopted as legislative adviser, as follows; despite the Siamese payment of substantial compensation in consequence of the 1893 Paknam Crisis, France had been unwilling to withdraw from the provinces occupied as a guarantee, Chantaburi and Trat. However, owing to the Entente Cordiale in 1904, Siam's relations with France like those of England ameliorated. France then asked Siam to employ a Frenchman as a legal adviser. The reason why France demanded the position of legal adviser related to the intractability of the question of the French-protected Asian subjects in Siam. There was much friction between the Siamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the French Legation in Bangkok concerning the French-protected Asian subjects over various legal problems. Since the person who carried on the official correspondence concerning this issue was the chief legal adviser in the Ministry of Justice i.e. Masao, the Foreign Minister of France, Delcassé, thought that if France filled the position of legal adviser, the friction would abate. The important factor which led to the resumption of the drafting work also derived from the 1904 British and Siamese agreements with France. The latter prescribed that the two governments agreed on setting a boundary line between Siam and Cambodia and appointing a boundary negotiation committee.

However, it appeared to be very difficult to set an accurate boundary line. The two governments then made a compromise which would become the 1907 treaty, affirming that Battambang and other former western parts of Cambodia would be ceded to France. In return, Siam asked for a resolution of the issue of French-protected subjects. As a result, in the course

38 Inagaki to Komura, September 30, 1902, no.30, and Komura to Inagaki, November 6, 1902, no.16 in JDA. 3-8-4-16.
39 Padoux had served as Secretary-General of the French Residency-General of Tunis and Under-Secretary of State in the Departments of the Interior and Justice of the Tunisian Government, see Masao to Komura, September 18, 1908 in JDA. 3-8-4-16. And see Rungsaeng Kittayapong, op. cit., pp. 260-261. The former was a Masao private letter, reviewing his career as an adviser to the Siam government, and extending his thanks to Count Komura for his recommending Masao to be adviser to the Siam government.
of negotiation for the 1907 treaty, France conceded that all French-protected subjects would be subjected to the new Siamese laws which were expected to be enforced in the future. Thus the Siamese government, whether it liked it or not, was again made aware of the necessity of codification.40

Meanwhile, Padoux presented his memorandum at the request of Prince Raphi.41 The former admitted that the draft which had been proposed before (by Masao and Schlesser) was sufficiently complete, and carefully enough studied, the latest product of criminal science, and could be used as a starting-point for the work of the Commission.42 After that Padoux, spending one year on it, reexamined that draft again to make a final draft.43

In 1906, a final draft was completed and sent to the High Commission for the Codification of Criminal Laws which was specifically set up with the strong recommendation of Masao and Padoux.44 The Committee members were Prince Damrong, Prince Thewawong, Prince Naret, and Prince Raphi.45 Since Prince Raphi then went to Europe to prepare for King Chulalongkorn's visit there, Masao was appointed to be the Justice Ministry representative on this Committee.46 This was clearly another proof that the Siamese government had confidence in Masao. The first meeting of this committee was held on February 16, 1907 with the three princes, Masao, Padoux as a drafter, and two secretaries, Phra Atakarn Prasit and Luang Sakon Sathiyathorn, present.47

The drafting meetings were held two or three times a week from Monday to Friday in the early evening to midnight at Prince Damrong's Ministry of Interior, probably because he led

---

40 Masao Tokichi, 'Shamu no shin keiho ni tsuite', pp. 1627-1630.
41 Prince Raphi to King Chulalongkorn, March 16, 1905 in R.5 Y.23/3, 'A Memorandum' by George Padoux translated into English dated February 10, 1905, and 'Note by [Stewart] Black on proposed Commission for a Criminal Code' dated March 11, 1905 are enclosed in this document. It was revealed that Prince Raphi stated in his letter to the King that he did not want to be the chairman of the drafting committee for the new criminal code. For Black, see Runsgaeng Kittayapong, op. cit pp. 262-265.
42 'A Memorandum' by George Padoux dated February 10, 1905, op. cit.
43 Masao Tokichi, 'Shamu no shin keiho ni tsuite', p. 1631.
44 Ibid., and 'A Memorandum of George Padoux' written in English dated October 9, 1906, in R.5 Y.23/3. Thai translation of it is also enclosed.
45 The Ministry of Justice in Siam, Siam Penal Code in 1908, preamble page, Masao Tokichi, 'Shamu no shin keiho ni tsuite', pp. 1631-1632. King Chulalongkorn instructed Prince Somnot Amoraphan (Head of the Royal Secretariat) to draft a royal edict concerning setting up the High Commission for the Codification of Criminal Laws with Prince Raphi, and to send it to Prince Naret, Prince Thewawong, and Prince Damrong, see King Chulalongkorn to Prince Somnot Amoraphan, December 5, 1906 in R.5 Y.23/3.
46 Masao Tokichi, 'Shamu no shin keiho ni tsuite', p. 1632. Regarding Prince Raphi's attitude which can be perceived from the documentation, it is apparent that he did not want to be involved in codification of the criminal code. It can be inferred that since he studied English law at Oxford, Prince Raphi was not in favour of a French legislative adviser. Ibid. Also see Runsgaeng Kittayapong, op. cit., ch. 7 (pp. 202-234).
the course of examination instead of Prince Raphi. At the same time, the new treaty was under negotiation between Siam and France at the Ministry of Interior.\textsuperscript{48} Masao gave a vivid description of the completion of the drafting work of the Penal Code as follows:

The new treaty was concluded at night on 23 March 1907. The Foreign Minister [Prince Thewawong] returned to the Ministry of Interior telling all committee members that the new treaty had just been signed. We were so glad and said to each other that we had to try to finish examining this draft within this night. As a result, the draft was passed at three a.m.\textsuperscript{49}

The Siamese Criminal Code was promulgated on 1st April 1908. Owing to his prolonged effort in the work of drafting the Criminal Code, Masao was given the decoration of the second class of the order of the Crown of Siam. This took place at a private audience to which he went at King Chulalongkorn's own command on the night of 7th September 1908, when he personally handed over the decoration to him.\textsuperscript{50}

It is interesting that when Masao made the first draft in 1898, he referred to the 1880 Japanese Criminal Code and the Indian Criminal Code. And when the first draft was being revised by Masao and Schlesser, while the latter looked into the Italian Criminal Code, Masao was influenced very much by the 1907 revised Criminal Code of Japan which had been submitted to the 15th meeting of the Japanese Diet for its consideration.\textsuperscript{51} Therefore, it might be said that the first Siamese Criminal Code was influenced by the western principles of criminal law through the Japanese Criminal Code which was based on the German Criminal Code, as well as by those of Italy and British India.

\textbf{5-2-5. Masao's resignation}

By the time the Siamese Criminal Code was enforced, Masao realized that the rest of the Siamese codification work would be carried on by the French legal advisers led by Padoux.\textsuperscript{52} Nevertheless, Masao became one of the members of the drafting committee of the Siamese Civil-Commercial Code. In 1910, King Chulalongkorn died. Thus the drafting work continued under King Wachirawut. Masao's major contribution to this drafting work was that he opposed the draft family law which was prepared by the French legislative adviser, Padoux, who proposed to incorporate polygamy which was still prevalent mostly among high-class

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Masao Tokichi, 'Shamu no shin keiho ni tsuite', loc., cit.
  \item \textsuperscript{49} Ibid., pp. 1634-1635.
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Masao to Count Komura, September 18, 1908 in JDA. 3-8-4-16.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Masao Tokichi, 'Shamu no shin keiho ni tsuite', p. 1626.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Masao to Komura, September 18, 1908 in JDA. 3-8-4-16.
\end{itemize}
Siamese society. Padoux seems to have desired to preserve Siamese traditional custom, but Masao insisted strongly on monogamy. He thought that since Japan had changed its own custom to monogamy to accord with modern western law, Siam also could or should change its old custom by legislation, even if there remained some difference between people's actual behaviour and the legal ideal, in order also to help abolish extraterritoriality in the future.53

In the meantime, it is assumed that the Thai committee members were in an ambivalent situation, for while thinking of respect for the old custom, they had to consider what Siam was still associated with, that is the unequal treaties. The decision of whether it should be polygamy or monogamy, in the end, was left to King Wachirawut. The King's judgment was that the marriage register system should be introduced first.54

This dispute apparently led Masao to a clear realization that the French would be dominant as legal advisers in the Ministry of Justice. Also he himself was now suffering from a general physical and nervous break-down, and the onset of Bright's disease.55 In these circumstances, Masao submitted his resignation to the Siamese government.56 He left Siam in 1913 after contributing to Siam's legal modernization for 16 years.

After Masao's resignation, the Japanese Legation again asked the Siamese government to employ Japanese legal advisers. The Japanese government might have regretted that they did not succeed in pushing another Japanese jurist at the time Prince Raphi asked in 1902 as mentioned above. Now Siam capitalized on the situation. Prince Thewawong replied that if Japan proposed surrendering extraterritoriality, the Siamese government would immediately fulfil Japan's desire.57 Yet Japan did not respond in that respect. If Japan had surrendered her extraterritoriality voluntarily, she would have obtained the position of legal adviser in the Siam government. To surrender her extraterritoriality voluntarily might have resulted in much more benefit for Japan, because Japan's extraterritoriality would be abolished sooner or later. But
Japan did not take such action, probably because of a lack of interest in Siam's affairs. As a result, Japan missed a chance to gain the real confidence of the Siamese government.

5-3. Other Japanese advisers to the Siamese Government

The total number of Japanese advisers to the Siamese government was, needless to say, far less than that of Britain and other Western Powers. Yet apart from Masao, there were a few other Japanese advisers who cultivated friendly relations between Japan and Siam after the conclusion of the 1898 treaty between Japan and Siam. Although the Siamese paid less respect to those Japanese than to Masao, a brief account of these people is relevant to the present study.

5-3-1. Japanese sericulture adviser: Toyama Kametaro

Toyama Kametaro, then associate professor at Tokyo University and a sericulture expert, was recruited by the Siamese government as an advisory technician in March 1902. Moreover, there were other Japanese who paved the way for Toyama's employment. In 1900, two Japanese investigated the state of the sericulture industry in the north-eastern part of Siam (Khorat), which was undertaken on the initiative of Minister Inagaki. He submitted a report in 1901, based on the result of the investigation by the above two Japanese, to Prince Damrong, suggesting improvement of the Siamese sericulture industry. Why did Inagaki propose it? Apparently he was concerned about France which had, he viewed, long desired to extend its influence into the north-eastern part of Siam. Before France took action in the sphere of sericulture in Siam, Japan should take the lead in doing so. That was Japan's mission in order to help preserve Siamese independence, Inagaki believed.

In April 1902, Toyama produced his initial report of silk production in Siam, and the following year, he undertook an inspection tour of Nakhon Chaisi where silkworm-raising would be suitable, and submitted a report of the results of his investigation. He attempted to apply the agricultural schemes of the Meiji government to Siam. Due to Toyama's suggestion, the number of Japanese sericulture experts on silk-worm breeding to silk reeling reached more

---

59 Brown, loc. cit.
60 Ibid., and Ishii and Yoshihara, Nittai roppyaku nenishi (Six Hundred Years of Japan-Thai Relations), pp. 177-178.
than 14 in 1903. In consequence, a Sericulture Section (Kong Chang Mai), having mostly Japanese staff members with Toyama as chief, was set up in the Ministry of Agriculture in the same year. Shortly after, Prince Phenphatthanaphong, after studying agriculture in Britain, returned to Siam. Toyama proposed that the director of his department should be Thai, and the department had better cover other forms of general agriculture and stock farming. As a result, in October 1903, the Agricultural Department (Krom Phopluk) started under Director Prince Phenphatthanaphong. The Sericulture Section belonged to this new Department. 63

In November 1903, the Sericultural School was established in the grounds of Dusit Palace, probably on the recommendation of Toyama. Japanese silk experts engaged in teaching. It seems that the school was not successful, and was closed in the following year. A new Sericultural School was opened two years later, on 16th January 1905. This time the students were given study loans on condition of five years work for the government after graduation. 64 Japanese experts, Tahara, Takano, and Nakamura, were in charge of teaching. 65

Further, Toyama proposed that sericulture experimental stations should be set up. These stations were attached to the above schools, and also set up in Khorat and Buriram. 66 Toyama's effort extended to silkworm species improvement. His research results were presented to the Siamese Ministry of Agriculture in 1905. 67

Owing to the efforts of the Siamese government with Japanese experts, the export figures of Thai silk manufacture increased gradually and substantially. 68 However, the decline of the Sericultural Section and silkworm experimental stations began when Prince Phenphatthanaphong, who understood and helped the Japanese experts very much, died in 1909.

64 Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., p. 183. This school was so successful that it extended its teaching subjects under a new name, the School of Agriculture (Rongrian Phopluk) in 1906. Merged with the Survey Department and Department of Canals, thanks to Prince Phenphatthanaphong, the School of Agriculture having developed gradually, was renamed the School of the Ministry of Agriculture (Rongrian Krasuang Kasettrathikan) in 1908. This was the origin of the present University of Kasetsat in Bangkok. ibid., p. 184. Brown, op. cit., p. 66. Also see Johnston, op. cit., p. 344.
65 Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., p. 185.
67 Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., pp. 188-189.
68 Total amount of silk exports of Siam (in US dollar).
   In 1897 to 1900 62,877
   In 1902 535,748
   In 1909 929,982

Unfortunate weather and silkworm disease made the government of King Wachirawut decide to abolish the Sericulture Section and all experimental stations in 1913 on the grounds that investment in the sericulture industry was unprofitable.\textsuperscript{69} It might be assumed that the reason why the Siamese government gave up the promising silk industry of Siam at this moment, was not only its estimate of the investment costs, but also following Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, King Wachirawut's fear of Japanese penetration of the Siamese agricultural administration. This affair provoked King Wachirawut to say 'We ourselves began to grow apprehensive' about employing Japanese.\textsuperscript{70} (This point will be dealt with in the next chapter.)

5-3-2. Japanese educational adviser: Yasui Tetsu

King Chulalongkorn consistently showed his interest in Japanese education. He sent Siamese missions to study Japanese educational institutions in 1888 and 1902.\textsuperscript{71} In the former case, the extremely detailed report on the Japanese education system written by Khun Worakan Koson was submitted to the King in 1888. But no influence of this report on the Siamese educational system seems to be remembered.\textsuperscript{72} On the other hand, the 1902 survey of the Japanese educational system reported in 1903 by Phra Phaisan Sinlapasat seems to have been paid attention to by the King. In 1903, Minister Inagaki was informed by Prince Damrong that the Siamese government desired to employ a Japanese educational adviser.\textsuperscript{73}

The Japanese who came were Misses Yasui Tetsu (Tetsuko), Kono Kiyo (Kiyoko) and Nakajima Toshi (Tomiko).\textsuperscript{74} Yasui Tetsu later became a founder of Tokyo Women's University, and contributed much to early Japanese women's education. She studied domestic science, pedagogy, and psychology at Oxford and Cambridge for three years as a student sent abroad by the Meiji government in 1897. As an educational adviser, Yasui and the other two assistants arrived in Bangkok in late January, 1904.\textsuperscript{75} They were to teach at Rachinee School (Queen's School), established in April 1904 by Queen Somdet Phra Sri Patcharin (Saowapha) for girls of noble birth. This school succeeded Sunanthalai Girls School which had been closed in 1902 because the Siamese government found it impossible to make the school flourish with a

\textsuperscript{69} Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., p. 191. Also see Brown, op. cit., pp. 158-165, and Johnston, op. cit., p. 345.

\textsuperscript{70} Vella, op. cit., p. 291 fn. 30.


\textsuperscript{72} Wyatt, op. cit., pp. 137-138.

\textsuperscript{73} Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., p. 149 and p. 165.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 166.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 164 and p. 167.
European headmistress. Headmistress Yasui taught English, mathematics and science. Kono, deputy head mistress, taught drawing and embroidery, and Nakajima taught paper flower-making.

During three years engaging in teaching, they seem to have been in great hardship because of the Siamese climate and the cultural gap between Japan and Siam, although their pupils gave some relief. In addition to teaching, Yasui took charge of managing the School. She was engrossed in this task, but Siamese weather gave them difficulty. Malaria attacked Yasui, and she began to think about going to England again in the second year of her duty in Siam. In 1907, Yasui declined the Siamese request to remain in the School, and she, as well as Kono and Nakajima, left Bangkok. Yasui, however, did not return to Japan directly. She separated from Kono and Nakajima in Singapore to go to England alone for another spell of study abroad.

It is noteworthy that a chief assistant of Yasui at Queen's School was Prince Thewawong's daughter, Princess Phichitcirapha. She later had charge of the School after the Japanese left. This shows perhaps Prince Thewawong's special favour towards Japan. In this sense, it might be said that the effort of Yasui and other Japanese educational advisers during their stay in Siam was not in vain, giving probably a positive impression of Japan to the Siamese leaders. And it could be said that for as long as Prince Thewawong was the Siamese Foreign Minister, his sentiment, through his daughter, towards Japan, influenced his attitude to the diplomatic relations between Japan and Siam.

During the reign of King Chulalongkorn, Siamese feeling for Japan appears to have been bright and positive. Of course, Minister Inagaki's role was important. All three main Japanese advisers, Masao, Toyama, Yasui, were employed through Inagaki's enthusiastic approach to the Siamese government. Among the three advisers, Masao's role in the Siamese legal reform stands out. Definitely Masao's relations with Prince Raphi and Prince Damrong became close. The effort of Toyama and other sericultural advisers created a friend, Prince Phenphatthanaphong who was in favour of Japan. Yasui's brief devotion to her Siamese pupils deserves not to be forgotten. Her education of the young Siamese Princess Phichitcirapha must

---

76 Wyatt, op. cit., p. 316.
78 Ishii and Yoshikawa, op. cit., pp. 169-175.
79 Ibid., p. 175.
have remained imprinted on the latter's mind. Also Yasui's sincerity might have gained the respect of Prince Thewawong, and his good impression of Yasui might also have influenced his relations with Minister Inagaki.

In particular, Prince Thewawong, Prince Damrong and Prince Raphi were highly significant, leading figures not only in the reign of King Chulalongkorn, but also subsequent Siamese politics and diplomacy. It could be concluded therefore that their relatively amicable impression of Japan drawn from the relations between them and the Japanese advisers contributed not a little to the succeeding Siamese diplomacy with Japan, including the negotiation for revising the 1898 treaty between the two countries. In this sense, Inagaki was successful in his programme for promoting relations between Japan and Siam. But it was only in the reign of King Chulalongkorn and the early reign of King Wachirawut that such good relations between the countries was maintained. By the time of the Great War, after Inagaki left, Siam's attitude to Japan gradually changed because of her desire to maintain good relations with Britain and France who had given up their plans to partition her, and developed a more suspicious view of Japan.
Part Two

Japan and Siam in Transition
Chapter 6
Siam, Pan-Asianism, and the Nanshin-Ron: the idea of Japanese southward advance

In the 1920's, Japan and Siam renewed their friendly relations by concluding the 1924 treaty, and behind this changing situation there seems to have been a revival of Japanese Pan-Asian attitudes towards Siam. Therefore, it is now necessary to return to the broader context already presented in chapter 2, and review the development of an ideology of Japanese foreign relations increasingly influencing Japan's policy towards Siam.

This chapter can be divided contextually into three parts. The first part is concerned with Japanese views on Pan-Asianism and southward view or advance (Nanshin-Ron). Both opinions have similar features, but not completely synonymous terms. Both views gave an impact to the Japanese foreign activities. For instance, Pan-Asianism had already existed in a purely ideological sense since early in the Meiji era in individual persons, and in the Taisho era it developed in a more practical, economic sense, mainly within the industrial circle. But what influence did Pan-Asianism and Nanshin-Ron (southward advance) have in the Meiji and Taisho eras? How were they changing and how were these two concepts regarded by Westerners? To answer such questions it is vital to understand overall Japanese foreign policy and activities in the Far East, before presenting the story of Japan's relations with Siam in particular.

On the other hand, taking Pan-Asianism and Nanshin-Ron into account, it is also necessary to make clear the meaning of 'Southeast Asia' to as important a Japanese institution as the military during the 1910's and early 1920's. How much of an interest in Southeast Asia did the military really have? This will contribute to an understanding generally of the features and nature of Japanese military activities in the Far East, and add a new dimension to discussion of the Japanese military. Hitherto the Japanese military before the 1930's has been examined and understood mostly in the context of Chinese and Korean affairs, rarely including Southeast Asia.

The third part of this chapter describes the reaction of the Siamese government to the concept of Nanshin-Ron and the Japanese economic interest in Southeast Asia. In particular, the
issue of how the Siamese king Wachirawut regarded Japan is related to succeeding negotiation work in revising the 1898 Siamese-Japanese treaty.

In this respect, we will see in the last section that the actual negotiation, which would be carried on officially in the early 1920's, had already begun in 1919, when the former Japanese legal adviser, Masao Tokichi secretly approached the Siamese government.

6-1. The meaning of Pan-Asianism

'Pan-Asianism' has always been a very ambiguous term, and involves very controversial matters. As normally understood, it is very difficult to distinguish Pan-Asianism from expansionism, nationalism, or aggressive policy. The Encyclopedia of Asian History (in Japanese) gives us one possible definition: Pan-Asianism is an opinion which holds that Asian people, giving leadership to Japan, should be consolidated in order to resist the imperialism of the Western Powers.¹

Even some Western historians of Japan seem tacitly and broadly to understand the term Pan-Asianism in a similar sense to the above definition. One views Pan-Asianism as the idea that 'Japan, as the first successful non-European modernizer, was obligated to assist the uplift of less fortunate neighbouring peoples.'² In this sense, Pan-Asianism can not truly be confused with expansionism, or aggressive policy, nationalism, ethnocentrism, patriotism, and ultranationalism. On the other hand, it seems that few arguments concerning Pan-Asianism have yet been presented by Japanese historians. This is probably because Pan-Asianism is still a sensitive issue at present, since the concept of Pan-Asianism was considered to be synonymous with such a notorious idea as the, 'Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'. Although nearly half a century has passed since the end of the last great war, Pan-Asianism seems to be something like a taboo theme among Japanese historians.

No comprehensive Japanese analysis of Pan-Asianism has been done since the end of the Second World War, except that of Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910-77), an expert on Chinese affairs, and a prolific writer on modern Asian historiography.³ He admitted that the above

¹ The Encyclopedia on Asian History (Tokyo, 1959-62), the section on Pan-Asianism.
³ Takeuchi Yoshimi, 'Ajia shugi no tenbo' (A View on Pan-Asianism) in Gendai nihon shiso taikei (An Outline of Modern Japanese Thought), vol.9. (Tokyo, 1963), pp. 7-63. Takeuchi was an authoritative interpreter of Chinese literature and culture, the translator of Lu Hsun's complete works. For more account of his thought, see, Tetsuo Najita
definition of the Encyclopedia of Asian History was to some extent similar to his own definition. But it is his view that the above definition clearly distinguishes the Pan-Asianism of societies such as the 'Kokuryu Kai' or 'Genyosha' from that of those who were involved in the Liberal People's Rights movement (Jiyuminken Undo, see Ch.2-2-2), such as Tarui Tokichi, Ueki Emori, and Oi Kentaro. While the former is categorized generally as aggressive opinion, the latter is considered a more moderate, solidarity-style view. Takeuchi thought that it was very hard to make such a clear-cut distinction.

His definition of Pan-Asianism gives us a very significant point of view for understanding of Pan-Asianism. He says that:

Pan-Asianism I think is something like 'inclination'. It is not objectively defined as 'thought' which has a substantive meaning. Within the right wing or left wing groups, one may recognize Pan-Asianism. - - Certain thought or thinkers can be identified in terms of Pan-Asianism, when one considers the situation surrounding such thought or thinkers. We can not make definitions of 'Pan-Asianism' independent of the circumstances. Pan-Asianism can not be understood unless such a manner of approach is adopted. - - Pan-Asianism is not perfectly synonymous with expansionism or aggressive policy though the former greatly overlaps the latter.

Takeuchi understood that Pan-Asianism was born from a kind of Meiji expansionism. The latter brought up two coordinated concepts, (1) a view of national prestige and power versus the Liberal People's Rights movement, (2) Westernization versus chauvinism. He assumed that Pan-Asianism was created through the confrontation of these two opinions. He concluded that "Pan-Asianism can not be discussed in the same way one discusses democracy, socialism or fascism. Pan-Asianism always appears accompanied by another ideology. Therefore the history of Pan-Asianism itself can not be traced."

Takeuchi's definition of Pan-Asianism above-stated coincides with the opinion of the author of this present study. Considering Takeuchi's view of Pan-Asianism, I incline to define it in the broadest sense as a feeling, no more than that, which holds that Asian people should foster fellow feeling in order to promote their political, economic, and cultural understanding. In this context, the figures and organizations described in chapter 2, e.g. Toyama Mitsuru, Arao Kiyoshi, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Miyazaki Toten, Koa Kai, Tenyukyo, Toho Kyokai, etc., were


4 Takeuchi Yoshimi, op. cit., p. 8.
5 Ibid., p. 10.
6 Ibid., p. 12.
7 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
characterised as Pan-Asianist. Inagaki Manjiro and Masao Tokichi also can be categorized in Pan-Asianists. Furthermore, the Nanshin-Ron, which will be assessed in the next section of this chapter, included the aspect of Pan-Asianism as well.

Pan-Asianism itself is kaleidoscopic. It is very easy for Japanese to be imbued emotionally with another's passionate sentiment. Yet one might say that Pan-Asianism is something like an essential sentiment of the Asian like the recent phenomenon of Pan-Arab sentiment triggered by the Kuwait Crisis. If an ideology contains at least a belief in the solidarity of Asian countries, 'Asia for the Asians', that ideology might be called one kind of Pan-Asianism. Pan-Asianism itself is very vulnerable to distortion. It is thus understandable that romantic missionary Japanese Pan-Asianism in the early Meiji period was absorbed afterwards in the aggressive policy and ultranationalism expressed by Uchida Ryohei, Kita Ikki, Okawa Shumei, and others. It is beyond the scope of the present study to trace the process of the merging or turning of Pan-Asianism into such extremism, and to analyse how this ultranationalism brought about the strong fear of the Powers, particularly Britain and America. But it may be useful to take up an example of the Powers' apprehension of such Japanese extremists and their Pan-Asianism accompanied by ultranationalism.

6-2. Britain's concern about Japanese Pan-Asianism

In 1917, the Siamese Foreign Minister, Prince Thewawong Waropakan, received a secret letter from the British Legation in Bangkok. Despite the continued existence of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it was a confidential memorandum from the British General Staff Headquarters, Straits Settlements in Singapore, reporting Japanese Pan-Asianist, anti-English activities, and the presence of representatives of the Indian independence movement in China and Japan. This memorandum was "compiled by the General Staff, Straits Settlements Command, from the information supplied at frequent intervals to the General Officer Commanding, Singapore, by an Officer who has been specially detailed to do this class of work

8 P. Oblas points out that "it is difficult to trace Japan's interest in mainland Southeast Asia with interests arising out of Japan's relationship with China or with events leading up to World War II". See Oblas, 'Nascent Pan-Asianism in Thai-Japanese Relations: The Kawakami Mission and the Treaty of 1898', pp. 56-57. Also see Beasley, 'Japan and Pan-Asianism', op. cit., pp. 6-14.
in the Far East." The first report of this memorandum concerned a Japanese 'Pan-Asiatic Society'. It said that:

This new league or Society recently formed in Japan, is a movement which is most dangerous to our interests not only in Japan, but also in China and India, and the East generally. - - It is clearly laid down in the confidential and secret creed of this Society that British Influence and prestige must be undermined as much as possible; that the British are the deadly enemies of Japan, China and India, and that everything possible must be done to damage their interests in these countries. 10

No specific name for the society was given in this memorandum. It was difficult to identify such a league or society as the report pointed out, because there were many organizations growing up at that time in Japan. Yet it is evident that such a society or league was an ultranationalist Pan-Asianist organisation, and that the British were very much concerned about such a movement. The report went on:

It is absolutely certain that there is a strong party in Japan which is at the back of this movement, - - The leading spirit is a man called Shumei Okawa, - - [who] is violently anti-British, - - . It may therefore be safely assumed that under his guidance, the activities of this dangerous Society will be directed, as indicated above, towards undermining British Influence in Asia, and generally damaging the interests of Great Britain in the Far East. 11

The name of Okawa Shumei was specified. This scholarly extremist was obviously in favour of the Indian independence movement. He was a close friend of leaders of the Indian independence movement. Not only that, his concern was also with the western part of Asia beyond India; he helped to send students to a university in Egypt. 12

The British were also provoked by the recent Japanese southward movement. The memorandum referred to it, saying that:

From what we know or have reason to suspect of Japanese activities in 'Nanyo' (as they call the Straits Settlements and surrounding countries), it would be seen highly probable that a branch of this Society will be organised in Singapore unless steps can be taken to prevent it. 13

It was apparently the Japanese southward movement that led the British Straits Settlements authority, and the British government, to be increasingly anxious of Japan. The

---

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Takeuchi Yoshimi, op. cit., p. 50.
13 Report of General Staff, Headquarters, Straits Settlements, Singapore, August 1917, op. cit. It is interesting that between the words 'Singapore' and 'unless' the word 'Siam?' was inserted in hand writing. It was added probably by King Wachirawut.
process of Japanese movement is on the whole called 'Nanshin-Ron (View of Southward Advance)'. What was Nanshin-Ron? This is our next question.

6-3. Meiji romantic Nanshin-Ron; an original view of Southward Advance

Nanshin-Ron might not be a familiar term to contemporary western historians of Japan. It contains substantive meaning without ambiguity. Nanshin-Ron simply represents Japanese interest in southern regions, South China, Taiwan, the South Seas islands, and the Southeast Asia mainland.

The Japanese inclination to move southward can be traced back to the late 16th century when, for instance, Toyotomi Hideyoshi dispatched a letter of 1591 to the Kingdom of Spain's General in the Philippines, Gomez Perez Dasmarinas, to ask him to pay tribute to Hideyoshi. Gomez, while preparing to fortify the Philippines, declined Hideyoshi's request. The exchanging of envoys between Hideyoshi and Gomez continued for three years. But because of Hideyoshi's scheme for conquering Korea in 1592 (Bunroku no eki), and later his rejection by Tokugawa Jeyasu in 1598, Hideyoshi's ambition in the Philippines came to an end. Since the succeeding Tokugawa era established the closed country policy (Sakoku), Japanese southward activities were very much limited thereafter. It was only when the Tokugawa Bakufu began facing western imperialism in the nineteenth century that the Japanese southward view came to be argued again.

By the end of the Tokugawa era, Russian southward expansionism towards Japan substantially threatened the Bakufu. Early Japanese experience of Western activity had given rise to a number of unconventional views on Japan's foreign policy. Among them, Hayashi Shihei (1738-93) studied the situation of the northern part of Japan, Hokkaido, and criticised the Bakufu's lack of a defence policy. He maintained in his book, Kaikoku heidan (An Account of the Strategy of the Maritime State), that a defence policy for Hokkaido should be urgently devised in order to secure Japan from the Russian threat. Honda Toshiaki (1744-1821), analysing the relationship between Japan's increase of population and gross national product, also outlined his perspective on Hokkaido policy from the mercantile point of view. Above all, Sato Nobuhiro (1769-1850) was one of the distinguished thinkers who expressed early Nanshin-

---

14 Ya'uchi Kenji, 'Shoki nissei koshoshi jo no ichi mondai (The Question of the relations between Japan and Spain) in Kyushu shigakukai, Shien (Kyushu, 1954), vol.61, pp. 27-28. And Josefa M. Saniel, Japan and the Philippines, 1868-1898, p. 27.
Ron ideas in the late Tokugawa era. In his *Bokaisaku* (Sea Defence Policy), he insisted that Japan should acquire the South Seas islands and Philippines in order to prepare for British eastward expansion. Annexation of these would enable Japan to trade with Java and other southern regions.\(^{15}\)

However, these opinions were in a minority at that time. The urgent foreign issues of the early Meiji government were Korea and China. The Bonin and Ryukyu Islands integrated into Japan (in 1876 and 1879 respectively) were not the result of an intentional Japanese southward strategy. Also, Japan's intervention in Formosa in 1874 was not a southward policy. These actions were implemented to make the national boundary of Japan clear. The 1894 Sino-Japanese War gave Japan Formosa and the Pescadores Islands (1895), and from then on Japan's policy towards the South meant mainly Formosa and south China. Kodama Gentaro and Goto Shinpei, both Meiji oligarchs, were supposed to be such Nanshin-Ron figures.

Meanwhile, the Philippines were an embarrassing issue for the Meiji government. Early Meiji leaders did not forget the issue of detaching the Philippines from Spain. They might have taken the Philippines, but America anticipated them. Southeast Asia was located far from Japan, and it was like China, a focus for the imperialist competition of the Western Powers. Thus Japan's major concern was directed to China and Korea throughout the Meiji period.\(^{16}\) By contrast with the northward trend of the Meiji government, there were various adventurous individuals looking to the south beyond Formosa and south China in the Meiji era. These included Shiga Shigetaka, Suganuma Sadakaze, Taguchi Ukichi, Takekoshi Yosaburo, Hattori Toru, Suzuki Tsunenori, and Inagaki Manjiro. They were indeed adventurous, having ambition and taking trips to Java, Borneo, the Philippines, Malaya, Siam, and other territories in the South Seas. Some visited Hawaii, Australia, and New Zealand. Except Takekoshi, all published major works during the first half of the third decade of the Meiji era (1887-1892). This period was a turning point in early Japanese emigration views, from 'inland emigration' (mainly to Hokkaido) to 'foreign emigration'.\(^{17}\) However, the book which was paid much attention to and which secured fairly good appraisal was Takekoshi's *Nangoku ki* (An Account of the South)

---

\(^{15}\) Ohata Tokushiro, 'Tairiku seisaku no shiteki kosatsu (A study concerning views on policy regarding the Asian Continent)' in *Nihon gaiko seisaku no shiteki tenkai* (Historical Development of Japanese Foreign Policy) (Tokyo, 1983), pp. 71-76.

\(^{16}\) Ohata Tokushiro, 'Nanshin no shiso to seisaku no keifu (A Short History of the Idea and Policy of the southward movement)' in *Nihon gaiko seisaku no shiteki tenkai* (Historical Development of Japanese Foreign Policy), pp. 228-231.

\(^{17}\) Yano Toru, *Nihon no nan'yo shikan* (Japan's Historical View of the South Seas), pp. 16-18.
published much later in 1910. Within less than two years it reached its tenth edition, and even a pocket edition appeared in 1915. This was partly due to Takekoshi's political career; he had been appointed in 1898 to be councillor and secretary to the Minister of Education, Saionji Kinmochi. Later, Takekoshi was elected to the Lower House in 1899. He visited the South Sea islands in 1909, and wrote up the above book based on his experience.¹⁸

Significantly, the other publications expressed similar opinions. Their term Nan'yo meant mainly the quarter comprising Bonin Island, 'the South Sea islands', the Philippines, New Guinea, Australia, and New Zealand.¹⁹ They stressed the potential importance of 'the South' for Japan, maintaining that the policy towards the North (China and Korea) should not be promoted from an offensive point of view. It was Japan's mission to improve the undeveloped situation of 'the South' in terms of both political and economic aspects. They believed that the South was not to be allocated only to Westerners. On the whole, Meiji Nanshin-Ron was coloured with optimism. Its advocates assumed that Japan's social and economic problems at that time could be solved in some way by means of Japan's involvement with the South.²⁰

Despite the enthusiasm of these romantic Nanshin-Ron supporters, they were still a minority in terms of Japan's general foreign policy. The main direction of foreign policy under the Meiji government was still Korea and China since their geo-political condition was related much more directly to Japan's strategic interest. Not only the government, but also non-government people, tended to be interested in China and Korea, feeling some respect for Chinese civilization which had fed Japanese culture for a long time. Those positively interested in China and Korea came to link with up the patriotic Japanese missionary sentiment which is represented nowadays by the general term, Pan-Asianism. But such consciousness did not at once develop towards the South Seas and Southeast Asia, even though the 1893 Franco-Siamese Crisis, and the independence movement of the Filipinos in the late 1890s, attracted some energetic Japanese activists. It was the tendency in those days for the people who crossed the sea to the South Seas and Southeast Asia in the Meiji period like many Westerners to be mostly vagrants and drifters, or adventurers dreaming of making a fortune at a stroke.²¹ It was not

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 47-48.
¹⁹ Ibid., p. 12.
²⁰ Ibid., pp. 51-52.
²¹ Ohata Tokushiro, 'Nanshin no shiso to seisaku no keifu', pp. 232-234.
really until the Taisho era that the South Seas and Southeast Asia, and the Nanshin-Ron, caught the imagination of the Japanese people generally, especially economically.

6-4. Taisho Nanshin-Ron and Japan's southward economic tendency

After the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese economy developed remarkably. Along with such economic success, the Meiji government itself felt the necessity to investigate the nature of the industries and natural resources in the South Seas and Southeast Asia. In 1912, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce completed two reports, 'Nihon tai nan'yo boeki taisei (The Situation of Japan's Trade with the South)' and 'Nan'yo no sangyo oyobi sono shigen (Industries and Resources in the South). 22

Nevertheless, Japan's major concern then was Russian retaliation following the 1904-5 war, and United States policy, the latter insisting on the Open Door in Manchuria in conflict with Japan's interests. The 1907 'National Defense Policy' of Japan was the expression of Japan's fear of both countries. While the army viewed Russia as the latent enemy as in 1904-5, the navy continued its increase of warships, with the so-called 8-8 plan, in order to counter the development of the Pacific Fleet of the United States. 23 The gradually intensified situation in the Pacific between Japan and the United States enhanced the interest of the former in the South Seas. But it might be difficult to say that such Pacific issues linked directly with Japan's southern policies. 24 The turning point in Japan's real move south was apparently the 1914-18 Great War. In particular, Japan's occupation of the German islands in the Pacific (Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls) in 1914, and the subsequent recognition of them as Japanese at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, made a great impact not only on the Japanese government, but also on the ordinary people in terms of recognition of the importance of the South Seas.

Another reason which led Japan to turn its interest dramatically towards the South Seas and Southeast Asia was its economic development during 1914-1920. Exports to the South Seas and Southeast Asia during this period jumped remarkably. For instance, during 1913/16, the exports of Japanese cotton manufactures to the Dutch East Indies and Siam increased 424 and

---

22 Ibid., p. 234.
24 Ohata Tokushiro, 'Nanshin no shiso to seisaku no keifu', p. 239.
167 percent respectively.25 As a whole, Japan expanded 234 percent its exports to Siam, Indochina, Philippines, Dutch East Indies, and the Straits Settlements during 1914/19, compared with 1906/13.26

Furthermore, the extension of shipping routes to the South Seas and Southeast Asia made it easier for Japanese to go there. In 1917, there were three shipping companies operating services to these regions, Nihon Yusen, Osaka Shosen, and Nan’yo Yusen. However, owing to the Great War, western steamship companies were forced to reduce their ships in East Asia. In their place, the Japanese took the opportunity of expanding their routes. Yamashita Kisen, Yubin Mitsubishi, Taiheiyou Kaiun, soon entered the competition.27 Along with the improvement of sea transportation, the number of overseas Japanese was boosted. During the ten years 1909-1919, Japanese residents in Siam increased 153 percent, up to 282 persons, and in the Dutch East Indies, and British Malaya and Borneo, 531 percent up to 4114 persons, and 317 percent up to 8297 persons respectively.28

Behind the Japanese vogue for travelling abroad to the South Seas were a number of encouraging publications. Through their books, Inoue Kiyoshi, Yamada Kiichi, Soejima Yasoroku, Sano Minoru, Tada Keiichi, Egawa Kaoru, and so on, inspired Japanese to cross the sea. The descriptions of these people of the South Seas were, however, not of the same tone as those of the romantic Meiji Nanshin-Ron. The new generation were more practical, focusing on industry, promoting the trade of the South Seas regions, or giving information how to emigrate to there, etc.29 Periodical articles on the South Seas also appeared during this time. Above all, a popular magazine, Jitsugyo no nihon (founded in 1897) began to report the issue of the South Seas from 1911. In 1913, premier Count Okuma contributed to this magazine his article, 'Embark on Great Ventures Abroad to the South Seas Islands' (in Japanese, issue no.11). The year 1915 was the peak of reporting the South Seas by the above magazine when it printed a special edition on the South Seas.30

25 Yano Toru, op. cit., p. 82.
26 Swan, 'Japanese Economic Relations with Siam', p. 29, Table 5.
27 For details of Japanese shipping industry at that time, see ibid., pp. 33-35.
28 Yamada Kiichi Nan’yo taikan (The Outlook of the South Seas) (Tokyo, 1934), p. 351, quoted from Yano Toru, op. cit., p. 84. Also see Swan, op. cit., p. 52, Table 14, which provides the detailed figures of Japanese people in Southeast Asia during 1900-1929.
29 Ohata Tokushiro, 'Nanshin no shiso to seisaku no keifu', p. 235.
30 Yano Toru, op. cit., pp. 98-100.
What is the principal feature of Taisho Nanshin-Ron? As stated above, the practical, economic tone is its chief feature. The romantic sentiment for the South Seas of the Meiji Nanshin-Ron was not seen in Taisho Nanshin-Ron. Going much further than Meiji Nanshin-Ron recognition, the Nan'yo came to be regarded as the quarter where Japanese would be able to expand their economic activities. The second aspect of Taisho Nanshin-Ron is that in this period the Japanese government itself began paying attention to the South Seas. The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, the Foreign Ministry, the Nan'yo cho (South Seas Bureau set up in 1922), and the Governor-General of Formosa, all started to study the South Seas. The third distinction of Taisho Nanshin-Ron concerns the Japanese image of the Nan'yo. Meiji Nanshin-Ron attracted particular people who were interested in Nan'yo with particular reasons. On the other hand, Taisho Nanshin-Ron prevailed among ordinary people. And it was in this Taisho period that the advocates of Nanshin-Ron looked much more at the region in which Taiwan, South China, Indo-China, Siam, British Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies were included, than the South Seas islands. It was also around this time that the Japanese term, 'Tonan Ajia' (Southeast Asia) began to used by the Japanese. Lastly, it can be pointed out that Taisho Nanshin-Ron on the whole still maintained a sense not of aggressive military expansion, but peaceful economic expansion like the Meiji Nanshin-Ron.

On the last point, the establishment in 1915 of the Nan'yo Kyokai (The South Seas Society) with government help through the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, and with the financial support of the Governor-General of Formosa, apparently indicated that Taisho Nanshin-Ron had considerable practical and commercial overtones. The society was a quasi-govermental institution. It published the Proceedings of the South Seas Society, and The Series of South Seas Studies. It is noteworthy that this institution opened the Merchandise Exhibition Centre in Singapore in 1918. The activities of this Centre included variously, showing samples, giving information on merchandise, helping daily business dealing, and studying South Seas trade and industries. No doubt it contributed substantially to increasing Japan's exports to the South Seas and Southeast Asia.

31 For details of the role of the Nan'yo cho (South Seas Bureau), see Mark R. Peattie, Nan'yo The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1945, passim.
32 Yano Toru, op. cit., pp. 81-86.
33 Shimizu Hajime, 'Nanshin-Ron: Its turning point in World War I' in The Developing Economies (Tokyo, 1987), vol. XXV-4, p. 390. The term 'Southeast Asia' in English-speaking circles only gained general acceptance during World War II.
34 'Nan'yo Kyokai kankei' in JDA, I-1-10-0-2-4, and Yano Toru, op. cit., pp. 102-105.
It is very likely that this Japanese southward tendency which dated from the end of the Meiji era, and grew conspicuously after Japan's obtaining the German territories in the Pacific, made other countries anxious about Japan; even the Prime Minister of New Zealand which was located far from Japan's peripheral regions worried about potential Japanese economic interest in his country. Britain, France, the Dutch, and the United States, the Western Powers which possessed colonies in the East, were also apprehensive about Japan. More than that, such apprehension created certain suspicion in the relations between Siam and Japan. In the next section, Western fear of Japan will be taken up.

6-5. Impact of Nanshin-Ron

In 1915, the Dutch Minister in Tokyo, being worried by the growing number of Japanese residents in Java, had a secret conversation with the Siamese Minister in Tokyo, Chamnong Dittakan, inquiring about Siamese policy towards Japanese residents in Siam. Chamnong answered that Siam at that moment had no such feeling because the number of Japanese residents in Siam was small. The Dutch Minister added that the Dutch Foreign Ministry in the Hague was informed by its Minister in Bangkok about the promising relations between Japan and Siam. The Dutch Minister in Bangkok obtained the information through the German Embassy in Bangkok (Siam's declaration war against Germany was not until July 22, 1917). The most sensational parts of that information were that 1) Siam and Japan were negotiating for a Defensive Alliance, 2) the Siamese government consented that a certain island located in the southern part of the Gulf of Siam would be leased to Japan as an anchorage, 3) the Siamese army regulations would be aligned with the Japanese ones, and Japanese army advisers could be employed by the Siamese, 4) the Siamese king would reiterate Siam's total independence, and he would also proclaim opaquely that Siam was to fight against any enemies which would destroy Siam.

As a veteran of diplomacy, Siamese Foreign Minister Prince Thewawong read this letter on the secret conversation with relative detachment, given the current diplomatic situation of the Dutch. He replied to Chamnong's letter that the apprehensions of the Dutch about Japanese nationals in Java could be true. But only the Dutch among the Western Powers in Asia suffered

from Japanese activities in Java. And the military power of the Dutch might not be able to compete with the Japanese military. Thus they were looking for sympathy in order somehow to expel the Japanese from Java. Prince Thewawong assumed that the Germans were trying to make some trouble between Japan and Siam. What is more, he argued that "Although [Japan] has an intention of taking Siam, it is not the present time [for Japan] to do so successfully. Considering the whole situation existing at present, probably Japan is much concerned with the country [China?] where Japan is facing problems." 37

Obviously Japan's gradual increasing interest in Southeast Asia gave strong concern at this time even to Prince Thewawong, who had been relatively favourable to Japan since the reign of King Chulalongkorn. Nevertheless, Prince Thewawong was not overly apprehensive. He interpreted the Dutch information with his usual insight as reflecting the present situation of the Western Powers who were annoyed by Japan. In fact, in Thewawong's estimation, the Dutch were attempting to trick the Siamese and the British. Through King Wachirawut's comment on Thewawong's letter on the issue reported by Chamnong, it emerges that the Dutch Minister in Tokyo also had conversation with the British Minister there, regarding the same thing that the Dutch Minister told to Chamnong. Then the British Minister in Siam was instructed by the Foreign Office in London, which got the information on the issue from Tokyo, to investigate it. The British Minister in Bangkok replied that no evidence was discovered. But he was not so sure so he decided to inquire of King Wachirawut. The King answered immediately that "I warrant you that what you replied to your Foreign Office is absolutely correct. That information from the Dutch is definitely groundless." 38

It is unclear whether or not the Siamese King really had such an intention of allying with Japan. Probably Thewawong's judgement was the most reliable. But it is apparently correct to say that the Siamese government could not avoid reconsidering their policy on Japan's southward tendency.

In addition to Japan's economic interest in Southeast Asia, it was her military activities in this region which contributed not a little to the suspicions of the Western Powers and the Siamese king regarding Japan.

It was after the Russo-Japanese War that the Japanese army and navy were opposed most sharply to each other in pressing the government to increase its military forces. While the army insisted on it from the view-point of preserving Japan's interest in Manchuria, the navy took its stand on preparing for a possible attack by the United States. However, since the Japanese government was facing financial stringency, Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi replied that the financial situation did not allow the implementation of the whole military program at once.39 Such arguments over budget support for the army or for the navy created the debate, 'Whether northward or southward should Japan go.' Probably influenced by the propagandists of Nanshin-Ron, the Saionji Cabinet refused the 1910 army request of adding two more divisions to the new Japanese army in Korea. The result of its refusal was eventually the collapse of the Saionji Cabinet in 1912.

At that moment, the Japanese army's concern was still directed to China, in particular Manchuria. The Japanese military almost totally neglected Southeast Asia. Yet a few officers were sent to these regions. According to the research of the present author at the Diplomatic Archives Office in Tokyo regarding Japanese service attachés for both the army and the navy dispatched for short period investigations, studying foreign languages, or residential purposes, it is evident that while the Japanese army sent military attachés mainly to French-Indochina and Hong Kong, the navy tended to look to Singapore and Siam. However, the total numbers of military attachés in those regions were very small. In the years from 1912 (the first year of the Taisho era) until 1925, only one or two residential military attachés were sent to Hong Kong, French-Indochina, Singapore, and Manila. As for Siam, the record shows that three officers went there in 1921, 1923, and 1925 respectively to investigate for two or three months this tropical country from the logistics point of view, and to examine its raw materials. Further, five officers visited Bangkok for general military observation. It could be inferred from the

---

documentation that the Japanese military, both army and navy, throughout the Taisho era, did not focus very much on Southeast Asia in their military activities.40

6-6-2. The role of Japanese intelligence in Southeast Asia

However, it does not mean that those officers sent to Southeast Asia were on holiday. Indeed they were doing military intelligence work in secret in these areas. For example, in 1915, the Japanese navy tried to send a navy intelligence officer to Batavia and Manila in secret, an officer disguised as one of the staff of the Japanese Consul.41 In the case in 1916, other evidence shows that the Japanese army sent two captains to the Philippines and Java. Both assumed fictitious names, disguising themselves as secretaries to the Japanese consulates in those places.42 Furthermore, in 1919, Major Ichinose Gennosuke was appointed to be a residential military attaché in Singapore. Then the Chief of the Military Section of the Bureau of Army Military Affairs of the Army General Staff Office (G.S.O.), Hata Eitaro, sent an official letter under the name of the War Minister to the vice-Foreign Minister, Hanihara Masanao, to report about Major Ichinose’s re-assignment to the Japanese Consulate General in Singapore. In this letter, Hata also asked Hanihara to make the purpose of Ichinose language study, not mentioning the real purpose.43 This is a limited number of cases showing the secret activities of the Japanese army.

On the other hand, the Japanese Foreign Ministry seems to have begun to be concerned about these secret activities of the Japanese army. Hayashi Gonsuke, on his way to London as Japanese ambassador to Britain in 1920, took a negative attitude as regards the Japanese residential military attaché in Singapore on the ground that the existing military attachés of both the army and navy might be able to create a misunderstanding with the British government.44

40 This survey was based on the Japanese archives concerning military officers in JDA. 6-1-6-1-1 and 6-1-6-1-2, and concerning Imperial army and navy officers sent to foreign countries in JDA. 5-1-10-4-1 and 5-1-10-4-2.
41 Foreign Minister Kato Takaaki to Consuls in Batavia and Manila, March 25, 1915 in JDA. 5-1-10-4-1.
42 This was memorialized in The Military Section of the Army Bureau of Military Affairs to the Personnel Section of the Foreign Ministry, (no specific personal names), November 17 1921 in JDA. 6-1-6-1-1.
43 Vice-War Minister, Yamanashi Hanzo, to vice-Foreign Minister, Hanihara Masanao, December 12, 1919, no.4814 in JDA. 6-1-6-1-1.
44 Hayashi Gonsuke was the first Governor-General of the Kwantung Territory Government (Kantocho) established in Dairen in 1919. By this re-organisation, military and administrative authorities, which the Kwantung Government-General (Kanto Totokufu) had possessed for years, were separated. While the military authority came to be exercised by the Commander of the Kwantung Army, the administrative authority was operated by the Kwantung Territory Government.
He sent a telegram through the Japanese Consulate in Singapore to ask Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya, to discuss the matter with the Minister of the Navy and the War Minister.\textsuperscript{45}

Indeed, it seems that the trend of independent activities of the Japanese army displeased the Foreign Ministry itself. In February 1920, the Japanese army wanted to send Major Kuroda Shuichi to observe the situation in Manila.\textsuperscript{46} But the Japanese Consul-General in Manila, Kurusu Saburo, proposed to postpone Kuroda's dispatch, saying that the American military in Manila at that time was very suspicious about Japan. If there was urgent necessity to send him, it was wise to instruct Kuroda to confer first with the Japanese Consul about his activities while staying in Manila.\textsuperscript{47} Informed of this by the Foreign Ministry, the War Ministry accepted Kurusu's suggestion, and Kuroda's dispatch to Manila was put off for a while.\textsuperscript{48} Yet Consul Kurusu seems still to have worried very much about the activities of the Japanese army. Later he cabled to Tokyo again to urge a prudent attitude by the Foreign Ministry towards army activities, reporting that in the previous year there had been a case when a Japanese army officer based in Manila attempted to make a survey of the distance from the coast to the American barracks. Although he was discovered by an American soldier, thanks to a quick-witted Japanese attaché accompanying the Japanese officer, it did not develop into trouble with the American military.\textsuperscript{49}

However, Major Kuroda was eventually dispatched in July 1921 without informing the American Embassy in Tokyo. In reply to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo when it inquired, the War Ministry claimed that Kuroda obtained a letter of introduction from an American army attaché in Tokyo.\textsuperscript{50} Whether in fact he took such a letter of introduction is unclear. Suffice it to say that such conduct of the War Ministry indicated that the Japanese army was doing military intelligence in Southeast Asia.

In the same year as Kuroda's trip to Manila (1921), the Army General Staff Office in Tokyo planned to dispatch three officers to investigate the situation of south China and Manila,

\textsuperscript{45} Japanese Consul in Singapore, Masuko Saizo, to Uchida Yasuya, August 27, 1920 in Hanihara to Yamanashi, September 1, 1920, no.429 in JDA. 6-1-6-1-1.
\textsuperscript{46} War Minister Tanaka Giichi to Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya, February 4, 1920, no.398 in JDA. 5-1-10-4-1.
\textsuperscript{47} Japanese Consul in Manila, Kurusu Saburo, to Uchida, February 18, 1920, no.10 in JDA. 5-1-10-4-1.
\textsuperscript{48} Vice War Minister Yamanashi Hanzo to vice Foreign Minister Hanihara Masanao, February 25, 1920, no.95 in JDA. 5-1-10-4-1.
\textsuperscript{49} Chief of the Personnel Section of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Okuyama, to Artillery Captain Izeki, July 2, 1921 in JDA. 6-1-6-1-1.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
Borneo, and Singapore.\textsuperscript{51} This time the War Ministry seems to have carefully prepared for it lest they arouse the misgivings of Western Powers, because the Washington International Naval Conference had just begun at this juncture (from 2nd November). The Japanese Foreign Ministry also took a prudent attitude to the army's plan; it sent a telegram to the Japanese Consul-General in Singapore, Ukita Satotsugu, instructing him to check whether this army trip would arouse about the suspicion of the British authorities in Singapore.\textsuperscript{52} The Japanese Consul-General in Singapore replied that it was very likely that such a situation would occur, but since he himself was by chance planning to make a short trip to Borneo, he suggested that the army officer could join him so that they could achieve their purpose without serious trouble with Britain.\textsuperscript{53}

The schedule of this observation tour was that they would leave for Manila from Nagasaki, and visit Hong Kong, Japanese Taiwan, northern Borneo, Java, Singapore, Penang, French Indo-China, south China, and Shanghai.\textsuperscript{54} From this, it can be easily conceived that the Japanese army desired to gather information on these regions. Why did they so desire? The answer could be assumed from the fact that although written notices, asking for assistance for the Japanese army officers, were sent to the Dutch, French, and British ambassadors in Tokyo, this notification seems not to have been sent to the ambassador of the United States.\textsuperscript{55} It might be said that this fact that almost escapes notice indicates that the Japanese military viewed the United States as a potential enemy as implied in the 1907 National Defence Policy. In addition, it is quite interesting that the Japanese army at this stage neglected the strategic position of Siam: she was not on the schedule of this observation tour though the starting-point for the fall of Singapore in 1942 was the Japanese army landings in southern Siam as well as northeast Malaya.\textsuperscript{56}

At any rate, even such a small number and scale of Japanese military activities in Southeast Asia continued to cause misgivings among the colonial authorities of the Powers in

\textsuperscript{51} Uchida to Japanese Consul-General in Singapore, Ukita Satotsugu, November 7, 1921, no.80, and Vice-War Minister, Ono Minobu, to acting vice Foreign Minister, Tanaka Tokichi, November 10, 1921, no.4950 in JDA. 6-1-6-1-1.

\textsuperscript{52} Uchida to Ukita, November 7, 1921, no.80 in JDA. 6-1-6-1-1.

\textsuperscript{53} Ukita to Uchida, November 8, 1921, no.76 in JDA. 6-1-6-1-1.

\textsuperscript{54} Uchida to Ukita, November 18, 1921, no.86 in JDA. 6-1-6-1-1.

\textsuperscript{55} Though the reply letters from Dutch, French, and British ambassador were enclosed, no letter from the ambassador of the United States appears in this archives. See JDA. 6-1-6-1-1.

\textsuperscript{56} See Brailey, \textit{Thailand and The Fall of Singapore, A Frustrated Asian Revolution}, p. 1. Tamura Hiroshi, who was a key person in the conclusion of the Japan-Thailand Alliance in 1941, lived in the Philippines as an undercover agent from 1928-31. See Fujiwara Iwaichi, \textit{F. KIKAN} (Hong Kong, 1983), P. 314.
Southeast Asia. For instance, in Singapore, one of the Japanese residential military attachés, Navy Lieutenant Commander Onishi, who had published a guide book on Singapore, was suspected very much by the British government. The Japanese Consul-General observed that they might press Japan to withdraw its military attaché on the ground of Onishi's recent activities. Such apprehensions on the part of the British authorities in Singapore inevitably increased. They refused the 1921 request of the Japanese officers on the observation tour around Southeast Asia mentioned above, to observe British military establishments in Singapore. In these circumstances, the Japanese Consul-General Ukita argued that it would be a wise policy to withdraw the Japanese military attachés voluntarily from Singapore, and that the purpose of such military attachés should be indicated more unambiguously if future military attachés were sent. 57

The Ministry of the Navy in Tokyo did not intend to risk such an unpleasant situation with the British Navy. The vice-Navy Minister informed the Foreign Ministry that the former agreed with Ukita's suggestion; no new navy attaché would be sent for the time being, or if sent, the purpose of such a navy attaché would be defined clearly. 58

The above description is the case of military attachés. Apart from this, it is almost impossible to find out how many such secret Japanese military intelligence officers there were in Southeast Asia at that time. But it can be assumed that apart from such military attachés whose names were reported beforehand by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the representatives of the Western Powers in Tokyo, there were very few persons who were engaged secretly in such military intelligence activities in Southeast Asia. By contrast, a Japanese archives document shows that the Japanese army and the Foreign Ministry gave their consent that Japanese army attachés who were to be sent to China publicly, should belong in appearance to the Directorate of the Bureau of Army Military Affairs, not to the Army General Staff Office. 59

What did this mean? Perhaps it can be said that the Japanese army and Foreign Ministry concentrated on China affairs, and that the Army General Staff controlled intelligence activities in China. On the other hand, it can be estimated that there were only a small number of Japanese military attachés compared with China, in Southeast Asia e.g. in Manila, Batavia, Singapore.

57 Ukita to Uchida, March 20, 1922, no.16 in JDA. 6-1-6-1-1.
58 Vice-Navy Minister, Ide Kenji, to vice-Foreign Minister, Hanihara, April 26, 1922, no.601-2 in JDA. 6-1-6-1-1.
59 The first section of Asian Affairs Bureau to the Director of the Asian Affairs Bureau, no date in JDA. 6-1-6-1-1. This document was penciled, mentioning that the writer, probably the Chief of this Section, visited the Director of the Bureau of Army Military Affairs and the Director of the Asian Bureau of the War Ministry in February 1923.
But in Siam no Japanese resident military attaché had yet been sent at that time. Despite such relative quiet on the part of the Japanese military in Southeast Asia, there were still things that aroused apprehension on the part of the Siamese government, for example Japanese economic interest in Siam.

6-7. Admiration or apprehension? King Wachirawut's variable attitude towards Japan

6-7-1. Japanese desire for investment in Siam

In 1910, a Japanese company in Kobe desired to extend its enterprise into the domain of the sugar and rubber industries in the southern part of Siam. One Japanese representative of this company, Mr. Hirai, was sent to Bangkok to investigate a possible estate. He was helped by the Japanese Consul to apply for permission from the Siamese Minister of Interior for going down to the South. But the vice-Minister of Interior, Phraya Sisahatep (Saeng Wiriyasiri), explained to them that according to the 1898 Treaty between Japan and Siam, Japanese could not obtain any land more than 24-hours travelling distance out of Bangkok.\(^{60}\)

Mr. Hirai did not give up. He inquired again through the Japanese Consul whether the Siamese government would grant permission to a Japanese company to be formed under Siamese laws and subject to the jurisdiction of a Siamese tribunal.\(^{61}\) Foreign Minister Prince Thewawong actually could not make up his mind whether a private individual or company agreeing to submit to Siamese laws and jurisdiction would be able to override the terms of the established Treaty of 1898 between Japan and Siam, and whether any Japanese company could effectively and really be changed into a Siamese company by simply adopting Siamese laws. He needed advice from Interior Minister Prince Damrong and General Adviser, Jens I. Westengard on this matter.\(^{62}\) Prince Damrong and Westengard discussed the issue. It was Westengard's view that the mere fact that a private individual or company agreed to submit itself to Siamese laws or jurisdiction would not be sufficient unless the Government of that individual or company gave its consent. He also gave a hint to Thewawong that the only way in which a Japanese company could effectively and really be changed into a Siamese company would be to

\(^{60}\) Thewawong to Royal Secretary, Krom khun Sommotamorphan, November 17, 1910, no.1064/7382 in R.6.T.25/3.


\(^{62}\) Copy no.196/7246, Thewawong to Damrong, November 15, 1910, no no., and Thewawong to Westengard, November 15, 1910, no.7247 in Thewawong to Royal Secretary, Krom khun Sommotamorphan, November 17, 1910, no.1064/7382 in R.6.T.25/3.
take out a Siamese charter, and to organize as a real Siamese company under that charter. But
Westengard and Prince Damrong agreed that it was inadvisable at that moment to give
encouragement to foreign capital, even as distinct from foreign individuals. It would probably
be better to discourage the whole thing from the start.63 This is a good example showing the
growing apprehensive feeling of the Siamese government. It also suggests that the later
Japanese negotiation for revision of the 1898 treaty was rooted partly in a Japanese desire to be
able to obtain landownership in the whole country of Siam.

6-7-2. Embarrassment of King Wachirawut

More important, in addition to this watchful posture of leading Siamese statesmen
towards Japanese economic ambitions, and the concern aroused by Dutch claims cited above
(section 6-5), the King of Siam, Wachirawut (Mongkut Klao / Rama VI: 1910-1925) himself,
was increasingly influenced by a sense of doubt towards Japan.

At that time, King Wachirawut was pursuing his programme of nationalism for his
country, inspired by his experience of Britain, where he was educated for nine years. Japan was
also an example to him.64 Before Japan occupied the German islands in the Pacific in 1914, the
King seems to have had a relatively warm regard for Japan. Up to this time, his distrust for her
had not yet been aroused. For instance, in 1911, King Wachirawut declared openly to his special
volunteer corps, the Wild Tigers, that "Of those two countries Japan and Siam, which is the
more respected in the world? I'm sorry to have to answer that it is Japan. Why? Because Japan
has clearly demonstrated to the world that it still has able soldiers."65 He grasped quite well
Japan's fundamental political structure.66 He praised the Japanese soldiers for their loyalty and
patriotism.67 Also in an essay, he clearly expressed his view of Japan as an example for
Siam.68

However, this does not mean that Japan commanded King Wachirawut's favour all
along. It was the fact that the King admired some aspects of the Japanese as far as his

63 Copy no.7261, Westengard to Thewawong, November 16, 1910, no no. in Thewawong to Royal Secretary, Krom
khun Sommotamorphan, November 17, 1910, no.1064/7382 in R.6.T.25/3. It might be inferred that the Harvard law
professor, Westengard, considered this matter from the point of view of the benefit of the United States.
64 Walter F. Vella, Chaipy! King Vajiravudh And The Development of Thai Nationalism, p. 247.
65 Speech to Wild Tigers, June 6, 1911 in Plukcha Phnva lae khlon tit lao, Bangkok: Mahachai, 1951, p. 18, quoted
in ibid., p. 30.
66 Ibid., p. 70.
67 Ibid., p. 89.
68 Ibid., p. 247.
nationalism programme was concerned, but at the same time the King seems to have felt apprehension about Japan for a long time. Thus when Japan occupied the German islands in the Pacific in October 1914, and forced the Twenty-One Demands on China in January in the following year, along with all sorts of other propaganda and claims, King Wachirawut's ambivalence towards Japan turned gradually into fear of Japan.

For example, in 1916, the Peking Daily News, Friday 14th January, was headlined 'Japanese writer pleads for acquisition of two Dutch Islands'. It reported an article written by Takekoshi Yosaburo, who, as stated before, was one of the leading advocates of Nanshin-Ron. In this article, Takekoshi strongly insisted that Japan's future lay not in Manchuria but in the South, and that Japan should occupy Java and Sumatra though those two very important islands belonged to Dutch, on the ground that Japan had the responsibility of leading the Malayan races to civilization.69 King Wachirawut apparently expressed his displeasure with this article:

Such opinion was identified before. In fact the trend of Japanese ambitions has existed for a long time. But it is the first time that these stories are expressed so straightforwardly.- - It is my opinion which I have held for a long time that Japan is the Germany of the East. And although at present Japan is allied with Britain, the former is rather in favour of Germany. Therefore, I will have no strange feeling in the future when I hear news that Japan calls the treaty of alliance with Britain just 'A Scrap of Paper'.70

The Siamese king also disclosed his concern about the trend of Japanese southward expansion in a strictly private confidential letter to the British Minister in Bangkok, E. Dering:

"A recent article by a well-known Japanese writer in a Japanese journal, a cutting of which was sent to me from Japan by my agent, has only tended to confirm this unfortunate impression -----

-----."71 He characterised such opinion of seizing Java and Sumatra as "Teutonic". He estimated that if both the islands fell to Japan, Japan's next target must be the Malaya of the Straits, and that Japan would come to Siam via China. He held the view that the Siamese were distinct from the Japanese and Chinese who were, he believed, of the same ethnic origin. And the King's apprehension extended to some Chinese and Japanese in Siam who were, according to the Siamese officials, doing intelligence work for Japan. The king gave an example of it; Japanese photographers opened studios all over Siam, and took pictures free of charge for the

69 King Wachirawut to Prince Thewawong. February 11, 1916. no.11/862 in R.6.T.2S/16. Also see Vella, op. cit., p. 291, fn. 30. The reference number of this document which Vella referred to is NA 10/28. This number was applied to the previous system of classification, which may not correspond to the present system of reference numbering.
71 King Wachirawut to Mr. Dering. April 19, 1916 in 'Grey Papers', FO.800/76. In the same document, Wachirawut claimed to have had suspicious of the Japanese going back to a visit to Japan en route to Siam in 1901-2.
Siamese military, and in return they could take pictures of particular areas which were closed to
the public. The King also disclosed that Japanese were running hotels (virtual brothels as he
noted) in very transparent disguise, and women in those establishments were especially adept at
warming out secret information. The King apparently believed that the Japanese tried to use the
Chinese as an instrument for getting at the Siamese.\textsuperscript{72} Whether or not such Japanese activities
really related to intelligence service we do not know; probably there might have been such
Japanese controlled by the Japanese Legation or by the Japanese military, or it might have been
Wachirawut's over-anxiety, but suffice it to say that the Siamese king was nervous of Japanese
activities in Siam.

Nevertheless, King Wachirawut confessed that "I feel no special anxiety at the present,
but there might be cause for real anxiety under the following circumstances." And he defined
such circumstances: 1) if the Japanese controlled the Chinese in Siam, they could take up
propaganda work on Japan's behalf if such Chinese had a news paper to support Japan's aims; 2)
if such propaganda bore fruit, they could promote hostile feeling against European Powers; 3) in
such a case, if the European Powers began war with Japan, and Japan obtained territory located
near Siam, for example, Java, the pro-Japan element in Siam may make itself most troublesome
to the Siamese government.\textsuperscript{73}

King Wachirawut finally promised in his letter to the British Minister that:

I communicate these fears to you because I sincerely desire to maintain that
ancient friendship which has so long existed between Great Britain and Siam, --
-- All we want and pray for is to continue our own existence as an independent
nation, and for that reason we cannot contemplate with equanimity any change
which would result in providing us with a new neighbour in any of the countries
close to us. And it is because we fear that such a change might be brought about
by the instrumentality of some of the more unscrupulous and self-interested
Chinamen that we watch such people so anxiously--; --.\textsuperscript{74}

Why did King Wachirawut write such a letter of confession to the British Minister? It
should be recalled that about three months before he wrote this letter, the king had been asked
by the British Minister whether or not what the Dutch Minister in Tokyo had reported was true,
and he derided this. Thus it might be assumed that the Siamese king, being all along friendly to
Britain, felt that he should dispel any British doubts about the relations between Japan and Siam
so that his kingdom, he trusted, could maintain its independence.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
In sum, all the activities of Japanese in Siam and Southeast Asia at that time very much provoked the King's suspicions about Japan. He was really wrapped in a shroud of such suspicion.

6-7-3. King Wachirawut's approach to the Japanese Emperor

However, something must have happened by late 1919 to King Wachirawut's view of Japan. In January 1920, the Siamese Foreign Ministry informed the Japanese Legation in Bangkok that King Wachirawut wished to make a personal visit to the Japanese Emperor (Taisho Tenno Yoshihito, 1879-1926), including in his tour Korea, Japanese Formosa, and French Indo-China.75 Japanese Minister Nishi Genshiro was of opinion that if the Japanese Emperor accepted this request, the Japanese government had better send a letter of invitation from the Japanese Emperor to the Siamese King to show Japan's friendliness to Siam.76 It was unfortunate that the Japanese Foreign Ministry neglected this matter for over one month. It was the middle of March before the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo informed the Japanese Governor-General of Korea and Formosa and the Japanese Minister of the Imperial Household of King Wachirawut's request.77 The reason why the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo delayed reporting the matter is unclear, but probably the Foreign Ministry was busy trying to get information on the state of the Taisho Tenno's health.

Indeed, the Taisho Tenno had been in poor health. He had suffered in childhood from meningitis and serious whooping-cough, typhoid fever, chest disease, and so on. His bad health had already become evident around 1914. His memory, thought, and powers of judgment were worse to such an extent that he was absent from the opening ceremony of the Imperial Diet on the 27th December 1918. Also the Tenno did not attend the celebration party for the thirteenth anniversary of the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution, on February 11, 1919. Something had happened to Taisho Tenno. Hara Takashi, five months after his inauguration as Premier in February 1919, was informed by vice-Minister of the Imperial Household, Ishihara Kenzo, that Taisho Tenno was ill.78 But it was not until November 1919 that Hara knew that the nature of

75 Japanese Minister in Bangkok Nishi Genshiro to Japanese Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya, January 31, 1920, no.19, very secret in JDA. 6-4-4-1-8.
76 Nishi to Uchida, February 2, 1920, no.20 in JDA. 6-4-4-1-8.
77 Uchida to the Japanese Governor-General of Korea and Formosa, March 15, 1920, no.20 and no.1 respectively, and Uchida to Minister of Imperial Household, March 16, 1920, no.21 in 6-4-4-1-8.
Taisho Tenno's illness was serious.\(^7^9\) In the same year, Taisho Tenno again did not attend the opening ceremony of the Imperial Diet in December. Finally, the Japanese heard the pronouncement of the Minister of the Imperial Household on March 30, 1920, about Taisho Tenno's fatal illness, which still did not disclose all the details of the condition of the Tenno's disease which was actually at a quite serious stage. It was at this time that the preparations for the succession to the Imperial Throne of Prince Hirohito (the later Showa Tenno) began.\(^8^0\) The Interior Minister, Matsukata Masayoshi proposed the establishment of a Prince Regent in June 1920. Hara, though holding the same opinion as Matsukata, was very cautious about doing so. He thought that the information of the Tenno's condition should be explained gradually to the people.\(^8^1\) Consequently, Prince Hirohito became the first Regent under the Meiji Constitution, at the age of 20, in 1921. Therefore, when the Siamese Foreign Ministry informed the Japanese Legation in Bangkok of King Wachirawut's wishes to meet the Taisho Tenno, neither side can have known the real condition of the Taisho Tenno's health.

About one month after the announcement of the Taisho Tenno's illness (April 1920), the news of King Wachirawut's proposed visit to Japan was disclosed by the *Bangkok Times*.\(^8^2\) The press, the Siamese government, and the foreign legations in Bangkok of course did not recognise at this juncture the seriousness of the disease of the Japanese Emperor. The British Minister, anxious of potential closer relations between Japan and Siam, met Prince Thewawong to inquire the purpose of the King's trip to Japan. The Siamese Foreign Minister laughed the apprehension of the British Minister away, saying that the purpose of the King's visit was to establish more friendly relations with Japan, not to make any political entente.\(^8^3\) On the other hand, the Chinese government, according to Prince Thewawong, wished the Siamese King to stop also at Peking (Beijing). Thewawong inquired of the Japanese Minister in Bangkok, Nishi, whether the Japanese government could provide protection to the Siamese king in Beijing; for Siam had no diplomatic relations with China. If Japan was reluctant to do so, the Siamese government would ask the British government to do it, Thewawong added.\(^8^4\) Needless to say, the Japanese Foreign Ministry did not desire Siam to turn to the British.

\(^7^9\) Ibid., p. 8.
\(^8^0\) Ibid., p. 3 and p. 11.
\(^8^1\) Ibid., p. 12.
\(^8^2\) *The Bangkok Times* February 7 and April 28, 1920, see Vella, op. cit. p. 291.
\(^8^3\) Nishi to Uchida, March 15, 1920, no.40 in JDA. 6-4-4-1-8.
\(^8^4\) Nishi to Uchida, April 30, 1920, no.64 in JDA. 6-4-4-1-8.
Why did King Wachirawut want to make a personal visit to the Japanese Emperor at this juncture? Vella revealed interesting evidence of what Prince Charoon, Siamese Minister in Paris, suggested in October 1919 to the King; Charoon thought that there was no power in East Asia sufficiently strong to counteract Britain. France was too weak, and the only other alternatives were the United States, whose interest was doubtful, and Japan. Prince Charoon concluded that he needed hardly say which of the two would be preferable. Perhaps surprisingly, it is clear that it was Japan that Prince Charoon implied.85

6-7-4. Masao's secret meeting with the Siamese government

The other explanation for King Wachirawut's turn to Japan derives from the fact that six Japanese members of Parliament made an observation tour to Southeast Asia during the middle of 1919, including Phya Mahithon, i.e. Masao Tokichi, the former legal adviser, as the head of this group. They visited Hong Kong, the Philippines, Singapore, Siam, Borneo, and French Indo-China. In Manila, they exchanged amicable words with the Governor-General, the Philippine Chamber of Commerce, and other leading people. An English-language newspaper there covered this meeting with the headline 'Japanese-Philippine friendship is voiced'.86

More important for the present study, Masao stayed alone in Bangkok for another fortnight, separated from the other Parliamentary delegates. Then in September 1919, as adviser to the Japanese 'Yamashita Steamship Line Company', he approached the Siamese government to negotiate for forming a new shipping company with the cooperation of the Siamese government.(see Ch. 5 fn.20) The Siamese government was told that this plan was to break the British trade monopoly. Siamese refusal would entail loss of sympathy of Japan's most influential class, but acceptance would bring Japanese surrender of extraterritorial rights in Siam, Masao said.87 Who was behind Masao is unclear. It can only be said that Masao belonged to the Seiyukai Party of Premier Hara Takashi (1918-1921), and that 'the most influential class' Masao referred to might have been Masao's patron Premier Hara, and other leading statesmen or Seiyukai members, though probably not the Japanese Foreign Ministry

because its attitude in the subsequent negotiations was sluggish and almost unintelligible, as will be described in the next chapter. Therefore, the attitude of 'the most influential class' might have derive from more specific figures, such as Premier Hara. Suffice it to say that certain politicians connected to Masao were willing to surrender Japan's extraterritoriality rights in Siam in return for Japanese economic and possibly political penetration in Siam.

What Masao disclosed to the Siamese officials, abolition of Japan's extraterritoriality, was of very great meaning to the Siamese government. In addition to this, one month later, Prince Charoon voiced his opinion on Japan to the king, as mentioned above. Therefore, it can be concluded that behind King Wachirawut's intention of visiting Japan announced in early 1920, there was the secret approach of certain Japanese leaders with the intention of abolishing Japan's extraterritoriality, and Prince Charoon's opinion. It seems that King Wachirawut's apprehension about Japan lessened for the time being. It could be assumed that the king thought that his proposal to visit Japan could pave the way not only for abolition of Japan's extraterritoriality, but also prevent any unpleasantness relations between Japan and Siam. It can be recalled that King Wachirawut wrote to the British Minister in Bangkok as stated above; "All we want and pray for is to continue our own existence as an independent nation.

However, the sudden death of King Wachirawut's younger brother, Prince Chakraphong (the Prince of Phitsanulok), at the age of 37 in July 1920, upset this proposed royal visit to Japan. Prince Thewawong, still the Siamese Foreign Minister, informed the Japanese Legation of the postponement of the king's visit to Japan. But at the same time, he inquired the schedule of the Japanese Emperor because King Wachirawut still had the intention to visit Japan in the following year. 88 This royal wish was again notified in 1921 when the new Minister to Siam, Masao Tokichi, succeeding Nishi, discussed with Prince Thewawong the presentation of his credentials from the Japanese Emperor. Thewawong told Masao about the King's strong desire to meet the Japanese Emperor personally. 89 However, the Japanese government replied that the Emperor was no longer in good enough health to see the Siamese king. 90 Of course, King Wachirawut did not know the nature of the Taisho Emperor's illness. Ultimately, the issue of the

---

88 Nishi to Uchida, June 24, 1920, no.91 in JDA. 6-4-4-1-8.
89 Japanese Minister in Bangkok, Masao Tokichi, to Uchida, February 27, 1921, no.17 in JDA. 6-4-4-1-8.
90 Uchida to Masao, June 6, 1921, no.19 in JDA. 6-4-4-1-8.
King's visit to Japan was postponed by the Siamese government until the Taisho Emperor could recover from his illness.91

It was King Wachirawut who first paid admiring attention to Japan's success as a nation-state, who later became increasingly apprehensive of Japan's southward trend, and who lastly decided to work for closer relations with Japan. He seems to have expected to recover Siam's judicial autonomy through improving relations with Japan, which was also regarded by the king as a possible counterbalance to British. But King Wachirawut died on November 26, 1925, at the age of 44. In the following year, 1926, the Japanese Taisho Emperor also died. The desire of the Siamese king Wachirawut to visit Japan had not been realized. Although it was impossible for the Siamese king to see the Taisho Tenno because there was no chance of recovery in his health, had the Siamese king at least met the Regent for the Japanese Emperor, the later Showa Tenno, Prince Hirohito, some spectacular change might have been seen in the relations between Japan, Siam, and the Western Powers. At least, it is probable that the succeeding sluggish process of the negotiations for revision of the 1898 Japanese-Siamese treaty could have been avoided. It is our next concern to look at these negotiations. What were Japanese and Siamese attitudes in their treaty revision negotiations? And how did the Kasumigaseki or Gaimusho (which means the Japanese Foreign Ministry) deal with this issue?

91 Masao to Uchida, June 12, 1921, no.61 in JDA. 6-4-4-1-8.
The early decades of the twentieth century in the Far East were a period of vigorous Japanese involvement in China. Japan pressed its Twenty-One Demands for special concessions on the hostile President (and aspirant Emperor) Yuan-Shih-k'ai as an extension of its role in the 1914-18 Great War. And at the same time, it was the period of increasing American antagonism to Japan over the China issue, following the disagreements over Manchuria, though the 1917 Ishii-Lansing Agreement to some extent released the two countries from the exigent tensions for the time being, as the Western Powers desired continual Japanese participation in the war against Germany.

It was Japan that proposed the negotiations for the revision of the 1898 Treaty with Siam. In 1909, the Japanese government had brought up the issue because, according to Article 14 of the 1898 Treaty, Siam was able to cancel the treaty after June 1908, whenever she desired to do so. The Siamese government objected to Japan's desire for revision of the treaty on the ground that the Protocol Clause 1 stipulated that Japanese consular jurisdiction would be relinquished when Siam's judicial reforms were completed. Japan's hopes faded, and the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo did not press the issue. The revision of the 1898 treaty seems not to have been regarded as an urgent issue at that time. Japanese residents in Siam numbered less than two hundred people. No serious problem concerning Japanese nationals was expected to take place. Meanwhile, the Japanese government at that time was preoccupied with 1) the Chinchow-Aigun railway line in Manchuria, 2) the succeeding negotiation of the Japanese-Russian agreement in 1910, and 3) Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910. In this situation, the Japan-Siam treaty issue was suspended more than a decade.

This chapter deals with the period between about 1920-1924. The most important event in Japan's diplomatic relations with Siam in this period was the completion of the negotiation for revising the 1898 Japan's unequal treaty with Siam. Why did it happen then? There were

---

2 As of the end of 1910, the Japanese residents were 199 persons. Ishii and Yoshikawa, Nitai koryu roppyyaku nenchi (Six Hundred Years of Japan-Thai Relations), p. 273.
3 Murakami Katsuhiko, 'Nihon teikoku shugi to gunbu (Japanese Imperialism and the Military)', pp. 178-188.
several reasons connected together. First, there was the increasing Japanese awareness of the South Seas region (Nan'yo) after the 1919 Paris Peace Conference; at Paris Japan obtained the former German islands in the South Pacific, and this led the Japanese to pay attention directly to the South Seas. This movement was called 'Taisho Nanshin Ron' as we have seen in the previous chapter. Not only the South Seas islands, but Southeast Asian mainland countries including Siam, linking with the South Seas islands, were also paid attention to by the Japanese though it did not happen rapidly.

Secondly, in addition to such general background, it was thought that the 1898 Japan-Siam treaty which had already become liable to renewal more than ten years before, should be revised so as to protect the Japanese nationals resident in Siam, and that as it was an unequal treaty, economic activities were limited, so it would be harmful to further promoting Japan-Siam trade. In the latter respect, the new treaty should be a fully reciprocal treaty so that Japanese would be able to possess land and enjoy other legal rights as much as Siamese citizens.

Such were the critical issues surrounding the 1898 treaty. But in reality, the Japanese Foreign Ministry was unenthusiastic for revision negotiation. It seems simply that the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, the Gaimusho, regarded Siam as a third-class country which was not of immediate importance for Japan's diplomatic relations. That was why, although more than ten years had passed since the renewal of the 1898 treaty had come due, the Japanese Foreign Ministry had taken no positive action on this issue as mentioned above. But at last the time came for Japan to take action. The growing interest of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region led the Japanese Foreign Ministry to wake up. At the same time, within the Gaimusho, a new movement for reforming the ministry arose among several young staff members after the Paris Peace Conference. In this context, it was thought by such reformists that Siam, an independent Asian country however trifling, should not be neglected.

In this chapter, we will first examine the general attitude of the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo towards Siamese affairs generally through the memoirs of Mr. Amada Rokuro, who was one of the Japanese diplomats in Bangkok during the period. This is important, because around this period the awareness of the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo of Siam began to develop. The key person in this change was Mr. Arita Hachiro, who later became the Japanese Foreign Minister during 1936-37, 1938-39, and 1940. He was sent as interim acting minister to Bangkok during
1920-21. What was his role in Japan's diplomatic relations with Siam? This is the second issue in this chapter.

Then we will examine the course of the negotiation for the revision of the 1898 Japan-Siam treaty in four stages. The first stage is the beginning of the negotiation for which Masao Tokichi, former legal adviser to the Siamese government, was appointed as minister to Siam. What did he think and how did he act in this negotiation? The second stage is the rest of the negotiation led by Yada Chonosuke succeeding Masao, the latter having died only six months after his arrival at Bangkok. In doing so, two questions will be focused upon, the question of extraterritoriality, and the question of the most-favoured nation clause. Why are these two questions taken up in this chapter? Because these were very controversial matters in the course of the negotiation by which we can understand what the attitudes of both the Siamese government and the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the negotiations were. Lastly, the significance of the revision of the 1898 treaty should be assessed.

7-1. Amada Rokuro: a witness to the Gaimusho's attitude to Siam

Amada Rokuro was born in 1897, the same year that the first Japanese minister to Siam, Inagaki Manjiro, arrived in Bangkok to negotiate for the 1898 treaty. Amada became a real expert on Siamese affairs, serving in the Japanese Legation in Bangkok from 1919 until 1932, except for September 1925-May 1926. After his retirement from the diplomatic service, he began to write his memoirs, some of which have been published in a certain newspaper, the rest never published. In the latter, there are very valuable descriptions for the present study.4

When Amada first saw the Gulf of Siam in autumn 1919, he was only a twenty-two years-old trainee sent from the Japanese Foreign Ministry. In the first three years (September 1919-November 1922), he studied Siamese language. He remembered vividly the scene when he arrived at the Japanese Legation:

4 These unpublished manuscripts have been preserved by Amada's daughter, Mrs Yoshikawa. Her husband, Mr Yoshikawa Hideo, a retired diplomat, also served in Siam and later became Ambassador to Liberia. (He is not related to Yoshikawa Toshiharu, co-author of Six Hundred Years of Japan-Thai Relations). As of July 1990, they live in Chiba Prefecture next to Tokyo. I owe the completion of this section to Amada's unpublished manuscripts which Mrs Yoshikawa kindly allowed me to borrow. Also, I must express my thanks to Mr and Mrs Yoshikawa for permitting interviews with them on the 9th, 14th, and 17th July 1990, at their residence.

Amada was also a good friend of the Siamese Prime Minister Luang Phibunsongkhram (he was also born in 1897) to such an extent that when Phibun was exiled to Japan, it was Amada who took care of Phibun. Interview with Mr. Yoshikawa on the 9th July 1990.
Japan Legation, I saw three young Japanese staff who, having just finished their half-day work, were taking their lunch at the small dining room next to the office. - - The Japanese Consul [Takahashi Seiichi], saying to me "It's hot, isn't it?", switched on the ceiling fan, but it did not work. Then he took a long broom, and poked the broken fan on the ceiling. It started whirring. I was deeply impressed at what a terrible residence the Japanese Consul lives in! Then I was introduced to the Japanese Minister, Nishi Genshiro. The two storey Minister's residence was opposite to the office of the Legation with a stretch of greensward between. Passing through the entrance, there was a too spacious dining-room like a hall. On the top floor, I saw a large reception-room and a living-room. Inside the house it was gloomy and cool. Minister Nishi had lived alone for nearly five years at such a place! He gave me the impression of being a 'Zen' priest in a mountain temple.

What Amada wanted to say through the above description was how Siam was regarded by the Japanese, and how Siam was treated by the Gaimusho. He explained frankly that Siam at that time was in a different position from that of colonial Java or Singapore which were located on the main commercial sea-routes linking Japan with Europe. Siam was thought of as an inactive bucolic place. By the Japanese government itself, economically or politically, little attention was paid to Siam. There was a prevailing phrase in the Gaimusho, i.e. 'Avoid three sha', which as for Europeans, meant that Girisha (Greece), Perusha (Persia), and Shamu (Siam) were awful places for appointment. Promising elite diplomats did not want to leave for posts in such countries. Japanese diplomats serving in such countries were often regarded as relegated persons. Amada implied that why the Gaimusho did not pay attention to facilities or residences in such countries was probably because of its preconception and underestimation of them. Amada might have not stated things in such a way with his sharp eye. But he loved Siam though he often criticised the Siamese government. He did not apply to change his assignment.

Amada also mentioned the situation of Japanese residents in Siam. According to him, most of the Japanese residents were engaged in trading or the commercial field. They ran their own shops, not big companies like the 'zaibatsu' (giant financial group). The Bank of Taiwan branch had been opened in Bangkok in March before Amada's arrival (1919), but in 1925 it would be closed due to financial problems. The Mitsui Trading Company had also already operated since 1907, but it was a mere small branch office. Other Japanese were medical doctors (without proper medical licenses), hairdressers, hotel keepers, photographers. They were living in unfashionable areas. Therefore, given the actual Japanese residents, Amada

---

5 Amada Rokuro, 'Ryoji saibanken jidai no taikoku zaiju nihonjin no kotodomo (Japanese residents in Siam under Japanese extraterritoriality)' unpublished, no specific date (but one might assume from the context that it was drafted probably in 1970), pp. 26-27. Hereafter cited under 'Amada Rokuro, Japanese residents in Siam'.

6 Ibid., pp. 28-29.

7 Interview with Mr Yoshikawa on the 14th July 1990. In 1932, he had an assignment to go to Chicago by the instruction of the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo.
doubts very much the real significance of Japanese extraterritoriality in Siam.\(^8\) In fact, the number of the Japanese residents was 282 as of the end of 1919.\(^9\)

From both the description of Amada regarding how Siam was valued then, and the fact that the number of the Japanese residents was small, it is clear enough why the Japanese Foreign Ministry was not enthusiastic to revise the 1898 treaty even though it had already come due for renewal. However, such an apathetic attitude at the Gaimusho towards Siam had to change in 1920. The trigger incident was a new treaty between the United States and Siam.

7-2. Arita Hachiro's five months' experience in Siam

On 18 December 1920, the Gaimusho received a telegram sent from the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Shidehara Kijuro, reporting the signing of a new treaty between Siam and the United States.\(^10\) The Japanese Foreign Ministry then cabled promptly to the Japanese interim acting Minister at Bangkok, instructing him to get as much information as possible on the new treaty between Siam and the United States.\(^11\) But the Japanese Minister received the response from the American Legation at Bangkok that negotiation of the new treaty had been carried on in Washington so they could say nothing about it. The Japanese Minister then visited Siam's Foreign Minister, Prince Thewawong, and was informed that he had no idea of the precise contents of the new treaty because certain clauses of the treaty had been changed just before signing.\(^12\) Not long after that, the American Legation at Bangkok announced the concluding of the new Siamese-American treaty.\(^13\) On the first day of the new year, 1921, the Japanese Minister had a chance to meet Thewawong at an evening party, and again asked for details of the new treaty. This time, Thewawong disclosed to him only that due to the new treaty, America would reserve the right of legal evocation for a period of 5 years.\(^14\) In addition, Thewawong hinted that this privilege enjoyed by the United States might be given to Japan.\(^15\)

---

8 Amada Rokuro, 'Japanese residents in Siam', pp. 31-32.
11 Arita to Uchida, December 29, 1920, no.154 in JDA. 2-5-1-69. Even before Arita, Shidehara also later became Japanese Foreign Minister.
12 Ibid.
13 Arita to Uchida, December 31, 1920, no.155 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
14 'Right of Evocation' in this context means that in the case where the defendant or accused is a Japanese subject, the Japanese Consul may by means of a written requisition, at any time before judgment in the Court of First Instance, evoke (transfer) the case to the Japanese Consul for adjudication, if the Consul shall think proper in the interests of justice. See the Japan draft treaty in Gaimusho Tsushokyoku, 'Nissen tsusho kokai joyaku kaitei ni kansuru koshō

165
It was Arita Hachiro that was mentioned above. Although Arita was instructed to investigate the new Siamese-American treaty, he was due to return to Japan within two weeks of meeting Thewawong on New Year's Day 1921. Arita's stay at Bangkok was only five months (August 1920-January 1921).

Arita Hachiro (1884-1965) was in his middle thirties at that time. Previously he had served at the Japanese Consulate at Mukden (1911), Ottawa (1912-13), and Honolulu (1912-1916). He was a promising career diplomat. Indeed, a year before he went to Siam, like so many other outstanding figures of the inter-war years, he had attended the Paris Peace Conference (1919), as the chief of the General Affairs Section of the Japanese delegation. Why was Arita sent to Siam as interim acting minister for only five months? The answer can be drawn from his autobiography.16

After the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, it was strongly argued in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, in particular, by the young staff members, that the Japanese delegates did not make sufficient preparations for the conference. It was thought that this was due to the conventional structure and administration of the Foreign Ministry. Then the young diplomats, Arita Hachiro, Shigemitsu Mamoru, and others, formed the 'Comrades Group for Reforming the Foreign Ministry', aiming at enlarging and strengthening the functions of the Foreign Ministry, training the staff members, and so forth.17

It was also its aim to eliminate the traditional attitude of the Foreign Ministry staff members who tended to carefully rank their assignment places. About that time, Arita was asked by vice-Foreign Minister, Hanihara Masanao, to go to Siam as acting minister for two or three months. Arita accepted, because he was trying to promote the movement for reforming the Foreign Ministry as one of the members of the Comrades Group for Reforming the Foreign Ministry. The reason why he accepted was that he wanted to eliminate a vice of the Foreign

---

15 Arita to Uchida, January 3, 1921, no No. in JDA. 2-5-1-69. At this stage, the major elements of this treaty, the abolition of extraterritoriality and acceptance of the tariff autonomy of Siam with reservations, were not revealed. Not knowing about all this, the Japanese Foreign Ministry seems to have been preparing its own draft revision of the 1898 treaty, a "Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Protocol between Siam and Japan." The 1898 treaty stipulated that "The present Treaty shall remain in force for ten years, and thereafter until the expiration of a year from the day on which one or the other of the Contracting Parties shall have repudiated it." Such being the case, Siam could have declared cancellation of the treaty after June 1908 whenever she desired. See 'The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Protocol between Siam and Japan', Article 14, in JDA. TH.2.
16 Arita Hachiro, Bakahachi to hito wa iu (People say 'Stupid Hachi') (Tokyo, 1959).
17 Ibid., p. 27.
Ministry; when an unpopular assignment place was concerned, the Gaimusho would say casually that the period of the assignment was two or three months, but actually, it would be extended, to a year or two years. On the condition that the period of staying was only three months, Arita decided to go to Siam which was such an unpopular place. However, the Gaimusho did not instruct him to return to Tokyo though three months had already passed. Arita cabled to Tokyo, saying that if the Foreign Ministry did not allow him to return to Tokyo, he would resign. Shortly after, Arita received a telegram, instructing him to return to Tokyo.18

More importantly, on his way back to Tokyo, Arita took a trip around other Southeast Asian countries, and presented a few page statement of his opinion about the South Seas and Southeast Asia to the chief of the Ministry's Commerce Bureau, Tanaka Tokichi. This interesting report is important for understanding the actual attitude of the Foreign Ministry to Southeast Asia. It pointed out what the Japanese Foreign Ministry should do in dealing with Southeast Asian affairs.

First, Arita insisted that the Gaimusho should not pay attention exclusively to China and Western affairs. Japan's 'political activities' in Southeast Asia and the South Seas region should be restrained because they could harm Japan's economic activities (which means political activities would provoke anti-Japanese sentiment). However, the Japanese Foreign Ministry had so far taken an apathetic line even on such economic issues. Secondly, Arita opined that Japan's positive economic policy towards Siam should be defined on the ground that Siam desired Japan to be a counter-weight power against the Western Powers since Germany, previously regarded as a counter-weight power by the Siamese, had lost the Great War. He pointed out that the traditional Japanese policy on Siam, i.e. the policy of avoiding any confrontation with Britain and France, should be reconsidered. Thirdly, Arita did not overlook the growing interest of the United States in Siam, reporting that America had increased the number of its staff at its Legation in Bangkok. Fourth, he criticised the cool attitude of the Gaimusho to its diplomats serving in Southeast Asia and the South Seas region. He also pointed out that there were few people in the Foreign Ministry who knew Southeast Asia, including Siam, well. He suggested that the policy of appointing personnel to Southeast Asia and the South Seas region should be standardized. Assigning senior experienced and healthy Japanese diplomats, who had served in

18 Ibid., pp. 30-31. However, probably due to his experience of Siam, along with his later assignment to Tientsin (1925-27), he became chief of the Asian Bureau in 1927-1930.
western countries for three or four years, to posts in Southeast Asia or the South Seas region would be appropriate policy. Further, he suggested that some leading staff of the Foreign Ministry should make an observation tour to Southeast Asia and the South Seas region, and a South Seas Section should be set up in the Foreign Ministry.\(^{19}\)

From the Arita report it is evident that the Japanese Foreign Ministry was inclined to dismiss not only Siamese affairs but also the South Seas region, despite Japan's obtaining the former German islands in the South Pacific and the growing general Japanese interest in the South Seas region. It is hard to trace in detail the influence of the Arita report on succeeding decision-making of the policy of the Gaimusho towards Southeast Asian and South Seas regional affairs. Yet it can be said that this experience of Arita imbued him with some concrete image and sense of Southeast Asia including Siam. And his opinion seems to have at least influenced the appointment of other Japanese ministers to Siam as will be stated later.\(^{20}\)

7-3. Masao Tokichi's embarrassment and the pro-Siam line over the negotiation for the revision of the 1898 Siam-Japan Treaty

7-3-1. Optimism of the Gaimusho in the treaty negotiation

After Arita left for Japan, the task of revision of the 1898 treaty was left to Masao Tokichi, who had taken an important part in the reform of Siam's judicial system as we have seen in chapter 5. It is easy to understand why Masao was appointed the Japanese Minister in Bangkok in that not only was he experienced in Siamese affairs, but he was also on friendly terms with Siam's Foreign Minister, Prince Thewawong Waropakan, Prince Damrong Rachanuphap, and other senior Siamese leaders. Further, as we have seen in chapter 6-7-4, Masao, on a mission from the 'most influential class in Japan', had already approached the Siamese government to sound it out about establishing a new Japanese steamship company in Siam, proposing in return that Japan might surrender her extraterritoriality in Siam.

On 18 January 1921, instructions from the Japanese Foreign Minister, Uchida Yasuya, were sent to Masao before Masao left for Siam.\(^{21}\) The contents of these instructions give us the fundamental policy of the Japanese Foreign Ministry on the revision of the 1898 treaty.

\(^{19}\) Arita Hachiro, 'An Impression of Siam and the South Seas', dated April 1921 in JDA. 1-6-1-4-4.

\(^{20}\) It is clear that the Arita report did not influence the appointment of Masao, who succeeded Arita, because the Arita report was dated April 1921, while the date of Masao's official appointment was February in the same year.

\(^{21}\) Uchida to Masao, January 18, 1921, no.1 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
Specifically, this instruction was drafted by the Commerce Bureau headed by Tanaka Tokichi (September 1920-October 1921) who was in charge of the Siam treaty issue. And the Treaty Bureau led by Yamakawa Hatao (September 1920-August 1925), and the Asian Bureau under Yoshizawa Kenkichi (October 1920-May 1923) as well as vice-Foreign Minister, Hanihara (September 1919-December 1922), and Foreign Minister Uchida, approved it with their signatures. 22

In the first place, these instructions directed Masao to explain thoroughly to the Siamese government the basic thoughts of the Japanese government on treaty revision, as in the following passage:

This treaty revision is merely a transitional measure towards the abolition of extraterritoriality in Siam. The treaty revision has to reflect the interests of both countries. Japan, therefore, does not intend to conclude an unsuitable treaty for the two countries. Japan never just follows the Powers. 23

In the second place, Uchida instructed Masao that a draft treaty would be requested, based mainly on the 1913 Dutch-Siamese treaty. Japan's proposals consisted of two parts, one concerning the extraterritoriality clause, the other commercial matters. Apart from these points, these instructions ordered Masao further to obtain informal consent from the Siamese government that a Japanese legal adviser or judge, and if possible a police adviser as well, would be employed in any lawsuit involving Japanese residents. 24

It is true that the Gaimusho did not intend to completely surrender the right of extraterritoriality in Siam by concluding a new treaty. Furthermore, it has to be said that although the beginning of this instruction insisted that the Japanese Foreign Ministry did not follow the Western Powers, the actual demand for the concluding of a new treaty paralleled them (except the United States). This contradictory attitude of the Japanese Foreign Ministry is

22 This pattern of drafting instructions continued until the completion of the negotiation.
23 Uchida to Masao, January 18, 1921, no. 1 in JDA, 2-5-1-69.
24 As for extraterritoriality, the instruction said that Japan had four requests; (a) a foreign judge or a foreign legal adviser should be allowed to participate in any lawsuit which involved Japanese residents, (b) any lawsuit concerning Japanese who had registered at the Japanese Legation by the time the new treaty was ratified would be transferred to the International Court, (c) the Japanese Consul would have the right of evocation of any lawsuit concerning Japanese residents brought to the International Court, (d) a most-favoured nation clause would include the legal procedure for the Japanese residents. The reason why the instructions did not propose a 'Japanese' judge or legal adviser was, as the Foreign Ministry explained, that although other Western treaties with Siam adopted the term 'European' advisers, it was not suitable for a specific lawsuit of Japanese residents. Thus, the Foreign Ministry took up the general expression 'foreign' adviser. They seem to have hesitated to specify explicitly 'Japanese' advisers in the treaty. With respect to the commercial matters, there were five claims; (a) Japanese residents would have property rights including mining rights, (b) treatment for Japanese residents on taxation should be on the same footing with Siamese citizens, (c) Japanese corporations would be permitted to operate in Siam, (d) Japanese residents would be exempted from military obligations or any substitute tax, (e) export and import taxes, and the transit duty stipulated in the 1898 treaty, would be confirmed in the new treaty. See ibid.
evident again from another fact mentioned above, that it desired posts of legal advisers in the Siamese government.

At any rate, Chief of the Treaty Bureau, Yamakawa, Chief of the Commerce Bureau Tanaka, Chief of the Asian Bureau Yoshizawa, as well as vice-Foreign Minister Hanihara, and Foreign Minister Uchida i.e., all at the Gaimusho, seem to have hoped optimistically that a new treaty based on Japan's draft could be concluded without difficulty. Not knowing that Siam and the United States had been negotiating for a new treaty stipulating abolition of extraterritoriality which was more fair to Siam, Japan's treaty draft along with an explanatory letter was sent to Masao at Bangkok on 4 March 1921.25

7-3-2. Seeking the contents of the new Siamese-American treaty

The Japanese Minister, Masao, proposed negotiations to Prince Thewawong on 2 April.26 However, the latter refused an immediate start to the negotiations on the ground that ratification of the new treaty between Siam and America was not yet completed in the United States Senate. Negotiation of a new treaty with Italy was also suspended due to the above situation, he added. Following the instruction of Tokyo, Masao then outlined Japan's draft, stressing in particular the employment of Japanese advisers and customs tariffs. Thewawong replied that they had no problem over tariff issues, but the matter of the employment of Japanese advisers would be impossible. He insisted on this for two reasons; (a) the Siamese government had at the time a policy of abolishing the foreign adviser system, in fact, negotiation with Britain concerning this issue had recently been started; (b) the United States would obtain the right of evocation by her new treaty, but she did not claim employment of American advisers as a complementary measure. Masao did not give up trying to persuade Thewawong, agreeing that the tariff issue was not a problem, only the matter of the employment of Japanese advisers was in question between them. So if Siam's government decided to employ

25 The letter repeated that this draft was based mainly on the 1913 Siamese-Dutch treaty, adding that some parts referred to the 1909 Anglo-Siamese treaty and the 1898 Siamese-Japanese treaty. Uchida to Masao, March 3, 1921 no.2 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.

The draft consisted of 14 articles. Among them, Article 12, which provided for property, landownership, and mining rights for Japanese residents, was regarded as important, simply because since the 1898 treaty between Japan and Siam did not stipulate them, the Japanese Foreign Ministry desired to enjoy such privileges along the lines of the 1913 Siamese-Dutch treaty. For the further text of Japan's draft, see Gaimusho Tsushokyoku, 'Nissen tsusho kokai joyaku kaitei ni kansuru kosho keika', op. cit. Masao received it on the 29th of the same month. Masao to Uchida, March 30, 1921, no.37 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.

26 Masao to Uchida, April 4, 1921, no.38 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
Japanese advisers before the ratification of the new treaty with America, no serious issue would arise and good relations would be maintained. Thewawong seemed to be influenced by Masao's words, but this meeting did not produce any concrete result.27

Receiving Masao's report, the Gaimusho seems to have doubted whether the United States did not claim the employment of American advisers at all. Chief of the Commerce Bureau of the Gaimusho, Tanaka, with the authority of Foreign Minister Uchida, then instructed Masao to confirm whether or not the United States demanded the same right of a most-favoured nation clause as in the Protocol Article 4 of the 1909 treaty between Britain and Siam, which stipulated that the British legal adviser would be allowed to sit in on any lawsuit concerning British residents.28

On 14 April, Masao, having met Thewawong again on 13th, cabled to Tokyo reporting that the American government certainly did not demand posts of adviser as a counter-weight for their new treaty which stipulated abolition of the right of extraterritoriality in Siam. It must have seemed incredible to the Gaimusho staff that the United States offered such a big concession to Siam. They needed confirmation of the contents of the treaty. Thus at the meeting on the 13th, Masao asked to see the contents of the new treaty but was refused. As for the question of the employment of a Japanese adviser, Thewawong answered that he himself might admit this but the Justice Minister opposed it.29 It can probably be assumed that the relatively pro-Japanese Thewawong, who had signed the 1887 Declaration and the 1898 treaty with Japan, hoped to grant Masao's request with felicity so as to complete the negotiation smoothly and amicably, but that he was on the horns of a dilemma as to Cabinet members who had an anti-Japanese sentiment, or opposed revision of the treaty with Japan.

In the meantime, it is clear that at this stage the Commerce Bureau at the Gaimusho did not see the contents of the new treaty between Siam and America. Masao appears to have spent much time getting information merely about the background to the conclusion of the new treaty between Siam and America. He was at last aware of the fact that Siam had sought for an equal treaty with America, and that after the Great War, because of Siam's sending troops to the War,

---

28 Uchida to Masao, April 11, 1921, no.12 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
29 Masao to Uchida, April 14, 1921, no. 5479 in JDA. 2-5-1-69. The Justice Minister was Chaophraya Aphairacha (M.R. Lop Suthat), see S.L.W. Greene, 'Thai Government and Administration in the Reign of Rama VI (1910-1925)', p. 368, table 13.
the Powers had begun to recognize Siam's claim to the abolition of extraterritoriality and the foreign adviser system. Masao sent his conclusions to Tokyo, saying that nothing could be done at this moment other than observing the situation. On 3 May 1921, the American Legation at Bangkok proclaimed the completion of the ratification of the new American treaty with Siam.

At this juncture, contrary to his first optimistic estimate (which was also the Gaimusho's view), Masao might already have felt difficulty about the conclusion of a new Japanese treaty with Siam because of the gap between Japan's expectations and the contents of the new American-Siamese treaty. Here the Gaimusho should have made a 180-degree turn in its approach to the negotiations with Siam.

It was urgent for the Japanese government to know the precise contents of the Siamese-American treaty. Foreign Minister Uchida cabled on 6 May to the Japanese Minister to the United States, Shidehara, instructing him to telegraph the contents of the article concerning tariffs and the right of evocation clauses, and to send by mail the whole contents of the Siamese-American treaty. The next day, 7th May, a telegram from Masao arrived inquiring whether or not he should send, by telegram, the whole contents of the treaty which he had just obtained privately from Prince Thewawong. Uchida then directed Masao to cable only the articles in question as he had instructed Shidehara. While Masao promptly informed Tokyo, Shidehara's telegram arrived late. From this Thewawong aid to Masao, it might not be incorrect to say that Thewawong himself probably desired the Japanese government to reconsider its draft treaty so as to meet Siam's position soon.

7-3-3. Masao's dilemma

As described above, it was the tariff and right of evocation clauses that in particular, the Gaimusho in Tokyo wanted to know of as soon as possible, so that it could reconsider the direction of the treaty negotiation with Siam. From May until July of the same year (1921), the Commerce Bureau at the Gaimusho seems to have examined this matter. At Bangkok, during

30 Masao to Uchida, April 6, 1921, no.4 in JDA. 2-5-1-69. This letter arrived in Tokyo May 7, 1921.
31 Masao to Uchida, May 3, 1921, No.46 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
32 Uchida to Shidehara, May 6, 1921, no.188 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
33 Masao to Uchida, May 7, 1921, no.47 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
34 Uchida to Masao, May 9, 1921, no.17 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
35 Masao to Uchida, May 10,1921, no.6, May 11, 1921, no.50, May 11, 1921, no.51, and May 12, 1921, no.52 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
36 Shidehara to Uchida, May 12, 1921, no.269 and no.270 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
these two months, Masao devoted himself to investigating the attitudes of Britain and France.\textsuperscript{37} Also he inquired of Prince Thewawong whether or not the Siamese government had begun to negotiate for treaty revision with Britain and France. Thewawong's answer was that negotiations had started recently in London and Paris respectively, but he had not heard the details of them yet. He added that when his government had pressed treaty revision negotiation with the two Powers at the Peace Conference of 1919, Britain's answer was that it would concede as much as any other nation did, while France seemed to give way to the Siamese pressure, confirming that she would surrender the right of extraterritoriality in Siam once Britain did so. Thewawong expressed his satisfaction with America's recent favourable attitude to Siam.\textsuperscript{38}

There were two choices for the Gaimusho: either to persist with its first treaty draft, or amend the first draft according to the Siamese-American treaty. It had been Japan's traditional attitude to take into account Britain and France's policies when it considered its policy towards Siam, as Arita mentioned above, and it tried not to create any confrontation with them in Siam. The then Japanese Foreign Ministry still held the same policy towards Siam. In this context, the first choice suited Japan's traditional stance. Probably Chief of the Commerce Bureau, Tanaka, did not wish to provoke Britain and France in Siam in terms of diplomatic strategy through concluding an equal treaty with Siam.

Uchida's instruction sent on 6 July followed the same line as the first instruction to Masao of January, but saying that Japan might make concessions to the demands of the Siamese government.\textsuperscript{39} By chance, Masao himself, before receiving the above telegram, cabled his opinion at length on 5 July.\textsuperscript{40} Masao's opinion appears to favour Siam, but analyzing coolly the diplomatic changes affecting Siam after the Great War, urges that:

An adequate policy that Japan could pursue is to decide firmly to give up the right of extraterritoriality and foreign adviser clauses voluntarily, in the same fashion as the United States did. If Japan does so, Siam, owing to these treaties with Japan and America, would be able to capitalize on them in the treaty revision negotiations with Britain and France, and the relations between Japan and Siam should be much improved.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{37} Masao to Uchida, May 17, 1921, no.54 and May 18, 1921, no.56 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
\textsuperscript{38} Masao to Uchida, June 12, 1921, no.62 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
\textsuperscript{39} Uchida to Masao, July 6, 1921, no.21 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
\textsuperscript{40} Masao to Uchida, July 5, 1921, no.66 in JDA. 2-5-1-69. While Masao's telegram arrived at the Foreign Ministry at 8:00 a.m. on 7 July, Uchida's instruction was cabled on 6 July, which means that the Gaimusho issued its instructions to Masao without reading Masao's opinion at all.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
Masao not only presented his opinion but also referred to the reason why this diplomatic direction would not be disadvantageous to Japan's diplomatic interest:

I strongly think that by means of the right of evocation, we can obtain substantially the same effect as we enjoy by the right of extraterritoriality. What is more, if Japan takes such a pro-Siam line Japan's demand of a post of adviser would be accepted at the same time. If so, this Japanese adviser might sit in on a lawsuit concerning Japanese residents, which means that we would able to obtain again the same effect as in getting the foreign adviser clause.42

He added an account of the present diplomatic situation of the Siamese government, that:

When I met the British Minister, I honestly felt that it would take much time before a new Anglo-Siamese treaty was concluded. It is the right time for Japan to take a diplomatic initiative in Siam. In addition, I got confirmation from Thewawong that there was no serious issue between us except the extraterritoriality and foreign adviser matters.43

In sum, Masao discarded form for substance. Of course, his ideas came from his diplomatic philosophy, and that of a person who had thorough knowledge of the Siamese diplomatic way of thinking, deriving from past experience as legal adviser and judge serving Siam's government for 16 years. He had a rather optimistic perspective on treaty revision between Japan and Siam. It could be conceived that he was, in a sense, confident in himself of a successful negotiation with the Siamese government taking account of his relationship with Prince Thewawong.

7-3-4. The negotiation suspended by Masao's death

Had Masao continued to direct the negotiations with Siam, Chief of the Commerce Bureau Tanaka, and other Gaimusho staff might have adopted his opinion. Had Masao's opinion been accepted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the relations between Siam and Japan would have developed in another way than they actually did. However, this Masao telegram of 5 July was his last one. About one month later, on 11 August 1921, Masao collapsed with apoplexy.44 Being informed, Prince Thewawong, as his old friend, promptly visited the Japanese Legation. In spite of the care of 5 Japanese doctors Masao passed away in the evening of the same day at the age of 52. The next day, a wreath from King Wachirawut was delivered.45

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Japanese interim acting Minister in Bangkok, Misumi Sutezo, to Uchida, August 11, 1921, no.77 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
45 Misumi to Uchida, August 12, 1921, no.79 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
Masao's death must have shocked the Gaimusho. There was nobody comparable except Arita in the diplomatic service at the time, able to deal with the difficult negotiations for treaty revision with the diplomacy skilful Siam when the Western Powers were also in diplomatic competition. Moreover, Masao had enjoyed the special confidence of Prince Thewawong, an old friend since 1898, and of King Wachirawut. The Siamese government was embarrassed by Masao's sudden death. The Japanese Legation was asked many times about the next Japanese Minister to Siam.

What surprised the Chief of the Commerce Bureau, Tanaka, as much as Masao's death, was the fact revealed by the Japanese interim acting Minister, Misumi Sutezo, that despite receiving the treaty draft sent from Tokyo in March 1921, Masao had only showed it to the Siamese on 29 July, after he got the telegram dated 6 July. Certainly Masao reported in his telegram of 4 April, that "I described the outline of our draft." This seems to have meant that he did not show the whole contents of it. It was his dilemma, that of a person who knew well about the real resentment of the Siamese government over the extraterritoriality clause and foreign adviser system, and who knew about Thewawong's enthusiasm for their abolition. Because of his very unexpected death, negotiation for treaty revision between Japan and Siam was suspended, and it was not until 1922, when the Gaimusho appointed a new minister to succeed Masao, that the negotiation was resumed.

7-4. Resumption of the negotiation

7-4-1. Yada Chonosuke's taking over of the negotiation

When the new Minister to Siam arrived in Bangkok, in June 1922, it was in the aftermath of the Washington Naval Conference. The new Minister was fifty-years old Yada

---

46 How important Masao's close relations with these two persons were might be seen in the above-mentioned behaviour of Thewawong and by the fact that Wachirawut gave Masao a state funeral involving the king's own participation. See Masao Ryujiro, Masao Tokichi tsuitoroku (A memoir record of Masao), pp. 91-94.
47 Misumi to Uchida, October 14, 1921, no.7 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
48 Misumi reported as follows: "Negotiation for treaty revision was begun on 2 April. But Minister Masao had to wait until the Siamese-American treaty was ratified. In May, when he got a copy of the said treaty from the Siamese Foreign Minister, he began to worry about the difference between the Japanese draft treaty and the Siamese-American treaty. He thought that our draft would never be accepted. So he decided to observe the situation for a while. Until 5 July, he was at great pains to resolve the gap between the two countries. In the end, he composed his long telegram expressing his opinion to Tokyo on 5 July. But the next day, another instruction was sent from Tokyo directing him in a completely different way from his opinion just sent the previous day. There was nothing else for him, at last, than to propose Japan's draft to Siam's government." Ibid.
49 Masao to Uchida, April 4, 1921, no.38 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
50 The Japanese government, led by Premier Admiral Kato Tomosaburo since June of this year, was going to reduce its armed forces in consequence of the Conference. See Mitani Taichiro, The establishment of party cabinet, 1898-
Chonosuke (1871-1940), a veteran diplomat of the Gaimusho. He began his diplomatic service at Pusan, then Tientsin, Hankow and Mexico, and held the post of Consul at Vancouver, and of Consul-General at Ottawa, New York and Honolulu.\textsuperscript{51} It was unclear why the Gaimusho did not appoint a new minister to Siam for almost one year after Masao's death. Whether the Gaimusho left the issue because of its unenthusiastic attitude or they tried to find a suitable person, we do not know. Yet it can be conceived that Yada's appointment seems to have been proposed by Arita Hachiro who had submitted a year before his opinion on the appointment policy of personnel for Southeast Asia and the South Seas. (See section 7-2)

It is interesting that ex-Minister Arita Hachiro actually knew Yada closely; for when the former was acting consul-general at Ottawa (1912 and 1913), Yada arrived to succeed him.\textsuperscript{52} Presumably, owing to this Arita connection with Yada, when the treaty negotiation with Siam faced difficulty, Arita who had served before at Bangkok suggested to the Gaimusho to appoint Yada as the new minister to Siam. It can also be assumed that Yada's appointment related to some extent to the fact that the advisers on foreign affairs to the Siamese government from 1902 were always American, currently Mr. Elton James, and experience of the United States was likely to help.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, the Arita report also seems to have influenced the appointment of Yada's assistant, Matsumiya Hajime (Jun), who succeeded the previous Japanese Consul, Takahashi Seiichi. Matsumiya later became Minister to Hungary (1938-1939), and vice-Foreign Minister (1940). And during the dispute between Siam and France over the Mekong valley, he was appointed as Special Ambassador for the Mediation Conference held in Tokyo in 1941, and was made chairman for the conference.\textsuperscript{54} Why were these two able diplomats sent to Siam to

\textsuperscript{1932'} (translated) by Peter Duus in The Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 6, The Twentieth Century, p. 93. For details of the Washington Naval Conference, see Hata Ikuhiko, 'Continental expansion, 1905-1941' in ditto, pp. 282-285. Further, it is noteworthy that the Japanese government set up the Nan'yo Cho (the South Seas Bureau) in April 1922. Japan's overseas interest was officially being shifted to the South. For details of the South Seas Bureau, see Yano Toru, Nihon no nan'yo shikan, pp. 114-118, and Mark R. Peattie, Nan'yo, pp. 68-80. This was a special administration for Japan's island possessions in the Pacific, many of them ex-German territories handed over at Versailles.

\textsuperscript{51} Yada first entered the Japanese Foreign Ministry at the age of 24. Shortly after, he retired from the diplomatic service. (reason unknown), and became a school teacher. But he was recruited again by the same Ministry in 1900. Gaimusho, Nihon gaikosbi jiten (The Dictionary of Japanese Diplomacy), section about Yada Chonosuke.

\textsuperscript{52} After Ottawa, Yada was appointed as consul-general at Honolulu which had been Arita's subsequent posting in his diplomatic service. (ibid.)

\textsuperscript{53} For the role of E. James in Siam's arrangement of the 1920 treaty with America, see Peter B. Oblas, 'Siam's Effort to Revise the Unequal Treaty system in the Sixth Reign (1910-1925)', p. 110 onward.

\textsuperscript{54} See Flood, Japan's Relations with Thailand: 1928-41, esp. Chapters Twelve and Thirteen. Amada noted that Matsumiya stayed in Bangkok for two years, and mostly took charge of drafting documents for the treaty negotiation. See Amada Rokuro, 'Bankoku no insho (Impression of Bangkok)', unpublished, no date, p. 289. Hereafter cited 'Amada Rokuro, Impression of Bangkok'.

176
take charge of the negotiation with Siam? Presumably Arita encouraged the Gaimusho to deal more actively with the Siamese issue, or the Gaimusho itself did not want to be stuck over the issue of the treaty negotiation which had been suspended for a year.

On the other hand, what was the attitude of the Siamese government towards the new Minister, Yada? In this respect, Yada's report tells us how much King Wachirawut welcomed him, and of the friendly atmosphere in which the ceremony of presenting his credentials was held. Actually it was more than Yada himself expected. This suggested that the Siamese government was waiting for resumption of the negotiation. Perhaps the Siamese expected to conclude a new treaty favourable to Siam in order to confirm the contents of the 1920 Siamese-American treaty.

It was August when Yada and Prince Thewawong resumed negotiation for revision of the 1898 treaty. Yada tried to explain Japan's proposed draft previously presented by Masao, as the Japanese Foreign Ministry had instructed Masao. Thewawong, listening to the same explanation as a year before, kept great composure, replying only that the Siamese counter-draft was under consideration. Yada felt intuitively that the negotiation would take a tortuous course until its completion. Soon after, Siam's counter-draft was presented to Yada. It was, as Yada might have expected, an imitation of the 1920 Siamese-American Treaty. But it improved on the Siamese-American treaty.

Obviously the Siamese government intended the negotiation with Japan to be a gambit for the treaty revision negotiations with the other Western Powers. In fact, Prince Thewawong

55 Yada to Uchida, July 18, 1922, no.43 in JDA. 6-1-5-8-13. Yada made a first call on the Siamese Foreign Minister, Prince Thewawong, on 21 June, 1922. As his credentials from the Japanese Emperor were not presented then because King Wachirawut was spending summer in the countryside, the two representatives did not talk about the pending treaty issue at this first meeting. Yada to Uchida, June 22, 1922, no.40 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
56 Yada was concerned about the policies of Britain and France regarding the revision of their treaties with Siam. He visited both Legations, and realised that they were moving the same way following the American-Siamese treaty recently concluded. Yada to Uchida, June 24, 1922, no.42 in JDA. 2-5-1-69. The British Minister in Bangkok, Mr. Edward Grey, noted that "He [Yada] strikes me as an able man," He also observed that Yada was exceedingly anxious to be in with the British Legation. See the Report on the Heads of Foreign Ministers at Bangkok for the Year 1922, Mr. Grey to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, January 5, 1923, no.4 in FO 422/80.
57 These were (a) the reason why Japan desired the Siamese government to employ Japanese judges was only because they wanted to preserve their vested interests in the judicial sphere in Siam, and (b) the Japanese government wished Japanese experts on administration to be invited by the Siamese government so as to help improve the Siamese administrative system. See Yada to Uchida, August 12, 1922, no.60 in JOA. 2-5-1-69.
58 Ibid.
59 These improvements were (1) providing recognition of Siam's tariff autonomy without any conditions, (2) providing for a conditional most-favoured nation clause, and (3) striking out (a) the expression, 'five year period' from the passage 'the right of evocation for the period of five years', and (b) the right of objection to Siamese Codes. See Yada to Uchida, August 15, 1922, no.63 in JDA. 2-5-1-69. For the original text of Siam's counter-draft, see Yada to Uchida, August 16, 1922, no.9, ditto. This was reprinted in Gaimusho Tsushokyoku, op. cit.
disclosed that if Japan agreed to revise the 1898 treaty along the same lines as the 1920 Siamese-American Treaty, Siam would be able to exploit this in negotiations with Holland and Portugal to abolish their extraterritoriality. He also hinted that a few Japanese advisers could be employed in the Ministry of Interior. But the only thing Yada did was to tell Thewawong that the counter-draft would never be accepted as a basis for negotiation because it was far different from that of the Japanese government. How he persuaded Prince Thewawong does not appear in the documentation, yet the Siamese Foreign Minister agreed to treat Japan the same as America.

It would be a successful achievement for Siam simply to treat Japan the same as America, because it would mean that the Siamese-American treaty could be confirmed by a third country. Clearly, the Siamese government desired Japan to take a pro-Siam line. For that purpose, it tried to develop friendly terms with Yada. In October, the Siamese king invited Yada and his family to a dinner party at the Palace. Yada reported to the Gaimusho that "The king did not hold such a dinner party even for new American and British Ministers; thus they were dissatisfied with the king. I thought that such a special invitation was a cordial expression of the friendly attitude of the Siamese government to Japan." Yada's good impression of the Siamese king affected his pro-Siam line in later negotiations.

In the meantime, the Japanese Foreign Ministry did not give any further instruction to Yada for over two months. Yada wired to Tokyo, suggesting that since Japan's attitude towards Siam so far could not be said to be amicable, it was a good chance to restore Siamese confidence in Japan. He persuaded the new Chief of the Commerce Bureau, Nagai Matsuzo (July 1922-May 1924), that to adopt Siam's counter-draft as the basis for negotiation was a suitable policy.

Finally, Yada's opinion was accepted, probably partly because of the new Chief of the Commerce Bureau, Nagai, who supported him. It goes without saying that Prince

60 Yada to Uchida, August 21, 1922, no.67 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
61 Thewawong withdrew (1) and (a) as mentioned in fn. 59.
62 Yada to Uchida, October 30, 1922, no.12 in JDA. 6-1-5-8-13. Amada revealed that it was unprecedented except for the case of the first Japanese minister, Inagaki, who also took his family to Siam. Yada, his wife and a daughter, became popular among important Siamese figures and Westerners because Yada and his wife looked out for social intercourse. See Amada Rokuro, 'Impression of Bangkok', p. 285.
63 Yada to Uchida, November 3 1922, no.92 in JDA. 2-5-1-69. Shortly after on December 23 1922, former Chief of the Commerce Bureau, Tanaka, was promoted to be vice-Foreign Minister. (until September 1923)
64 Uchida to Yada, November 11, 1922, no.34 in JDA. 2-5-1-69. The Japanese Foreign Ministry sent its revised opinion on Siamese draft treaty, see Uchida to Yada, November 13, 1922, no.2 in JDA. 2-5-1-69. This Nagai's decision was made when Tanaka did not charge of the negotiation.
Thewawong welcomed Japan's decision. He apparently expected to open negotiations for revision of the treaties with Britain, France, and Denmark, on the plea of expecting a new Japanese-Siamese treaty. However, at this juncture, Thewawong was not presented with Japan's amended proposal, a proposal which still might not please Thewawong. Yada seemed to have thought that Japan's proposal should be further altered, otherwise the negotiation could not proceed. Yada's anxiety provoked him to argue with the Gaimusho. From November 1922 until late January 1923, Yada and the Gaimusho corresponded many times in the effort to complete Japan's final proposal. Now Yada first had to win over the Gaimusho.

7-4-2. Arguments between Yada and the Gaimusho

It is helpful to consider what Yada and the staff of the Gaimusho argued over. Thereby, we can identify the gap in attitudes to Siam between the Gaimusho and the actual negotiator in Bangkok. During this period, the crucial arguments between Yada and Tokyo were over the most-favoured nation clause and extraterritoriality. These later also became crucial issues between Yada and the Siamese Foreign Ministry as well. While the Japanese Foreign Ministry insisted on a strict literal term, 'unconditional' most-favoured nation, Yada pressed Tokyo to accept the 'conditional' one on the ground that in a practical sense it would have the same effect when considered from the viewpoint of justice and equity under the existing international law. Nevertheless, Tokyo did not pay attention to his view at all. Since Yada was concerned about a delay in the negotiations, he gave up arguing this point. But this issue would meet with the severe opposition of the Siamese government later.

As for extraterritoriality as stipulated in the Siamese draft Protocol, the Gaimusho involving the Commerce Bureau led by Chief Nagai at the Commerce Bureau, Yoshizawa at the Asian Bureau, Yamakawa at the Treaty Bureau, and vice-Foreign Minister Tanaka, first took a concessionary attitude, following America's example. But a problem arose over a legal point. The Siamese draft provided that in a case of evocation, the Japanese Consul should try such a case according to the Siamese law. In fact it was possible for Japan to do so by means of freely

65 Yada to Uchida November 24, 1922, no.97 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
66 Uchida to Yada, December 20, 1922, no.43, and December 29, 1922, no.107 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
67 Uchida to Yada, January 19, 1923, no.2 in JDA. 2-5-1-69. Possibly why the Gaimusho at this juncture took a firm stance to Yada was because the former Chief of the Commerce Bureau, Tanaka, who became vice-Foreign Minister on 23 December, seems to have had a hard-line attitude to the negotiation, and again participated in the negotiation.
68 Yada Chonosuke, 'The account of the negotiation for revising the Japanese-Siamese treaty', Yada to Foreign Minister, Matsui Keishiro, March 31, 1924, no.13, p. 16 in JDA. 2-5-1-69, hereafter, 'Account of the negotiations'.

179
interpreting the law concerning the duties of the Japanese Consul, which stipulated that the Consul should discharge his duties according to the Japanese laws and 'treaties'. But it was unclear whether or not the Japanese Ministry of Justice accepted this interpretation in the case of appeal. This meant that although the case would be transferred to a court in Japan, it would be tried by the Siamese laws 'in Japan'. 69 The Ministry of Justice objected even to a Japanese Consul trying a case based on Siamese laws 'in Bangkok'. 70 The Gaimusho instructed Yada to follow the opinion of the Ministry of Justice. Also, Yada was directed to ask the Siamese government to recruit Japanese advisers to the Siamese Ministry of Justice, or as Prince Thewawong had hinted before, the Ministry of Interior. 71

Two days before the above instruction was dispatched, Yada had sent his views at length to Tokyo. Here, he gave his careful analysis of Japan's original draft with respect to the right of evocation, the issue of Japanese advisers, and the right of objection to Siamese laws. Even from the stand-point of Japanese national interests, he criticised Japan's draft, saying that the Siamese draft regarding the right of evocation was more rational and practical. More, he suggested that securing the post of legal adviser in the Siamese government would not be helpful to the Japanese government from the political and economic points of view. He took a pessimistic view of Siam's accepting the employment of Japanese advisers. Yada concluded that the exchange of a secret note between the two countries on the issue of employment of advisers would be an alternative way to meet Japan's interests. As for the right of evocation for the period of five years, and the right of objection to Siamese codes, stipulated also in the 1920 Siamese-American treaty but not in the Siamese draft presented to Japan, Yada did not think those articles would really bring much benefit to Japan. Rather, he insisted, it would be more effective for Japan's future position in Siam to accept the Siamese draft as it was. 72

Although Yada did not forget to consider Japan's national interests regarding the new treaty with Siam, he appears to have understood the Siamese desire to recover their judicial autonomy as much as Masao did. In this sense, it might be said that he was an idealistic Pan-Asianist. Such tendencies in Yada were not so strong at this juncture, but soon after became

69 Vice-Foreign Minister, Hanihara Masanao, to vice-Minister of Justice, Yama'uchi Kakusaburo, October 28, 1922, no.26 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
70 Yama'uchi to Hanihara, November 28, 1922, no.19 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
71 Uchida to Yada, December 9, 1922, no.38 in JDA. 2-5-1-69. Uchida added that this was, however, not a collateral condition for the negotiation. Ibid.
72 Yada to Uchida, December 7, 1922, no.14 in JDA. 2-5-1-69. This letter was received on 6th January 1923.
evident. Yet this did not mean that he was totally favourable to the Siamese government. It might be fair to say that at first Yada's approach in the negotiation was not like Masao's, but very flexible and business-like, designed to secure a compromise for the two sides. The Commerce Bureau at the Gaimusho, however, seems to have placed more value on Japan's own national prestige and interests than Siam's retrieval of judicial autonomy. It could be assumed that the Japanese Foreign Ministry, or more specifically speaking, the Commerce Bureau and probably the vice-Foreign Minister, Tanaka, did not or could not understand Siam's diplomatic situation with the Powers, and also were not fully aware of Japan's image with Siamese officials, and the relatively suspicious feeling of the Japanese as described in the previous chapter.

About three weeks later, Yada sent another long memorandum to Tokyo about the right of evocation and Japanese advisers. This time, he criticised very severely the policy and basic attitude of the Japanese Foreign Ministry towards Siam. Yada insisted that:

If the Japanese Imperial Government genuinely sympathizes with Siam's regaining an independent judiciary, and intends to help her so as to restore friendly relations, we should show an attitude outreaching all the Western Powers. However, Japan's treaty draft is based on the Siamese-Denmark treaty concluded 10 years ago, which is quite out-of-date in the political situation after the Great War. Furthermore, even after accepting Siam's counter-draft as a basis for negotiation, the Imperial Government rejected her draft regarding the application of Siamese laws to cases of evocation. This implies that the Imperial Government does not have real sympathy for Siam. The sincerity of the Imperial Government will never be understood by the Siamese government until we sympathize with Siam and make sacrifices in order to release an Asian brother from the Western claws and fangs.

Yada also condemned Japan's demand for the post of legal adviser, saying that it was not only impractical but also the absolute opposite of Siamese wishes. Yada's conclusion was that Japan should unconditionally relinquish its extraterritoriality in Siam, and only after that should she try to influence the Siamese government. Yada persuaded Tokyo to consider what was really in Japan's real interests in Siam.

Notwithstanding the argument between Yada and the Gaimusho, the latter did not give up its policy on the issue of extraterritoriality and its insistence on an unconditional, most-
favoured nation clause. But when two months had already passed after Japan's acceptance of the Siamese counter-draft as a basis for the negotiation, it became urgent that Japan's final amendment should be presented to the Siamese government. Eventually, Japan's counter-draft with some modifications was submitted by Yada to the Siamese government on 27th January 1923.75

7-4-3. The question of the Protocol

It was March when Prince Thewawong replied to Japan's new proposal.76 He replied that "the proposals of Your Excellency's Government do not seem from the Siamese stand-point to be more advantageous than the existing Treaty. Indeed, in many respects they are less so."77 A major issue was whether Japan conceded the application of Siamese laws to evoked legal cases. The Siamese government deemed it on the whole more advantageous to Siamese interests to maintain the existing situation until its automatic termination, unless the Japanese government accepted the Siamese draft Protocol.78 It was a critical question which had to be settled first before the negotiation of the main text of the new treaty. Thewawong viewed it from a practical stand-point, urging that although treaties with Powers stipulated the right of evocation, very rarely had cases of evocation happened so far; therefore, the insistence of the Japanese Ministry of Justice was too 'theoretical'. He could not imagine that Siamese citizens would appeal a case to the court of appeal in Japan. Thus he doubted very much whether any evoked case concerning Japanese citizens would be tried in Japan.79

On the other hand, the Commerce Bureau in Tokyo was still keeping to the same line, though Yada telegraphed to say that a fresh approach towards the negotiation was needed to avoid a split. He also proposed an alternative compromise, and tried to persuade Chief of the Commerce Bureau Nagai, to be flexible by adopting a different angle of argument, that is, in

75 Yada to Thewawong, January 27, 1923. Copies of both the letter and 'A Short Explanatory Notes to the Japanese Amendments of the Counter Draft Treaty of Siam' are attached in Yada to Uchida, March 15, 1923, no.5 in JDA. 2-5-1-69, hereafter, 'A Short Explanatory Notes'.
76 During the previous two months, Yada had contacted the American adviser on foreign affairs to the Siamese government, Elton James. From him, Yada learnt that Japan's amendments of the Protocol would meet severe opposition from the Siamese government. Yada to Uchida, March 6, 1923, no.12 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
77 Thewawong to Yada, March 5, 1923, which appears in Yada to Uchida, March 15, 1923, no.5 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
78 Ibid.
79 Yada to Uchida, March 12, 1923, no.13 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
terms of future relations with Siam which would undoubtedly increase in importance, considering the existing extension of Japan's interests to southern parts of Asia.  

In the meantime, being pushed by Yada, the Japanese Foreign Ministry appears to have faced perplexity in finding a solution because they also met firm opposition to the application of Siamese law in Japan from the Japanese Ministry of Justice. Therefore, Chief of the Commerce Bureau Nagai could cable only that he agreed to the right of evocation without the five-year period time-limit, and would relinquish extraterritoriality once the new Siamese codes came into force. But he still declined to adopt Siamese law in the case of evocation. Clearly this was not acceptable to Siam. Yada deplored the answer of his government. More significantly, at this juncture, the Siamese government was gradually losing its desire for negotiation with Japan. The issue was developing a difficult complexion.

In these circumstances, nevertheless, the Commerce Bureau was not able to drop the negotiation because the 1898 treaty would be terminated sooner or later. And then Japan's trade and the Japanese residents would undoubtedly be in a more disadvantageous position than the Westerners in Siam. The Japanese Foreign Ministry finally if belatedly pushed the Ministry of Justice for a solution of this unfinished problem. At the same time, the former instructed Yada to send information back instantly about the progress of Siamese codification work.

It was 29th May, the same day as the arrival of Yada's telegram urging Uchida's final decision, that the Japanese Ministry of Justice replied to the Foreign Ministry. Their answer was that they conceded the Siamese draft protocol as it was. In other words, they concurred with the application of Siamese laws to evoked cases without any amendments. But they required one condition that a criminal case could be, if necessary, re-tried under Japanese law. Nagai cabled to Yada, saying that a special note with respect to the above condition should be made at the time of signing a treaty.

---

80 Uchida to Yada, March 28, no.10, and Yada to Uchida, March 19, no.6, no.31, and no.18, 1923 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
81 Uchida to Yada, April 16, 1923, no.16 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
82 In his official letter to Prince Thewawong, Yada suggested that they had been rather childish to dwell so long upon a quite unessential and even untoward discussion, which might be attractive to university professors or law-students. But it was time for them to quit the class-room. See letter from Yada to Thewawong, April 10, 1923 in Yada to Uchida, April 16, 1923, no.10 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
83 Yada to Uchida, April 20, 1923, no.23-1 and no.23-2 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
84 Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tanaka Tokichi, to Vice-Minister of Ministry of Justice, Yama'uchi Kakusaburo, May 8, 1923, no.17 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
85 Uchida to Yada May 12, 1923, no.23 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
86 Yada to Uchida, May 28, 1923, no.31 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
87 Yama'uchi to Tanaka, May 19, 1923, no.13 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
88 Yada to Uchida, June 6, 1923, no.29 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
Although this instruction was notified to the Siamese Foreign Ministry by Yada's letter of 12th June, it is rather doubtful whether it ever reached Prince Thewawong personally. By then he was seriously ill in bed with a swelling coming out on his head. Yada must have been disappointed to be informed of Thewawong's sudden death despite a last operation on 28th June. It was Thewawong's son educated in England, Prince Traithot (Thewawong Warothai), who took over the treaty issue. Prince Traithot had served his father as Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since 1918. But as the treaty issue seemed to have been dealt with mainly by Thewawong, and now not only Masao but he had died, the negotiation between the two countries was suspended for the time being.

7-4-4. The dispute between Yada and Prince Traithot over the question of the most-favoured nation clause

Remarkably, after Prince Thewawong's death, the Siamese government, now with Prince Traithot as Acting Foreign Minister, adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards Japan. Although Japan had already indicated its concession of submitting to the Siamese draft Protocol as it was, the Siamese government notified the Japanese Legation that the right of evocation for a period of five years, and the right of objection to Siamese Codes, both excluded from the Siamese draft, would after all be granted to Japan. Evidently, the above decision was made in the absence of a foreign adviser; at that time, the previous American adviser on foreign affairs to the Siamese government, James, had already retired in March, and a new American adviser, Francis Sayre, was only due to arrive in Siam in November 1923. It can be assumed that the Siamese government felt free to decide its own direction in the negotiation with Japan because the influence of the American adviser James, presumably wary of Japan, no longer operated at this time.

Such freedom of Siamese Foreign Ministry influence can be seen in the fact that the above decision was made at the Cabinet meeting on 13th August under its chairman, Prince

---

89 Yada to Thewawong, June 12, 1923 in Yada to Uchida, June 19, 1923, no.14 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
90 Yada to Uchida, June 16, 1923, no.38 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
91 Yada to Uchida, June 28, 1923, no.40 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
92 For a profile of Prince Traithot, see Peter B. Oblas, 'Siam's Effort to Revise the Unequal Treaty system in the Sixth Reign (1910-1925)', pp. 73-74. The Japanese Minister in Bangkok sent an interesting report to Tokyo, saying that the British Minister in Bangkok asked King Wachirawut that Prince Damrong succeed as Foreign Minister, but King Wachirawut did not agree. See Yada to Uchida, July 1, 1923, no. 56 in JDA. 1-6-1-4-4.
93 Yada to Uchida, August 20, 1923, no.48-1 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
94 Oblas, op. cit., p. 198.
Damrong, and immediately approved by King Wachirawut. Therefore, it can probably be assumed that the Cabinet chose to show its goodwill in its treatment of Japan much as it did America. In other words, the Siamese government gave up its plan for making an improved treaty with Japan in terms of the complete abolition of extraterritoriality. But on the other hand it might also be presumed from Yada's telegram that the Cabinet members tried to secure a more significant matter by admitting Japan's right of evocation for a period of five years, and the right of objection to Siamese Codes. The Siamese government seems to have had as their other target, to sweep away the 'most-favoured nation' clause. Japan's proposed amendments insisted on an unconditional most-favoured nation clause. As stated before, correspondence on this matter had been exchanged between Yada and the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, and Yada himself ended their argument. But as Yada might have expected, when the negotiation reached the main text of the treaty, the Siamese government tried to reduce Japan to only the principle of a conditional most-favoured nation. If the principle of a conditional most-favoured nation clause, as provided in Siam's draft Article 8, was adopted in the expected treaty, all the articles would be interpreted on the principle of a conditional most-favoured nation.

Whatever argument there was between them, the real problem seems to have derived from the different international standing of the two countries. Siam, now without its veteran of diplomacy, Prince Thewawong, but with a senior statesman, Prince Damrong having more influence on decision-making than the new Foreign Minister, Prince Traithot, might have been over-sanguine of Japan's next concession. On the contrary, the staff members responsible for the negotiation at the Gaimusho, i.e. Nagai (Commerce), Yamakawa (Treaty), Debuchi (new Chief

---

95 Yada to Uchida, August 20, 1923, no.48-2 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Siam's draft Article 8 declared that "The High Contracting Parties agree that in all that concerns commerce and navigation, any privilege, favour or immunity which either Contracting Party has actually granted or may hereafter grant to the subjects or citizens of any other State shall be extended to the subject of either Contracting Party gratuitously, if such privilege, favour or immunity in favour of that other State shall have been gratuitous, and on the same or equivalent conditions if such privilege, favour or immunity shall have been conditional." See the Siamese draft in Yada to Uchida, August 16, 1922, no.9 in JDA. 2-5-1-69, and Gaimusho Tsushokyoku, op. cit. Regarding this draft, the Commerce Bureau desired to strike out the above paragraph altogether, and to stipulate a most-favoured nation clause (which meant an unconditional one) in a different form and as a separate Article (as Article 19). The logic of Japan's argument was very simple; Siam gave unconditional most favoured nation status to the Western Powers; why could not Japan enjoy the same thing? See Premier and Foreign Minister, Yamamoto Gon'no hyoel, to Yada, September 22, 1923, no.37 in JDA. 2-5-1-69. Minister Yada added that "the conditional clause involves the probability of easily exciting untoward disputes about the applicability of the so-called 'condition' often leading to such deplorable results as to almost nullify the existence of the most-favoured nation clause." See Letter from Yada to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince Traithot, October 2, 1923 in Yada to Japanese Foreign Minister, Ijuin Hikokichi, October 4, 1923, no.25 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
of the Asian Bureau since May 1923), and vice-Foreign Minister, Tanaka, all seem not to have taken into account Siam's historical background amidst her treaty revision with the Powers. They appear to have maintained Japan's demands mainly from their own point of view.

By the end of September 1923, most points reached settlement between Yada and Traithot. Yet the most-favoured nation clause itself was still causing trouble between the two sides. On this question, as the Siamese government was apprehensive of the effect of an unconditional most-favoured nation clause, Yada argued exhaustively that Japan would never take advantage:

you urged that the unconditional form has an inclination to be abused by the stronger powers - - - In this respect I feel very proud that Japan has never betrayed the idea of international fidelity and good faith - - - You may therefore rest assured that the Japanese Government would not give the clause in question any undue and selfish interpretation. - - -

Yada waited for Traithot's answer for one month. However, the outcome was not one which Yada expected. The Siamese government still strongly insisted on a conditional most-favoured nation clause. Prince Traithot urged that:

I have had occasion,- - -to point out to Your Excellency how important it is for His Majesty's Government to maintain their conditional interpretation of the most-favoured nation clause. This importance is not merely of a theoretical but also of a practical order, for, in fact, extravagant and inadmissible claims have already been made to the Royal Government by virtue of the unconditional interpretation. Therefore, in order to guard against any possible misunderstanding on this point in the future, His Majesty's Government desires clearly and explicitly to maintain their conditional interpretation.- - -the Imperial Government must have been beset with similar difficulties during the existence of the extraterritoriality in Japan and they would, on this account, no doubt fully appreciate the reasons why the Royal [Siamese] Government are now, as they were then, anxious to maintain such conditional interpretation.

Yada was wedged between both governments. Why did the Siamese government strongly oppose an unconditional most-favoured nation clause? Certainly, what Prince Traithot replied was one of the reasons. Probably it was hard for Siam to fully trust Japan, because the former might fear the latter which had earlier been vigorously promoting its interests in China and Korea. What is more, one should not overlook Siamese eagerness for treaty revision with the Western Powers. It was in a sense a strategic Siamese objective. Step by step, with patience, the Siamese government had been pursuing the recovery of their judicial autonomy for many

99 Yada to Ijuin Hikokichi, October 18, 1923, no.54 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
100 Yada to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince Traithot, October 9, 1923 in Yada to Ijuin Hikokichi, October 14 1923, no.26 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
101 Yada to Ijuin, November 8, 1923. no.56 and 56-2 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
102 Prince Traithot to Yada, November 4, 1923 in Yada to Ijuin, November 8, 1923, no.27 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
years, and it was the 1920 Siamese-American treaty that marked substantial Siamese success. Therefore, at the beginning of the negotiation with Japan, Siam proposed a draft treaty with three amended points compared to the 1920 treaty with America. But the five-year evocation right was granted to Japan later, and the target of Siam's unconditional tariff autonomy was withdrawn by then Foreign Minister Prince Thewawong. Now the only question left was the conditional most-favoured nation clause. If Siam conceded this point, there would be no advance for her, and such a result would undoubtedly affect her whole succeeding treaty revision work with the Western Powers. The Siamese government may have wanted to avoid such a situation. Therefore, Prince Traithot indicated in his letter to Yada that:

The conditional interpretation of the most-favoured nation clause is of vital importance to Siam not necessarily vis-a-vis of Japan alone but vis-a-vis of all the other powers also. It is a question of principle and I trust that you will realise how essential it is for His Majesty's Government to avoid the establishment of a precedent which, in other cases in the future, may prove highly dangerous and prejudicial to Siamese interests.103

According to the documentation, at least Minister Yada himself among the Japanese involved in this treaty negotiation, comprehended Siamese feeling. Still, the Japanese Foreign Ministry seems not to have considered this Siamese dilemma.

7-4-5. Eventual Gaimusho compromise

From November 1923 to March 1924, Yada following Tokyo's instruction, and Traithot advised by a new American adviser on foreign affairs, Sayre, polarized the issue in correspondence. Their views were in head-on conflict. To bring the controversy over the most-favoured nation clause to an end, stratagems were adopted. But they did not reach a decisive conclusion.104 By that time, the Gaimusho seems at last to have become aware that some compromise should be made to avoid an unpleasant outcome. Ultimately, the Gaimusho instructed Yada that if the Siamese government was not likely to concede further, Japan would agree that the most-favoured nation clause would be excluded from the main text of treaty, and no specific note on that matter would be exchanged. If any actual problem of interpretation over

---

103 Prince Traithot to Yada, November 29, 1923 in Yada to Ijuin, December 1, 1923, no.28 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
104 Yada to Ijuin, December 1, 1923, no.62-1, 62-2, and December 21, 1923 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
any article of the treaty arose between them, it would be solved according to international practice. The Japanese Foreign Ministry thus made its last concession.\textsuperscript{105}

It was in February 1924 that the Siamese Foreign Ministry, after long deliberation, informed the Japanese Legation that it concurred with the above proposal, though Siam desired to exchange a note on interpretation of the most-favoured nation clause.\textsuperscript{106} The new treaty, the 1924 'Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Siam', consisting of twenty articles and a Protocol with four articles, was signed on 10th March 1924.\textsuperscript{107} By then, its negotiation had already taken almost 3 years.

\textbf{7-5. The significance of the 1924 treaty negotiation}

Compared with the 1898 treaty which was a reflection of the amicable relations between Japan and Siam expressed in the efforts of Inagaki and Thewawong, what was the meaning of the 1924 Treaty to both countries? There are several points which should be noted.

First, by Article 1 of the 1924 Treaty with the Note of exchange of 19th February 1924, Japanese nationals would be entitled to the right of ownership of land and other property throughout the whole extent of Siam. Inagaki's similar idea expressed in 1896 as described in chapter 4 was now, twenty-eight years later, realized. Second, various rights were to be enjoyed by both countries' nationals on an equal footing with 'native subjects'. This meant that citizens of both would be able to conduct business more freely and to engage in commerce. It was exactly the same as what the Commerce Bureau, assuming responsibility for the benefit of Japan's international economic activities, desired. Third, for Siam, Japan's extraterritoriality in Siam was in a real sense relinquished though the right of evocation and the right of objection to Siamese Codes were preserved. In this respect, Siam succeeded in obtaining the exact same arrangements as with the United States. And this Siamese achievement became a model for future treaty revision negotiation with other Western Powers.

Throughout the course of negotiation, it can be pointed out that Japanese foreign policy towards Siam at that time was still in line with that of the Meiji era, i.e. following the Western

\textsuperscript{105} Yada to Ijuin, December 28, 1923, no.55 in JDA, 2-5-1-69. This decision seems again to have related to vice-Foreign Minister Tanaka Tokichi; for he resigned from his post, and Matsudaira Tsuneo succeeded him in September 26, 1923 (until December 18, 1924).

\textsuperscript{106} Yada to Foreign Minister, Matsui Keishiro, February 20, 1924, no.10 in JDA, 2-5-1-69.

\textsuperscript{107} Yada to Matsui, March 10, 1924, no.24 in JDA, 2-5-1-69. The ratification was exchanged on 22nd December 1924. Yada to Foreign Minister, Shidehara Kijuro, December 22, 1924, no.99 in ditto. It was delayed by domestic affairs surrounding the then Japanese government. Shidehara to Yada, July 17, 1924, no.33 in ditto.
Powers except America. A new direction was needed, but the Gaimusho staff involved directly in the negotiation with Siam, namely the Commerce Bureau (later vice-Foreign Minister Tanaka, and Nagai), the Treaty Bureau (Yamakawa), the Asian Bureau (Yoshizawa and Debuchi), all of them did not change such traditional policy towards Siam. But it seems evident that when Matsudaira Tsuneo became vice-Foreign Minister replacing Tanaka Tokichi, certain compromises began to be sought. Yet traditional policy or thought towards Siam's affairs was still firmly maintained. The most typical example of this was the Gaimusho's demand for the employment of a Japanese adviser in the Siamese government. It was anticipated eagerly by the Gaimusho, although it became clear that Japan's demand for the employment of a Japanese adviser played merely the role of bait in the negotiations with Siam, though Prince Thewawong might not have been aware of it. Even after the signing of the 1924 Japanese-Siamese treaty, Minister Yada had to search for a way to fulfil this Gaimusho demand. But the Siamese Foreign Ministry did not take notice of Japan's demand at all.108

Amada argued later that such a demand was completely needless. Japan did not recognise the Siamese situation.109 He disclosed that the Gaimusho at that time seemed not to have paid attention very much to Southeast Asian countries. Japanese diplomats sent to such regions were demoted or superannuated persons. In general, they did not even try to learn about their places of posting, and in its turn, the Gaimusho did not properly recognise Southeast Asia or even Siam.110 Amada's somewhat exaggerated description is a severe criticism of the Gaimusho. But it was largely true, and Yada himself felt the same as Amada; after signing the treaty Yada sent his over-view report to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, including his personal impressions of the negotiation. It also was quite critical in tone. He pointed out very sharply the lack of sincerity, equity, and positiveness of the Gaimusho in dealing with Siamese affairs. He blamed Japan's lack of independence in foreign policy decision-making towards Siam.111 He may have desired to point out that Japan should treat Asian countries as its real neighbours.

108 One day, Yada, accompanied by interpreter Amada Rokuro, visited Siamese Interior Minister Chaopraya Yomarat (Pan Sukhwn) at his house to have a talk over this issue. Yada asked in a very roundabout way whether the Siamese government employed five Japanese teachers for the Siamese police school. Yomarat's answer was simple, the same as that of the Siamese Foreign Ministry; "No such line is followed either now or in the future." Amada Rokuro, 'Japanese residents in Siam', pp. 47-48.
109 Amada Rokuro, 'Impression of Bangkok', p. 313.
111 Yada Chonosuke, 'An impression with respect to the negotiation for Japanese-Siamese treaty' in Yada to Matsui, March 31, 1924, no.12 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
It is doubtful that such criticism changed directly and immediately the Gaimusho's attitude towards Siam. Neither was the general attitude of the staff at the Gaimusho towards Siam improved; for it was not until 1926 (a year after Yada's return to Japan) that the succeeding Japanese Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Hayashi Kyujiro, was sent to Siam. However, it was this treaty revision work that boosted the Pan-Asianist Japanese diplomats who derived through their experience a real awareness of Siam and perhaps also other Southeast Asian countries, namely Arita, Matsumiya, Yada, and Amada. In particular, the former two figures later played important roles in Gaimusho diplomacy. Therefore, a small token of Japanese Pan-Asianism regarding Southeast Asian countries could be identified in this negotiation process. However, no part of the Gaimusho appears at this time to have indulged so idealistic a cause as Pan-Asianism, unlike some other sectors of the Japanese polity.

Looking back to the whole process of the negotiations, the Japanese Foreign Ministry was at a disadvantage throughout the negotiations because of the limitations of the 1898 treaty itself. If only Japan's extraterritoriality had been involved, Siam might not have had to accept Japan's desire for revision of the 1898 Treaty, because sooner or later, Siamese judicial autonomy would have been restored by the completion of its codification work. But this treaty revision was very timely for Siam; for it was this treaty that could confirm the terms of the 1920 treaty between Siam and the United States. This was the real Siamese target. No doubt this Japanese-Siamese Treaty was expected to obviate Siamese difficulty in recovering equality with other Powers. Indeed due to this Japanese-Siamese treaty, discussions with France on treaty negotiation were soon well advanced.\[112\] Politically, the 1924 treaty represented a diplomatic victory for Siam. The Gaimusho painstakingly accepted 'Siamese diplomacy'.

---

Economic and political relations between Japan and Siam following the 1924 Treaty

As we have seen in chapter 6, relations between Japan and Siam throughout the 1910's and the early 1920's were relatively quiet in terms of both economic and political aspects. This situation was expected to change with the 1924 treaty between the two countries. There are various matters worthy of remark in the relations between the two countries following the conclusion of the 1924 treaty up to 1932/33, the Siamese Revolution.

First, after the signing of the 1924 Siamese-Japanese treaty (March 1924), Shidehara Kijuro, the former Ambassador to the United States, became the new Foreign Minister (June 1924). Stressing economic issues rather than others, he endeavoured to make Japanese diplomacy accord with the trend towards cooperative international relations. For this chapter, it is essential to review the Japanese political situation around that time, focusing on the Shidehara diplomacy. Second, under the Shidehara diplomacy, there was a changing Gaimusho (Japanese Foreign Ministry) attitude towards Siam and other Southeast Asian countries. In this context, one should pay attention to the First South Seas Trading Conference held in Tokyo in 1926.

Third, after the Conference, one can see that the Japanese industrialists attempted to promote Japanese international trade with Southeast Asian countries including Siam. In the case of Siam, one year after the First South Seas Trading Conference, the Japan 'Siam Society' was established in 1927 by the Japanese industrialists in order to promote Japanese-Siamese trade. To pay attention to this organization is important in terms of examining Japan-Siam relations and the attitude of the Gaimusho to Siam, because it consisted not only of Japanese economists but also politicians and military. The main question is, what the role of the Japan Siam Society in Gaimusho diplomacy towards Siam was, and whether there was any influence over other private organizations. Fourth, what was the reaction of the Siamese government to such Japanese economic interest in Siam? Fifth, after the Japan Siam Society was set up, the Japanese military, hitherto relatively indifferent towards Siam, began to develop friendly relations with the Siamese military through the Japan Siam Society. How did they approach Siam? And what was their purpose for doing so?
This chapter begins with a macroscopic description of Japanese politics, and will deal thereafter with Siamese issues in a microscopic way. Through the whole process, there is constant linking between each section. This will bring us to the answer to the question: what were Japan's relations with Siam prior to the 1932/33 Siam Revolution?

8-1. 'The Gaimusho' and the Japanese military, the 'Gunbu': economic rationalism or national defence?

8-1-1. Shidehara diplomacy

In 1924, the same year as the conclusion of the new Japanese-Siamese Treaty, Shidehara Kijuro was inaugurated as Foreign Minister, serving from 1924-27 and 1929-31. In his view, his idea of diplomacy coincided with that of the previously assassinated Premier, Hara Takashi. He argued that their diplomatic views were symbolized by the following passage: "The age of Machiavellian political tactics and invasion policy was completely over. Now diplomacy is proceeding with justice and peace." 1

It is said that Japanese diplomacy at that time entered a new phase. A diplomatic policy based on the principle of international cooperation was adopted, and economic development was given priority. 2 Foreign Minister Shidehara enunciated his diplomatic principles at the 49th meeting of the Lower House. These were (a) preserving and increasing Japan's due rights and interests on the Asian continent, and respecting those of other Powers, (b) maintaining trustful relationships with foreign countries, (c) improving relations with the United States and Soviet Union, and maintaining a non-intervention policy towards China. 3 It should not be argued, however, that this Shidehara diplomacy was idealistic pacifism. A policy of international cooperation was inevitably needed in the post-Washington Conference era. Japanese economic expansion towards China and Southeast Asia would not be furthered through military activity like previous years. Economic expansion had to be subordinated to maintaining amicable relations with the United States, Britain, and other Powers. A non-intervention policy in China was also indispensable. The conventional Japanese attitude to Chinese political turmoil, military interference, was no longer considered a wise policy for fear of affecting the level of Japanese

3 Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, op. cit., pp. 262-266.
exports to China. Put simply, Shidehara diplomacy was unavoidable for Japan in existing political and economic circumstances.4

In 1925, Foreign Minister Shidehara succeeded in restoring diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. This was another development influenced by the international political upheaval following the Washington Conference. The Japanese government was not able to act against the Soviets under Japan's new diplomatic principle of international cooperation. From the economic viewpoint, Shidehara desired, as representing the Japanese industrial community in general, to acquire rights and interests in connection with the exploitation of oil-fields in Russian northern Sakhalin and also coal-mines. He was also considering Siberia as a prospective commercial market for Japanese goods.5

By 1925, however, the crumbling of one of Shidehara's principles had already begun. Notwithstanding the internal disorder in China, namely, the second Fengtien-Chihli war in September 1924, Shidehara himself believed in his non-intervention policy in China. But the Minister of War, Ugaki Kazushige, was actually maneuvering behind the scenes in order to preserve Japan's interests in Manchuria. As for the rebellion there of Kuo Sung-ling, in November 1925, though Shidehara opposed sending troops, the Japanese Army intervened in this uprising. Shidehara's policy in China could not cope with a possible threat to Japan's interests on the Asian continent so long as the principle of economic expansion was pursued. The established Japanese security system was gradually eroding Shidehara diplomacy.6

8-1-2. Rise of Tanaka Giichi

The appointment of the supposedly pliant Tanaka Giichi as War Minister in 1918 had been the political tactic of Premier Hara Takashi. Hara had apparently aimed thereby at the central direction of Japanese diplomacy. In 1922 arms reduction was implemented. The succeeding War Minister, Ugaki Kazushige, also carried on the same role. Nevertheless, the conventional Japanese military structure itself persisted through, oblivious to ups and downs in policies.

---

4 Imai Seiichi and others, Taiheiyo sensoshi (History of the Pacific War) (Tokyo, 1971), p. 96. Also see Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942, pp. 154-156.
5 Imai Seiichi and others, op. cit., p. 98.
6 Ibid., pp. 97-100. Also see Nish, op. cit., pp. 156-157.
The Japanese military was sustained under the 1889 Imperial Constitution which attached to the Tenno or 'Emperor' the independent prerogative of supreme command (Article 11 and 12). The organisation which advised the Tenno on matters of the prerogative was the Army General Staff Office, already inaugurated by the founder of Japan's modern army and War Minister, Yamagata Aritomo, under the Regulation of the General Staff Office in 1878, 11 years before the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution. This body was independent of any Government sector, even the Premier or War Minister. According to the 1889 Constitution, although, formally, the right of decision and command was granted to the Tenno, the Chief of the G.S.O. was given the right of direct reporting to Emperor on matters of military command, and given the right of obtaining direct Imperial decisions. Thus, one of the principal causes of the dual structure of foreign policy-making in the history of Japanese diplomacy was the existence of the Army General Staff Office, since foreign policy was necessarily much related to security matters at that time.

It was Tanaka Giichi, as Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs 1911-12, who had earlier arranged for the Army General Staff Office to carry on a programme of military intervention in China. Tanaka and his subordinate, Chief of the Section of Military Affairs of the above Bureau, Ugaki Kazushige 1911-13 and 1915-16, similarly a Yamagata protégé, were afterwards very active as War Ministers in Japanese military activities in China. This powerful Tanaka-Ugaki line also controlled the Army General Staff Office by dominating its personnel. Eventually, the Army General Staff Office lessened in influence, and became inferior to the War Ministry. On the other hand, the Ministry of War, now combined with the direct advisory office to the Tenno that was the Army General Staff Office, grew up as the most powerful political interest in Japanese politics and foreign policy-making. It was called 'Gunbu'. The fundamental factor behind the foreign policy of the military was the issue of national security, in contrast to Shidehara's concern for non-military economic expansion.

However, when Tanaka became the Premier and Foreign Minister concurrently in 1927-1929, he maintained the principle of economic development. One difference from Shidehara was that Tanaka thought that a non-intervention policy in China and economic rationalism could not alone preserve Japan's interests in China. Thus his attitude to China was rather

---

7 See Ch.3 fn. 5.
9 For the concept of 'Gunbu', see ibid., pp. 3-11.
Machiavellian. For example, when the disorder in China brought about by the northern expedition of Chiang Kai-shek reached Shantung in May 1927, Premier Tanaka adopted swiftly an outwardly tougher policy, and dispatched an army brigade to Shantung. This so-called Shantung intervention probably would not have happened under Shidehara or even Hara, who applied policies of non-intervention to Chinese politics. 10

But by contrast with Chinese affairs, Tanaka's basic policy towards the Powers corresponded with Shidehara diplomacy, in the sense of international cooperation. Actual foreign policy decided on by Tanaka was an amalgam of Shidehara's economic rationalism with military realism.

Japanese economic growth, owing to the Great War, brought about an increase in the import of raw materials. The Japanese cotton industry which had been one of the major industries sustaining economic development since the Meiji era, needed a great amount of raw cotton. For this, various kinds of raw cotton with different lengths of fibre from India and America were accepted. Admixing raw cotton resulted in an improvement in cotton spinning technology. At the same time, the Japanese cotton industry extended into China. In consequence, through the 1920s, the Japanese cotton industry outsold not only Chinese cotton manufactures but also those of India. For Japan, the whole of Southeast Asia was now being targeted as a market. 11

As for iron ore, Chinese nationalism hampered Japan's imports. During the period between the late 1920s and early 1930s, Japan's imports from British Malaya exceeded twice those from China where Japan had been obtaining it for years. Imported iron ore as well as domestic ore was refined at the Yahata (Yawata) iron mill in Kyushu operating since 1901 mainly for war supplies. 12 For warships, the demand for oil, and particularly of heavy oil, was enhanced. This stemmed from the development of the internal combustion engine. A new mixed combustion system of coal with oil was adopted. The figure for Japan's import of heavy oil in

10 For more details of the difference between Shidehara diplomacy and Tanaka diplomacy, see Hata Ikuhiko, translated by Alvin D. Coox, 'Continental expansion, 1905-1941' in The Cambridge History of Japan, volume 6, pp. 285-290.
12 Ibid., pp. 254-259.
1929 represented 3.6 times that of 1926, much coming from the Dutch East Indies as well as the United States.\textsuperscript{13}

In sum, around the turn of the 1920s, Japan's reliance on the natural resources of South and Southeast Asia became more and more conspicuous. And those regions were regarded as a promising market for Japanese manufactures.\textsuperscript{14}

8-2. A token of Gaimusho economic interest in Siam

Thanks to the economic rationalism of Shidehara's foreign policy, Siam, as an independent country in Southeast Asia, was again paid attention to by Japanese economists. In the interval before the ratification of the 1924 treaty, shortly after the appointment of Shidehara Kijuro as Foreign Minister, the Japanese Foreign Ministry instructed its commercial attaché in Singapore, Nakajima Seiichiro (later in 1926 Consul-General), to visit Bangkok. He was to investigate how the 1924 treaty might influence the position of Japanese nationals, and what potential there was for Siamese trade with Japan. His report is interesting, giving us useful information about how the Gaimusho viewed Siam.\textsuperscript{15}

The first question for the Japanese Foreign Ministry was whether or not there were some enterprising Japanese nationals who would take advantage of the right of landownership under the 1924 treaty. Nakajima informed Tokyo that only two projects were planned. He recognised that the numbers of both Japanese companies and banks, and Japanese residents locally, was small, and the existing Japanese organizations had little experience of undertaking new projects. Nakajima also observed that they did not possess able man-power, or connections with prominent Japanese businessmen in Japan. He reasoned that why Japanese trade with Siam was so slack was that industrialists in Japan did not so far pay enough attention to Siam. Siam at that time was, he felt, considered to be of small practical value in terms of trading and business activities, compared with other South Sea regions. Therefore, the new treaty with Siam would not immediately bring benefit to local Japanese residents. Hasty expansion of Japanese trading

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp. 266-228.
\textsuperscript{14} The total figures of Japanese trade in Southeast Asia (Siam, Indo-china, the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, and Straits Settlements) during 1920-1929 were 2.9 times those during 1914-1919, See Swan 'Japanese Economic Relations with Siam', p. 29, Table 5.
\textsuperscript{15} Nakajima Seiichiro,'A report concerning an official trip to Bangkok' in Nakajima Seiichiro to Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro, August 13, 1924, no.20 in JDA. 2-5-1-69.
to Siam might result in failure. It should be done gradually. If enterprise would be implemented, good organisation, sufficient capital, and able man-power should be available.\(^{16}\)

Was there any inconvenience to Japanese nationals in Siam because of the abolition of Japan's extraterritoriality? This was the second query of the Japanese government. Nakajima replied that law-abiding Japanese citizens did not feel any such inconvenience. Yet it should be recommended that Japanese interpreters be employed in Siamese police and law courts. Nakajima added that translation of Siamese laws into Japanese, and promotion of Japanese law-firms in Siam were also needed.\(^{17}\)

The third question was about the clauses covering the export of Japanese-made goods to Siam. According to Nakajima's report, it was cotton manufactures that could be most successful. But on the whole, his opinion in this respect was pessimistic. Nevertheless, Nakajima found that the Siamese Ministry of the Army, the Ministry of the Navy, and Ministry of Royal Railways were potential customers. The Japanese Mitsui Trading Company, having maintained good contacts so far with the Siamese Army and Navy, was to act as agent for the Siamese government.\(^{18}\)

At the end of his report, Nakajima gave his attention to the route for shipping Japanese goods to Siam. Export of Japanese goods via Hong Kong or Singapore did not necessarily disadvantage Japanese goods compared to European, Chinese, and Indian products. However, he suggested the existing steamer service from Taiwan to Bangkok operated by a Japanese company should be extended to Kobe in Japan proper, so that Japanese wholesalers in Bangkok would be able to compete much more easily with other nationals' goods.\(^{19}\)

From the above, it might be assumed that the Japanese Foreign Ministry in Tokyo was, to some extent, discouraged by this report surveying the existing Japanese trading links with Siam. Some scheme needed to be devised for improving Japanese exports to Siam. But politically, for three years after Nakajima's observation tour, seemingly no significant event took place in the relations between the two countries. It might be said that the Gaimusho considered colonial Southeast Asian countries, e.g. Singapore, Hong Kong, or Java more

\(^{16}\) Ibid., pp. 3-4.
\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 5.
\(^{18}\) Ibid., pp. 6-10.
\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 11.
important. This estimation coincides with Amada's description. (See Ch.7-1) Siam was still not
an attractive country for the Japanese industrialists.

Nevertheless, it could not be said that concluding the 1924 treaty was merely something
like the renewing of an insurance contract. Economically, from 1924 onward, Japanese goods
imported from the Japanese main islands and Taiwan, into Siam, were boosted remarkably. The
rate of Japanese goods imported to Siam in 1925-26 jumped almost 60 percent over 1924-25.20
Among specific items, cotton and silk manufactures were prominent.21 Most of those imports
were not handled by the Japanese but overseas Chinese traders in Siam. Thus it is apparent that
up to the middle of the 1920's, Japanese who were actually engaged in business in Siam were
very limited.22

However, such a situation did not last for long. The trigger incident which turned
Japanese eyes to Siam was nothing less than the First South Seas Trading Conference held in
Tokyo in 1926.

8-3. The First South Seas Trade Conference in Tokyo

The First South Seas Trade Conference was planned and held by the Japanese Foreign
Ministry under Shidehara Kijuro. It was a good example of the Shidehara diplomacy which
gave priority to economic issues, also a good example of how the Japanese industrial circle was
becoming really interested at that time in Southeast Asia.

The Conference opened at the Budget Committee room in the Assembly Lower House
in Tokyo, and it continued for ten days from 13th September 1926, involving Finance,
Agriculture, Communications, and Foreign Ministries respectively. And Japanese Consul-
Generals and Consuls from Southeast Asian countries, the Chambers of Commerce and

20 The total figure of Japanese trade with Siam during 1920-29 was 3.5 times that during 1910-19. See Swan, op. cit.,
p. 29, Table 5.
21 Siam's imports from Japan and Taiwan from 1923 to 1925 (in baht units):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>From the Japanese Islands</th>
<th>From Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923-24</td>
<td>4,390,897</td>
<td>32,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-25</td>
<td>5,220,425</td>
<td>58,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-26</td>
<td>8,276,921</td>
<td>297,025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japanese-made cotton and silk manufactures imported to Siam during 1924-1926 (in baht units):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>cotton manufactures</th>
<th>silk manufactures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924-25</td>
<td>2,104,131</td>
<td>279,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-26</td>
<td>3,976,463</td>
<td>784,957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 'Kakkoku Jijyo kankei zassan, shamu no bu (Collection of Miscellaneous articles on the Situation of Various
Countries, Siam section)', vol.2 in JDA. 1-6-1-26-3, p. 1003. Also see Swan, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
22 Flood, 'Japan's Relations with Thailand: 1928-41', p. 11.
Industries from Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagoya, and twenty industrial associations, eleven private corporations, two banks, five shipping companies, fifteen other kinds of associations, in all, about two hundred and fifty people, participated. It was the largest-scale conference which had ever been held.

The Gaimusho's principal objects in staging this conference were to discuss the issues regarding enterprise, investment, trade, shipping, tariffs, and commercial treaties, in Southeast Asia, the South Seas, and India. In accordance with such purposes, the Conference was divided into seven subcommittees, namely, enterprise and investment, imports, exports, communications and transportation, investigation and information, finance, and legal matters.

In sum, the Gaimusho aimed at comprehensive discussion of Japan's economic relations with such regions.

In his opening speech, Foreign Minister Shidehara pointed out that due to the recession after the Great War and the Great Earthquake of 1923, Japan's balance of foreign trade showed an excess of imports over exports. In such economic circumstances, promoting export of Japanese goods and Japanese investment abroad were urgent issues. In this context, he continued, the countries which Japan should consider were not only western countries and the Chinese continent but also Southeast Asia, the South Seas, and India. It was the purpose of this Conference to pay attention to and study such regions which had not hitherto been very much taken into account for Japan's foreign trade. Shidehara stressed the economic aspect, repeating that the Conference would not consider any political matters in those regions.

Because of the scale of the conference it was much talked about in the Japanese newspapers before its opening day. One newspaper covering it said that this conference was "an almost unprecedented event." Amongst this coverage, one should not overlook the Chugai Shinbun and the Kokumin Shinbun, reporting that the Gaimusho was considering a new

23 The Gaimusho file regarding the First South Seas Trading Conference (in Japanese), Section concerning participants in JDA. 3-2-1-40-5. Hereafter cited under 'The Gaimusho file on the Conference (participants)' From Bangkok, Hayashi Kyujiro Minister since January 1926 attended it.
25 The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (The Newspaper Tokyo Asahi), September 13 1924 in 'The Gaimusho file regarding the First South Seas Trading Conference (in Japanese), Section concerning public opinion' in JDA. 3-2-1-40-6. Hereafter cited under 'The Gaimusho file on the Conference (public opinion)'. This file is comprised of many newspaper cuttings from several kinds of Japanese newspapers.
26 The Kokumin Shinbun (The Newspaper Kokumin), September 7. Others commenting were the Jiji Shinbun, July 29, the Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun (The Newspaper Tokyo Nichinichi), August 13, and the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, September 5 1926 respectively in ibid.
economic policy towards Siam as the most important thing in this conference. The Chugai Shinbun adopted the heading that "the Imperial Government intends to form a revolutionary economic policy towards Siam."27 the Kokumin Shinbun reported that "the Gaimusho attempts to formulate a positive economic policy in Siam", and that the 1924 Japanese-Siamese treaty by which Japan obtained several economic rights in Siam was one expression of such a Gaimusho policy.28

From the above news coverage, we can appreciate the Gaimusho's changing attitude towards Siam. The Nakajima report in 1924 mentioned in the previous section seems to have been the basis of such Gaimusho views of Japan's economic policy towards Siam. Indeed, the Commerce Bureau of the Gaimusho was reportedly deliberating opening up the direct sea route from Japan to Siam.29 A similar idea had already been proposed by Nakajima. (See section 8-2)

This First South Seas Trade Conference, however, could not produce any concrete policy to improve Japan's trade with the specified countries as one might have expected, because of insufficient preparation by the government for the many questions which arose during the conference.30 Yet suffice it to say that the fact that the Gaimusho actually organised such a conference, and that many questions, opinions, and proposals arose during the sessions, surely indicates how much the interest of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Japanese industrial world towards Southeast Asia, and the South Seas, and India, had increased. Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that King Prachathipok was regarded by the Japanese at that time as Pan-Asianist; one of the newspapers suggested that "he is a Great-Pan-Asianist who has a wise mind, and tries to abolish the [foreign or western?] adviser system in Siam, and endeavours to recover its legal autonomy."31 (It indicated that the Gaimusho demand of employment of Japanese advisers during the negotiations for the 1924 treaty was actually a secret issue which even most Japanese did not know!) Therefore, it might not be incorrect to say that the Japanese businessmen regarded Siam as a country which, having a Pan-Asianist

27 The Chugai Shinbun (The Newspaper Chugai), April 5, 1926.
28 The Kokumin Shinbun, July 7, 1926.
29 The Chugai Shinbun, loc. cit.
30 The Chu'o Shinbun (The Newspaper Chu'o), September 18 1926. The Japanese government was criticised by some industrial representatives, because Prime Minister Wakatsuki Rejiro did not deliver any speech at this conference. Ibid. However, the First Section of the Commerce Bureau later completed a voluminous final report which details many proposals and suggestions which arose during the conference. See Gaimusho file on the Conference (Final report) dated October 1926 in JDA. 3-2-1-40-9.
31 The Kokumin Shinbun, July 7, 1926.
monarch, would welcome and understand their economic interest in Siam. Such a Japanese belief should not be neglected in the study of Japanese-Siamese relations.

Coincident with this new movement of Japanese economic interest in Southeast Asia including Siam, in the context of Japanese Pan-Asianism, independent Siam seems to have gradually been paid attention even by Japanese politicians and the military. It was as an expression of such Japanese interest in Siam that a Japanese 'Siam Society' was inaugurated in Tokyo which is the next focus of this chapter.

8-4. Establishment of the Japan 'Siam Society'

It will be recalled that the first Japanese Minister to Siam, Inagaki Manjiro, attempted in vain to establish a Japan-Siam Society in 1902 (see Ch.3-2-2). It took twenty-five years before the plan for establishing such a society materialized. In 1927, the same year as the installation of the prominent military strategist Tanaka Giichi, as Japanese Premier and Foreign Minister concurrently, the first cooperative organization was set up by the governments of Siam and Japan in Tokyo. This was the Siam Society of Japan (not to be confused with the much older, premier learned society of Bangkok, founded in 1904). Ostensibly it was a private institution. But its membership consisted of leading Japanese politicians, military officers, industrialists, and so on. One individual who originally broached the idea of setting up the society was Baron Okura Kishichiro. His father, Okura Kihachiro, was a founder of the giant family trust (Zaibatsu), Okura-gumi. The role of the Okura-gumi in the Chinese Revolution in October 1911 is well-known due to its selling of arms to both the Ching monarchy and the revolutionary army, and its earlier involvement with Miyazaki Toten in the Philippines in 1898 was equally questionable (see Chap. 2 fn. 54). Apparently the Okura-gumi had intimate connections with the Japanese Ministry of War, the General Staff Office, and the Foreign Ministry. The thing which led Baron Okura Kishichiro to establish links with Siam initially, was that he was a fellow student at the University of Cambridge of the Siamese Interior Minister since 1926 (until March 1928), the Prince of Lopburi (Prince Yukhon).

32 Inoue Kiyoshi, op. cit., p. 99, p. 108
33 Minister in Bangkok, Hayashi Kyujiro, to Foreign Minister, Tanaka Giichi, September 6, 1927, no.74 in JDA. 1-1-10-0-2-14. For the Prince of Lopburi, see Benjamin A. Batson, The End of The Absolute Monarchy in Siam (Singapore, 1984), p. 154 fn. 15.
In August 1927, Baron Okura made a private visit to Siam, but the Siamese government treated him as if he were a state guest. The schedule of his visit was specially arranged by the Prince of Lopburi, King Prachathipok's principal aide-de-Camp and private secretary, Prince Amorathat, and King Prachathipok himself. During his one week visit, Baron Okura met the British Minister and French military attaché as well as the Prince of Lopburi, Prince Amorathat, and King Prachathipok. Okura also met the Minister of Public Instruction, Prince Thani, the Foreign Minister, Prince Traithot-Thewawong, the senior prince, Prince Phanurangsi, and War Minister Prince Nakhon Sawan (Prince Boriphat). The then Japanese Minister to Siam, Hayashi Kyujiro, reported to Tokyo that "Baron Okura was unprecedentedly welcomed despite being merely an individual." Therefore, it can be said that his trip had not the character of an ordinary Japanese citizen. One of the purposes of Okura's visit seems to have been to sound out Siamese views on establishing a Siam Society in Japan, with a branch in Siam in the future. In fact, he enquired of the Japanese Minister, Hayashi, before meeting Siamese officials, whether or not he should inform the Siamese government about his plan of setting up a new Japan-Siam association in Tokyo. Hayashi recommended him to do so.

After arriving in Bangkok on 27th August 1927, Okura was invited for a tea party by the Siamese Foreign Minister, Prince Traithot. Probably on this occasion, Prince Traithot was informed of Okura's plan for establishing a Siam Society. Okura emphasised that the Siam Society would be set up to improve friendly relations between the two countries. It would not be concerned with any political activities. Also he asked Prince Traithot to sound out the intentions of the Siamese King towards the planned Society. Okura disclosed that he desired to invite one

34 See Batson, op. cit., p. 33 and p. 53.
35 Hayashi to Tanaka, September 6, 1927, no.74 in JDA. I-1-10-0-2-14.
36 For the role of those princes in the reign of King Prachathipok, see Batson, op. cit., and N. J. Brailey, Thailand and the Fall of Singapore, pp. 25-50. It is noteworthy that Prince Thani claimed in 1927 that Japan, despite having a parliament, was in fact really an autocracy. See below fn. 104.
37 Hayashi to Tanaka, September 6, 1927, no.74 in JDA. I-1-10-0-2-14. The British Minister in Bangkok at that time described Hayashi as "remarkably un-Japanese both in physique and temperament, being open and companionable and ready to discuss any political subject not unintelligently and with seeming frankness- -." Mr. Waterlow to Sir Austen Chamberlain, January 4, 1927 in FO. 422/84. Hayashi later became Consul-General at Mukden, and was present for the Mukden incident instigated by the Japanese army in Manchuria (Kwantung Army). Imai Seiichi and others, op. cit., p. 264.
38 Hayashi to Tanaka, September 6, 1927, no.76 in JDA. I-1-10-0-2-14.
39 Hayashi to Tanaka, September 6, 1927, no.74 in JDA. I-1-10-0-2-14. With respect to the date of Okura's visit to Siam, Flood, op. cit., pp. 21-22 and p. 43 fn. 38 refers to it, mentioning that "it occurred in July 1928, and he was presented by the Siamese King with a statue of the Buddha." But Okura actually visited Siam in August 1927, and the presentation of the statue of Buddha took place on that occasion. See Hayashi to Tanaka, September 6, 1927, no.74 in JDA. I-1-10-0-2-14.
of the Siamese princes to be a patron of the Society. It can probably be assumed that Okura had decided to approach the Prince of Nakhon Sawan who was then War Minister (1926-March 1928, and Interior Minister during March 1928-June 1932) and the most powerful prince, and was increasingly expected to succeed to the throne at the end of the Seventh Reign. On the 29th, Okura visited Prince Nakhon Sawan, and conversed with him about the Siam Society. But it seems that Okura at this time did not ask Prince Nakhon Sawan to be Patron of the Society though he actually became so afterwards.

On the other hand, Prince Traithot replied to Okura that the Siamese king was friendly in general terms to his plan. Okura promised Prince Traithot that he would present a concrete outline of his plan before the Society was launched. However, Traithot certainly gained an unfavourable impression of Okura in that Okura was not as good as his word. He knew through the Japanese Minister Hayashi that the Siam Society had already been established.

The inaugural meeting of the Japan Siam Society was held on 20th December 1927 at the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo. The society's membership comprised various influential figures from Japanese politics and its economic world of that time. Among them Prince Konoe Fumimaro was President, Premier Tanaka Giichi and War Minister, Shirakawa Yoshinori, were honorary members. The report on the establishment of the Siam Society written in English said that:

The need for an organ to strengthen the ties of friendship between the two nations [Japan and Siam] has been felt in different quarters up to the present, but it is a matter of deep regret that the idea was not realised.

Such a need has lately been felt more intensely than ever before through the visit of a number of prominent Japanese to Siam.

Indeed, apart from the Siam Society, there was another similar movement concerned to set up such an organization. The Siamese Minister in Tokyo, Phya Chamnong, received a letter written in Japanese inviting him to be a patron of 'The Siamo-Japanese Association' from its eighteen Japanese promoters. Phya Chamnong reported it to Prince Traithot, the Siamese

---

40 Prince Traithot to the Head of the Royal Secretariat, Chao Phya Mahithon, May 9, 1928 in R7.RL 17/33. For the role of the Royal Secretariat, see Batson, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
41 Batson, op. cit., pp. 31 and 284.
42 Prince Nakhon Sawan to Chao Phya Mahithon, January 24, 1928 in R7. RL 17/33.
43 Prince Traithot to Chao Phya Mahithon, May 9, 1928 in R7. RL 17/33.
45 Ibid.
46 Letter to Siamese Minister, Phya Chamnong Dittakan, September, 1927 (translated into English) in Prince Traithot to Chao Phya Mahithon, May 9, 1928 in R7. RL 17/33. Enclosed document, no.17852.
Foreign Minister. Prince Traithot was not able to instruct Chamnong adequately because the former was at that time waiting for Okura's communication on the Siam Society. But after learning that the Siam Society had already been established from Minister Hayashi, Prince Traithot instructed Chamnong to refuse an invitation to join the Siamo-Japanese Association.\(^{47}\)

From the above event, it can be said that a number of Japanese at that time turned their attention to Siam. This might seem much clearer from what the above group (the Siamo-Japanese Association) said in the letter to Chamnong:

> As a consequence of the recent great European War, the changes of equilibration of the international political situation has led the progress of Japan to Southwards [the South?] of Asia. Accordingly, the chance of paying attention to the economical extension with the Kingdom of Siam arouse us to consider over the gist of solution of population and food problem of Japan [sic]. From this point of view, we now, with the support and assistance of prominent persons and enlightened men, are going to organize the Siamo-Japanese Association in this country [Japan].\(^{48}\)

It is unclear who these people were, though this letter was written in a quite straightforward way. For instance, it made clear that promoting of Japan's interests in the region to the South was for solving its over-population and food problems. Yet their view seems to have epitomized increasing Japanese economic interest in Siam.

Soon after the inauguration of the Japan Siamese Society, H.I.H. Prince Chichibunomiya Yasuhito, younger brother of Prince Regent Hirohito (who later became the Showa Emperor), was invited to become first patron of the Society. He gave his consent to become patron in January 1928. He wrote his acceptance to the President of the Siam Society, Prince Konoe: "it is altogether surprising that an organization of this kind had not yet [sic] been established before and this all the more emphasises the importance of this association".\(^{49}\)

At the same time, the Japan Siamese Society expressed its unanimous desire that it wished Prince Nakhon Sawan in effect Prince Chichibu's Siamese equivalent also to be an honorary patron of the Society. This request was cabled by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to Minister Hayashi in Bangkok. The Japanese Foreign Ministry also directed Hayashi to ask Prince Nakhon Sawan to give his support for establishing a Japan Society in Siam. In fact, it was a desire of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, or more specifically speaking, of the Asian Bureau of

---

\(^{47}\) Prince Traithot to Chao Phya Mahithon, May 9, 1928 in R7. RL 17/33.

\(^{48}\) Letter to Siamese Minister, Phya Chamnong Dittakan, September, 1927 in Prince Traithot to Chao Phya Mahithon, May 9, 1928 in R7. RL 17/33.

\(^{49}\) 'The Address of H.I.H. Prince Chichibunomiya, Patron of the Siam Association [Society]' in Notification from the President of the Siam Association [Society], Konoe Fumimaro, to the Siamese Minister in Tokyo, February 1, 1928 in Prince Traithot to Chao Phya Mahithon, May 9, 1928, attached document, no.24345 in R7. RL 17/33.
the Gaimusho, that the Siamese government would set up a Japan Society equivalent to the Japan Siam Society. It is interesting that the person who was actually behind this Gaimusho scheme to promote Japan's relations with Siam through the Japan Siam Society was Chief of the Asian Bureau, Arita Hachiro. He, after he left Siam in 1921, had served as Consul-General in Tientsin from June 1925 to April 1927, and he was appointed in September 1927 as the fifth chief of the Asian Bureau to take charge of the issue of the Japan Siam Society. Arita remained in this post until October 1930. Therefore, it can be presumed that Arita, who had previously wanted to improve Japan's attitude towards Southeast Asia including Siam, played an important part in the issue of the Japan Siam Society.

In this context, it is understandable why Chief of the Asian Bureau Arita instructed Hayashi to carry on this effort for the future close contact between the Japan Siam Society and the Siamese Japan Society; Prince Nakhon Sawan, the Prince of Lopburi, and Prince Amorathat should be appointed by the Siamese government as president, chairman of the latter, and director respectively, the instruction said.50

In the mean time, what was the reaction of Prince Nakhon Sawan who was notified of the request to become honorary patron of the Japan Siam Society by the Japanese Legation? He reported to King Prachathipok asking whether he should accept the request.51 The King's opinion was that if Prince Nakhon Sawan was willing to do so, there was no reason to object to it. "If we do not accept, it will not be an expression of our amity [with Japan]," the King advised.52 Acceptance by Prince Nakhon Sawan was telegraphed to Prince Konoe by Minister Hayashi on February 9, 1928.53

However, with respect to the establishment of a Japan Society in Siam, Hayashi had it that setting up such an organization should be an issue taken up at first by the Siamese side. He thus kept Arita's request about the membership of the committee of the Japan Society on one side.54

Nevertheless, a telegram in which Prince Chichibunomiya expressed his desire for the establishment of such a society seems to have embarrassed the Siamese government.55 In reply

50 Tanaka to Hayashi, January 18, 1928 (drafted), no.3 in JDA. I-1-10-0-2-14.
51 Prince Boriphat [Prince Nakhon Sawan] to Chao Phya Mahithon, January 24, 1928 in R7. RL 17/33.
52 Comment of King Prachathipok, January 25, 1928, and Chao Phya Mahithon to Prince Boriphat, January 26, 1928, no.230/5239 in R7. RL 17/33.
53 Hayashi to Tanaka, February 9, 1928, no.7 in JDA. I-1-10-0-2-14.
54 Hayashi to Tanaka, January 23, 1928, no.2 in JDA. I-1-10-0-2-14.
to Prince Nakhon Sawan’s report on the issue. King Prachathipok accepted that such an organization should be set up in Siam. But when Prince Nakhon Sawan promptly reported to the king again on his view, King Prachathipok began to express concern about the difficulties involved in founding such an organization. Prince Nakhon Sawan admitted that “When Baron Okura disclosed his plan for establishing the Siam Society, I felt very much concerned about it, for fear we might be forced to set up a similar association in Siam.”

Prince Nakhon Sawan was anxious about two things. One was that it would be difficult to find members who might be able to contribute funds for managing such an association. More important was his fear of the reaction of the Western Powers regarding getting involved in intimate relations with Japan, because, he pointed out, the motive of the Japanese behind this plan might have included political matters as well. Nevertheless, Prince Nakhon Sawan was reluctant to refuse Japan’s request for the founding of a Japan Society on the ground that if Siam did not accept, Japan might derive an unpleasant impression of Siam. His conclusion was to accept the setting up of such a Society unless something could be found to be a serious obstacle. The Siamese king shared his view, saying that founding such an association was for mere form’s sake in order to express Siamese amity to Japan.

However, when Foreign Minister Prince Traithot submitted the copies of the whole correspondence on the Japan Siam Society already inaugurated, along with Japan’s desire for setting up a similar organization in Siam, King Prachathipok this time instructed Chao Phya Mahithon to deliver all relevant information on the Siam Society to the members of the Supreme Council of State, and to the Minister of Commerce and Communications, the Prince of

56 Prince Boriphat to Chao Phya Mahithon, March 9, 1928 in R7. RL 17/33.
57 Comment of King Prachathipok, March 9, 1928 and Chao Phya Mahithon to Prince Boriphat, March 11, 1928, no.277/6171 in R7. RL 17/33.
58 Prince Boriphat to Chao Phya Mahithon, March 11, 1928 in R7. RL 17/33.
59 It seems that in addition to the Siamese leadership’s conservative attitude which had been keeping its pro-western line, Prince Nakhon Sawan was concerned particularly about the reaction of the United States to his involvement in the Japan Siam Society. Because around 1924 there had been a rise in Siamese pro-American feeling. King Prachathipok himself delivered a speech before Siamese boy scouts that “the method of prospectors for gold and iron are in America and the attitude of American business men are a good example of the proper way to work” And Prince Sawat Sawatdisophon, uncle to King Prachathipok, also expressed his pro-American (and anti-British) sentiment at a banquet of American university alumni in early 1928, urging that “Siam should follow in the footsteps of America, and saying this I am repeating the thoughts of His Majesty the King. Siam to-day is in the state of the great Mississippi valley a century ago, awaiting full development, and we would do well to pursue our task in the spirit which impelled American pioneers.” Quoted from Mr. Waterlow to Sir A. Chamberlain, April 7, 1928 in FO. 422/85/no.22.
60 Prince Boriphat to Chao Phya Mahithon, March 11, 1928 in R7. RL 17/33.
61 Comment of King Prachathipok, March 14, 1928 and Chao Phya Mahithon to Prince Boriphat, March 14, 1928, no.285/6270 in R7. RL 17/33.
62 Prince Traithot to Chao Phya Mahithon, May 9, 1928, no.29/2610 in R7. RL 17/33.
Kamphaeng Phet (Prince Burachat).63 The Siamese king was cautious about the activities of the Japan Siam Society. He commented that "we should keep on eye on what intentions they [the Japanese] have in setting up the Siam Society."64 The Prince of Kamphaeng Phet also adopted a watchful attitude towards the future outcome of the Siam Society.65

By that time, the political situation in China had deteriorated. What helped to increase Siamese caution towards Japan was, no doubt, the Tsinan Incident there in May 1928. In consequence of the Incident, an anti-Japanese boycott movement arose among the overseas Chinese in Siam, and the import figures of Japanese goods into Siam plunged to zero by September 1928.66 In such a situation, the proposal of the Japan Siam Society desiring the establishment of a Japan Society in Bangkok rested there.67

8-5. Siamese apprehension of Japanese economic interest in Southeast Asia

As a background to Siamese scepticism regarding the Japan Siam Society, there had already been incidents annoying to the Siamese government. The Courrier d'Haiphong, The Krungthep Daily Mail, and The Siam Observer, all in late 1926, noted that several Japanese industrialists intended to invest at least 500 Japanese yen to establish a new company for cultivating and trading Siamese rice. Prince Traithot, on 29th November, instructed the Siamese

---

63 Comment of King Prachathipok, May 11, 1928 and Chao Phya Mahithon to Prince Traithot, May 16, 1928, no.53/871 in R7. RL 17/33.
64 Comment of King Prachathipok, May 11, 1928 in R7. RL 17/33.
65 Prince Burachat to Chao Phya Mahithon, June 19, 1928 in R7. RL 17/33.
66 Flood, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
67 The issue of the Japan Society came into the spot-light again at the meeting of the Supreme Council of State on 27 February 1931. This time, Prince Nakhon Sawan mentioned the issue, saying that he was apprehensive about the reaction of European countries to him being Patron of the Japan Siam Society. As for a Japan Society, Prince Damrong suggested that it would be useful, following their consideration of the issue, to investigate the role of similar societies in other countries. This duty was given to Prince Traithot. See, Khat chak raingan prachum aphirathamontri (An extract of the Report of the Supreme Council of State), no.3612373, February 27, 1931 in R7. RL 17/33. European countries which Prince Nakhon Sawan mentioned were Britain, France, and Germany. See Chao Phya Mahithon to Prince Thewawong, [Prince Traithot] March 4, 1931, no.554/7385 in R7. RL 17/33. The Siamese Foreign Minister instructed the Siamese Legations in Paris, London, and Berlin to check whether or not there were similar organizations to the proposed Japan Society in those cities, and if so, what were their activities. It was at the end of the year 1931 that King Prachathipok received the result of those investigations. The report referred to the 'Société Franco-Japanaise de Paris' and 'The Japanese Society' in London. See Yo nangsu phanaek tangprathet (A summarised report of the Foreign Affairs Division in the Royal Secretariat), December 31, 1931, no.370/5077 in R7. RL 17/33. As to Berlin, information was delayed. See Prince Traithot Thewawong to the Royal Secretariat, March 3, 1932, no.452/18484 in R7. RL 17/33. A major concern of the Siam government was the possible political influence of those organizations in each country. It needed to know about the relations between such organizations and each government, and the attitude of the influential people towards such organizations. Although the reports from Paris and London did not clarify all the above questions, the Siamese Royal Secretariat assumed that both organizations mentioned above had no political function, and were regarded as the same as ordinary associations. Yet the report concluded that if the Siamese government was involved even in an ordinary association in Siam, such an association would become conspicuous because the number of such associations in Siam was relatively small, and the Siamese government was given great respect by Siamese citizens. See ibid.
Minister in Tokyo, Phya Chamnong, to investigate the details of this news. The result of Chamnong's investigation, dated 9th April 1927, was that there was no reliable evidence of such a scheme. The King commented that sooner or later Japanese would contemplate doing so even though the current news was not firm.

Ironically, this prediction of the King materialised in the following year. Siamese Minister Phya Suphan Sombat, succeeding Chamnong in Tokyo, sent extracts from a Japanese monthly trade magazine, *The Oriental Trade Journal* (in Japanese), to the Siamese Foreign Ministry in Bangkok. The magazine reported that a Japanese shipping company in Osaka was planning to develop a new line, from Yokohama to Bangkok via Jilon (in Formosa) and Singapore. It hoped to invite Japanese capitalists to invest in Siam. The same editor revealed that the Chamber of Commerce in Osaka wished to hold an exhibition of Japanese goods in Bangkok. King Prachathipok this time was much more concerned about the issue. The extracts of the magazine sent from Tokyo were promptly circulated to the members of the Supreme Council of State, the Minister of Agriculture, Chao Phya Phonlathep, and the Minister of Commerce and Communications, Prince Burachat. The matter was taken up in a meeting of the Supreme Council of State on 24th October, 1928. Apprehension dominated the meeting.

The King observed:

> It might be supposed that Japanese will invest in the purchase of land on a large scale, and will export rice by using Siamese labour. If so, it is not very good. Rice cultivation must be reserved for the Siamese people. Enforcement of land law may be a means to maintain it as such.

On the other hand, Prince Burachat maintained that regarding foreign landownership, the 'lease hold' system should be adopted. This opinion changed the direction of the land act committee, which had been considering only 'free hold' of land 'for industry' to foreigners.

In addition to the above incident, Japanese press activities, both periodical and daily, focusing on Siamese mineral resources, the cultivation of Siamese rice, and the purchase of land

---

69 Flood, op. cit., p. 20 wrote that "These editorials were brought to the attention of the King of Siam by his advisers in February, 1928." But the King actually commented on this information over his signature in 1927. See Comment of King Prachathipok, May 10, 1927 in R.7 T.21.5.
70 Sombat to Prince Traithot, September 7, 1928, no.94/690. This document includes the extracts translated from *The Oriental Trade Journal* of July 1928 in R.7 T.21.5.
71 Comment of King Prachathipok on the letter dated October 3, 1928 from the Siamese Foreign Ministry through the Royal Secretariat in R.7 T.21.5.
73 Ibid.
74 Prince Burachat to Chao Phya Mahithon, November 3, 1928, no.1664/71 in R.7 T.21.5.

208
for rice cultivation, aroused the increasing suspicion of the Siamese king.\textsuperscript{75} In August 1928, the Japanese \textit{Oriental Trade Journal} again covered Siamese issues. This was conveyed to King Prachathipok in November.\textsuperscript{76} The king showed his displeasure:

\begin{quote}
I do not like this account at all. You should order our Minister [in Tokyo] to be always alert, and to try to investigate quickly whether or not Japanese are thinking of coming to cultivate rice in Siam, so that we can ready ourselves.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

What part of the account in the \textit{Journal} annoyed King Prachathipok? It was apparently the sections describing at length the possibility of cultivating rice in Siam, other potential uses of land, and encouraging of Japanese emigration to Siam, all without regard for Siamese feelings.\textsuperscript{78}

At the turn of the year 1928/29, a rumour spread: a Japanese was negotiating to purchase land in the Rangsit area. The Siamese government was extremely nervous of it. The meeting of the Supreme Council of State on 14th January thus decided to instruct Minister of Agriculture, Chao Phya Phonlathep, to check the truth of this rumour. Chao Phya Phonlathep reported that no evidence was found.\textsuperscript{79} But King Prachathipok commented that "Although it has not been confirmed, it might be true that Japanese really need to purchase land."\textsuperscript{80} The Japanese Minister since July 1928, Yatabe Yasukichi, succeeding to Hayashi, also misled the Siamese government about his activities, because it was reported that Yatabe was investigating Siamese mineral resources. The king of Siam expressed his vexation at this: "We should try to preserve these resources for Siamese people as far as we can."\textsuperscript{81}

The thing that eventually surprised the Siamese government was that the above Rangsit 'rumour' was in fact true.\textsuperscript{82} A Japanese newspaper reported it as 'First Japanese to own land in Siam'.\textsuperscript{83} Prince Boriphat showed great resignation, commenting that "Since it has already been

\textsuperscript{75} Flood, op. cit., pp. 19-21, 23-24.
\textsuperscript{76} Siamese Minister Sombat actually sent the extract of \textit{The Oriental Trade Journal}, issued on 20th August and translated into Thai, in October, 1928. See Sombat to Prince Traithot, October 10, 1928, no.122/231, and Prince Traithot to Chao Phya Mahithon, November 10, 1928, no.213/16274 in R.7 T.21.5. This document contradicts Flood's information that King Prachathipok was informed of these articles in August, 1928. Flood, op. cit., p. 20.
\textsuperscript{77} Comment of King Prachathipok on the letter of Mahithon dated on 10th November, 1928, no.213/16274 in R.7 T.21.5.
\textsuperscript{78} \textit{The Oriental Trade Journal}, August 20, 1928 attached in (copy no.15688) Sombat to Prince Traithot, October 10, 1928 in R.7 T.21.5.
\textsuperscript{79} Chao Phya Phonlathep to Chao Phya Mahithon, January 17, 1929, no.299/6333 in R.7 T.21.5.
\textsuperscript{80} Comment of King Prachathipok on the letter from Chao Phya Phonlathep, January 18, 1929 in R.7 T.21.5.
\textsuperscript{81} This comment of King Prachathipok was repeated in the letter of Chao Phya Mahithon to Chao Phya Phonlathep, January 26, 1929, no.341/5588 in R.7 T.21.5.
\textsuperscript{82} Vice-Foreign Minister Phya Samphakitkasetkan to Chao Phya Mahithon, February 5, 1929, no.309/6729 in R.7 T.21.5. Also see Batson, op. cit., p. 121 fn.108.
\textsuperscript{83} Sombat to Prince Traithot, May 6, 1929, no.22/115, enclosed in the letter from Prince Traithot to Chao Phya Mahithon, May 30, 1929, no.67/4374 in R.7 T.21.5.
done, there is no way to hinder it." On the other hand, King Prachathipok was more inclined to resist. He noted:

There is no measure to prevent it anyhow unless Siamese people altogether think that rice cultivation is a significant industry for them, and it should not be neglected to such an extent that foreigners come gradually into Siam and engage in cultivating rice. 84

The King also stressed his opinion repeatedly in the meeting of the Supreme Council of State, adding that:

We should try to preserve it [the rice industry] so that Siamese people cultivate rice as much as they can. With respect to other industries which need much capital, we ought to accept that foreigners will be able to come to engage in it, because it is impossible to preserve all kinds of industries. 85

As to selling land to Japanese, the Siamese newspaper Nangsuphim Thai strongly insisted that "it is an unpatriotic act", or "conduct destructive of our country" 86.

It is evident that behind this Japanese press incitement to investment in Siam, were the members of the Japan Siam Society as well as the Japanese Legation in Bangkok, collecting information on the Siamese industrial situation. For instance, the writer of one account in the Japanese monthly magazine, Japanese Abroad (in Japanese), was a member of the Japan Siam Society who had stayed for years in the residence of Chao Phya Phatsakorawong previously referred to in the context of the 1890's crisis years. 87 This article also caught the eyes of King Prachathipok: "This description is very important. Extract it, and let the Cabinet members and members of the Supreme Council of State know." Some parts of the account in Japanese Abroad which the King particularly noticed were underlined. One underlined part concerned projects for Japanese emigration to Siam. 88

On the matter of Japanese purchasing land and cultivating rice in Siam, careful discussions were carried on in the Supreme Council of State until late 1929. Among the members, it is noticeable that Prince Damrong opined that "These accounts [in the Japanese press] might be individual propaganda, not a real intention of the Japanese government. Japan is

84 Comment of King Prachathipok, including the comment of Prince Boriphat, February 6, 1929. Prince Boriphat reported that the person who mediated between the Siamese land owner and the Japanese was an acquaintance of his. Prince Boriphat to Chao Phya Mahithon, January 29, 1929 in R.7 T.21.5.
86 Two cuttings of Nangsuphim Thai of February 19 and 21 in 1929 included in R.7 T.21.5. Also see Batson, op. cit., p. 121 fn.108.
87 Sombat to Prince Traithot, September 20, 1929, no.119/616, enclosed in the letter from Traithot to Mahithon, October 16, 1929, no.218/15887 in R.7 T.21.5. For Phatsakorawong in the 1890's, see ch. 4-2 and 4-3-1.
88 Comment of King Prachathipok, November 4, 1929 in R.7 T.21.5. Also see Batson, op. cit., p. 65 fn.38.
at the moment looking at China and Manchuria." He also admitted that "The fault does not lie only with people who expressed views which encourage capitalists to invest in Siam. However, we must be careful of [foreign] landownership." 90

Further, Prince Thani, the Minister of Education then called Public Instruction. (1926-June 1932), reported his opinion to the king that "Japanese coming to Siam do not necessarily cause harm in terms of 'competitive factors in our labour market', but it could cause problems in the longer term." 91 The king simply answered "The only important thing which we should concentrate on is landownership. Transferring land on a large scale into the hands of foreigners is not a good thing." 92

It appears that the Siamese government was now relatively embarrassed in dealing with Japanese affairs, because by this time Siamese people needed Japanese goods which were widely varied and of fairly low price compared with rivals. 93 Siam was now aware of the benefit it derived from Japanese manufactures. Japan was becoming Siam's good trade partner, but the Siamese did not like the Japanese surging into their land.

8-6. The Japan Siam society's relations with the Japanese military

8-6-1. Unenthusiastic Japanese military in Southeast Asia

No doubt the activities of the Japanese press mentioned above created concern in the Siamese government about Japan. But a question remains. Did the Japanese at this juncture really regard Siam as an important country in the military and political aspects? As we have seen in chapter 6, during the 1910's and around the turn of the decade, the Japanese military took a relatively indifferent attitude towards Southeast Asia and Siam, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry also, as described in previous chapter, avoided political confrontation with Western Powers in Siam. Such context is basic to understanding the attitude of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. However, in the latter half of the 1920's, in particular, after the conclusion of the 1924 Siamese-Japanese treaty, the Commerce Bureau of the Gaimusho and Japanese industrialists

90 Raingan prachum aphirathamomtri (Report of the meeting of the Supreme Council of State), November 20, 1929, no.27/2472 in R.7 T.21.5.
91 Minister of Education, Mom Chao Thaniniwat to Chao Phya Mahithon, November 23, 1929, no.253/10618 in R.7 T.21.5.
92 Comment of King Prachathipok, December 24, 1929 in R.7 T.21.5.
93 Flood, op. cit., pp. 31-34.
increasingly turned their attention to Siam as a trading partner. This was an important change in
Gaimusho policy towards Siam.

Then what about the Japanese military? Did it actually have any ambitions regarding
Siam around that time? Was the interest of the Japanese military the same as in China or
Manchuria? No documentary evidence has been found in the Japanese archives to show such
similarity. The available Japanese documents only indicate how unenthusiastic the army and
even the navy were towards Southeast Asia at that time, compared with China and/or
Manchuria. More than that, very little documentation regarding the activities of both the army
and navy in Southeast Asia at that time now exists, perhaps because they were not actually
interested in Southeast Asia, or because they carried out their activity in a very secret way so as
to avoid it being recorded in any official documents.

The following account considers the role of the Japanese army in the late 1920's in the
perspective of Japan-Siam relations. In this connection, it should be reiterated that the
documentation which is referred to here is very limited. The documents which are used in this
section derive from the National Archives Office in Bangkok and the Japanese War History
Room, Defence Agency in Tokyo.

8-6-2. The faint Japanese Army interest in Siam

From the documentation it might be argued that behind the establishment of the Japan
Siam Society in Tokyo, and the subsequent idea of setting up a Japan Society in Siam, the
Japanese military were trying to use the connection of the Japan Siam Society with the Siamese
military in order to create, somehow, a close link between them. Whether Baron Okura really
desired the Japan Siam Society to work for such a purpose is not known, but it seems that the
Siam Society did indeed function along these lines.

This presumption can be supported by the following facts: 1) Okura's visit to Siam
(scheduled originally for July 1927)\textsuperscript{94} took place in August, not long after General Tanaka
became Japanese Premier (in April 1927). Second, considering Okura's long and close
connection with the Japanese Army, including Premier Tanaka, and considering that one of
Okura's special enterprises was selling arms disposed of by the Japanese Army, it might be
suspected that before Okura's visit to Siam, he had some talks about Siam with the Japanese

\textsuperscript{94} See Hayashi to Tanaka, September 6, 1927, no.74 in JDA. 1-1-10-0-2-14.
Army, perhaps General Tanaka himself or his protégés at the Army General Staff Office. But all of this is conjecture. Among the limited documentation, one does find some evidence of the interest of the Japanese army, from the fact that the senior Japanese Army officer of subsequent 1937 China Incident notoriety, Lieut. General Matsui Iwane, visited Siam in early 1929 in order to establish a military attaché there.95

8-6-3. Matsui in Siam, Alongkot in Japan

The Siamese Minister in Tokyo, Sombat, was informed privately by an officer of the Siamese Ministry of Defence training in Japan at the beginning of 1929, that Lieut. General Matsui and Captain Takahashi Hiroshi would visit Siam in order to investigate the prospects for establishing a military attaché in Bangkok. Sombat then invited Matsui and Takahashi to luncheon. What Sombat discovered from these two officers was that Matsui and Takahashi were going to Bangkok via French Indo-China, including Saigon and Nakhonwat (Angkor), and Aranyaprathet, the Siamese frontier town. Afterwards, both would go down to Singapore. While Matsui would carry on his trip to India, Europe, and America for military purposes, Takahashi would return to Japan. Sombat added that this was discovered through private conversation, and he had not yet been officially informed of it by the Japanese Foreign Ministry.96

Shortly after, Sombat received an informal request from the chief of the Section of Protocol and Personnel in the Japanese Foreign Ministry to issue a laissez-passer for Matsui and Takahashi.97 Although Sombat immediately issued diplomatic visas for them, he was rather suspicious of their activity. Soon after, Sombat received a memorandum from Lieut. General Matsui, stating that Matsui would invite Prince Nakhon Sawan to visit Japan to view some major army manoeuvres.98 Matsui and Takahashi arrived in Bangkok on February 14, 1929.99

Nothing is known of what they talked about with the staff of the Japanese Legation or with the Siamese military. It is only known that they had a plan for inviting a Siamese officer to Japan. However, it was not to be Prince Nakhon Sawan but Prince Alongkot, then Chief of the Siamese General Staff, who actually attended the military manoeuvres in Japan. It seems that

95 Matsui Iwane later became the Commander in attacking Nanking in 1938, the so-called 'Rape of Nanking'. He was executed as an A-level war criminal after the war.
96 Sombat to Prince Traithot, January 9, 1929, no.183/1174 in KT 33.6.6/13.
97 Sombat to Prince Traithot, January 10, 1929, no.185/1177 in KT 33.6.6/13.
98 Sombat to Prince Traithot, January 11, 1929, no.189/1190 in KT 33.6.6/13.
99 Vice-Minister of Interior, Phya Sri Thammathirat to Vice-Foreign Minister, Phya Siwisawacha, February 16, 1929 in KT 33.6.6/13.
Prince Nakhon Sawan, in charge of the Ministry of Interior from March 1928, was regarded in Bangkok as an unsuitable choice. Also Matsui, when he arrived in Bangkok, showed a desire for inviting the 'Minister of War'. But War Minister Prince Boworadet directed Prince Alongkot to do the job for him.\(^{100}\)

Prince Alongkot with two other officers toured Japan, and also Korea then under Japanese rule, and French Indo-China, from September to November, 1929.\(^{101}\) The Japanese military seems to have succeeded in giving these guests a positive impression of itself.\(^{102}\) It should be reiterated that Matsui first had the intention of inviting Prince Nakhon Sawan rather than Prince Alongkot. We should also remember that the former was the Patron of the Japan Siam Society. Thus, we can see that the Japanese military was approaching the Siamese military via the Japan Siam Society. One can say that there was a certain connection between the Japanese military and the Japan Siam Society. Also, Lieut. General Matsui was an active member of an anti-European, Pan-Asianist organization, the Dai Ajia Kyokai (Great Asian Society) founded in 1924 in Tokyo, and Baron Okura Kishichiro was one of the founding fathers of that Society.\(^{103}\) Thus it is apparent that General Matsui attempted to approach the Siamese military through Prince Nakhon Sawan as a person considered to be much easier of access because of his being Patron of the Japan Siam Society.

Why did the Japanese military try to create an intimate relationship with the Siamese military. One explanation can be assumed. The Japanese military at that time was resentful towards the Western Powers after the Washington Conference. In addition to the advance South view, 'Nanshin-Ron', stated in chapter 6, which can not be neglected in an examination of the policy-making of the Japanese military, there was an eruption of Japanese Pan-Asianism coloured by anti-Western feeling. This trend can be exemplified by the establishment of the Dai Ajia Kyokai as mentioned above. It was a rather political organization expressing the sensitivity of the Japanese military and other Japanese people against the Western Powers. It also

\(^{100}\) Minister of Defence to the Royal Secretariat, August 1, 1929, no.54/4638 in R.7 K.10/4.
\(^{101}\) See JDA. L-1-3-0-2-1 and R.7 K.10/4.
\(^{103}\) Flood, op. cit., p. 28. Owing to his great assistance in improving relations between Siam and Japan, Baron Okura was awarded the third class of the Order of the White Elephant of Siam after Prince Alongkot visited Japan. See R.7.K.10/4, August 13, 1930.

The Dai Ajia Kyokai was originally founded by Japanese Parliament members and industrialists numbering about two hundred persons in order to concentrate opinion against the anti-Japanese immigration movement in the United States of America. The first general meeting was held in July 10 1924 at the Head office of the 'Seiyukai' Party in Tokyo. See the newspaper Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, July 11 1924.
concentrated Japanese support for the slogan, "Asia for the Asians". The "Dai Ajia Kyokai" indeed had held an international conference in Nagasaki city in August 1926. Delegates came from China, Japan, the Philippines, Afghanistan, and India. A Siamese delegation seems to have been asked to participate in this conference, but did not actually turn up. Therefore it might be fair to say that the Japanese army with its anti-western inclinations, in particular the Dai Ajia Kyokai member, Matsui, wanted to bring Siam, which had not appeared at the conference, over to the anti-western, Pan-Asianist side.

8-6-4. The Japanese military attachés in Siam

In this context, Prince Alongkot's visit to Japan was a timely event to develop the relations between Siam and the Japanese army. In fact, on this occasion, Prince Alongkot was presented with some new artillery pieces by the Japanese army. And this later led the Japanese Army to send an officer, Lieut. Colonel Tsuneoka Kanji, to Siam for the purpose of instructing Siamese in the use of these weapons. It was the first step to Japan's dispatching its first permanent military attaché to Siam.

Interestingly, the Japanese archives reveal that at first the Japanese Army Ministry did not intend to dispatch an army officer as resident military attaché. Lieut. Colonel Tsuneoka was expected to be sent for a short visit to Siam regarding the new weapons presented by the Japanese army. However, Prince Alongkot himself informed the Japanese Army that he agreed to accept Tsuneoka as a military attaché at the Japanese Legation. Consequently, Tsuneoka resided in Bangkok as the first Japanese military attaché to Siam until January 1931 (appointed officially December 10 1929). However, it is doubtful whether the Japanese army was filled with rapture over this Siamese concession, although it might have been debating sending a resident military attaché to Siam.

---

104 Interestingly, Siamese prince Thani seems to have shared such sentiment, saying also that "patriarchal rule was more suited to Eastern peoples than democratic institutions borrowed from the West." See Batson, op. cit., p. 134.
105 See JDA. 1-4-6-0-1-1. The Japanese Foreign Ministry was very apprehensive of this conference, commenting to one newspaper that such a conference would needlessly create fear of Japanese aggressive imperialism in world opinion. Ibid.
107 Flood, op. cit., p. 30.

215
Yet certainly the Japanese military now had its own intelligence agent in place to obtain military information not only of Siam but also the Western Powers in Siam. The next military attaché succeeding Tsuneoka was Lieut. Colonel (later General) Giga Tetsuji. He was officially Japanese military attaché in Siam from January 1931 until March 1932. However, after Giga no military attaché from either the Japanese army or navy was sent to Siam until 1934. Despite the 1932/33 revolution in Siam, only in March 1934 did Japan resume sending its military attachés to the new Siam. What does this indicate? One explanation is that the Japanese military basically regarded Siam as a much less important place strategically than Manchuria, where the Japanese military was then busy. Indeed, very little information was dispatched by both Tsuneoka and Giga during 1930-32. Thus it might be understandable that the Japanese military stopped sending military attachés to Siam for a while. Such an indifferent attitude of the Japanese army (and the navy as well) continued until after the 1932/33 revolution of Siam, when it became evident that the new Siam's leaders inclined to change their traditional relations with Western Powers. The Japanese military seems then to have reconsidered Siam's military position in the context of their anti-western military strategy in the whole Asia Pacific region.

Throughout the 1920's, when considering Japan's foreign policy regarding Southeast Asia, one can see how much the attention of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and military was concentrated on China and Manchuria, and, on the contrary, how peaceful and quiet Japanese relations with Southeast Asia were. The Gaimusho's interest in that region was limited to economic matters. The Japanese army and navy also seems to have almost discarded Southeast Asian affairs from the military point of view. General Matsui's approach to the Siamese military took place in a sense simply for a better understanding between the two sides, with some emotional (Pan-Asianistic) motivation but no clear plan. It was a markedly different attitude from that in contemporary Manchuria and China, or attitudes of the early 1940's. In the meantime, the cultural and economic relations between Japan and Siam were getting close from the 1920's onward, in particular after the setting up of the Japan Siam Society. The society contributed, on the one hand, to direct Japan-Siam relations, on the other, to shaping Japanese foreign policy towards Siam. The Japan Siam Society existed as an inconspicuous entity.

---

110 Ibid. Giga Tetsuji became famous as an airman in 1939 against the Russian air force in Manchuria. See the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, April 14, 1942.
because of its originally being set up for economic and cultural purposes. Throughout the 1930s, the Japan Siam Society helped to concentrate Japanese attention on Siam's trade and to some extent Siam's culture.\footnote{In 1935, Siamese students and teachers numbering thirty-five people from the National Music and Dance School in Bangkok visited Japan to present performances before the Japanese. Beginning in Tokyo, they visited Nagoya, Osaka, Okayama, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Kagoshima, and Dairen, Changchun, Mukden in Manchuria, Pyongyang, Seoul, Taegu, Pusan in Japanese Korea, and back to Kyoto in Japan. They presented their performance in total 23 times during April-May. The person who took charge of this group was Amada Rokuro. See The Proceedings of the Japan Siam Society, no. 2, no.3 in 1935. Both are filed in JDA. 1-1-10-0-2-14.} The Kansai [the middle southwest part of Japan] Japan-Siam Society and the Kobe Japan-Siam Society were established independently in 1935 and 1936 respectively. Apparently these Japan Siam Societies played roles in maintaining a more amicable relationship between the Japanese government and both the Siam of the absolute monarchy and the subsequent constitutional Siam. Then what were the relations between Japan and the new 'Thailand' after the 1932/33 Siamese revolution? This is the last question for this study.
Chapter 9

The Siamese revolution in 1932/33, a spring-board for closer relations between Japan and the new Siam

Politically and economically, the 1930's were a period of crisis, triggered by the Great Depression in 1929. The latter brought about social instability and political disturbance in many countries. In the west, the Spanish overthrew their monarchy in 1931 and built a new republican Spain, based on a constitution. And in Germany the Nazis became the ruling party in 1932, and the following year Hitler was appointed as premier. In East Asia, the Japanese military plotted the Manchuria incident, and Japan's isolation from international society increased. In Siam, the June Revolution took place in 1932.

This last chapter is designed to describe the relations between Japan and Siam during the early 1930's. It is appropriate to end the present study at this point for two reasons. Firstly, subsequent relations up to the outbreak of the Pacific War between both countries have already been discussed in detail by Thadeus Flood.

Secondly, more significantly the early 1930's were a most important period for the subsequent relationship of solidarity between Japan and Siam up to 1945. The 1930's witnessed an unprecedented closeness in the relations between the two countries. These relatively warm relations between the two governments seem to have stemmed from the international political situation surrounding Japan, and also internal political changes in Siam in the 1930's; Japan was increasingly getting involved in a struggle with China because of the conduct of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria. The second Wakatsuki government and Shidehara, its Foreign Minister, were put in a difficult position by the Kwantung Army disputing their claim to represent the Japanese people and national interests.

On the other hand, the Kingdom of 'Siam' as it was still called, saw the end of absolute monarchy and after ensuing fluctuating domestic political changes, a new Siamese government finally gained a firm control of the whole kingdom. At the same time, in this period one might see both increasing anti-western feeling in Japan, and a changing attitude in Siam towards the Western Powers. Elements in both countries seem to have shared a fundamental sentiment: anti-western feeling, if not a desire to challenge western domination in Asia. Such emotion could be transformed into a feeling of solidarity or Pan-Asianism.
For relations during the early 1930's, Flood commenced his own study in 1928, but there are still various matters requiring further attention in the years 1928-33. In particular, the role of the Japanese Minister to Siam, Yatabe Yasukichi, during this period should be examined more thoroughly. This chapter concentrates on the relations between him and Siam's new leaders of the 1932/33 revolution. In doing so, Yatabe's views on the new Siam will be highlighted. Why Yatabe? Because he was an expert on Siam's affairs at that time, with a comprehensive knowledge of Siam's current internal circumstances and its relations with other nations. In the Japanese diplomatic service it was hard to find any suitable person other than Yatabe, who could then give relevant, up-to-date information on Siam. His opinions on Siam clearly influenced Japanese policy-making at the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo.

Before we examine the above question, the political situation of both Japan and Siam during the early 1930's should be outlined so that we have a clear picture of their circumstances.

9-1. The political and economic situation of Japan during the 1930's

The 1930's opened with the London Naval Conference which began on the 21st January 1930. The new cabinet of the Japanese government, inaugurated in the previous year, was led by Premier Hamaguchi Osachi with Shidehara Kijuro in his second term as Foreign Minister. The Japanese delegation to the conference led by the former premier (1926-27), Wakatsuki Reijiro, had been instructed to insist on a 10:7 non-capital ship tonnage ratio between Japan and Britain and the United States. But the Western Powers refused to agree to this. The negotiation faced rough going. The delegation of the United States offered a compromise. This compromise which still provided for a lower ratio split the Japanese Navy high command. It was severely criticised by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, but the Hamaguchi Cabinet decided to approve the lower ratio in face of strenuous objections from the Navy. The treaty was signed in April, 1930.¹ Clearly, however, the Army was also discontented with the government. The incident symbolic of this was the shooting of Premier Hamaguchi in November by an ultranationalist. Also a coup d'État was planned by an ultranationalist group named 'Sakurakai'

(the Cherry Blossom Society),\(^2\) called 'Sangatsu jiken' (The March incident) which proved unsuccessful, but inspired a subsequent series of plots by army officers.\(^3\)

As for Manchuria, economically, politically, and strategically, it was believed that Japan's future hinged on the protection of Japan's interests in Manchuria. The threat of a revenge attack by Russia, after 1917 also a Communist country, American efforts to construct railways in competition with the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railways, and the Depression provoked a sense of crisis in the Japanese government.\(^4\) Such a mood of desperation, along with the growing success of the anti-Japanese Chinese Kuomintang government, prompted severe popular criticism of the Japanese Foreign Ministry under Shidehara Kijuro, now a member of the second Wakatsuki Cabinet formed in April 1931. The Opposition party, the Seiyukai, condemned Shidehara's diplomacy. It was the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria which had already prepared for settlement of the Manchuria issue by force. It eventually took military action in September 1931. Premier Wakatsuki called an emergency cabinet meeting to consider how to deal with the situation. The government desired to solve this crisis by direct negotiation with the Chinese government, but China a few days later raised the matter with the Council of the League of Nations.\(^5\)

In the economic field, the Wakatsuki cabinet faced difficulty in dealing with the economic crisis in Japan. The Wall Street crash in 1929 and the consequent world-wide Depression damaged the Japanese economy severely. American demand for Japan's most important export at that time, raw silk, fell suddenly. Japanese farmers whose secondary income came from the sericulture industry were unable to maintain their purchasing power. The industrial production and employment also fell because of plunging domestic demand. The Japanese economy fell into catastrophe.\(^6\)

What is more, England's abandonment of the gold standard in September 1931, and devaluation in England and her colonies, made the price of Japanese exports much higher in

---


\(^3\) For details of the March Incident, see Crowley, op. cit., pp. 93-102. Also Yoshii Kenichi, 'Sangatu jikenn to rikugun choken bakuryo so (The March incident and the nucleus staff of the army)' in *Jinmon kagaku kenkyu*, no.67, July 1985, pp. 41-70.

\(^4\) Mikiso Hane, op. cit., pp. 237-238.


those markets. In consequence, the entire Wakatsuki cabinet resigned in December 1931. The new government of Premier Inukai Tsuyoshi immediately quit the gold standard within one day of assuming office.7

In Manchuria, the Kwantung Army was now manoeuvring for the establishment of an independent local state, persuading the last emperor of the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty, Hsuan-t'ung (Henry Pu-yi, 1906-1967), to leave Tientsin. Their plan to establish a so-called independent state in Manchuria was realized on 1 March 1932. The Protocol between Japan and the new 'Manchukuo' was signed on the 15th September. It was not unexpected that Japan might withdraw from the Geneva-based League of Nations when the Kwantung Army, this time on the orders of the Admiral Saito government, advanced its troops into Jehol. The League's Committee of Nineteen charged with examining the Manchuria Incident drew up a report insisting on the withdrawal of Japanese troops into the railway zone, and the recognition of China's sovereignty in Manchuria. Within one month, an imperial rescript announced Japan's withdrawal from the League, and a communication to this effect was sent to the League.

In September 1933, Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya resigned because of ill-health and died three years later. In his place, another career diplomat, the ex-ambassador to the Soviet Union (1930-32), Hirota Koki, was chosen as foreign minister. His problem was to somehow reduce confrontation with the Powers, particularly America, the Soviet Union, and China, and simultaneously to enlarge and secure Japan's interests in Manchuria. However, this ambivalent foreign policy, the so-called Hirota diplomacy, against expectations, scored some points, during 1934-35, in diplomatic relations with the Kuomintang government and the Soviet Union. But in the field of domestic politics, the 1934 Admiral Okada Keisuke Cabinet (until 1936), appointed new ministers who were concessionary to the military, and the political influence of the latter resumed. A clear example was the setting up of the Manchuria Office in the Cabinet; the first Governor-General was the concurrent War Minister General Hayashi Senjuro. By this measure, the role of the Japanese Foreign Ministry dwindled, and the further upheavals of 1936-7, while changing the personnel in power, made little difference in these respects.

7 For details of Japan's ending of the gold standard, see ibid., pp. 65-71.
The political and economic situation of the new Siam

The 1930's in Siam might be divided into four periods for our convenience; the first period is 1930-32. This was the period of the decline of King Prachathipok's government (1925-1935). The second period is 1932-33, the year of two coups, that of June 1933 completing the transfer of power to a new regime. The third is 1933-38. During this time, Phraya Phahon Phahonphayuhasena (Phote Phahonyothin), one of the promoters of the 1932 coup d'état, served as prime minister in consequence of the June 1933 coup, until he resigned from the premiership. The fourth is 1938-41. Luang Phibunsongkhram (Plaek Phithakangha), also one of the 1932-3 plotters and a key person in Japan-Thai relations during the Second World War, succeeded Phraya Phahon in 1938 and served until 1944, and later again in 1948-57. It was under him that the Japan-Thai Alliance was concluded in 1941.

The economic, financial, and trade conditions of the Siamese state, which had been caused by the World Depression, were the most urgent issue under King Prachathipok. Economic issues turned into political problems at various levels. The Supreme Council set up three days after the death of King Wachirawut (26 November 1925), sought to make its effort to meet this economic crisis.

Siam like Japan also suffered from England's unexpected abandonment of the gold standard. This affected Siam's rice exports severely. The issue as to whether Siam remained on the gold standard or not was discussed carefully in the meetings of the Supreme Council. It took about eight months until Siam finally abandoned the gold standard. On May 11, 1932 King Prachathipok approved Siam's going off the gold standard, which later stimulated Siamese rice exports.

However, before the government's economic policy produced an effect, and while government counter-measures to meet the economic crisis was not going well, criticism of the royal family had already swelled since the Supreme Council consisted mostly of the royal family. It was this growing unpopularity of the royal family among the Siamese during the Seventh Reign that became a critical factor which brought about the 1932 coup d'état.

---


222
In particular, radical Siamese students abroad took a severely critical attitude towards the royal family. Among such radical students in Paris were the idealist Pridi Phanomyong (Luang Pradit Manutham), who later served in the Ministry of Justice and was a law lecturer at Chulalongkorn University, and the realist Luang Phibunsongkhram who was a promising military officer.\textsuperscript{10} The June 1932 coup d'état in Siam, led by the 114 promoters comprising army and navy officers and civilians, was planned carefully and completed swiftly with only one casualty.\textsuperscript{11} At the early stage of the new regime, the original young Promoters, i.e. Pridi Phanomyong and others, remained largely behind the scenes, leaving actual political power to a small number of rather conservative senior military men. Phraya Phahon, and Phraya Song Suradet (Thep Phantumasen) were the most important of such senior officers.\textsuperscript{12} Under this new leadership, the provisional constitution was promulgated on June 27, and the first, nominated National Assembly followed.

In December 1932, a so-called 'permanent' constitution came into force. Around that time, the latent factional conflict of the new regime government began to be evident between the conservative and radical plot Promoters. The most significant incident in 1933 was the new June coup d'état which stemmed from this confrontation. The 1933 second coup d'état proved very important for the history of Siam, arguably perhaps more than the previous 1932 coup d'état. For the Promoters, this 1933 incident was the guarantee of their future domination in Siamese politics; the first premier, Phraya Mano, was replaced by new prime minster Phraya Phahon, and seven of the Promoters were appointed as ministers.\textsuperscript{13}

Miyazaki Shinro, who was Japan's chargé d'affaires during 1933-34 in Bangkok, who was instructed by his government to escort Pridi during his stay in Japan in 1935, later reported to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Hirota Koki, what he heard privately from Pridi. Miyazaki noted that it was a heart-to-heart talk. In it, Miyazaki revealed that he was told by Pridi about the background to the 1933 coup d'état which overthrew Phraya Mano, that it happened because Phraya Mano was being influenced by the former official of the Department of the Treasury in

\textsuperscript{10} For details of the ideology of Thai students abroad, see Thawatt, op. cit., pp. 77-83, and profiles of young promoters of the coup d'état see ditto pp. 5-12.

\textsuperscript{11} For details of the 1932 coup d'état, see Thawatt, op. cit., pp. 30-42, and for a well-summarised description, Brailey, Thailand and the Fall of Singapore, pp. 25-50.

\textsuperscript{12} For profiles of the senior promoters of the coup d'état, see Thawatt, op. cit., 13-20.

\textsuperscript{13} For details of the 1933 coup d'état, see Brailey, Thailand and the Fall of Singapore, pp. 51-61. Thawatt, op. cit., pp. 162-170.
British India, James Baxter, as Siam's Financial Adviser, and the American Foreign Affairs Adviser, R.B. Stevens, to follow reactionary policies.\textsuperscript{14}

Another political event which tested the leadership of the Promoters in the new Siam was the so-called Prince Boworadet rebellion in October 1933.\textsuperscript{15} By this incident, Luang Phibun who defeated Prince Boworadet could step fully into the political arena. During the Phahon regime 1933-38, several progressive policies designed by Pridi and the other Promoters were implemented. In diplomatic and financial fields, one can identify several progressive aspects. From August 1935 to January 1936, Interior Minister Pridi (1934-36) took a trip to Europe including Britain, and then Japan. His ten-days visit to Japan, arriving in late December 1935, was to study the Japanese banking system and confer with Japanese experts since he expected to become finance Minister in Siam when he returned there.\textsuperscript{16} On the other hand, his visit to Britain was to negotiate for a three million pound loan agreement with the Bank of England.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, when instead Pridi became foreign minister on his return to Bangkok (until 1938), he began to negotiate for revision of Siam’s unequal treaties, which resulted at last in the complete abolition of such treaties in 1939.

On December 26, 1938, Luang Phibunsongkhram became the third prime minister of modern Siam.\textsuperscript{18} During the Phibun regime, one could see drastic changes in both social and cultural aspects. Noteworthy was the change of the name of the country to 'Thailand' in 1939. It

\textsuperscript{14} Miyazaki Shinro, ‘A report concerning the speech and behaviour of Siamese Interior Minister, Luang Pradit during his stay in Japan’, dated January 3 1936 in JDA. L-3-3-0-8-12-1. Hereafter cited under ‘Miyazaki, A report concerning Pridi’.

\textsuperscript{15} For details of this incident, see Brailey Thailand and the Fall of Singapore, pp. 61-62. Thawatt, op. cit., pp. 201-214.

\textsuperscript{16} Behind this trip, there was an increasing political struggle between the military faction and the liberal civilian faction in Siam. Pridi left Bangkok with former Economies Minister, Phra Sarasat Pholakhan, who was going to Japan to settle in exile in Tokyo. See Flood, ‘Japan’s Relations with Thailand: 1928-41’, pp. 112-115, and pp. 123-124. For details of Pridi’s stay in Tokyo, and his talks with the chief of the East Asian Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Kuwajirna Shukei, see ibid., pp. 137-141.

Incidentally, when Pridi visited Japan in 1935, he revealed in his address at the luncheon party held by the Japanese Interior Minister, Goto Fumio, on 8 January, 1936, that he had referred to the Meiji Constitution when he had engaged in drafting the Siamese Constitution 3 years earlier, and ended his address by saying that "It is my thought that I will devote myself to the affairs of state, more and more following the example of Japan." See 'A report concerning the Siamese Interior Minister's visit to Japan', Toa Ikka (the First Section, East Asian Bureau), February 22, 1936, no.275 in L-3-3-0-8-12-1.

\textsuperscript{17} Pridi also disclosed to Miyazaki Shinro that Finance Adviser James Baxter strongly opposed this loan project. However, he was not trusted by the Siamese government because of his partial attitude in favour of Britain. Later, Baxter resigned from his post because of this distrust. Pridi disclosed that Baxter's resignation (October, 1935) was a good chance for him to promote the above loan project, thus he voluntarily assumed this task. Pridi continued saying that the Bank of England agreed to Siam's proposal for an unsecured loan provided that the new financial adviser should also be British. See Miyazaki, 'A report concerning Pridi', op. cit.

\textsuperscript{18} Phibun was born in 1897, which was the same year that the first Japanese Minister to Siam, Inagaki Manjiro, arrived in Bangkok to begin negotiation for concluding a treaty of friendship and commerce. In his last years, Phibun was exiled in Japan and died there in 1963.
was a time for arousing Thai nationalism against the Chinese in Thailand who were relatively rich and tended to control the Thai economy.

The focus of Phibun's Thai nationalism policy turned to recovery of irredenta, the portions of Laos west of the Mekong River which had been ceded to France after 1893. Fearful of possible occupation of these regions by the Japanese who were marching down from south China into French Indo-China, Phibun finally decided to invade Laos and Cambodia in November 1940. Japan now became a mediator between Thailand and the French rather than advance its troops into Thailand. At last, Phibun's desire for the retrocession was fulfilled.19

It might be said that in addition to his Pan-Asianistic nature, Phibun's pro-Japanese attitude was a kind of reflection of his anti-Chinese policy which accorded with Japan's attitude in the midst of its China War that began in 1937. His desire for retrocession of the old Siamese territories seems to have related indirectly to Japan's military strategy in the China War. The time for solidarity between the two sides was coming. In 1941, Phibun determined to conclude a military alliance with Japan.20

---


20 For more discussion of Phibun's pro-Japanese aspects, see Brailey, Thailand and the Fall of Singapore, pp. 86-93. Swan, 'Japanese relations with Thailand', op. cit. Ch.9 and 10. Regarding subsequent relations between Japan and Thailand after the 1941 Alliance, which seem to be of great interest to Western scholars, several recent works are available, Swan, op. cit., Ch.11 onward. Also by Reynolds, 'The Fox in the Cabbage Patch: Thailand and Japan's South Advance', pp. 1-19, also by Reynolds, 'General Nakamura Aketo: A Khaki-Clad Diplomat in Wartime Thailand' in Chaiwat and Reynolds, Thai-Japanese Relations in Historical Perspective, pp. 161-202, and by the same author, 'Aftermath of Alliance: the Wartime Legacy in Thai-Japanese Relations', pp. 66-87. And J. Stowe, forthcoming, Siam becomes Thailand.

Swan produces his own interpretations of the relations between Japan and Thailand in the period before outbreak of the Pacific War; the general view regarding Premier Phibun's attitude to Japan prior to the War is that the Thai government, led by Phibun, had not been expecting an attack for at least another two or three months. However, Swan argues a contrary conclusion, saying that Premier Phibun realized that a Japanese attack was imminent, and the Thai government was dealing with the Japanese all along. See Swan, 'Japanese relations with Siam', p. 145.

In his memoir on Phibun, Japanese Embassy translator in Bangkok in December 1941, Amada Rokuro, doubted at that time whether Phibun had really left for Prachinburi. He had the impression that Phibun had been staying on in Bangkok. Amada estimated that the Japanese army at that time had already begun to advance from the Thai-Cambodia border into Thai territory, and in such a situation, in his view, it was almost impossible that Phibun's car could have broken through the Japanese army. See Amada Rokuro, 'Thai koku genshu ko Phibun san no kotodomo (A Note on the Late Premier Phibun)'. This memoir was contributed to Nihon keizai shinbun (The Nihon Economic Newspaper) November 26, 1957, evening edition. But later Amada rewrote it, adding to his account of Phibun's behaviour in December 1941. This revised memoir has not been published. This Amada account was based on mere impressions, therefore, it is vulnerable because there is no ground in actual evidence. Yet the present author can not ignore his 'impression', that of a person who was an actual interpreter at that particular moment.
9-3. Japanese Minister Yatabe and Siam's second abstention at the League of Nations

9-3-1. Yatabe and the 1932 coup d'état

The first report on the 1932 Siamese coup was telephoned to Berlin by a German airwoman, Frau Ezdorf, who was staying in Bangkok after her trip to Japan in the summer of the previous year.\(^{21}\) The Japanese heard the news of the Siamese revolution from the evening paper, \textit{Tokyo Nichinichi}, the next evening.\(^{22}\) At the Siamese Legation in Tokyo, acting Minister Suphan Worasa [?], and his secretary were sitting about waiting nervously for official contact from their country, saying to the press that they had also learnt the news from the Japanese newspaper, and could not think of any cause for this revolution.\(^{23}\) Baron Okura Kishichiro, friend of Prince Nakhon Sawan and Siam expert, claimed that the Great Depression was one of the causes of the Siamese upheaval, and that Siam would adopt a constitutional monarchy.\(^{24}\) At the Japanese Foreign Ministry, up-to-date information of the crisis was telegraphed continually by Yatabe Yasukichi, the Japanese Minister in Bangkok. Regarding Yatabe himself, 4 years had already passed since his arrival in Siam as Minister.

Indeed, Yatabe Yasukichi was a real witness to the 1932-33 revolution. He played a remarkable role in the relations between Japan and Siam when the subsequent 1933 Siamese coup occurred, as will be stated later. He had begun his diplomatic career as attaché to Siam in 1908 under Japanese Minister Yoshida Sakuya. Yatabe's position previous to his return to Siam had been Consul-General at the strategically important port of Tsing-Tao in Shantung province in China, facing the Yellow Sea, where up to 1915 there had been a German base.\(^{25}\) He had arrived in Bangkok July 28, 1928.\(^{26}\) Since then Yatabe had tried to gain the confidence of Siam's royal family, and to secure Japan's economic position in Siam. But his endeavours to investigate Siam's mineral resources as well as the over-active Japanese press activities in Japan had displeased the Siamese king, as stated in the previous chapter. (see Ch. 8-5) On the whole, the Siamese government, while noting Japan's economic progress and its military power, was suspicious of Japan's interest to the South. Nevertheless, even before 1932, it is not accurate to

\(^{21}\) \textit{The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun}, June 26, 1932.

\(^{22}\) \textit{The Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun}, June 25, 1932.

\(^{23}\) \textit{The Osaka Asahi Shinbun (The Newspaper Osaka Asahi)}, June 26, 1932.

\(^{24}\) \textit{The Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun}, June 26, 1932. Thawatt also notes causes of the Siamese revolution other than the world depression. See Thawatt, pp. 100-101.


\(^{26}\) See Prince Traithot to Chao Phya Mahithon, August 4, 1928, no.100/9206 in R.7 T.21.5.

226
say that Siam's relations with Japan were entirely unfriendly. It seems that the Siamese government felt difficulty in dealing with Japan. It seems to have realized that it needed Japanese investment to develop its economy, but at the same time, it was to some extent fearful of Japanese interest in Siam, for instance after the 1931 events in Manchuria. And Minister Yatabe seems to have had the feeling that it was not easy for Japan to avoid provoking the Western Powers, in particular Britain, for Japan's trade with Siam was becoming a rival to Britain's at that time. But even in early 1932, Siam had declined to support a League of Nations' censure of Japanese behaviour in Shanghai (the so-called Shanghai jihen).\(^{27}\)

The Siamese coup d'état of June 24th, 1932 might have given Yatabe the hope that the traditional close relations between Siam and the Powers (Britain and France) would be damaged. The initial event showing the real independence of the new Siam under the Phraya Mano regime was its abstention, in February 1933, at the League of Nations, from voting to adopt the Lytton Report condemning Japan's conduct in Manchuria.\(^{28}\) It has been said that this decision of the Siamese government was 'merely a more severe assertion of Siamese neutrality than had ever been the case under the old monarchy'.\(^{29}\) But behind this Siamese behaviour, interestingly, there seems to have been Minister Yatabe's endeavours to persuade the Siamese government to oppose the Lytton Report.\(^{30}\)

9-3-2. Neutrality or solidarity? Yatabe's views on Siam's abstention

The very valuable historical evidence regarding Siam's League stance which was cited previously by Flood, could be interpreted differently than he did. A secret memoir of about 10 pages written by Yatabe's secretary, Miyazaki Shinro, discloses that before the General

\(^{27}\) The issue was taken into consideration at the League of Nations. But the Siamese absolute monarchy government instructed its representatives in Geneva to adopt a position of complete neutrality in the affair, because if the League voted economic sanctions it might affect Siam's already depressed rice trade. See Batson, The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam, p. 179 and p. 186 fn. 62.

\(^{28}\) Other Siamese abstentions at the League of Nations were in 1937 on the debate in the League on the Japanese action in China, the so-called Nikka jihen on the 7th July 1937 which brought about the Sino-Japanese War. See Flood, Japan's Relations with Thailand; 1928-41, pp. 182-183.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., p. 54.

\(^{30}\) In the Lytton Report (submitted to the League September 22, 1932), Japan's military acts at Mukden on the 18th September 1931 were characterized as illegitimate self-defence measures. The Report also rejected the claims to independence of Manchukuo because it was not established with the Manchurian people's support as a whole. But the Report did not totally deny Japan's interests in Manchuria. The real aim of the Report seems to have been control of the whole of Manchuria cooperatively by the Powers including Japan, so as to prevent the spread of Chinese revolution by making Manchuria a 'bulwark' against Communism. See Crowley, op. cit., pp. 185 below. For an interesting account of the process of drafting the Lytton Report, see David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (London, 1971), pp. 530-532.
Assembly vote Minister Yatabe several times visited the Siamese Foreign Minister, Phraya Siwisan Wacha, to discuss the matter of Manchuria. Miyazaki noted that:

In the end Minister Yatabe was told by the Siamese Foreign Minister that Siam's delegate would abstain from voting at the League of Nations on the matter of the Manchuria incident on the ground that Siam could not afford to support either Japan or China. Neither did Siam want to make enemies, because she was also an Asian country. Minister Yatabe, prior to the vote, already cabled to the Imperial government what he was told. 31

Though this talk was not an official written agreement, it is evident that Japan's delegate to the League of Nations could have predicted how Siam's delegate would behave at the voting. Thus it seems that the action of Matsuoka Yosuke at the vote of 24 February 1933, in rushing up to the Siamese representative and wringing his hand and pledging that Japan would fight alongside Siam if the latter fought against Western Powers, was a preconceived Japanese tactic to show the solidarity of the Asians before the Powers. 32

Another point which can be inferred from the above memoir is that Yatabe must first have asked the Siamese government to vote against the Lytton Report. But in consideration of its relations with the Western Powers, the Siamese government could not do so. However, at the same time, it would be difficult for Siam to decide to vote against Japan from the viewpoint of Siam's economic relations with Japan. Neutrality was the appropriate stance for Siam. Nevertheless, one question arises. Why did Siam send her delegate to the League of Nations at all? In other words, why did Siam not absent itself from the voting? Siam could have expressed its neutrality by means of absence from the voting. Why did Siam send her delegate to Geneva and abstain from the voting? There must have been some other reason than that it was Siam's severe assertion of her neutrality.

In this respect, Flood indeed pointed out that Siam sympathised with Japan, and it was true "because of a feeling among the Siamese leadership that the League of Nations was in fact excessively Europe-centered in its outlook, and failed to consider Asian realities." 33 The League of Nations was something like a mouthpiece of a now apprehensive western world hegemony, so that an appeasement policy towards Japan was pursued by the League, though lesser countries in the League were dissatisfied with such a tendency. Such feeling might also

31 Miyazaki Shinro, 'Yatabe koshi no taisen kosaku (The Strategy of Minister Yatabe)', June 15, 1942 in JDA. A-6-0-0-1-27, p. 5.
32 British Ambassador, Sir Francis Lindley P. C., took a sympathetic attitude towards Japan, and repeatedly pressed the Foreign Office in London to be tolerant of Japanese actions in Manchuria. See Brailey, 'Southeast Asia and Japan's Road to War', pp. 1002-3.
33 Flood, loc. cit.
have existed among the Siamese leaders. But can it be concluded immediately that Siam abstained from the voting only because it was dissatisfied with the existing League of Nations being Europe-centered? Also why did Siam sympathise with Japan? Was it only because Japan and Siam were both Asian? On this question, Yatabe Yasukichi produced an interesting view in 1936:

The conclusion of the Lytton Report was that Manchuria should be governed by an international committee while the League of Nations admitted that China kept its sovereignty over Manchuria. But this kind of arrangement could not be acceptable to the Siamese government. Siam had had painful experience of the foreign adviser system in her administration, and it has been said that Siam was a kind of country governed by international cooperative control under the guise of foreign advisers. Therefore, whatever the opinions of either Japan or China over Manchuria, the destiny of Manchuria were not a question for Siam. Siam simply could not accept the principle which the Lytton Report contained, that of international control over an Asian country, Manchuria. Moreover, there were over two million Chinese residents in Siam who were controlling its economy. If Siam had voted against the Lytton Report, these Chinese would have been provoked. The Siamese government wanted in fact to vote for Japan. But considering the Siamese Chinese, it could not afford to do so. There was no alternative to abstention. Yet it was significant that Siam was present at the vote and did abstain. It meant that Siam did not support the Lytton Report.34

This Yatabe analysis of the background to Siam's abstention might have derived from what he had discovered during the course of conversation with the Siamese Foreign Minister when he had tried to persuade Siwisan on the matter prior to voting. And it might be more convincing to emphasize such Siamese feeling than her dissatisfaction with the western-centered League of Nations.

Yatabe further commented on Siam's abstention:

Of course Siam's abstention did not have any effect on the decision of the League of Nations [to adopt the Lytton Report]. The real significance emerged in another respect. It was that Siam, a country which had been accommodating itself to the Western Powers, asserted its real independence before its own citizens. - - Further, Japan's unexpected thanks to Siam helped more to realize her own national independence. As a result, Siamese interest in Japan increased, triggered by this abstention. It was really epoch-making in the relations between Japan and Siam.35

Yatabe's view of Siam's abstention was based on his historical perspective, along with his good understanding of the Siamese leadership and people. Also, as the Japanese Minister living in Siam for several years, he seems to have gained a large number of Siamese friends.

34 Yatabe Yasukichi, 'Shamu yori kaerite no.7 (Returning from Siam)' in The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, March 3, 1936. This was Yatabe's memoire on Siam, compiled from an interview. Also see Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-33 (London, 1972), p. 284.
35 Ibid.
One of them was so in favour of Japan that Minister Yatabe tried to develop his special scheme for Japan's economic penetration of Siam as follows.

9-4. Yatabe's scheme of inviting a pro-Japanese Siamese politician to Japan

In January 1933, the Japanese Foreign Ministry received a telegram from Minister Yatabe. He asked for information whether or not the Japanese government would be able to invite the Siamese Commissioner-General of the Royal State Railways, Phraya Sithikan Banchong, to Japan in order to observe Japan's railway industry. According to Yatabe, Phraya Sithikan had become the Commissioner-General soon after the 1932/33 revolution, and he had been Yatabe's friend since he had been just the Director of Transport of the Royal State Railways. And when Phraya Sithikan had been the acting Commissioner-General some years before, Japan had made a successful tender to supply building materials for railway bridges in Siam. This had been the first time Japan had succeeded in exporting railway materials to Siam. Yatabe found that Phraya Sithikan was very much in favour of promoting good relations between Japan and Siam. 36

What Minister Yatabe cabled to Tokyo clearly shows his economic strategy in Siam. He later suggested to a newspaper that Japan, succeeding so far in exporting the products of its light industries, ie. cotton products, to Siam, should promote the export of its heavy industrial products as well. The Japanese government should supervise the Japanese exporters who were then competing in exporting goods to Siam. 37 Indeed Japan's cotton textile exports to Siam increased remarkably from less than 12 percent of the Siamese market (Britain then had over 28 percent) in 1925/26, to 70-75 percent by the mid 1930's (Britain, as still the next largest cotton products exporter to Siam, was down to 6-7 percent). 38 At the same time, Japan's heavy industry exports began to increase from the year 1931 when the Manchuria Incident happened. The iron industry also expanded remarkably after 1932. 39 Thus Yatabe's attitude to Siam, regarding extending Japan's heavy industry exports to Siam, coincided with Japan's industrial interests.

36 Yatabe to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Uchida Yasuya, January 2, 1933, no.1 in JDA. L-3-3-0-8-12.
37 Yatabe Yasukichi, 'Sharin o kataru (Talking about Siam)' in The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, September 3, 1933.
In the meantime, the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Railways, having already tendered for construction materials for railway bridges in Siam and failed several times, had succeeded in making a successful bid in 1930, probably due to Phraya Sithikan Banchong. On that occasion, the officials of the Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Railways in Tokyo discussed the policy of exporting Japan's heavy industrial products. They agreed that the involvement of the Japanese government in the activities of Japanese companies based on the 1930 contract with Siam was necessary, because whether the implementation was successful or not it would promote the name of Japan's heavy industry.

All the above efforts indicate that Minister Yatabe and the Japanese Foreign Ministry agreed that one of Japan's basic policies towards Siam was to promote the exports of Japan's heavy industrial products. Yet Yatabe was very cautious of the reaction of Western Powers. At any rate, it was evident that Minister Yatabe intended to promote Japan's relations with Siam much more by means of inviting Phraya Sithikan to Japan. And it seems that later it occurred to Yatabe to revive this scheme when the Phahon government took power in June 1933, following the earlier abstention from voting at the League of Nations.

The reply of the Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Railways in Tokyo to Yatabe was in the affirmative, although the journey would be an expense to the Japanese manufacturers of bridge-construction materials. Receiving the telegram from Tokyo, Yatabe promptly sounded out the intentions of Phraya Sithikan through the Bangkok office of the Japanese Mitsui Company. Phraya Sithikan's reply was that he desired to be invited formally by the Japanese Railways Minister, so that he would be able to get good marks from his government. It was decided that an invitation over the name of the Japanese Railways Minister would be sent to Phraya Sithikan.

However, this Yatabe plan was prevented by the Siamese political changes that took place in April 1933 prior to the June second coup. On 2nd April, Phraya Sithikan was replaced as Railways Commissioner General. Yatabe decided to drop his plan for inviting Phraya

40 See JDA. F-1-9-3-6.
42 Yatabe to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shidehara Kijuro, September 20, 1930, no.33 in JDA. F-1-9-3-6.
43 Uchida to Yatabe, February 21, no.7 in JDA. L-3-3-0-8-12.
44 Yatabe to Uchida, March 13, 1933, no.32 in JDA. L-3-3-0-8-12.
45 Uchida to Yatabe, March 31, 1933, no.16 in JDA. L-3-3-0-8-12.
46 Yatabe to Uchida, April 6, 1933, no.47 in JDA. L-3-3-0-8-12.
Sithikan to Japan because the matter of the invitation actually arose based on the personal relationship between Yatabe and Phraya Sithikan. Soon after Yatabe learnt the reason for Phraya Sithikan's reshuffle. It related to the Siamese abstention at the League of Nations. The Bangkok Times, April 8, reported that The Saigon Opinion had claimed that the Japanese Minister of Postal Services invited the Siamese Transport Minister to visit Japan, in return for the Siamese abstention in the previous month. Although the news was not correct, the Siamese government was reportedly anxious what impression the Western Powers derived from this news. Yet Yatabe later heard a rumour that Phraya Sithikan, by then the Director of Power Stations which was a lower rank, had close relations with Luang Pradit who was forced to go into exile (April-September 1933) due to his economic plan. Thus Yatabe understood that the reason for Phraya Sithikan's replacement was superficially linked with Siamese concern for the Western Powers, but in reality it was caused by the Siamese domestic political struggle. Consequently, Yatabe's scheme ended in failure.

9-5. Yatabe and the 1933 coup d'état

9-5-1 Yatabe in deliberation

For Yatabe, not the coup d'état of 24th June 1932, but the succeeding coup d'état of June 20, 1933, was something like a spring-board to develop Japan's relations with the new Siam according to his scenario. Indeed, he had already known through his intelligence service that Luang Phibun and Phahon planned a coup d'état and the time to put it into practice had come. Thus he might not have been so excited when the young planners of the second coup approached him through an interpreter to request military support for their coup. Yet Yatabe had to be circumspect in deciding how he should answer them. In fact he was in a position to

47 Yatabe to Uchida, April 6, 1933, no.65 in JDA. L-3-3-0-8-12.
48 Yatabe to Uchida, April 10, 1933, no.69 in JDA. L-3-3-0-8-12.
49 Yatabe to Uchida, June 3, 1933, no.109 in JDA. L-3-3-0-8-12.
50 It is interesting that after all Phraya Sithikan Banchong, with his son, visited Japan in 1937. See the Japanese Minister at Bangkok, Ishii Itaro, to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Sato Naotake, Match 25, 1937 in JDA. L-3-3-0-8-12. And on that occasion, he was given The Second Class of the Sacred Treasure, on the 24th April 1937, on the ground that he had contributed to Japan's exporting railway materials to Siam for a long time. See 'Gaimusho Memorandum' of 26th and 30th April 1933 in JDA. L-3-3-0-8-12. Phraya Sithikan was then in the post of Chief Mechanical Engineer of the Siamese Royal State Railways which was the same rank as vice-Minister, and had been established after his resignation as Commissioner General in 1933. See Ishii to Sato, April 13, 1937, no.85 in JDA. L-3-3-0-8-12.
51 Yatabe to Uchida, July 10, no.137 in JDA. A-6-0-0-1-27.
supply these weapons through the Bangkok Office of the Japanese Mitsui Company which actually had sold military supplies in late 1932 to the Phraya Mano regime. But Yatabe seems to have pursued Japan's peaceful economic penetration of Siam while reviewing Japan's relations with the Western Powers, Britain, France and America. Thus he only responded to the young Siamese that he was ready to help the new government after the coup d'état.

The June 1933 coup d'état led by Luang Phibun and Phraya Phahon was successful. It is very significant that next morning after their seizing power (June 19), the leaders of the coup d'état promptly invited Japanese Minister Yatabe to their headquarters, the Paruskawan Palace. It was symbolic behaviour to indicate how much Phibun and Phahon needed Japanese support to maintain their new regime. Britain favoured the conservative side (the Phraya Mano government) because of Britain's traditional intimate relations with the Siamese king who the Siamese conservatives supported. France also favoured the conservative side. She was fearful of the development of Siamese chauvinism regarding former Siamese territory. Therefore, it is quite understandable that Phibun and Phahon needed a third country which might help them. No country could have been considered except Japan.

It is unlikely that Japanese Minister Yatabe entirely believed from the first in the complete success of Phibun and Phahon without any counter-action against them. In fact, on the 20th June when he was invited to the coup d'état headquarters, Yatabe inquired of Phraya Phahon how his new government was treating Phraya Mano and other former cabinet members. On that occasion, in a ninety-minute secret meeting, Yatabe promised to give the new regime economic support from Japan. Nevertheless, Yatabe could not discard completely his link with the conservative side. His continuing relations with the Siamese conservatives can be seen from the fact that only a week after the June 1933 coup d'état, he played golf with ex-

53 Yatabe to Uchida, July 10, 1933, no.137 in JDA. A-6-0-0-1-27. (hereafter 'Yatabe report') This was Yatabe's detailed report on the June 1933 coup d'état. In it, it was reported by Yamaguchi Takeshi, of the staff of the Japanese Legation, that he met Miyakawa Iwaji who became involved in a plot of 1934, and got information that the Siamese government had ordered military supplies from the Mitsui Company in Bangkok. But Mitsui could offer only small amounts of weapons on the ground that factories in Japan producing military supplies were very busy at that time.

54 Miyazaki Shinro, 'Yatabe koshi no taisen kosaku', pp. 5-6, and Flood op. cit., p. 59.

55 Flood, op. cit., p. 58. The United States was also sympathetic to Prachathipok since his 1931 visit. See Bailey, Thailand and the Fall of Singapore, p. 35.

56 Yatabe Yasukichi, 'Yatabe report', op. cit.

57 Miyazaki Shinro, 'Yatabe koshi no taisen kosaku', p. 8, and Flood, op. cit., pp. 61-63. According to Miyazaki, Phahon told Yatabe at that meeting that "I [Phahon] have in the past been stationed in Japan, so that I understand Japan well. I believe that this country [Siam] will be able to develop by means of learning from Japan's experience of its development. My country is still like a baby. Therefore, I would like to ask for your support." Yatabe replied that "I agree as far as possible, but please do not betray Japan's friendship." See Miyazaki Shinro, 'Chakuri ocho botsuraku (The Fall of Chakri Dynasty)' in a magazine The Sunday Mainichi (in Japanese), October 20, 1950, pp. 81-85.

233
Foreign Minister, Prince Traithot, at the royal golf course, and conversed on the current Siamese political situation. Yatabe discovered that Prince Traithot was very much disappointed by the successful coup d'état of Phibun and Phahon, because Prince Traithot was one who had supported Phraya Mano and had had influence over Phraya Siwisan Wacha who had worked as vice-Foreign Minister under him.\(^{58}\) By contacting the conservative leader, Minister Yatabe seemed to be trying to judge how long the new Phibun and Phahon regime could last.

Consequently, Yatabe seems to have been given confidence in the continuing success of the new government by Phibun and Phahon's ardent attitude to their reform of Siam. However, it also seems that Minister Yatabe realized that he was not a Minister who would be able to promote Japan's relations with the new government. Apparently, he wanted to resign from the Japanese diplomatic service because his health was getting worse around that time. British Minister at Bangkok Sir J. Crosby later observed that Yatabe was suffering from diabetes and chronic rheumatism.\(^{59}\) Yatabe returned to Japan in late 1933.

9-5-2. Yatabe's lecture on the changes in Siam

At this time, we should note that Yatabe was called by the Japanese Emperor to lecture on the current Siamese political changes.\(^{60}\) He delivered a one and a half hour speech before the Emperor, and also probably cabinet members.\(^{61}\) From this, it can be said that the Japanese government at that time was quite interested in Siamese politics, and so wanted to hear about the current situation in Siam from Yatabe. What impression did the Emperor and others get from Yatabe's lecture? There is no documentation available to us, but it could be presumed that the apparent pro-Japan trend among Siam's new leaders gave the audience a fresh image of the new Siam. This is important, because hitherto the Japanese leaders tended to make light of Siam's affairs. But now they realized that the new Siam might be becoming sympathetic to Japan. Although the documentation does not tell us anything, it might be expected that Japan's policy to Siam would have been reconsidered by the government.

---

\(^{58}\) Yatabe Yasukichi, 'Yatabe report', op. cit.

\(^{59}\) Sir J. Crosby to Sir John Simon, January 3, 1935 in FO.422/90/no.5.

\(^{60}\) The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, December 13, 1933.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., December 15, 1933.
At any rate, this lecture was Yatabe's great honour, and an event memorable enough to mark his retirement from diplomatic service. But in fact he was not to retire until August 1937. At first it was reported that the succeeding Japanese Minister to Siam would be no one less than the Chief of the East Asia Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, Kuwajima Shuken. However, it seems that still nobody except Yatabe was regarded as a suitable person to handle the issues affecting the new Siam. Consequently, Yatabe again returned to Bangkok as Minister in 1934. So Kuwajima remained in his post in Tokyo until 1937.62

During Yatabe's absence in Japan, Miyazaki Shinro had served as Chargé d'affaires ad interim,63 and like Yatabe experienced great uneasiness over Iizuka Shigeru. Reportedly, Iizuka was involved in Prince Nakhon Sawan's plot to overthrow the Phahon government in 1934.64 Iizuka was a wealthy businessman who was an important official of the Okura-gumi in Sumatra.65 Why did Iizuka become a contact man for Prince Nakhon Sawan, the strong-man of the absolute monarchy regime overthrown in 1932, who had been exiled to Java in 1932, and take a letter to King Prachathipok for him? It was probably because of the friendship between Baron Okura Kishichiro and Prince Nakhon Sawan since 1927 when the former visited Siam in order to seek a Siamese patron for the Japan 'Siam Society' which was to be established in Tokyo. Baron Okura was enthusiastic for the plan. On that occasion, he met Prince Nakhon Sawan who later became the Patron. (See Ch.8-4) Thus it is likely that Baron Okura was inclined somehow to help Prince Nakhon Sawan who was in difficulty in Java.

However, it is unclear whether Okura Kishichiro and Iizuka really intended to join Prince Nakhon Sawan's plot. Although Iizuka was ordered by Okura to help Prince Nakhon Sawan, Okura himself must have realized what would happen to the relations between Japan and Siam if this became public. Further, considering Okura's earlier links with the Japanese government and the military, he can only have been intended to help Prince Nakhon Sawan by means of supplying weapons. Thus this Iizuka activity would never involve any actual military support.

62 Ibid., December 28, 1933.
64 Flood, op. cit., pp. 66-69.
65 Ibid., p. 86 fn. 23. For Okura-gumi see ch.8-4. Iizuka was later elected for Saitama prefecture to serve in the Lower House of the Tokyo Diet. He died in Taipei when he was travelling the Nan'yo region in 1944-45. See The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, January 18, 1945.
Iizuka's behaviour worked as something like a touchstone for Yatabe and the Japanese Foreign Ministry. For the Iizuka affair made it clear that Yatabe and the Japanese Foreign Ministry took the side of the revolutionaries in Siam.

The Siamese revolutionary government, meanwhile, appointed Phraya Aphiban Rachamaitri to be Foreign Minister and Lieut. Commander Luang Damrong Nawathwathi to be the Secretary-General of the Cabinet. Both were friendly to Japan, and according to one Japanese source, the latter assumed the role later of Japan's 'faithful spokesman'.66 The relations between Japan and the new Siam rapidly became closer.

The main concern of Minister Yatabe at that time in Japan's relations with the new Siam as representative of the Gaimusho remained economic issues as before 1932. His attitude had already been expressed when he met Phraya Phahon and Luang Phibun on the day of the coup d'état in June 1933.67 Yatabe wanted the Phahon government to employ a Japanese economic adviser, but the new Siam government was reluctant to do so perhaps because of its wish to completely abolish the foreign adviser system.68

Yatabe was a strong promoter of Japan's economic relations with Siam. He concentrated on promoting Japan-Siam-Manchukuo economic relations.69 This was a farsighted attitude, because the first Konoe cabinet (June 1937-January 1939) advocated a comprehensive five-year plan in Japan. The cabinet insisted that the planning in both Japan and Manchukuo should be coordinated.70

Yatabe did not particularly want Siamese recognition of the Manchukuo government. He thought that economic advantages were much more important for Japan than political ones.71 The Japan-Siam trade figures fell into imbalance at that time due to Japan's prohibition since 1933 of Siamese rice imports to protect the Japanese rice industry.72 Yatabe suggested as

67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., p. 9.
69 The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, February 15, 1936.
71 The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, February 15, 1936.
72 Yatabe Yasukichi 'Shamu yori Kaerite no.5 (Returning from Siam)' in The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, February 29, 1936.
some sort of substitute for Siamese rice export to Japan that Siamese rice should be imported into Manchukuo.\textsuperscript{73} He also advocated that Japan should buy all Siam's row cotton.\textsuperscript{74}

Yet it was his distinction among contemporary Japanese economic protagonists that Yatabe pointed out that apart from economic matters, Japan had never contributed to closer cultural relations with Siam.\textsuperscript{75} He believed that Japan should be a faithful friend of the new Siam.\textsuperscript{76} He can apparently be categorised as an idealistic Pan-Asianist.

As Yatabe predicted, indeed, the subsequent relations of both countries became much closer than ever before, but it was this that led independent Siam, or "Thailand" after 1939, via eventual alliance with Japan, to gain the reputation of a defeated country like Japan in the 1941-5 War.

\textsuperscript{73} The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, February 15, 1936.
\textsuperscript{74} Yatabe Yasukichi 'Shamu yori kaerite no.5', op.cit.
\textsuperscript{75} Yatabe Yasukichi 'Shamu yori kaerite no.3 (Returning from Siam)' in The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, February 27, 1936.
\textsuperscript{76} Yatabe Yasukichi 'Shamu yori kaerite no.4 (Returning from Siam)' in The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, February 28, 1936.
This is a case study thesis concerning Japan's diplomatic relations during the Meiji, Taisho, and early Showa eras. Generally, there seem to be two approaches to this subject. The first is to investigate Japan's relations with the so-called Western Powers, i.e. Britain, France, Russia, Germany, America, and so on. The second is to discuss the matter in the context of Japan's relations with China and Korea. Both approaches have been popular and numerous academic works have been produced.

By contrast, the present thesis has focused upon Japan's relations with a Southeast Asian country which is not a popular object of historical study in regard to Japanese diplomacy, although the significance of this region for contemporary Japan is increasing yearly in terms of economic, cultural, and perhaps political aspects. In particular, this study focuses on Siam up to the early 1930's.

Despite Siam and other Southeast Asian countries having been neglected in studies of Japanese foreign relations, it is my contention that they are important in helping us to understand the correlation between so-called Japanese 'imperialism' and Japanese Pan-Asianism; the former of which has been almost unquestionably regarded by many scholars as the fundamental feature of modern Japanese historical phenomena.

Yet Pan-Asianism was the essential factor to the solidarity movement between Japan and Siam after the 1932/33 Siamese revolution. Arguably, it led to the eventual conclusion of a Japan-Thailand Alliance in 1941, and also provided the real context and the key motives to Japan raising its profile in world affairs between 1931 and 1945.

It was Siam that initiated the resumption of diplomatic relations with Japan after the opening up of the latter country. In the late 19th century, Siam suffered from the imperial competition between Britain and France, and seems to have sought a partner in order to resist western imperialism. At that time Japan also faced difficulty in its relations with the Westerners. The two countries were in a similar enough situation to understand each other.

The Otori Keisuke mission to Siam in 1875 was the first contact between both governments after the Meiji Restoration. It took place on the recommendation of the then British Minister in Tokyo, Harry S. Parkes, a former envoy to Siam, who suggested to the Meiji
Emperor sending a Japanese envoy to observe at first hand Siam's foreign policy towards the Western Powers. Ironically, this was the beginning of a process that afterwards saw Japan and Siam begin to develop close relations, and culminated with Britain, at the beginning of the Pacific War, losing its Far Eastern fortress, Singapore, to the Japanese who landed in the southern part of a not uncooperative Siam. After Otori's mission to Siam, a first formal step towards establishing friendly relations was begun with the first Japan-Siam declaration of friendship signed between the Siamese Minister, Prince Thewawong, and the Japanese vice-Foreign Minister, Aoki Shuzo, in 1887. The encouragement given by Ernest Satow, the British Minister in Siam, towards the conclusion of a treaty with Japan, played a significant part in the development and direction of Siam-Japan relations with which Prince Thewawong was closely involved.

Meiji Japanese interest in Siam at that time can be characterized by its romantic missionary sentiment. The Franco-Siam Incident (1893) provoked some greater Japanese interest. This was pure Pan-Asianism. Simultaneously, Japan's concern also focused on economic interest in Siam. This was a time of great Japanese emigration. Iwamoto Chizuna, Ishibashi Usaburo, and probably Miyazaki Toten were among those who advocated Japanese emigration to Siam, but they were not so-called 'economic animals'. They wished for Siam's success in maintaining its independence, and in this sense, they were true Pan-Asianists.

However, under the Japanese Foreign Ministers, Okuma Shigenobu (1888-89), Enomoto Takeaki (1889-92), Mutsu Munemitsu (1892-96), and Saionji Kinmochi (1896), no remarkable progress in the relations between Japan and Siam can be traced. A clear Japanese policy towards Siam was not discussed seriously. It was only the energetic, English-educated Inagaki Manjiro, who gave the impetus to the next step in Japan-Siam relations. His 1894 trip to Siam, meeting Prince Thewawong to discuss concluding a treaty with Japan, was a historic advance in the relations between both countries. It should not be overlooked that Okuma Shigenobu seems to have been influenced by Inagaki, who reported personally to Okuma the result of his 1894 trip to Siam. Later, when Okuma became Japanese Foreign Minister for the second time in 1896-7, Okuma's desire for the conclusion of a treaty with Siam led him to ask General Kawakami to sound out Siam's intentions. On the other hand, Prince Thewawong, seeking a way to recover Siam's judicial autonomy, inclined to cooperate with the Inagaki and Okuma initiative. Prince Thewawong hoped a new treaty with Japan would be the break-
through leading to abolition of the Western Powers' extraterritoriality in Siam. In a sense, the 1898 treaty was the outcome of the determination of these three figures, ie. Inagaki who had a practical mind combined with his Pan-Asianism, Okuma Shigenobu who was a Pan-Asianist with a degree of pragmatism, and the patriotic Prince Thewawong, who was also a skilful diplomat.

Indeed, the 1898 treaty was epoch-making for the Siamese government because Japan's extraterritoriality was reserved to the Protocol and not in the main text. However, the Siamese government was not able to exploit this coup. Thus it was not until 1920 that a guarantee of future Siamese judicial autonomy was promised by the new treaty with the United States. Japan, facing the necessity of revising the 1898 treaty, could do nothing but follow the 1920 Siamese-American treaty. This time the 1924 Japan-Siam treaty confirmed the judicial autonomy regained by Siam.

During the years 1910-20, nothing much of significance occurred in Japan-Siam relations. However, after Japan obtained the former German territories in the Pacific Ocean in 1919, the Japanese turned to Siam, in pursuance of trade and general economic interests. This Japanese economic interest prodded Siam into being much more cautious of Japan, which was characterized as 'the Germany of the East' by the Siamese king, Wachirawut. But the Siamese government did not plainly express its displeasure or fear of the Japanese economic activities in Southeast Asia. Siam needed Japan's investment; she was in a dilemma. In these circumstances, the first South Seas Trade Conference was held by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 1926, involving also the Japanese Finance, Agriculture, and Communications Ministries. Many Japanese organizations and participants gathered to discuss comprehensively Japan's economic relations with Southeast Asia, the South Seas, and India. It was the best example of Japanese diplomacy and industrial interest in the southern regions at that time.

Coincident with this new Japanese economic interest in Southeast Asia, in the context of Japanese Pan-Asianism, Siam was increasingly paid attention to by the Japanese with the consequence that the Japan 'Siam Society' was set up in Tokyo in 1927 for the promotion of better understanding between both countries. Apparently the Japan 'Siam Society' was expected by the Japanese political, military, and industrial people to assist in giving the Siamese confidence in Japan, and developing Japan-Siam trade in order to break the British economic influence in Siam. Furthermore, the Japan 'Siam Society' desired to establish a branch in
Bangkok, but did not succeeded in doing so under the Siamese absolute monarchy. Siam could not completely give up the traditional links with the Powers, in particular with Britain.

It was with the 1932/33 Siamese revolution that this conventional relationship between Siam and the Powers came to be at risk. Instead of the Powers, Japan became the country which came to be regarded as a friend of the new Siam. By the Siamese abstention from voting at the League of Nations in February 1933 on the matter of the Manchuria incident, though Siam did not intend to appear to be in favour of Japan, Siam and Japan were seen as having cooperative relations in terms of not only economic but also political aspects. In the course of the political changes in Siam, the Japanese Minister in Bangkok, Yatabe Yasukichi, took part in promoting good relations with the new Siamese leadership. The economic situation in Siam was the first concern of Yatabe. Rather than political issues, Yatabe laid stress on economic and also cultural spheres in the new relations with Siam. However, it was at this point that Japan and Siam began to move towards military cooperation.

People in the history of relations between Japan and Siam

A leading Western historian on Japanese diplomacy pointed out that there had been a tendency to neglect 'personality' in Japanese foreign policy studies, and that many Japanese foreign ministers had appeared as 'cardboard figures'.¹ I share this view, and agree as a Japanese, that this tendency becomes even stronger where studies of Japanese foreign policy by Japanese are concerned, let alone studies of other Japanese diplomats. Thus in the present study I have attempted to focus on several people involved in Japan-Siam relations.

In the modern relations between Siam and Japan which dated from 1861, when a letter from the Siamese government under King Mongkut was received by the Japanese Bakufu, until the Siamese 1932/33 revolution, I incline to conclude that there were five important Japanese diplomats who actually and significantly took part in contributing to the Japanese-Siamese relations, ie. Inagaki Manjiro, Masao Tokichi, Arita Hachiro, Yada Chonosuke, and Yatabe Yasukichi. Apart from these five Ministers, it is true that there were a number of other Japanese involved in Siam's affairs. But generally in terms of diplomatic influence and of gratitude displayed by the Siamese government, not only under the absolute monarchy but also the revolutionary government, the above five most deserve to be noted.

¹ Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942, p. 2.
If Inagaki Manjiro, presently an unfamiliar figure in the study of Japanese diplomatic history, had not been involved in Siamese affairs in the late 1890's, Japan's relations with Siam would have turned out differently. It was fortunate for Japan and Siam that Inagaki was only thirty years old and basically just an idealistic young man with great political ambition when he began to be concerned with Siam's affairs. He was so young that he crossed the sea and met high Siamese officials. Inagaki might have thought that the position of Minister in Bangkok was one step towards future promotion. Indeed, he became the first Japanese Minister to Siam and concluded the 1898 Japanese-Siamese treaty with Prince Thewawong. He was later promoted to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Siam. But it was unfortunate for Inagaki that he was so farsighted to the extent that he might be regarded as merely a youth by the Meiji political leaders. Therefore he was sent to Spain afterwards, not to Britain or America where promising diplomats were usually sent.

Inagaki died soon after his arrival as Minister in Madrid at the age of forty-seven. It is assumed that Inagaki's health was originally damaged by the Siamese climate. If Inagaki had lived longer, he could have become a high-ranking official in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and we could have read interesting accounts of his diplomatic experience. Indeed he was an eloquent speaker and a prolific writer. His *Japan and the Pacific* was a unique work. It is a subject for future study as to how Inagaki could publish such a book so early in England.

After Inagaki returned to Japan in 1905, relations with Siam became inactive until 1920, though several Japanese advisers to the Siamese government contributed to the maintenance of friendly relations between the two countries. But the 1920's saw a revival of Japanese awareness of Siam stemming from Japanese enthusiasm for Pan-Asianism and anti-Western sentiment. Also during this period the 1898 treaty came due for revision. Someone who contributed to the revision negotiations for the 1898 treaty was the later Japanese Foreign Minister, Arita Hachiro. His involvement in this issue was rather accidental and very short (five months), but his stay in Siam and his later observation tour around Southeast Asia en route to Japan gave him a fundamental knowledge and perception of these regions. Based on his experience, he suggested that the Japanese Foreign Ministry adopt a positive attitude towards these regions, and seems to have had a lasting influence on the policy-making of the Japanese Foreign Ministry at least as regards Siam.
The revision negotiations for the 1898 treaty were carried on by the next Japanese Minister to Siam, Masao Tokichi. He could be seen as having been one of Inagaki's rivals during their simultaneous spell in Bangkok, though Inagaki was nine years older than him. While Inagaki graduated from Cambridge, Masao got a doctorate from Yale. Yet Masao achieved more than Inagaki in terms of length of stay in Siam (sixteen years in all), and in his contribution to Siamese internal affairs; Masao's role in drafting the Siamese modern criminal and civil-commercial codes was a permanent achievement. Not only that, during the course of drafting, Masao's credit with the Siamese government increased. Masao, after his 1913 return to Japan, made an effort to promote trade with Siam. His good relations with the Siamese leaders later led him to be appointed Minister to Siam because he was expected to be able to influence Prince Thewawong who was responsible for the revision work of the 1898 Japanese-Siamese treaty. However, Masao unfortunately died soon after his arrival in Bangkok (1921), and Thewawong followed soon after (1923).

Thus the difficult Siamese climate took the lives of two Japanese diplomats.

Masao's duties were taken over by Yada Chonosuke. His contribution to relations between Japan and Siam was limited to his skilful diplomacy leading to completion of the revision negotiations for the 1898 treaty. Yada was merely a professional diplomat who did not have the academic mind of Inagaki or Masao. But he quickly grasped the diplomatic situation surrounding the Siamese government, and especially Siam's experience of extraterritoriality and the foreign adviser system. Yada was a pragmatist. Well understanding Siam's diplomatic history, and simultaneously considering Japan's benefit, he was able to complete the negotiations to mutual benefit.

Yatabe Yasukichi was, like Yada, a career diplomat. His major concern was Japanese economic penetration of Siam. Although he tried to obtain the goodwill of the Siamese government, his research activities into Siam's natural resources and his intelligence activities created displeasure among the leaders of the Siamese absolute monarchy. It is evident that Yatabe was rather close to the revolutionary leaders in Siam. His connection with Luang Phibun and also Phraya Phahon who asked Japan's military support for the 1933 coup d'état, and their subsequent invitation to Yatabe to meet them at revolutionary headquarters, indicated that Japan and Siam would become good partners in Asia. His role in the smooth transfer of relations from the old leaders, under the absolute monarchy, to the new Siamese leaders, was noteworthy. In
particular, his efforts to persuade the Siamese government to abstain in the League of Nations in 1933 was remarkable. As he himself said later, the event made the Siamese realize much more clearly that both Japan and Siam were independent countries in Asia. Siam consequently would become closer to Japan in 1941.

The Siamese leaders also cultivated good relations between Japan and Siam. Among these leaders, King Chulalongkorn and Prince Thewawong should be mentioned first. That Inagaki Manjiro and Masao Tokichi were able to play their active parts in the relations between both countries owed much to King Chulalongkorn's understanding of Japan's position in the Far East. Japan was used partly as an example in the king's plan of reformation of the country. The 1887 Japanese-Siamese Declaration of Friendship was concluded due to King Chulalongkorn's final deliberate decision. Prince Thewawong had such an affinity for Japan that he wished his daughter to be educated by Japanese teachers, Yasui Tetsu and others, at the Rachinee School (Queen's School) in Bangkok. Prince Thewawong was an experienced diplomat. He was the man who had to make decisions in the various negotiations with foreign countries. Needless to say, he had to take into consideration the interests of Siam. Thus although he first agreed with Inagaki that the Siamese government should admit Japan's judicial extraterritoriality in Siam, during negotiations afterwards he refused to do so. However, it might be said that in the mind of both King Chulalongkorn and Prince Thewawong there was a sentiment of solidarity of Asians or a Pan-Asianistic sense, though it might not be exactly the same as that of the Japanese.

Pan-Asianism: an important aspect in the history of Japan-Siam relations

Pan-Asianism is a very ambiguous term in both its Japanese and non-Japanese contexts. It has been said that Pan-Asianism is an opinion which holds that Asian people should be consolidated in order to resist Western imperialism. But I incline to define Pan-Asianism in the broadest sense as a feeling, no more than that, which holds that Asian people should foster their fellow feeling in order to promote their political, economic, and cultural understanding. Yet when one talks about Pan-Asianism, and the Japanese version in particular, it can be confused with expansionism, aggressive policy, nationalism, ethnocentrism, patriotism, and ultranationalism. It has been quite difficult to distinguish Japanese Pan-Asianism from these concepts. It might be safe to say that Japanese Pan-Asianism is something like 'inclination', and not to be defined as 'dogma'.
In this context, Nanshin-Ron (Southward Advance) should be included in Japanese Pan-Asianism. It might be said that Pan-Asianist in the original sense meant Japanese people who were concerned with areas to their West and North, ie. China, Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia. On the other hand, those people who propounded 'Nanshin-Ron' were usually looking to the South; ie. Java, Sumatra, Singapore, the Philippines, the Malay Peninsula, Siam, Vietnam, the South Sea Islands, and sometimes including the Antipodes. In this sense, one might say that Nanshin-Ron can be separated from Pan-Asianism. But it is difficult to say clearly that orthodox Pan-Asianists were not interested in the South at all. If Pan-Asianists were only those people who were concerned with China and Korea etc., according to historical record, Pan-Asianism would largely correspond with ultranationalism and a policy of aggression. But Pan-Asianism did exist without aggression. Miyazaki Toten was the best example. He was involved in Siamese and Filipino affairs though he thought about both in the context of the Chinese revolution. He paid attention to Siam and the Siamese with the aim of affording help against Western imperialism. He also sincerely hoped that the Chinese revolution should be successful. Inagaki Manjiro also looked to both China and Korea, and the South. His proposals to the Toho Kyokai (The Oriental Society) covered wide-ranging aspects in the pursuance of only peaceful expansionism.

Those later Japanese diplomats who held a Pan-Asianist and sympathetic attitude towards Siam, including Masao, Yada, Arita, Yatabe, etc., were not an organized group within the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and the latter itself took a relatively indifferent attitude towards Siam. But it is to be presumed that in the Japanese Foreign Ministry from the Meiji era on, there were many people who could be categorised as Pan-Asianist even on Chinese and Korean issues.

Japan's relations with Siam are in stark contrast with the relations Japan experienced with the Western Powers. Before the Great War 1914-18, the West still had no great respect for Japan. After the end of the war, the 1920's and the period through to the end of the Pacific War, saw growing Western dislike of Japan. By contrast, throughout the years after the Meiji Restoration, Japan's relations with Siam generally featured mutual understanding, although during 1910-20, they were quite quiet. Moreover, the two countries did not deliberately try to maintain close relations all along. Japan's Far Eastern Asian policy was concerned mainly with Korea and China. The general interest of the Japanese government in Siam was not great. Yet
there was a latent sense of sharing common feeling against western imperialism in East Asia from the early Meiji era, because while Japan faced difficulty with the United States, Russia, Britain and France, Siam was also in an intractable situation between British and French imperialism. However, Siam's foreign policy pursued neutrality as far as possible, and Japanese governments similarly avoided unnecessary confrontation with the Western Powers with the exception of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5. The diplomatic relationship between the two countries from the end of the nineteenth century can be characterized as involving ambivalent feelings; sometimes pro-Western, sometimes anti-Western or these of Asian solidarity. Emotionally, the sense of Asian solidarity was the ethos that bound together the Siamese and Japanese. Politically, however, it was necessary to adopt pro-Western foreign policy in order to preserve their national independence.

But anti-Western feeling gradually developed during the 1920's in Japan. As N. J. Brailey pointed out, Japanese Pan-Asianism re-emerged when it came once again to coincide with Japanese national interest. During the early 1920's, the United States pressed Britain to abandon its Japanese alliance, and cooperate at both the Washington and London naval conferences to limit Japan's naval strength. And at the height of the Depression the West closed Japan's markets in Asian colonies which she had striven to develop over the previous two decades for her export manufactures. If Japan became Pan-Asianist as well as anti-colonial in the 1930's, it was largely because she was pushed into it.  

More than that, many Japanese during the 1920's believed that Japan had already contributed its own unique voice to global civilisation, viewing that Japan was uniquely qualified to assume leadership in Asia. And during the 1930's, it was proposed that Japan was appointed to lead the world to a higher level of cultural synthesis that surpassed Western modernism itself. In particular, it was thought by radical restorationists that Japan's goal was that of expelling the Western presence in Japan and Asia.  

On the other hand, after the 1932/33 Siamese revolution, the Siamese began expressing their own anti-Western feelings. Siam's closer relations with Japan became evident. During the 1930's the sentiment of Asian solidarity developed out of anti-Western feeling in both Japan and

---

2 Brailey, 'Southeast Asia and Japan's road to war, pp. 1005-1006.
4 Ibid., pp. 713-714.
Siam. It continued until the end of the Second World War. Eventually, the Japanese-Thailand Alliance was concluded in 1941. In a sense, Japan and Siam clasped hands for the prosperity of Asia for the Asians. It is important to point out that this Asian solidarity or Pan-Asian sentiment seems to be at the root of the relations between Japan and Siam from the Meiji era.

The relevance of the term Japanese 'imperialism'

The question of Japanese 'imperialism' is a debatable issue. 'Imperialism' having the attributes of ideology or prejudice, is a very axiomatic term in the study of Japanese history. Even Iriye Akira's circumspect analysis of 'imperialism' in general and 'Japanese imperialism' in particular, comes up with no clear definition.5 Also Iriye, adopting the term 'imperialism' in his review article, and Marius B. Jansen in his essay actually entitled 'Japanese Imperialism', do not reveal their definitions of 'imperialism'.6 The term 'imperialism' is not fully examined in order to analyse Japan's expansionistic behaviour. Whether or not such a term can be applied to Japanese activity at least before the 1930's has not been very much argued.

Harrington, Oh, and Conroy argue as to whether or not 'Japanese imperialism' was planned or unplanned as mentioned above in the Introduction, section 3-2. Mark R. Peattie seems not to take up such a formidable term as 'imperialism' in his arguments although he appears to adopt that of 'Japanese empire' with the premise that Japan was merely expansionist not imperialist.7 Marius B. Jansen holds that Japan was imperialist but in a very unique way. All in all, it seems to be assumed that Japan was imperialist all along, though Conroy's and Peattie's stances are relatively vague.

Some scholars of Japanese history define their terminology of imperialism in their discussion of 'Japanese imperialism'. For instance, Peter Duus refers to the term 'imperialism', saying that "In customary parlance, imperialism implies an asymmetrical power relationship between two societies, the metropolitan society exercising some degree of political dominance over the peripheral one."8 Another writer adopts the definition of imperialism as "the employment of force or the threat of force by a stronger nation to control or influence, and to

---

5 Iriye Akira, 'Imperialism in East Asia', pp. 122-150.
7 His stance can also be seen in one of his essays, 'Japanese Colonialism: Discarding the Stereotypes' in Japan Examined, pp. 208-213. He always uses 'Japanese empire' instead of 'Japanese imperialism'.
extract privileges from, a weaker nation." A third declares "imperialism being defined here as extension of control over alien people and territories either by conquest or by economic and cultural penetration." 10

Nevertheless, when 'Japanese imperialism' is discussed, intentionally or unintentionally, most scholars tend not to discuss the term 'imperialism' itself in relation to Japanese expansionistic behaviour. It seems that few reconsider the definition of imperialism, and few examine its application to Japan's expansionism. Japan has automatically been categorized as imperialist with little attempt to examine whether or not the term 'imperialism' can fairly be applied to Japanese history after the Meiji Restoration. One contributor of a study of this subject says that "All of the authors seem to [!] agree that Meiji Japan was imperialistic —. " 11 This situation is understandable, because of the complexity and ambiguity of the term 'imperialism'. Therefore, the contributors to Taiheiyo senso e no michi (The Road to the Pacific War) originally published in Japanese in 1962-63, agreed to refrain from the use of the term 'imperialism'. 12 Even though one can at first accept what appears to be a reasonable definition of 'imperialism', one may be aware of the complexities of application of such a definition to the whole phenomena of Japanese expansionism. As for Meiji Japanese expansionism, Oh admits that "not all of early Meiji expansion was imperialistic", 13 while Iriye claimed that Meiji expansionism was always imperialistic. 14 Eventually, most scholars come to apply the term 'imperialism' to Japan's case without a careful examination of its relevance.

In such circumstances, if one takes Japan's relations with Siam into the argument, one can perceive that their common diplomatic history can be understood in a different way. The Japanese government and military, which was always busy with Chinese and Korean affairs, were not interested seriously in Southeast Asian countries up to the 1930's. In so far as the strategic point of view is concerned, Siam and Southeast Asia were neglected by the Japanese army and navy. Japanese industrialists also maintained a rather indifferent attitude to these regions until the 1920's. Therefore, I have to conclude that politically and economically, Japan's attitude towards Siam, and perhaps Southeast Asia as a whole, before the 1930's was certainly

10 Bonnie B. Oh, 'Introduction' in Japan Examined, p. 122.
11 Ibid.
14 Iriye Akira, 'Imperialism in East Asia', p. 136.

248
not 'imperialistic'. It should be said that when one considers Japanese foreign relations before the 1930's in a broad sense, including not only China and Korea but also Southeast Asian countries, the term 'imperialism' is not appropriate terminology. Applying the term 'imperialism' to Japanese history should perhaps be avoided generally as doing little to explain the total phenomena of Japanese expansionism before the 1930's, and even perhaps afterwards.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of appointment</th>
<th>Name and Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 31 1897</td>
<td>Inagaki Manjiro (Minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13 1898</td>
<td>Fujita Toshiro (Temporary acting Minister, the Second Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 26 1898</td>
<td>Kokubunji Shinsaku (Temporary acting Minister, the First Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 19 1899</td>
<td>Inagaki Manjiro (Minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1 1903</td>
<td>Komatsu Midori (Temporary acting Minister, the Second Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 10 1903</td>
<td>Inagaki Manjiro (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 21 1905</td>
<td>Tanabe Kumasaburo (Temporary acting Minister, the Second Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10 1907</td>
<td>Matsukata Shosaku (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 14 1907</td>
<td>Tanabe Kumasaburo (Temporary acting Minister, the Second Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15 1908</td>
<td>Yoshida Sakuya (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 12 1912</td>
<td>Miho Goro (Temporary acting Minister, the Third Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 28 1913</td>
<td>Yoshida Sakuya (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 20 1913</td>
<td>Miho Goro (Temporary acting Minister, the Third Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 7 1915</td>
<td>Nishi Genshiro (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 20 1920</td>
<td>Arita Hachiro (Temporary acting Minister, the First Secretary and Consul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 14 1921</td>
<td>Misumi Sutezo (Temporary acting Minister, Consul and the First Interpreter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 25 1921</td>
<td>Masao Tokichi (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 11 1921</td>
<td>Misumi Sutezo (Temporary acting Minister, Consul and the First Interpreter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 20 1922</td>
<td>Yada Chonosuke (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 8 1924</td>
<td>Morita Kanzo (Temporary acting Minister, the Second Secretary)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 17 1926 Tsuchiya Hakuai (Chief Executive, Foreign Attaché and Police Inspector)

January 30 1926 Hayashi Kyujiro (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)

August 11 1926 Gunji Kiichi (Temporary acting Minister, the Third Secretary and Consul)

November 16 1926 Hayashi Kyujiro (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)

February 22 1928 Gunji Kiichi (Temporary acting Minister, the Third Secretary and Consul)

July 28 1928 Yatabe Yasukichi (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)

November 19 1930 Takatsu Tomio (Temporary acting Minister, the Third Secretary and Consul)

September 26 1931 Yatabe Yasukichi (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)

August 8 1933 Miyazaki Shinro (Temporary acting Minister, the Second Secretary)

July 3 1934 Yatabe Yasukichi (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)

January 15 1936 Mori Takashi (Temporary acting Minister, the First Secretary)

October 16 1936 Ishii Itaro (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)

April 22 1937 Mori Takashi (Temporary acting Minister, the First Secretary)

July 27 1937 Murai Kuramatsu (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)

June 19 1940 Asada Shunsuke (Temporary acting Minister, the First Secretary)

May 16 1941 Futami Yasusato (Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)

August 16 1941 Futami Yasusato (Temporary acting Ambassador, Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)

September 4 1941 Tsubogami Teiji (Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)

September 9 1944 Yamamoto Kumaichi (Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary)
Appendix 2

The Japanese Foreign Ministers up to 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1869</td>
<td>Sawa Nobuyoshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Iwakura Tomomi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Soejima Taneomi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>Terajima Munenori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>Inoue Kaoru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>Ito Hirobumi (interim with Premier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1888</td>
<td>Okuma Shigenobu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>Aoki Shuzo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>Enomoto Take'aki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>Mutsu Munemitsu (June 5 1895-April 3 1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saionji Kinmochi as interim acting minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Saionji Kinmochi (concurrently as Minister of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Okuma Shigenobu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>Nishi Tokujiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Okuma Shigenobu (concurrently as Premier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Aoki Shuzo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Kato Taka'aki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Sone Kosuke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Komura Jutaro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>July 3 1905-October 18 1905 and November 4 1905-January 2 1906 Katsura Taro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(interim with Premier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Kato Taka'aki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Saionji Kinmochi (interim with Premier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Hayashi Tadasu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Terauchi Masaki (interim with the War Minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Komura Jutaro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Uchida Yasuya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>August 30 1911-October 16 1911 Hayashi Tadasu (interim with Minister of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Communication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Katsura Taro (concurrently as Premier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Kato Taka'aki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Makino Nobu'aki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Kato Taka'aki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Okuma Shigenobu (concurrently as Premier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Ishii Kikujiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Terauchi Masaki (interim with Premier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Motono Ichiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Goto Shinpei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Uchida Yasuya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Yamamoto Gon'nohyoei (concurrently as Premier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Ijuin Hikokichi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Matsui Keishiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Shidehara Kijuro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Tanaka Giichi (concurrently as Premier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Shidehara Kijuro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Inukai Tsuyoshi (concurrently as Premier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Yoshizawa Kenkichi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Saito Minoru (concurrently as Premier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Uchida Yasuya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Hirota Koki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Arita Hachiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Sato Naotake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Hirota Koki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Ugaki Kazushige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Arita Hachiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Nomura Kichisaburo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Arita Hachiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Matsuoka Yosuke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Toyoda Teijiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Togo Shigenori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Tani Masayuki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Shigemitsu Mamoru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Primary sources

British Public Record Office, Kew.

800/76. Grey Papers.

P.R.O. 30/33, Diaries of Sir Ernest Mason Satow.

India Office Library.

'Diary' 1891-2 in Curzon Papers, Mss Eur.

Japanese Diplomatic Archives (JDA)

JDA. 1-6-1-26-3. 'Kakkoku Jijyo kankei zassan, shamu no bu (Collection of Miscellaneous articles on the Situation of Various Countries, Siam section)', vol.2.

JDA. 1-6-1-4-4. Shamu koku no bu (Siam section).

JDA. 2-5-1-17. Nissen shuko tsusho kokai joyaku teiketsu ikken (Concerning conclusion of the Japan-Siam Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation).

JDA. 2-5-1-69. Nissen tsusho kokai joyaku kaitei ikken (Concerning revision of the Japan-Siam Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation).

JDA. 3-2-1-40-3-1. Dai ikkai boeki kaigi ikken: gidai ni kansuru ikensho (Concerning the First Trade Conference: section on proposals).

JDA. 3-2-1-40-5. Dai ikkai boeki kaigi ikken: sankasha kankei (Concerning the First Trade Conference: section of participants).


JDA. 3-8-4-16. Gaiko kancho ni oite honpojin yatoire kankei zakken: bessatsu shamu koku no bu (Miscellaneous matters concerning Japanese nationals who were employed by foreign governments: separate volume on Siam).

JDA. 4-1-1-35. Kakkoku keiho kankei zakken (Miscellaneous matters concerning criminal laws in various countries).

JDA. 5-1-10-4-1. Teikoku riku kai gun shoko kaigai haken zakken: rikugun no bu (Miscellaneous matters concerning imperial commissioned army and navy officers who were sent abroad: Army section).

JDA. 5-1-10-4-2. Teikoku riku kai gun shoko kaigai haken zakken: kaigun no bu (Miscellaneous matters concerning imperial commissioned army and navy officers who were sent abroad: Navy section).
JDA. 6-1-6-1-1. Teikoku bukan shutcho chuzai oyobi ryugaku kankei zakken: rikugun no bu (Miscellaneous matters concerning appointment and dismissal of the Imperial military officers: Army section).

JDA. 6-1-6-1-2. Teikoku bukan shutcho chuzai oyobi ryugaku kankei zakken: kaigun no bu (Miscellaneous matters concerning official trip, residence, and study abroad of Imperial military officers: Navy section).

JDA. 6-1-6-60. Zaisen koshi indo no jokyo shisatsu no tame shutcho yori hinshin ikken (Concerning the Japanese Minister in Siam who asked permission of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to make observation tours of India).

JDA. 6-4-4-1-8. Gaikoku kihin no raicho kankei zakken: bessatsu shamu koku no bu (Miscellaneous matters concerning honoured guests who visited Japan: separate volume on Siam).

JDA. 6-4-4-12-1. Kakkoku tokuha shisetsu raicho zakken: bessatsu shamu koku tokuha 'hiya basukara wongs' raicho ikken (Miscellaneous matters concerning foreign envoys who visited Japan: separate volume on the visit of Siamese ambassador extra-ordinary Phraya Phatsakorawong).

JDA. 6-4-4-13. Rikugun chujo Akihito shin'no denka gunji shisatsu toshite o'bei shu gojunkai ikken (Concerning the military observation tour of Lieutenant General Prince Akihito to Europe and America).

JDA. A-6-0-0-1-27-2. Shogaikoku naisei kankei zassan: nairan kankei (Miscellaneous matters concerning internal politics of various foreign countries: section on internal disturbances).

JDA. A-6-0-0-1-27. Miyazaki Shinro, 'Yatabe koshi no taisen kosaku (The Strategy of Minister Yatabe)', June 15, 1942.

JDA. A-6-0-0-1-27. Shogaikoku naisei kankei zassan: Shamu koku no bu (Miscellaneous matters concerning internal politics of various foreign countries: Siam section).

JDA. F-1-9-3-6. Shamu tetsudo kankei zakken (Miscellaneous matters concerning the Siamese Railway).

JDA. I-1-10-0-2-14. Shamu kyokai kankei (Concerning the Siamese Society).

JDA. I-1-10-0-2-4. Nan'yo kyokai kankei (Concerning the South Seas Society).

JDA. I-4-6-0-1-1. Minzoku mondai kankei zakken (Miscellaneous matters concerning ethnic problems).

JDA. L-1-3-0-2-1-1. Gaikoku genshu oyobi kozoku honpo homon kankei zakken: Arong kotto denka goraicho ikken (Miscellaneous matters concerning foreign heads of state and royal families who visited Japan: section on Prince Alongkots's visit to Japan).

JDA. L-1-3-0-2-1. Gaikoku genshu oyobi kozoku honpo homon kankei zakken: shamu koku no bu (Miscellaneous matters concerning foreign heads of state and royal families who visited Japan: Siam section).

JDA. L-3-3-0-8-12-1. Kakkoku meishi no honpo homon kankei zakken: shamu koku no bu: Naimu sangi 'ruan pradito' raicho kankei (Miscellaneous matters concerning foreign notables who visited Japan: section on Thailand, Luang Pradit's visit to Japan).

255


Boeicho senshi shitsu (War History Room, Defence Agency)

'Rikugun sho mitsu dai nikki (The Great Diaries of the Japanese Ministry of Army)', no. S 5. 1-3.

Okuma Shigenobu Monjo (Okuma Shigenobu Archives).

Ito'ke Monjo (Archives of Ito Hirobumi Family).

Thai archives

1. Ekasan kraswong kan tang prathet (Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (KT.))

Chao tang prathet: jiam muang Thai (Section of foreigners: visiting to Siam)

KT. 33.6.6/3. Mr. N. Osako, nai thahan punyai jipun ma thiaw krungthep (Mr. N. Osako, Japanese army officer, artillery section who visited Siam).

KT. 33.6.6/4. Oehaga [Uehara Yusaku], Yakama [Yamada Yoshimaro] naai thahan jipun kho ma thiaw na krung Siam (Japanese army officers, Uehara and Yamada, ask permission to make tour in Siam).

KT. 33.6.6/5. Kimi Saito [Moo Saito] kongsung jipun thi muang Singapore cha khao ma krungthep (Japanese Consul in Singapore will visit Siam).

KT. 33.6.6/6. Chao tang prathet, jiyam muang thai, jipun / naai phan'ek Fukushima naai thahan jipun ma krungthep (Section on foreigners: visit to Siam, the Japanese / Japanese army officer Colonel Fukushima visit to Siam).


KT. 33.6.6/13. Naai thahan jipun cha ma krung Siam phicharana kan tang thut thahan (Japanese army officer [Matsui Iwane] will visit Siam to consider sending army attaché to Siam).

Krom racha lekhathikan rachakan thi ha (Rama 5th King's Royal Secretariat: R.5)

Kraswang kan tan prathet (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: T.)

R.5 T.2.2/31. Chao tan prathet, dairap pharachathan khruang isariyaphon, mo ti Masao chao jipun pen thipruksa kotmai krasuwong yutitham (Section on foreigners who were conferred decorations: Dr. Masao, a Japanese legal adviser to the Ministry of Justice).

R.5 T.3.6. Thut lae kongsun tan prathet (Ambassadors and consuls abroad).

R.5 T.12.3. Somdet krom phraya phanuphanthuwongworadet sadet jipun lae kotmontienban jipun (Prince Phraya Phanurangsi's visit to Japan and the cities).

Betsel (Miscellaneous: P.)

R.5 P.9/22. Legal advisers, Schlesser and Orts.
Krasuwong Yutitham (the Ministry of Justice: Y.)

R.5 Y.10/19. Letter from Prince Raphi to King Chulalongkorn.


2. Ekasan rachakan thi hok (Archives of Rama 6th: R.6)

Kraswang kan tan prathet (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: T.)


R.6 T.3.2/18. Chao tan prathet, jiam muang thai, ruang kromkan nai khana samachik saman jipun khao ma krung Siam phrom kap Phraya Mahithon phua truot kan pho pluk nai prathet Siam (Section on foreigners who visited Siam, the members of the Japanese Lower House's including Phraya Mahithon [Masao Tokichi] visit to Siam to investigate cultivation [rice and rubber] in Siam.).

R.6 T.3.3/34. Chao tan prathet: taai, Phraya Mahithon ramanu pakon kosonkhun Tokichi Masao akkarathuth jipun tung kae kam (Section on foreigners' death: The Japanese Minister, Phraya Mahithon Masao Tokichi, dies).

R.6 T.25/3. Jipun: chao jipun khit cha tang borisat pho pluk thai laem malayu lae kho nangsu dun thang pai truot phunthi (Japanese section: a Japanese has the intention to establish a company for cultivation in Malaya, and asks permission to go there in order to investigate).


Betset (Miscellaneous: P.)

R.6 P.5/177. Masao Tokichi

3. Ekasan rachakan thi chet (Archives of Rama 7th: R.7)

Krom racha lekhanukan (The Royal Secretariat: RL.)

R.7 RL.17/33. Samakhom samonson: Samakhom prathet jipun lae Siam (Section of Associations and Societies: Japan-Siam Society).

Kraswang Kalahom thahan rua (The Ministry of Defence, Army and Navy: K.)

R.7 K.10/4. Song naai thahan pai truat lae du kan tan prathet, momchao alongkot, luang Ramarithriong, luang Sarasit Thayanukan ook pai du kan thahan prathet jipun lae thi indo-chin (Sending military officers to foreign countries to observe them, Prince Alongkot, Luang Ramarithriong, Luang Sarasit Thayanukan visit Japan and Indo-China).
Books and articles

Amada Rokuro. 'Bankoku no insho (Impression of Bangkok)', unpublished, no date.

--------. 'Ko Masao Tokichi koshi no kotodomo (A Note on the Late Minister Masao Tokichi) in Kasumigaseki kai kaiho (The Proceeding of the Kasumigaseki Association), no.2, 17, March, 1964, pp. 9-11.

--------. 'Ryoji saibanken jidai no taikoku zaiju nihonjin no kotodomo (Japanese residents in Siam under the Japanese extraterritoriality)' unpublished, no specific date.

--------. 'Thai koku gensei ko Phibun san no kotodomo' (A Note on the Late Premier Phibun) in Nihon keizai shinbun (The Nihon Economic Newspaper), November 26, 1957.

Aoki Koichi. 'Fukuzawa Yukichi no chosen ron (A View on Korea of Fukuzawa Yukichi)' in Yokohama shiritsu daigaku ronso jinmon kagaku keiretsu (The Collection of Treatises of Yokohama City University), March, 1982, pp. 99-117.


Arita Hachiro. Bakahachi to hito wa iu (People say 'Stupid Hachi') (Tokyo, 1959).

Batson, Benjamin A. The End of The Absolute Monarchy in Siam (Singapore, 1984).


--------. 'Sir Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: The Trial of A Diplomat in The Age of High Imperialism', forthcoming in Historical Journal.

--------. 'Southeast Asia and Japan's Road to War' in Historical Journal, 30,4 (1987), pp. 995-1011.

--------. Thailand and The Fall of Singapore, A Frustrated Asian Revolution (Boulder Colorado, 1986).


Chumsai, Pritsdang. *Prawat Yor (Short Autobiography)* in Thai (Bangkok, 1970, ed.).


--------. *The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii 1868-1898* (California, 1953).


Dai kyukai teikoku gikai shugiin giji sokki roku 10 (The Stenographic Record of the ninth meeting of the Imperial House of Representatives. No.10) (Tokyo, 1979).

Dainihon jinmei jisho (The Great Japan Biographical Dictionary) (Tokyo, 1937).


Eto Shinkichi and Jansen, Marius B. *My Thirty Three Years' Dream* (Princeton, 1982).


Fujimura Michio. 'Seikan Ron ni okeru gaiin to naiin (External and Internal Causes in the Argument on Conquering Korea)', in Kokusai seiji (International Politics) no.37, October 1968, pp. 183-201.

Fujiwara Iwaichi. F. KIKAN (Hong Kong, 1983).

Fukuzawa Yukichi. 'Fukuou jiden (An autobiography of Fukuzawa)' in Nihon no meicho (Japanese Famous Writings), no.33, (Tokyo, 1969).

Futsu jutsugo jiten (Dictionary of common terminology) (Tokyo, 1905).


Hattori Reijiro. 'Fukuzawa Yukichi to shamu (Fukuzawa Yukichi and Siam)', in Fukuzawa Yukichi kyo kai, Fukuzawa techo (Notebook on Fukuzawa), vol.55, (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 4-11.

Hobson, J. A., Imperialism (Reprinted by The University of Michigan, 1965).


Imai Seiichi and others. Taiheiyō sensoshi (History of the Pacific War) (Tokyo, 1971).


Inagaki Manjiro. 'A discussion of relations between Korea and the Powers, and the spirit of Japanese foreign policy (in Japanese)' in Toho Kyokai Kaiho, no.34, 1894, pp. 31-60.


------. 'A proposal for investigating the building of a new port on the coastal area of the northern Japan Sea' (in Japanese), in Toho Kyokai Kaiho, August, 1892, pp. 158-161.


------. 'Benefit from Sakhalin and the Kurile Island within the East from a geographical point of view' (in Japanese), in Toho Kyokai Hokoku, no.9, January, 1892, pp. 33-53.


------. 'Nan'yo no jissei (The Actual Condition of the South Seas) in Toho Kyokai Hokoku, vol.24, 1893, pp. 1-86.

------. 'Nansei hidan (A Secret Account of a Visit to the South)' in Okuma Shigenobu monjo (Archives on Okuma Shigenobu), no.770.

------. 'Nissen joyaku teiketsu danpan teikyo (A Summary of the Negotiation for the Japanese-Siamese Treaty)' unpaged in JDA. 2-5-1-17.


------. 'The question of whether Japan can express dissent in the light of International Law concerning the British occupation of Kyubun Island' (in Japanese) in Toho Kyokai Hokoku, no.6, November, 1891, pp. 31-40.

------. 'The question of which is the better position in the Pacific, Amami-o-shima or Formosa' (in Japanese), in Toho Kyokai Hokoku, no.11, April, 1892, pp. 85-134.

------. Gaiko to gaisei (Diplomacy and Expansion) (Tokyo, 1896).


------. Kizoku ron, daiichi, daini (A View on Aristocracy, vol.1 and 2) (Tokyo, 1891 and 1893 respectively).

------. Kyoiku no taihon (A Fundamental Principle of Education) (Tokyo, 1892).
---. Siberia tetsudo ron (A View on the Siberian Railways) (Tokyo, 1891).
---. Taigaisaku (A View on Foreign Affairs) (Tokyo, 1891).
---. Tohosaku daiippen (Eastern Policy, vol.1) (Tokyo, 1891).
---. Tohosaku ketsuron so'an (A Draft concerning conclusive views on Eastern Policy) (Tokyo, 1892).


---. Pacific Estrangement (Massachusetts, 1972).

Ishii Yoneo. Nittai roppyaku nenshi (Six Hundred Years of Thai-Japan Relations) (Tokyo, 1987).


Ito Teruo. 'Meiji shoki no koa ron ni tsuite' (Concerning the Interest in Reviving Asia in the Early Meiji Era)' in Yokohama shiritsu daigaku ronso jinmon kagaku keiretsu (The Collection of Treatises of Yokohama City University), March 1982, pp. 53-99.

Iwamoto Chizuna. 'Shamu dan (An Account of Siam)' in Toho Kyokai Hokoku, no.25, June 1893, pp. 22-64.

---. 'Modernization and Foreign Policy in Meiji Japan,' in Robert Ward (ed.), Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton, N.J.), 1968, pp. 149-188.

Jirin (The Dictionary) (Tokyo, 1911).


---. King Mongkut and Sir John Bowring (Bangkok, 1970).


Koketsu Atushi. 'Tosuiken kanpan ronso no tenkai to sanbo honbu (Dispute of encroachment on the supreme command and the General Staff Office)' in *Nihon rekishi (The Japanese History)*, no. 376, September, 1979, pp. 68-85.


Kuykendall, Ralph S. *The Hawaiian Kingdom volume II* (Honolulu, 1953).

Lebra, Joyce C. (translated by Shoda Ken'ichiro). *Okuma Shigenobu, sono shogai to ningenzo* (Tokyo, 1980).


Masao Ryujiro (ed.). *Masao Tokichi tsuito roku (Memories of Masao Tokichi)* (Tokyo, 1922).


---. 'Shamu no Hanashi (A Tale of Siam)' in *Keio gijuku gakuho (the Keio Gijuku Gazette)*, no.93, August 1905, pp. 3-9.


Miki Sakae. 'Taikoku horitsu komon Masao Tokichi den' (A legal Adviser to Siam, Biography of Masao Tokichi), in Mantetsu toa keizai chosa kyoku, Shin ajia (The New Asia), November, 1939, pp. 146-154.


Miyazaki Toten, Sanju sannen no yume (The thirty-three years' dream), annotated Miyazaki Ryusuke and Eto Shinkichi (Tokyo, the first print in 1967, the thirteenth print in 1982).


Nagaoka Yozo. Sir Ernest Satow koshi nikki (The Diaries of Minister Sir Ernest Satow) (Tokyo, 1989).


Nakamura Teiji. 'London kaigun gunshuku kaigi o meguru funkyu no ichi kyokun (A Lesson from the entanglement of the London Naval Conference)' in Gunji shigaku (Study of Military History), vol. 15, no. 1, June, 1979, pp. 2-15.


Nishio Yotaro. 'Daito gappo ron oboe gaki (A Note on Daito Gappo Ron)' in Seinan daigaku bunri ronshu (Collection of Humanities and Sciences Treatises of Seinan University), no.19-1, 1978, pp. 49-76.


Oblas, Peter B. 'Japan's Pro-Thai Policy of the 1890s: Pure Pan-Asianism', a paper presented to the International Conference on Thai Studies, Bangkok 1984, unpublished.


--------. 'Tairiku seisaku no shiteki kosatsu (A study concerning views on policy regarding the Asian Continent)' in Nihon gaiko seisaku no shiteki tenkai (Historical Development of Japanese Foreign Policy) (Tokyo, 1983), pp. 69-111.

Okuma Shigenobu. 'Concerning foreign policy towards Korea, China, and the Philippines', in 1898. Okuma Archives no. A894.


Otori Keisuke. Shamu kiko (An account of a trip to Siam) (Tokyo, 1875).


--------. Nan'yo The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1945 (Honolulu, 1988).


266
Santaputra, Charivat. Thai Foreign Policy (Bangkok, 1985).


Shamu Kyokai (Siam Society). Shamu Kokujo (Tokyo, 1929).


Shin ehime henshu kyoku. Nanyo no gunzo (The Department of Shin Ehime, The People of southern part of Ehime prefecture), April, 1966.


-------. 'A proposal concerning concluding a friendly commercial treaty with Siam' (in Japanese), Toho Kyokai Kaiho, no.16, 1895, pp. 2-6.


-------. 'Shamu hou no shinpo to ko-Masao hakushi no koseki (Development of Siamese Law and the contribution of the late Doctor Masao)' in Chu-ou horitsu shinpo (The Chu-ou Law Journal), vol.II, pp. 5-6.


Takizawa Makoto. 'Tenyukyo noto: ajia shugi shinwa no keisei, 1 (A Note on Tenyukyo: Making of Myth of Pan-Asianism, part 1)' in Kaigai jijo (The State of Foreign Affairs), Institute of Foreign Affairs of Takushoku University, 1987, no.35-7, pp. 119-134.


Tanaka Nobumasa. Taisho Tenno no taiso (The Great Funeral of the Taisho Tenno) (Tokyo, 1988).

Tanaka Yajuro. 'Inagaki Manjiro to taikoku (Inagaki Manjiro and Thailand)' in Kokusai hyoron (The Comment on International Affairs), vol.8, no.8, 1943.


The Encyclopedia on Asian History (Tokyo, 1959-62).

The Japanese Diet Library. 'Ito'ke Monjo (Archives of Ito Hirobumi Family)', vol.45, pp. 17-18, and p. 20 in Kensei shi hensan shushu monjo, no.624.


Treat, P. J. Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan 1853-1895 (Gloucester, Mass., 1963).


Vella, Walter F. Chaivo! King Vajiravudh And The Development of Thai Nationalism (Honolulu, 1978).


Ya'uchi Kenji. 'Shoki nissei koshoshi jo no ichi mondai (The Question of the relations between Japan and Spain)' in *Kyushu shigakukai, Shien (Kyushu, 1954)*, vol.61, pp. 27-36.

Yamada Kiichi. *Nan'yo taikan (The Outlook of the South Seas)* (Tokyo, 1934).


--------. *Nihon no nan'yo shikan (Japan's historical view of the South Seas)* (Tokyo, 1979).

Yasuoka Akio. 'Toho Kyokai ni tsuite no kisoteki kenkyu (A fundamental study concerning the Toho Kyokai)' in *Hosei daigaku bungakubu kiyo (The Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of Hosei University)*, no.22, 1976. pp. 61-98.

--------. 'Toho Kyokai to Soejima Taneomi (The Oriental Society and Soejima Taneomi) in *Seiji keizai Shigaku*, no. 169, 1980, pp. 1-12.

Yatabe Yasukichi. 'Shamu o kataru (Talking about Siam)' in *The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun*, September 3, 1933.

--------. 'Shamu yori kaerite (Returning from Siam)' no.4. February 28, 1936, no.5, February 29, 1936, and no.7 March 3, 1936, in *The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun*.

Yoshii Ken'ichi. 'Sangatu jikenn to rikugun chukun bakuryo so (The March incident and the nucleus staff of the army)' in *Jinmon kagaku kenkyu*, no.67. July 1985, pp. 41-70.

Yoshikawa Toshiharu. 'Ajia shugisha no taikoku shinshutsu (The Inroad to Thailand of Pan-Asianists) in Kyoto University, *South East Asian Studies*, vol.XVI, no.1, June, 1978, p. 83.


Newspapers
Bangkok Post
Bangkok Times
Chinzei Nippo
Choya Shinbun
Chu'o Shinbun
Chugai Shogyo
JiJi Shinbun
Kokumin Shinbun
Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun
Nippon Rikken Seito Shinbun
Tokyo Asahi Shinbun

Yubin Hochi

Yomiuri Shinbun