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## THE LANGUAGE OF ROADS AND TRAVEL IN HOMER: *HODOS* AND *KELEUTHOS*\*

### ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to map the relationship between the main words that comprise the Homeric lexicon of roads, journeys, paths and travel. The central task is to explore the relationship between the words *hodos* and *keleuthos*; along the way, the article will also address other terms that appear less frequently, such as *atarp(it)os* and *poros*. The article first teases out a difference in sense between *keleuthos* in the singular and in the plural. The discussion of *keleuthos* provides a key distinction, namely between ‘object-concepts’ and ‘activity-concepts’, that proves valuable in discussing different senses of the word *hodos*. Rather than differentiating the words *keleuthos* and *hodos* as others have suggested, however, this distinction should be used to differentiate domains of meaning within each word. The result will be what might be conceived of as a four-part grid, with the two words *hodos* and *keleuthos* split into two distinct parts along the ‘activity-concept’/‘object-concept’ axis. Finally, concepts drawn from discussions of verbal aspect and philosophy of action are deployed heuristically to develop further the analysis of this semantic field.

**Keywords:** Homer; roads; travel; journeying; path; way; *hodos*; *keleuthos*

What does the word *hodos* mean in Homer? What about the word *keleuthos*? The aim of this article is to map the relationships between the words that comprise the Homeric lexicon of roads, journeys, paths and travel; its central task will be to explore the relationship between the words *hodos* and *keleuthos*, which together comprise the vast majority of uses in this semantic field in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.<sup>1</sup> Along the way, I shall also address other terms that appear less frequently, such as *atarp(it)os* and *poros*.

The relationship between *hodos* and *keleuthos* has attracted little dedicated attention since Otfried Becker’s 1937 dissertation on road imagery.<sup>2</sup> Nor are dictionaries

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<sup>1</sup> In the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, *hodos* appears eighty-seven times, *keleuthos* thirty-nine times (see Table 1 below); *aguiā* eleven times (seven times in the same formulaic line); *atarp(it)os* five times; *poros* four times; *potos* three times. For *oimē*, which appears three times, see B. Folit-Weinberg, *Homer, Parmenides, and the Road to Demonstration* (Cambridge, 2022), ch. 3.1.1.

<sup>2</sup> O. Becker, *Das Bild des Weges und verwandte Vorstellungen im frühgriechischen Denken* (Berlin, 1937) remains the most widely cited authority on the topic; see 7–14 for *keleuthos*, 15–22 for *hodos*. Becker’s analysis still has much to offer; I shall highlight important shortcomings below. Y.A. Lolos, ‘Greek roads: a commentary on the ancient terms’, *Glotta* 79 (2003), 137–74 synthesizes information from a broad range of sources and time-periods, but this can prove a detriment when fundamental differences in genre, chronology, or social context are ignored; additionally, its single-paragraph entry on *keleuthos* is problematic for reasons that will become clear in Sections I and II below.

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necessarily more helpful now than they were then: under the heading *keleuthos*, we find ‘Weg, Bahn, Fahrt’ in the *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*; ‘road, path’ in LSJ; ‘chemin, route, trajet, voyage’ in Chantraine; ‘path, way’ in Autenrieth; ‘way, road, path’ listed first in Cunliffe; and ‘path, road, track’ in the first heading of the new *Cambridge Greek Lexicon*.<sup>3</sup> As we shall see, none of these quite hits the mark.

In what follows, I begin by examining the word *keleuthos*; I then turn to the word *hodos*. I shall first tease out a difference between uses of the word *keleuthos* in the singular and in the plural.<sup>4</sup> This discussion of *keleuthos* will provide a key distinction, namely between ‘object-concepts’ and ‘activity-concepts’, that will also prove valuable in discussing different senses of the word *hodos*.<sup>5</sup> Rather than articulating the primary distinction between the words *keleuthos* and *hodos* as others have suggested, the dichotomy should be used to differentiate domains of meaning contained *within* each word.<sup>6</sup> What results might be conceived of as a four-part grid, with the two words *hodos* and *keleuthos* split into two distinct parts along the ‘activity-like’/‘object-like’ axis.

### I. KELEUTHOS (SINGULAR)

It is illuminating to analyse the frequency with which the words *keleuthos* and *hodos* are used, particularly in respect to their grammatical roles and collocation with specific prepositions.

One of the most obvious differences is the frequency with which the two words are used in the plural: *hodoi* appears only once in the extant Homeric corpus (*Il.* 16.374). This points to other differences. The nearly one-to-one ratio of singular to plural uses of the word *keleuthos* is significant, particularly since, as we shall see, the word’s domain of reference differs depending on whether we are dealing with a single *keleuthos* or many *keleuthoi*.<sup>7</sup> In the plural, the word *keleuthos* nearly always denotes some aspect

<sup>3</sup> See Becker (n. 2), 12. A particularly clear example of the problem can be found in Cunliffe, who adduces *Od.* 6.291—unique among Homeric uses of *keleuthos* in designating a pre-existing visible path overland (cf. possibly *Il.* 13.334–5)—to support the primary heading ‘way, road, path’, thereby making an outlier appear exemplary; for further discussion, see Sections I and II below. C. Buck, *A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages* (Chicago, 1949), 717 suggests that *keleuthos* is merely a poetic synonym for *hodos*. This has consequences: see e.g. B. Maslov, ‘The real life of the genre of proimion’, *CPh* 107 (2012), 191–205, at 202. Despite its unfortunate main heading, the *Lfgre* subheadings begin with the more appropriate ‘Passage, Fahrt’. The *Lfgre*’s entry for *hodos* is strong, and my conclusions mesh nicely with the general framework outlined there.

<sup>4</sup> In addition to Becker (n. 2), Lolos (n. 2), Buck (n. 3) and the lexicons cited above, for discussion of *keleuthos*, see J. Ellendt, *Drei Homerische Abhandlungen* (Leipzig, 1864), 41–3; J.H.H. Schmidt, *Synonymik der griechischen Sprache* (Leipzig, 1886), 4.630–2; C.M. Bowra, ‘Homeric words in Arcadian inscriptions’, *CQ* 20 (1926), 168–78, at 172; M. Riemschneider-Hoerner, ‘Die Raumschauung bei Pindar’, *ZAnt* 36 (1942), 96–114, at 110–14; W. Luther, *Weltansicht und Geistesleben* (Göttingen, 1954), 28–9; C.J. Ruijgh, *L’élément Achéen dans la langue épique* (Assen, 1957), 123–4; and *Lfgre*. For *hodos*, in addition to the first six citations in this note, see also W. Porzig, *Die Namen für Satzinhalte im Griechischen und im Indogermanischen* (Berlin, 1942), 89–90, 201, 306; W. Wyatt, *Metrical Lengthening* (Rome, 1969), 226–9; J. du Bouchet, ‘Remarques sur ΛΑΟΦΟΡΟΣ et ΑΜΑΞΙΤΟΣ dans l’*Iliade*’, *RPh* 80 (2006), 273–9.

<sup>5</sup> Here my analysis intersects most directly with Becker’s (n. 2); his distinction between an ‘activity-concept’ and an ‘object-concept’ proves useful—when correctly applied.

<sup>6</sup> See Becker (n. 2), 7–22.

<sup>7</sup> As this distinction is important, I shall use *keleuthos* to refer to the singular of the word *keleuthos*, *keleuthoi* to refer to the plural, and the phrase ‘the word *keleuthos*’ to refer to the word irrespective of number.

Table 1: Analysis of *hodos* and *keleuthos* in Homer (entries in bold emphasize notable features)

	Total count	Subject	Direct Obj. (w/adj.)	W/spatial preposition (w/adj.)	Other
<b>Hodos</b>	87 (28 <i>Il.</i> / 59 <i>Od.</i> )	14	50	22	1
Singular	<b>86</b>	14	49	22	1
<i>Iliad</i>	27	4	6	<b>16</b>	1
<i>Odyssey</i>	<b>59</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>43</b>	6	0
Plural	<b>1</b>	0	1	0	0
<i>Iliad</i>	1	0	1	0	0
<i>Odyssey</i>	<b>0</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>Keleuthos</b>	39 (17 <i>Il.</i> / <i>Od.</i> 22)	<b>2</b>	<b>31</b> (10)	4 (2)	2
Singular	<b>21</b>	<b>0</b>	18 ( <b>0</b> )	1	2
<i>Iliad</i>	10	0	10 (0)	0	0
<i>Odyssey</i>	11	0	8 (0)	1	2
Plural	<b>18</b>	2	13 ( <b>10</b> )	3 (2)	0
<i>Iliad</i>	7	1	5 (4)	1 (0)	0
<i>Odyssey</i>	11	1	<b>8</b> ( <b>6</b> )	2 (2)	0

of the physical, non-man-made world.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, these *keleuthoi* are rarely to be found on land, inhabiting instead the more fluid domains of sea and sky; this is clear from the repertoire of epithets appended to *keleuthoi*, which rarely appears unaccompanied by an adjective.<sup>9</sup> We find ὑγρά κέλευθα ('watery') used five times;<sup>10</sup> the winds have λαίψηρά κέλευθα ('swift-rushing', *Il.* 14.17 = *Il.* 15.620), the atmosphere ἡερόεντα κέλευθα ('airy, hazy, murky', *Od.* 20.64), the hinterlands between our world and the next εὐρώοντα κέλευθα ('mouldering', *Od.* 24.10). The winds are not the only heavenward entities to have *keleuthoi*—Night and Day also possess *keleuthoi*, as we discover in the portentous description of the land of the Laestrygonians.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> This is always true in situations where the accusative plural takes the form κέλευθα (preferred to κελεύθους by a ratio of 13 to 3 across both epics). I shall discuss differences between the two forms elsewhere.

<sup>9</sup> By contrast, *keleuthos* is almost never modified by an adjective (see Table 1 above); in the sole instance (*Il.* 15.357), the adjective is a very pointed one (see discussion below). This suggests that metrical and other compositional considerations also certainly come into play here, a point I shall discuss in another setting.

<sup>10</sup> *Il.* 1.312, *Od.* 3.71 = *Od.* 9.252, 4.842, 15.474; see also *Od.* 3.177 ἰχθυόοντα κέλευθα 'fish-infested'.

<sup>11</sup> *Od.* 10.86 ἐγγὺς γὰρ νυκτός τε καὶ ἡματός εἰσι κέλευθοι.

If *keleuthoi* generally appear to involve the natural world, anytime the word *keleuthos* relates strictly to the natural world, it is always and only plural; *keleuthos* in the singular seems to be the prerogative of sentient beings and movements they effect or control. Three categories of uses account for most occurrences of *keleuthos* in the singular in Homer. I shall explore each of these in turn.

The first involves a scene of travel—often by some vehicular means of transport—undertaken in a controlled, intentional manner (rather than, say, buffeted off course by a storm). Two very similar scenes from the opening books of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* exemplify this usage.<sup>12</sup> The first (*Il.* 1.475–83) describes the return of the expedition sent to placate Chryses; having returned the aggrieved priest's daughter, the Achaean embassy sets sail for camp at dawn. The second (*Od.* 2.413–34) depicts the departure of Telemachus from Ithaca under the cover of darkness. In each case, considerable attention is paid to the anatomy of the boat, the fair wind sent by a superintending divinity (*Il.* 1.479 ≈ *Od.* 2.420), the way this wind fills the sail (*Il.* 1.481 ≈ *Od.* 2.427), and the 'singing' of the dark waves on the ship's keel (*Il.* 1.482 = *Od.* 2.428). At the conclusion of the set-piece (*Il.* 1.483 = *Od.* 2.429), we find it said of the ship:

ἡ δ' ἔθεεν κατὰ κύμα διαπρήσσουσα κέλευθον ...

And it was speeding on the surge, progressing along its *keleuthos* ...

The scene from the *Iliad* ends here. The journey to Pylos continues in the narrative frame, embellished by the securing of gear and libations to the gods before closing with this image of the ship (*Od.* 2.434):

παννυχίη μὲν ῥ' ἦ γε καὶ ἠὼ πείρε κέλευθον ...

So all night long and through the dawning it cleft/was cleaving<sup>13</sup> its *keleuthos* ...

Although I shall return to these passages later, a few points are worth observing now. First, the elaborate description slows down narrative time toward 'scene time'.<sup>14</sup> This is especially true in *Odyssey* Book 2, where such details as the loading of the provisions onto the vessel, the casting off of the ship's cables and the positioning of the crew at the oars, the erecting and securing of the firwood mast in the mast-box are each accorded their share of narrative real estate (*Od.* 2.413–26). Meanwhile, the details of the sailing itself—the deep colour of the sea, the whistling of the wind and the 'singing' of the water on the ship's hull, the billowing of the sail—are narrated with a phenomenological emphasis, as if focalized through someone onboard, in language that appeals richly to the senses. Finally, the formulaic closing phrase (*Il.* 1.483 = *Od.* 2.429) is given in the imperfective ('present') participle rather than in the perfective ('aorist') participle. The scrupulously catalogued series of activities, vivid focalization, pace of narrative

<sup>12</sup> See *Il.* 14.282, 23.501, *Od.* 2.213, 13.83 for other instances of this usage, and I.J.F. de Jong, *A Narratological Commentary on the Odyssey* (Cambridge, 2001), 65–6 for parallels with other "departure by ship" type-scenes.

<sup>13</sup> See W.B. Stanford, *Homer Odyssey I–XII* (London, 1959<sup>2</sup>), ad loc. The scene and its treatment of time favour an imperfective construction indicating progressive meaning.

<sup>14</sup> By contrast, it takes just two lines for Athena and Telemachus to get from Odysseus' palace to the harbour (*Od.* 2.405–6).

time, and careful use of verbal aspect all emphasize the experience of the process of journeying.

A second category of uses occurs during the Trojan attempts to break through the Achaean wall; of the word's seventeen appearances in the *Iliad*, twelve occur in Books 11–15 (and eleven in Books 12–15). The key clusters involve the breaching of the wall. In Book 12, Sarpedon leads an assault against the right flank of the Achaean wall; he manages to 'seize the battlement with his stout hands and drag it down....' (*Il.* 12.397–8); by doing so (*Il.* 12.399),

πολέεσσι δὲ θῆκε κέλευθον.

he established a *keleuthos* for many.

Exploiting this *keleuthos* proves more difficult, however. Ajax and Teucer plug the gap and beat back Sarpedon, who rallies his squadron by observing (*Il.* 12.410–12):

ἀργαλέον δέ μοι ἔστι καὶ ἰφθίμῳ περ ἔόντι  
μούνῳ ῥηζαμένῳ θέσθαι παρὰ νηυσὶ κέλευθον ...

It is difficult for me, sturdy though I am,  
to break through on my own and forge a *keleuthos* by the ships ...

His men take up the challenge, but are met by the right flank of the Achaean front. The two sides fight to a dead halt; the Achaeans are unable to repulse the Lycian advance, while Sarpedon and his comrades (*Il.* 12.417–18)

οὔτε ... .. ἔδύναντο  
τεῖχος ῥηζαμένοι θέσθαι παρὰ νηυσὶ κέλευθον ...

were not able,  
though they had shattered the wall, to forge for themselves a *keleuthos* by the  
ships ...

Finally, Hector smashes the central gate at the end of Book 12, and a Trojan horde swarms the wall behind their talisman.

Three books later, Hector and the Trojans again find themselves on the wrong side of the Achaean fortifications.<sup>15</sup> This time Zeus sends Apollo to be his boots on the ground; the latter announces that he will serve as the Trojan vanguard himself (*Il.* 15.260–1):

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ προπάροίθε κιῶν ἵπποισι κέλευθον  
πᾶσαν λειανέω, τρέψω δ' ἥρωας Ἀχαιούς.

For, spearheading the charge myself, I shall smooth the whole *keleuthos*  
for the horses, and drive back the Achaean heroes.

He is as good as his word: less than a hundred lines later, the Achaean rearguard having been put to flight, Hector spurs his men on to the ships, while (*Il.* 15.355–8)

<sup>15</sup> Regarding this idiosyncrasy, see e.g. R. Janko, *The Iliad: A Commentary. Volume IV: Books 13–16* (Cambridge, 1992), 226–7; J.S. Clay, *Homer's Trojan Theater: Space, Vision, and Memory in the Iliad* (Cambridge, 2011), 81–3; also C. Whitman and R. Scodel, 'Sequence and simultaneity in *Iliad* N, Ξ, and O', *HSPH* 85 (1981), 1–15, at 10.

προπάροιθε δὲ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων  
 ῥεῖ' ὄχθας καπέτοιο βαθείης ποσσὶν ἐρείπων  
 ἐς μέσσον κατέβαλλε, γεφύρωσεν δὲ κέλευθον  
 μακρὴν ἢδ' εὐρείαν ...

before them Phoebus Apollo  
 easily dashed down the banks of the deep ditch with his feet  
 filling it all the way in, bridging a *keleuthos*  
 long and broad ...

Over this 'bridge' the Trojan cavalry charge.

The third category occurs only in the *Odyssey*: the *keleuthos* that is blocked, hindered, checked, or restrained, a common phenomenon in a story dedicated to the travails of vexed *nostoi*. The word appears early in the poem; disguised as Mentor, Athena tells Telemachus that she came to see Odysseus (*Od.* 1.195):

ἀλλά νυ τόν γε θεοὶ βλάπτουσι κελεύθου ...

But now the gods are hindering him from his *keleuthos* ...,

she deduces, since he has not yet returned to Ithaca. Menelaus, marooned on Pharos, twice implores the house of Proteus (*Od.* 4.379–81 = 4.468–70):

ἀλλά σύ πέρ μοι εἶπέ, θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασι,  
 ὅς τίς μ' ἀθανάτων πεδάα καὶ ἔδησε κελεύθου,  
 νόστον θ', ὡς ἐπὶ πόντον ἐλεύσομαι ἰχθυόεντα.

But now do tell me, for the gods know all things,  
 which of the immortals it is who constrains me and checked my *keleuthos*,  
 and tell my *nostos*, how I shall travel over the fish-thick sea.

About which immortal it is who does this to him, Odysseus has no doubt. Recounting his raft-voyage from Ogygia to Scheria, he names Poseidon as the culprit, the one (*Od.* 7.272)

ὅς μοι ἐφορμήσας ἀνέμους κατέδησε κελεύθου ...<sup>16</sup>

who raised up many winds against me and hindered my *keleuthos* ...

Journeys narrated at length in the course of their transit; meditations on overcoming the obstacle of the wall en route to the ships; blocked passage in the course of a journey: what links these three categories?

We may begin by observing that the second and third categories form a complementary pair united around the theme of what we might call 'blocked passage'. The examples in the third set thematize the appearance of an impediment to the course in question. Those of the second, meanwhile, occur at moments when the act of overcoming such an impediment is thematized; the instant passage is attained, the course that had been impeded appears as an entity in its own right. At the heart of both categories is the

<sup>16</sup> As West's Teubner, Allen's OCT and Stanford (n. 13) have it; see also A. Heubeck, S. West and J.B. Hainsworth, *A Commentary on the Odyssey. Volume 1* (Oxford, 1988), 337. The manuscript tradition can support arguments for various combinations of genitive or accusative, singular or plural; the analysis here bears little on case, but weighs heavily against the plural in favour of the singular.

issue of passage: through a wall or an army of men, over a ditch, across the sea; passage blocked, passage checked, passage impeded, passage smoothed, passage won.

Incidentally, ‘passage’ does not here mean ‘mere’ passage, in the sense in which either a river, which otherwise blocks passage, can be crossed—this, in the *Iliad*, is the only apparent meaning of πόρος<sup>17</sup>—or the breadth of the sea is ‘a virgin expanse, unmarked ... a *poros* to be opened up’.<sup>18</sup> As the phrase repeated in *Iliad* Book 12 evinces, what is at stake in these episodes is passage with some manner of destination and purpose, for what Sarpedon ‘sets down’ is in each case **παρὰ νηροῖ** κέλευθος: a *keleuthos* not merely to some place the other side of the Achaean wall but specifically alongside the ships (and this, too, with a goal: to burn them). This is equally clear in the ‘blocked’, ‘checked’, or ‘hindered’ *keleuthoi* of Odysseus and Menelaus. In Menelaus’ case, the appeal to discover the ‘fetterer’ of the *keleuthos* is framed by the request that Eidothea and Proteus ‘tell a *nostos*’; in Odysseus’ case, the *keleuthos* that comes into view is constituted by the gap between Odysseus’ present location and desired destination, the place where Athena herself stands. In each instance, the overall shape of the movement in question occurs relative to a clear destination.<sup>19</sup>

We may further develop this claim, and conclude our analysis of *keleuthos*, by examining it alongside the first category of examples. Here again the contours of the journey undertaken are clear, the spatial goal well defined: from Chryses to the Achaean camp, from Ithaca to Pylos. As we saw, however, this is not what the passages spent their energy describing; rather, the emphasis was on the act of journeying, on the details that form the experience of being on the way. Instructive here is the persistent use of the imperfective rather than the perfective aspect with this use of *keleuthos*, and the frequent use of participles.<sup>20</sup> As we saw, the passages in *Iliad* Book 1 and *Odyssey* Book 2 concluded with the line (*Il.* 1.483 = *Od.* 2.429):

ἦ δ’ ἔθρεν κατὰ κῦμα διαπρήσσουσα κέλευθον ...

And it [*sc.* the ship] was speeding on the surge, progressing along its *keleuthos* ...

The point is even clearer in the variant of this collocation used during the chariot race of *Iliad* Book 23. As the narrative cuts back to the breathless last sprint of Diomedes’ chariot team, a description rich in sensory detail again slows narrative time markedly. The final stage of the chariot race unfolds in literally granular units of action (*Il.* 23.499–506):

Τυδεΐδης δὲ μάλα σχεδὸν ἦλθε διώκων,  
 μᾶστι δ’ αἰὲν ἔλαυνε κατομαδόν: οἱ δὲ οἱ ἵπποι  
 ὑψός’ ἀειρέσθην ῥίμφα πρήσσοντε κέλευθον.<sup>21</sup>  
 αἰεὶ δ’ ἠνίοχον κονίης ραθάμιγγες ἔβαλλον,

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Il.* 2.592 and 14.433 = *Il.* 21.1 = *Il.* 24.692, all four uses of the word in Homer.

<sup>18</sup> M. Detienne and J.-P. Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*, transl. J. Lloyd (Hassocks, 1978), 152. For πόρος, see also Becker (n. 2), 23–34 and *LfggE* s.v. πόρος.

<sup>19</sup> *Contra* Riemschneider-Hoerner (n. 4), 110–14, a shortcoming that vitiates much of the analysis undertaken there.

<sup>20</sup> See below for verbal aspect.

<sup>21</sup> ῥίμφα πρήσσοντε κέλευθον is also used at *Il.* 14.281–5 to describe the journey from Lemnos taken by Hera and Hypnos. Here again, the poet might have handled their return to Ida much more swiftly; at the moment when it is instead presented in detail, we find the word *keleuthos*.

ἄρματα δὲ χρυσῷ πεπυκασμένα κασσιτέρῳ τε  
ἵπποις ὠκυπόδεσσιν **ἐπέτρεχον**: οὐδέ τι πολλή  
**γίγνεται** ἐπισσώτρων ἄρματαροχίη κατόπισθεν  
ἐν λεπτῇ κονίῃ ...

The son of Tydeus, hot on the trail, had very nearly arrived there,  
and throughout it all he kept driving the horses with whip strokes from the  
shoulder, and his two horses  
were stepping high, swiftly progressing along its *keleuthos*.  
And throughout it all grains of dust kept falling all over the charioteer,  
and the chariot panelled with gold and tin  
was grazing the ground lightly behind the swift-footed horses, and light indeed  
did the track of the wheels behind them grow  
in the fine dust ...

Finally, this collocation (and, with a slight variation, the whole of *Il.* 23.501)  
reappears when the Phaeacians' fabulous ship speeds Odysseus back to Ithaca  
(*Od.* 13.81–5):

ἦ δ', ὡς τ' ἐν πεδίῳ τετράοροι ἄρσενες ἵπποι,  
πάντες ἅμ' ὀρμηθέντες ὑπὸ πλεγγῆσιν ἰμάσθλης,  
ὑψὸς **ἀειρόμενοι** ῥίμψα **πρήσσοσι** **κέλευθον**,  
ὡς ἄρα τῆς πρύμνῃ μὲν **ἀείρετο**, κύμα δ' ὄπισθε  
πορφύρεον μέγα **θυε** πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης.

And just as on a plain stallions yoked four together,  
all straining at the same time under the lashes of the whip,  
stepping high, swiftly progress along its *keleuthos*,  
so the ship's stern kept leaping up, and in its wake the dark swell  
of the much-roaring sea was seething enormous.

In each case, although (or rather, perhaps, because) these were defined, neither the specific route to be travelled nor the destination is of interest; the racetrack is simply the racetrack, the trip to Ithaca taken by a ship that steers itself. Rather, the poem shines its light on the nature of the *passage*, the *journeying* along these courses. In the first case: the sequence of action after breathless action, the marvelous thrill of the charioteer hurtling toward the finish line, kicking up dust, whipping his horses, hardly skimming the ground in his wondrous gold-and-tin chariot as he wings towards victory. In the second: amid the suspenseful anticipation of the final voyage, so long awaited, back to Ithaca, the preternatural frisson of riding on the majestic ships of the Phaeacians. Here, then, against the backdrop of a clearly prescribed journey, but one where the *passage* along the course—in its actualization or its inhibition, in its specific details and its sequence of events as a phenomenological experience—is in focus, we find the word *keleuthos* in the singular.

## II. KELEUTHOS (PLURAL)

*Keleuthos*—but not *keleuthoi*. In emphasizing the action-oriented dimension of *keleuthos* in the singular, my claims are not at odds with Becker's discussion of the word *keleuthos*; beyond this, however, our analyses part ways more decisively. In differentiating between the meanings of the words *keleuthos* and *hodos*, Becker would distinguish what were 'originally activity-concepts' from what were 'originally

object-concepts';<sup>22</sup> on his account, the word *keleuthos* belongs to the former category, *hodos* to the latter. While the dichotomy is illuminating, too many uses of the word *keleuthos* shade too far into the territory of the 'object-concept' (and likewise *hodos* and the 'activity-concept') to sustain the claim that this distinction constitutes the fault-line between the words *keleuthos* and *hodos*.

Or rather, too many uses of *keleuthoi* do. Consider, for example, the description of the land of the Laestrygonians (*Od.* 10.86):

ἐγγὺς γὰρ νυκτός τε καὶ ἡματός εἰσι κέλευθοι ...

For here the *keleuthoi* of Night and Day are near to each other ...

Of the sea's ὑγρὰ κέλευθα, Becker claims programmatically that 'the sea has such κέλευθα only when a ship sails on it. Without its journey, they would not be there.'<sup>23</sup> The case of the *keleuthoi* of Night and Day, however, suggests that this understanding of *keleuthoi* is mistaken.

There are in fact problems at two levels, one lexical or referential, the other grammatical. First, the lexical level. The 'journeys' of Night and Day are arguably *the* regular repeated journeys par excellence;<sup>24</sup> at a minimum, as long as day continues to follow night, and night day, the *keleuthoi* referred to in *Odyssey* Book 10 are simply 'there'. Moreover, not only are 'the journeys of night and day' an archetype of regularly recurring phenomena, but, on an annual basis, the routes of the journeys themselves are as regular and immutable as the journeys themselves. Why should these *keleuthoi* be thought to exist only at the moment when the sun or the moon moves through a particular region in the sky? To the extent that the journeys of Night and Day are to be understood as part of the inner construction of the *kosmos*, the fixed course along which these journeys take place—that is, their *keleuthoi*—should be understood the same way.

Second, the grammatical level. Notably, the word *keleuthoi* (a) is the subject in this sentence (something we do not find with *keleuthos* in the singular) and, more importantly, (b) as the subject of this sentence, takes as a verb a form of *einai* ('to be'). However contested the semantics of this verb may be, one point that has emerged clearly is that 'a copula use of *einai* is implicitly existential'.<sup>25</sup> We might, therefore, render *Od.* 10.86: 'There exist the *keleuthoi* of Night and Day, and here they are near to each other.'

Perhaps these are exceptional *keleuthoi*; from a grammatical perspective this is true, as Table 1 suggests (for *Il.* 10.66, see Section III below). There are, however, other critical differences between the grammatical situations in which *keleuthoi* and *keleuthos* appear. On several occasions, we find the phrase κατ' ... κέλευθα as when, for example, Hermes leads the souls of the slain suitors to Hades<sup>26</sup> or when Penelope wishes to be borne away by a gale along its 'murky' *keleuthoi*.<sup>27</sup> This construction is

<sup>22</sup> Becker (n. 2), 18; his terms are 'ein ursprünglicher Tätigkeitsbegriff' and 'ein ursprünglich gegenständlicher Begriff'; though he buttresses the dichotomy by invoking the concepts of the *eigentlich* or *ursprünglich* as opposed to the *uneigentlich*, his commitment to the distinction is—to his credit—not always borne out by his sensitive analysis of individual passages.

<sup>23</sup> Becker (n. 2), 9–10.

<sup>24</sup> See also Ellendt (n. 4), 41, who, arguing along different lines, also concludes that in this passage 'ist ... durch κέλευθοι ein bestimmter, fest vorgezeichneter Weg angedeutet'.

<sup>25</sup> C. Kahn, *Essays on Being* (Oxford, 2009), 113, also 127–8.

<sup>26</sup> ἦρχε ... σφιν ... κατ' εὐρώεντα κέλευθα (*Od.* 24.9–10).

<sup>27</sup> προφέρουσα κατ' ἠερόεντα κέλευθα (*Od.* 20.64).

never used with *keleuthos* in the singular, but appears regularly with *hodos* in its sense as the physical object.<sup>28</sup>

Nor is this the only instance where *keleuthoi* differs from *keleuthos* but resembles *hodos*. For one thing, *keleuthoi* never appears alongside διαπρήσσω, the verb most commonly associated with *keleuthos* where sea voyages are concerned; instead, *keleuthoi* is often the object of ἐπιπλέω (cf. *Il.* 1.312, *Od.* 4.842, 15.474). Notably, διαπρήσσω takes the words *hodos* and *keleuthos* (singular) as its patient in different ways; as we have seen, with *keleuthos* it governs the accusative, whereas with *hodos* it governs the genitive (*Il.* 24.264; *Od.* 3.475, 15.47, 15.219), just as it does for other words such as πεδίον (*Il.* 2.785, 23.364). Becker chalks this up to a distinction between the ‘subjective’ status of the internal object *keleuthos* and the ‘objective’ presence of, for example, the πεδίον, which is already ‘there’ regardless of the journey carried out across it.<sup>29</sup> The phrase ὕγρὰ κέλευθα (*Il.* 1.312; *Od.* 4.842, 15.474), however, does not take a different case from the two other patients of ἐπιπλέω in Homer; all three patients appear in the accusative. Strikingly, the other two patients of ἐπιπλέω are πόντος (*Il.* 3.47, 6.291; *Od.* 3.15, 5.284) and ἄλμυρὸν ὕδωρ (*Od.* 9.227, 9.470), both of which plainly refer to objects that are ‘there’ independently of any kind of travel. Similarly, we find other linguistic patterns associated with *keleuthoi* that are also associated with *hodos* and with other words denoting clearly definable, independently existing physical objects. As we saw, Hermes ‘led’ (ἦρχε) the souls of the suitors along the dank *keleuthoi* (*Od.* 24.9) just as the Phaeacian herald ‘leads’ (ἄρχε) Demodocus down the same *hodos* (αὐτήν ὁδόν) the Phaeacian nobles travelled (*Od.* 8.107). Perhaps most notably, in the three instances where the words *hodos* and *keleuthos* appear side by side, *keleuthoi* takes the same grammatical form as *hodos*, *keleuthos* in the singular a different one.<sup>30</sup>

Grammatically, then, *keleuthoi* is treated in a manner quite distinct from a single *keleuthos*, but shares several features more commonly associated with words such as *hodos* or *atarp(it)os* when these denote physical objects, items that are ‘part of the landscape’, as it were. What part of the landscape do *keleuthoi* form? We noted that ‘Night and Day’ have their *keleuthoi*, while the subjective genitive also appears in references to the ‘*keleuthoi* of the winds’ (ἀνέμων ... κέλευθα, *Il.* 14.17, 15.620, *Od.* 10.20; and ἀνέμων ... κελεύθους, *Od.* 5.383).<sup>31</sup> Striking in these passages is Aeolus’ favour to Odysseus in ‘check[ing] the *keleuthoi* of the winds’ by stuffing them into his vaunted sack—all but that of Zephyr, which he leaves to hasten the journey back to Ithaca (*Od.* 10.18–26). This is reminiscent of Athena’s response to the storm Poseidon had stirred up in *Odyssey* Book 5; the goddess intervenes to check the *keleuthoi* of the winds themselves—all, that is, except for that of Boreas, which she leaves unblocked so that it can blow Odysseus to dry land. Boreas and Zephyr are winds whose courses are so fixed and steady that their names serve as

<sup>28</sup> As at *Il.* 15.682, when a daring horseman drives λαοφόρον καθ’ ὁδόν; see, further, Section III below. Cf. also *Od.* 17.204, *Il.* 17.743.

<sup>29</sup> See Becker (n. 2), 18. See also Stanford (n. 13), on *Od.* 3.475 and N. Richardson, *The Iliad: A Commentary. Volume VI, Books 21–24* (Cambridge, 1993), 301.

<sup>30</sup> At *Od.* 9.261–2, when Odysseus says to Polyphemos οἰκάδε ἰέμενοι, ἄλλην ὁδὸν ἄλλα κέλευθα | ἦλθομεν, *hodos* and *keleuthos* (plural) can each be governed as direct objects; by contrast, at *Od.* 3.389–90 = *Od.* 10.539–40, when Eidothea and Circe each says ὅς κέν τοι εἴτησιν ὁδὸν καὶ μέτρα κελεύθου | νόστον θ’, ὡς ἐπὶ πόντον ἐλεύσεια ἰχθυόεντα, it is μέτρα (not *keleuthos*) that, along with νόστος, is grammatically parallel to *hodos*.

<sup>31</sup> I shall discuss elsewhere the relationship between the plural forms κέλευθα and κελεύθους.

cardinal points of direction; why should the *keleuthoi* along which these winds blow be less permanently established than the winds themselves?<sup>32</sup> At the least, these unchanging *keleuthoi* are used and reused with such frequency that they appear to garner a kind of object-residue. But why not go further and say that they appear to fall into the same category as the *keleuthoi* of Night and Day? If so, they too would form part of the underlying structure of the natural world, with all the permanence that would imply. Finally, similar in this respect are the εὐρώεντα κέλευθα along which Hermes leads the souls of the suitors; the landmarks described at *Od.* 24.11–13 suggest that this pathway, too, is a permanent feature of the world's architecture.<sup>33</sup>

In fact, the term 'object-concept'—deemed inapplicable to the word *keleuthos* by Becker—seems to capture this phenomenon remarkably well. When describing the *hodos* that involves the action of travelling, Becker comments that such a *hodos* nevertheless retains the quality of an objective fact, a datum, a 'given', at least in certain respects.<sup>34</sup> This description extends just as easily to the *keleuthoi* under discussion. To the extent that the patterns of Day and Night, the courses of the winds, and one's path to Hades after death might be understood as 'givens', as objective facts, so should the fixed, stable, repeatedly used *keleuthoi* associated with them be understood, too.

### III. HODOS AS AN OBJECT

In fact, a first glance at the use of the word *hodos* in Homer suggests, rightly, that the same can also be said of its different senses: that, roughly speaking, the word's uses can be broken down into instances where *hodos* designates a concrete physical object, and instances where it should be understood to denote an activity.<sup>35</sup>

In contrast to *keleuthoi*, *hodos* in its sense as a physical object almost exclusively signifies a land route. One major difference between *hodos* in its sense as an object and *keleuthoi* becomes clear from the range of grammatical situations and cases in which the two words appear. The frequency with which *hodos* is modified by various spatial prepositions (especially those governing the genitive or dative case) relative to the word *keleuthos* is particularly telling (see [Table 2](#)).

Taken collectively, this array of spatial prepositions presents a portrait of the *hodos* as a concrete object with physical mass and spatial extension. While we may find the *keleuthoi* of Night and Day in a general proximity to each other in the land of the Laestrygonians (a fact whose salience lies not in the precision of the spatial relationship but in the extended daylight hours people in that clime enjoy), all manner of entities and creatures enter into more explicitly determined spatial relations with the *hodos* as an object. At any moment, we may find portentous herons hard alongside them (*Il.* 10.274), angry bees who live beside them (*Il.* 12.168, 16.261), clandestine night-warriors who leap off them (*Il.* 10.349), lions or stags who happen upon them (*Il.* 15.276; *Od.* 10.158), once-yoked horses that split to opposite sides of them (*Il.* 23.393),

<sup>32</sup> See in this context N. Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon: Poetic Problems in Homer's Odyssey* (Berkeley and London, 1975), especially 134–6.

<sup>33</sup> For the 'Leucadian rock', the gates of the Helios, the *dēmos* of dreams, and other striking features of this passage, see J. Russo, M. Fernández-García, A. Heubeck, *Homer's Odyssey. Volume 3, Books XVII–XXIV* (Oxford, 1992), 360–1.

<sup>34</sup> Becker (n. 2), 19; his term is 'Gegebenheit'.

<sup>35</sup> See also *LfgRE* s.v. *hodos*.

Table 2: Spatial prepositions used with *hodos* and *keleuthos/keleuthoi*: frequency in Homer

	<i>hodos</i>		<i>keleuthos</i> (1)	<i>keleuthoi</i> (3)
	<i>Iliad</i> (14)	<i>Odyssey</i> (7)		
ἐγγύς	1	1	0	0
ἐκτός	1	1	0	0
παρέξ	1	0	0	0
πρό	1	0	0	0
ἀμφίς	1	0	0	1
ἄγχι	0	0	1	0
ἐν	3	2	0	0
ἐπί	3	0	0	0
κατά	1	2	0	2
εἰς	1	1	0	0
ἀνά	1	0	0	0

or, famously, chariots that cannot both pass (two abreast) atop them (*Il.* 23.419, 23.424, 23.435).

Similarly, several passages show that a *hodos* is an item in the universe of immediately visible objects. For example, we find at *Il.* 22.145–57 that a *hodos* takes its place alongside other such distinctive landmarks as lookout points, ‘windy’ fig trees, and two springs, one hot, one cold, where not so long ago the women of Troy kept their laundry clean.<sup>36</sup> As an object, then, the *hodos*—unlike *keleuthoi*—is part of the visible landscape.

Moreover, if *keleuthoi* often appear to be part of the natural constitution of the world, the *hodos* as an object is almost invariably part of the *built* landscape; generally speaking, a *hodos* is constructed.<sup>37</sup> When Nestor first proposes that the Greeks build the Achaean wall, he stresses the importance of building gates into it (*Il.* 7.340):

ὄφρα δι' αὐτάων ἱππηλασίη ὁδὸς εἴη ...

So that through them there might be a road suitable for horse-drawn vehicles ...<sup>38</sup>

<sup>36</sup> See J. Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death* (Oxford, 1980), 20–1; I.J.F. de Jong, *Homer Iliad Book XXII* (Cambridge, 2012), 96–7. Cf. also *Od.* 13.187–99, when Odysseus first views Ithaca but does not recognize the otherwise-familiar ‘long tracks (ἄτραπτοι), anchorage of the bays, steep cliffs, and lush trees’ (*Od.* 13.195–6); however one interprets contested details of this passage (see e.g. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Die Heimkehr des Odysseus: Neue Homerische Untersuchungen* [Berlin, 1927], 6–7; *LfgRE* s.v. ὄηρ; A. Bowie, *Homer Odyssey Books XIII and XIV* [Cambridge, 2013], 191), the point is that roads—even less sophisticated ones—would be expected to play a role in defining a landscape.

<sup>37</sup> Though, strictly speaking, need not necessarily be so; see e.g. the chariot race in *Iliad* Book 23. The observation of Becker (n. 2), 20 that ‘*hodos* is the street’s “superordinate concept [*übergeordneter Begriff*]”’ is shrewd; although he is referring to ἀγυῖά, the point seems to hold for the whole lexicon of overland routes, paths, tracks, streets, etc., not all of which will have been built. See also *LfgRE* s.v. *hodos*.

<sup>38</sup> See Cunliffe for this rendition of ἱππηλασίη; also Chantraine s.v. ἐλαύνω.



Just as when mules, struggling with all their might,  
 drag out of the mountain heights, along a rocky beaten track,  
 a beam or great ship-timber ...

Making do with a mere *atarpos*—a ‘beaten track’ of the rugged sort that Odysseus takes through the wooded country and steep terrain between the harbour and Eumaeus’ hut inland (τρηχειαν ἀταρπὸν | χῶρον ἄν’ ὑλήεντα δι’ ἄκριας, *Od.* 14.1–2)<sup>44</sup>—the mules toil laboriously to bring a single beam down from the mountain; on the smooth Laestrygonian road, one may bring it down by the wagon-load.

Similarly, we may contrast the level of construction and sophistication associated with both the Laestrygonian wagon-*hodos* and the ἱππηλασίη ὁδός through the Achaean wall’s gates with that rarest of entities, overland *keleuthoi*. After the embassy to Achilles in *Iliad* Book 9 has proved fruitless, Agamemnon and Menelaus meet in the small hours and decide to summon the Greek chieftains to a midnight council. Having settled who will go to rouse whom, Menelaus asks whether he should return to Agamemnon or stay with Ajax and Idomeneus, whom he will visit; Agamemnon replies that the latter makes more sense, lest they miss each other in the course of their errands (*Il.* 10.66):

πολλὰ γὰρ ἀνὰ στρατὸν εἰσι κέλευθοι.

For many are the *keleuthoi* up and down the camp.

In contrast to the very limited number of specially constructed carriageable *hodoi* communicating the Greek camp to the Trojan plain or serving as a landmark in *Iliad* Book 22, these rare overland *keleuthoi* seem to be merely ways of getting through the camp between the tents and the ships, channels or ways of passage that take on a kind of object-residue by being used repeatedly and habitually.<sup>45</sup>

Though exceptional in being overland passages or channels, the *keleuthoi* through the Greek camp bring into sharper focus differences between *keleuthoi* and both *hodoi*-as-physical objects and the *atarpoi* discussed above. Like the ἀμοξιτός in the duel between Achilles and Hector, *atarpoi*, too, are marked as visible features of a landscape, as when Odysseus sees Ithaca for the first time but does not recognize its harbours and *atarpoi*.<sup>46</sup> Equally, however, the *keleuthoi* are not in constant flux or radically unstable any more than the location of the tents and ships that together make up the camp is in flux or unstable; the *keleuthoi* through them may be invisible to the eye, but they are apparently as fixed and stable as the camp itself.

The contrast between the ‘many *keleuthoi*’ through the camp and the Laestrygonians’ single ‘smooth *hodos*’ or the Achaean camp’s three ‘*hodoi* suitable-for-wheeled-traffic’ is neatly exemplified in the simile used to describe Ajax as he leaps from ship to ship to fend off the Trojan advance (*Il.* 15.679–84):<sup>47</sup>

<sup>44</sup> The country road from Eumaeus’ hut to the fountain where Melanthis is encountered is referred to as both a *πειπαλόμεσσα ὁδός* (*Od.* 17.204) and an *atrapitos* (*Od.* 17.234). *Contra* Becker (n. 2), 35, it seems useful to see the contrast between a *hodos* and an *atrap(it)os* as hinging on functionality as much as level of construction; an *atrap(it)os* would be a road that is not accessible by wheeled vehicle, though it may also be passable by means other than foot (e.g. a mule). See Lolos (n. 2), 150–1.

<sup>45</sup> See again Kahn (n. 25), 113. One wonders how much the contested status of *Iliad* Book 10 might matter with respect to this passage.

<sup>46</sup> *Od.* 13.195; see n. 36 above.

<sup>47</sup> See Bouchet (n. 4) for the relationship between a ἀμοξιτός and a λαοφόρος ὁδός.

ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἄνθρωπος ἵπποισι κελητίζειν εὖ εἰδώς,  
 ὅς τ' ἐπεὶ ἐκ πολέων πίσυρας συναίρεται ἵππους,  
 σεύας ἐκ πεδίοιο μέγα προτὶ ἄστρῳ δῖηται  
 λαοφόρον καθ' ὁδόν: πολέες τὲ ἐθήσαντο  
 ἄνδρες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες: ὃ δ' ἔμπεδον ἀσφαλῆς αἰεὶ  
 θρόσσκων ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἄλλον ἀμείβεται, οἱ δὲ πέτονται ...

And as when a man who knows well the art of leaping from horse to horse,  
 having yoked together four choice horses,  
 speeding from the plain to the great city, drives  
 along the *laophoros hodos*: and crowds marvel at him,  
 men and women alike, as he keeps leaping, safe and steady,  
 now to this horse, now to that one, while the stallions fly on ...

The juxtaposition of the ‘many *keleuthoi*’ through the camp with the single *laophoros hodos* (‘highway’, ‘thoroughfare’, ‘main road’) is telling. In the first case, in the absence of the limitations imposed by constructing a sophisticated *hodos*, the number of *keleuthoi* available for use proliferate to such an extent that two individuals who are expressly seeking each other may nevertheless fail to encounter each other. By contrast, there being but a single route along which to transport one’s team of horses (or Laestrygonian timber), the attention of the many men and women who live along the *laophoros hodos* is concentrated on the single location of the road.<sup>48</sup>

#### IV. HODOS AS AN ACTIVITY

While *hodos* frequently appears alongside spatial prepositions governing the genitive or dative when it signifies a physical object, when it signifies an ‘activity-concept’ it most commonly appears in the accusative.<sup>49</sup> By shifting our focus from the *hodos* as a physical object to the *hodos* as an ‘activity-concept’, we are also shifting focus from the *Iliad* to the *Odyssey*.<sup>50</sup> And in the *Odyssey*, no verb—and no cluster of words—is more closely associated with the word *hodos* than those of words derived from *telos* (‘end’). Notably, verbs derived from *telos* take *hodos* as a direct object three times and are used passively with *hodos* as the patient subject twice more.

Closely related to this is the fact that, unlike *keleuthos*, which often appears in the middle of an episode of travel, the word *hodos* (especially when paired with a verb derived from *telos*) often appears either before a journey has occurred or upon its completion. The first pairing between *hodos* and a verb derived from *telos*, during the debate in the Ithacan agora, provides an excellent example. Telemachus’ proposal to raise a news-gathering expedition is met with scorn by Leocritus, who suggests that Telemachus will never get around to leaving Ithaca and so ‘will never accomplish

<sup>48</sup> For the implications of this point, see B. Folit-Weinberg, ‘Conceptualizing chance: the *hodos* in Homer’, *Phoenix* 74 (2020), 1–14.

<sup>49</sup> In fact, it is tempting to call this an ‘activity-like concept’ rather than just an ‘activity-concept’ (*Tätigkeitsbegriff*) and the ‘object-concept’ an ‘object-like concept’, viewing the semantic field as a continuous space with gradations rather than radical breaks. See also Porzig (n. 4), especially 89–90, also 201, 306.

<sup>50</sup> Of the twenty-seven appearances of the word *hodos* in the *Iliad*, all but five signify ‘object-concepts’; of its fifty-nine appearances in the *Odyssey*, at least thirty-seven take the sense of an ‘activity-concept’ (though see n. 63 below).

the *hodos*’ in question (*Od.* 2.256 τελέει δ’ ὁδὸν οὐ ποτε ταύτην). Later, after Telemachus has, in fact, embarked on this journey, Antinous will remark (*Od.* 4.663–4):

ὦ πόποι, ἦ μέγα ἔργον ὑπερφιάλως ἐτελέεσθη  
Τηλεμάχῳ ὁδὸς ἦδε: φάμεν δέ οἱ οὐ τελέεσθαι.

For shame! A great deed, this *hodos*, was accomplished for Telemachus, and outrageously so: and we said that it would not be accomplished for him.

The completion of this voyage’s return leg occasions a virtually identical outburst from Eurymachus twelve books later (*Od.* 16.146–7).

The same pattern of usage—namely, a verb derived from *telos* takes *hodos* as its patient at the precise moment the journey emerges as a totality, either just before it has begun or at its completion—also characterizes Odysseus’ journeys. When Odysseus appeals to Circe to launch him on his voyage home from Aeaea (*Od.* 10.483–4) with the words

ὦ Κίρκη, τέλεσόν μοι ὑπόσχεσιν ἦν περ ὑπέστης,  
οἴκαδε πεμψέμεναι ...

Circe, fulfil for me the promise that you made to guide me home ...

she responds using the verb τελέω as a pivot (*Od.* 10.490):

ἀλλ’ ἄλλην χρῆ πρῶτον ὁδὸν τελέσαι ...

But first you must complete another journey ...

Likewise, when Odysseus and his men are so close to completing their *nostos* that they desecrate Ithaca’s hearth-fires, we find this pairing again. That their journey is essentially finished is precisely the concern, for what his crewmates lament is that, because the journey is effectively over, they will have no further opportunity to gain the spoils of war or collect gifts from abroad—as Aeolus’ bag of winds makes it seem Odysseus has (*Od.* 10.41–2):

ἡμεῖς δ’ αὐτε ὁμῆν ὁδὸν ἐκτελέσαντες  
οἴκαδε νισσόμεθα κενεὰς σὺν χεῖρας ἔχοντες ...

But we, who have completed to the end the very same journey, return home empty-handed ...

We may observe two things. First, the *hodos* as an ‘activity-concept’ is something that one can ‘complete’, ‘accomplish’, or ‘fulfil’. Second, it is just at the moment when one views a journey as a single unified project to be undertaken (viewed prospectively) or already essentially completed (viewed retrospectively) that one discusses a *hodos*, and does so in terms expressed by verbs derived from *telos*.

The association between *hodos* and words derived from *telos* is not limited to the relationship between verb and patient. When Athena encourages Telemachus in the aftermath of the *agora* debate, she invokes Odysseus, saying (*Od.* 2.272–3):

οἷος κείνος ἔην τελέσαι ἔργον τε ἔπος τε  
οὐ τοι ἔπειθ' ἄλιη ὁδὸς ἔσσεται οὐδ' ἀτέλεστος ...

As able as he was to accomplish word and deed,  
so then your *hodos* will not be vain or unfulfilled ...

Athena's assimilation of 'accomplishing' something—an *ergon*, an *epos*—to a *hodos* that is not 'vain' or 'unfulfilled' reveals another aspect of this meaning of *hodos*. The adjectives ἄλιη and ἀτέλεστος represent a key cluster of modifiers associated with the *hodos* as an 'activity-concept' in the *Odyssey*.<sup>51</sup> These feature most prominently in the discussions surrounding Telemachus' journey. In a reprise of the debate in the agora, the suitors respond to Telemachus' proposed *hodos* with the same contempt displayed by Leocritus; this time, Telemachus stands his ground, declaring (*Od.* 2.318):

εἶμι μὲν, οὐδ' ἄλιη ὁδὸς ἔσσεται ἦν ἀγορευώ ...

But indeed I shall go, nor will the *hodos* of which I speak be vain ...

Not long after he completes the first leg of this journey, another authority figure, this time Nestor, urges Telemachus onwards by invoking the spectre of a τηῦσιη ὁδός, a 'fruitless *hodos*', that must be avoided (*Od.* 3.316 = *Od.* 15.13; Athena delivers the second admonition). Closely related, then, to the notion of 'accomplishing, completing, fulfilling' a *hodos* is a concern with the *hodos* that is potentially ἀτέλεστος, ἄλιη, or τηῦσιη, 'unfulfilled, fruitless', 'vain', 'useless'.

The sense mobilized here extends beyond a journey that is simply unfinished or incomplete—one that was somehow terminated before its scheduled point of conclusion—to suggest that a notion of purpose is inherent in the word these adjectives modify; an 'unfulfilled' *hodos* would not be one that is merely unfinished, but rather one that fails to fulfil or accomplish its purpose. The point can be expressed in two possible ways. The more modest claim is that just as 'a stone can be sightless but not blind' (for 'to be blind requires that one be in the sight game'),<sup>52</sup> so in order for a *hodos* to be ἀτέλεστος, ἄλιη, τηῦσιη, 'unaccomplished, fruitless', 'vain', 'useless', it would have to be in the 'accomplishment', 'fruitfulness', or 'usefulness' game to begin with. A *hodos*, then, would be a notion with just such a nature that it is susceptible to predications involving the notion of purposiveness. Or, given the frequency with which the predications in question are made, we could make the stronger claim that not only is purposiveness an inherent aspect of the notion of the *hodos* as an 'activity-concept', it is one of the aspects of this notion emphasized most prominently in Homeric usage.

Moreover, specific purposes are frequently attributed to a given *hodos*. This is most commonly expressed via a verb of motion used in conjunction with a future participle, something we find in a number of the passages we have reviewed. Exemplary again is Circe's reply to Odysseus when the latter asks her to 'fulfil her promise' (*Od.* 10.490–3):

<sup>51</sup> The other alludes to the length (*Od.* 17.426) or difficulty (*Od.* 3.288, 14.235)—or both (*Od.* 4.393, 4.484)—of a *hodos*.

<sup>52</sup> M.A. Wrathall, 'Unconcealment', in H.L. Dreyfus and M.A. Wrathall (edd.), *A Companion to Heidegger* (Oxford, 2005), 337–57, at 342.

ἀλλ' ἄλλην χρῆ πρῶτον ὁδὸν τελέσαι καὶ **ικέσθαι**  
 εἰς Ἄϊδαο δόμους καὶ ἐπαινῆς Περσεφονείης,  
 ψυχῇ **χρησομένου**ς Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο,  
 μάντιος ἀλαοῦ, τοῦ τε φρένες ἔμπεδοί εἰσιν ...

But you must first complete another *hodos* and come  
 to the house of Hades and dread Persephone,  
 in order to receive a prophecy from the spirit of Theban Tiresias,  
 the blind seer, whose wits abide steadfast ...

We shall see below how frequently the ‘verb of motion + future participle’ construction appears alongside the word *hodos*. While the nexus of adjectives identified above demonstrates the intrinsic relationship between the *hodos* as an ‘activity-concept’ and a sense of purposiveness more generally, this sense is often rendered explicit by the use of grammatical constructions that specify a particular purpose associated with a particular *hodos*.

Similarly, the word *hodos* is often accompanied by a pair of lexical items—the direction-indicating lexeme –δε and the preposition εἰς—that identify a clear spatial goal or destination. When Odysseus calls on Circe to ‘fulfil her promise to him’ (τέλεσόν μοι ὑπόσχεσιν ἦν περ ὑπέστης, *Od.* 10.483), this promise consists in ‘guiding (me) homewards’ (οἴκαδε πεμψόμεναι, *Od.* 10.484). Her response, we saw, redirects this *hodos* towards another destination (*Od.* 10.490–1):

ἀλλ' ἄλλην χρῆ πρῶτον ὁδὸν τελέσαι καὶ **ικέσθαι**  
**εἰς Ἄϊδαο δόμους** καὶ ἐπαινῆς Περσεφονείης ...

For his part, Odysseus underscores this sense of destination by echoing Circe’s line-initial ‘to Hades’ (*Od.* 10.501–2):

ὦ Κίρκη, τίς γὰρ ταύτην ὁδὸν ἡγεμονεύσει;  
**εἰς Ἄϊδος** δ' οὐ πῶ τις ἀφίκετο νηὶ μελαίνῃ.

Oh Circe, who will guide us on this *hodos*?  
 To Hades no man has ever yet travelled in a black ship.

This exchange mirrors the opening scene of the Telemachy proper. There, too, a female divinity proleptically narrates to another member of the House of Laertes a *hodos* the latter ought to accomplish; in that case, it is Athena-as-Mentor who sets the poem’s plot in motion by addressing Telemachus as follows (*Od.* 1.280–90):

νηῖ ἄρσας ἐρέτησιν ἐείκοσιν, ἧ τις ἀρίστη,  
**ἔρχεο** **πευσόμενος** πατρός δὴν οἰχομένουιο ...  
 πρῶτα μὲν ἐς **Πύλον** ἐλθε καὶ εἴρεο Νέστορα διόν,  
 κεῖθεν δὲ **Σπάρτην**δε παρὰ ξανθὸν Μενέλαον ...  
 εἰ δέ κε τεθνηῶτος ἀκούσης μηδ' ἔτ' ἔοντος,  
 νοστήσας δὴ ἔπειτα φίλην ἐς **πατρίδα γαίαν** ...

Fit out a ship with twenty oars, the best you can come by,  
 and depart for the purpose of asking about your father, who is so long absent ...  
 First go to Pylos and question the great Nestor,  
 and from there go to Sparta to see fair-haired Menelaus ...  
 But if you should hear that he has perished and no longer lives  
 then return home to your beloved native land ...

Just as Circe's *hodos* was *to* the house of Hades and dread Persephone *in order to* consult the spirit of Tiresias, so Athena spells out a clear itinerary: first *to* Pylos to talk to Nestor, then *to* Sparta to Menelaus, and finally back *to* Ithaca (and, again, in the service a clearly defined goal—gathering news about Odysseus—designated through the same purpose construction). Characteristic of the discourse of the *hodos*, then, is the appearance of place-names rendered as destinations with the direction-indicating lexemes  $\text{--}\delta\epsilon$  or  $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ . Whether one is completing a *hodos*, narrating a *hodos*, or guiding someone else's *hodos*, in the *Odyssey* the *hodos* in question is a *hodos* to somewhere.<sup>53</sup>

It may prove useful at this juncture to introduce a pair of distinctions from the linguistic analysis of verbal aspect and philosophical analysis of action: that between the perfective and the imperfective, and between events and processes, respectively.<sup>54</sup> Introducing these terms is as an act of bricolage, not engineering; these dichotomies provide models from which we may simply draw inspiration, and are presented on a purely heuristic basis.

Verbal aspects are 'different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation'.<sup>55</sup> The fundamental distinction in the domain of aspect is between the so-called perfective and imperfective.<sup>56</sup> The perfective 'presents the totality of the situation referred to', which is to say that 'the situation is presented as a single ... whole'; that is, the perfective aspect depicts the situation 'from the outside'.<sup>57</sup> The imperfective 'make[s] explicit reference to the internal temporal constituency of the situation'; it thus looks at the situation 'from the inside'.<sup>58</sup>

That this description of the perfective can be applied to the relationship between the word *hodos* and verbs derived from *telos* is evident. In the situations discussed—Telemachus' proposal in the agora; the suitors' dismay at his journey to the mainland; the resentment of Odysseus' crewmates as Ithaca hoves into view—there is no interest in the phenomenological experience or in individual actions that make up the *hodos* discussed; rather, the emphasis falls on the journey understood as a 'single whole' presented 'in totality' and viewed, whether after the fact or before it, 'from the outside'. This contrasts starkly with the passages where *keleuthos* featured, particularly the microscopic precision with which the travel of the Achaean, Ithacan, and Phaeacian ships and Diomedes' chariot were presented. Here the focus is emphatically on the 'inside' of the action, the attendant range of experiences, details and sensations that comprise the process of travelling a *keleuthos*.

Two further observations spring from this comparison. First, while *keleuthos* is often the object of verbs in the imperfect or present (that is, imperfective) form, in virtually all predications involving the *hodos* as an 'activity-concept', the aorist (that is, perfective)

<sup>53</sup> See also A.P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route Of Parmenides* (Las Vegas, 2008<sup>2</sup>), 19.

<sup>54</sup> For verbal aspect, see B. Comrie, *Aspect. An Introduction to the Study of Verbal Aspect and Related Problems* (Cambridge, 1976). For analysis of 'situations', see A.P.D. Mourelatos, 'Events, processes, and states', *Linguistics and Philosophy* 2 (1978), 415–34; A.P.D. Mourelatos, 'Aristotle's *kinēsis/energeia* distinction: a marginal note on Kathleen Gill's paper', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 23 (1993), 385–8; D.W. Graham, 'States and performances: Aristotle's test', *The Philosophical Quarterly* 30 (1980), 117–30; M. Thompson, *Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought* (Cambridge, MA and London, 2008), 123–8.

<sup>55</sup> Comrie (n. 54), 3 with n. 1.

<sup>56</sup> The place of what is usually referred to as the 'perfect' (as opposed to the 'perfective', of the dichotomy 'perfective/imperfective') in this schema is disputed; see Comrie (n. 54), 5–6.

<sup>57</sup> Comrie (n. 54), 3.

<sup>58</sup> Comrie (n. 54), 4.

is used: Odysseus' crewmates deploy the aorist participle to note their completion of the journey home (ὄδὸν ἐκτελέσαντες); Circe the aorist infinitive as she instructs Odysseus that he must take another journey (ἄλλην χρῆ πρῶτον ὄδὸν τελέσαι); Odysseus the aorist infinitive to command Eurylochus to lead him to Circe's palace (*Od.* 10.263 αὐτήν ὄδὸν ἡγήσασθαι).<sup>59</sup> There is thus a marked tendency for *hodos* and *keleuthos* to be the patient of verbs in the aorist (that is, perfective) and in the imperfect or present (that is, imperfective), respectively.<sup>60</sup>

Second, we observed that, where verbs derived from *telos* were involved, the *hodos* under discussion was yet to be embarked upon or had already been completed. This phenomenon holds across nearly all uses of the word *hodos* as an 'activity-concept'; if aspect matters, so too does tense. Notably common is the link between the word *hodos* and the future tense. The exchange between Odysseus and Circe is again exemplary;<sup>61</sup> Odysseus responds to Circe's injunction to 'accomplish another *hodos*' by asking (*Od.* 10.503):

ὦ Κίρκη, τίς γὰρ ταύτην ὄδὸν ἡγεμονεύσει;

But who, Circe, will guide us on this *hodos*?

Another common pairing is *hodos* and a future form of εἰμί or its compounds.<sup>62</sup> Athena reassures Telemachus, fresh from the Ithacan agora, with the words (*Od.* 2.272)

οὐ τοι ἔπειθ' ἄλιη ὁδὸς ἔσσειται οὐδ' ἀτέλεστος ...

Nor will this *hodos* be vain or unfulfilled for you ...

before repeating this encouragement (*Od.* 2.285):

σοὶ δ' ὁδὸς οὐκέτι δῆρὸν ἀπέσσειται ...

Not for long will this journey remain absent for you ...

Laodamas, the Phaeacian nobleman who challenges Odysseus, repeats the claim verbatim (*Od.* 8.150); the future journey to be taken from Ithaca to the mainland, or from Scheria to Ithaca, lies ahead of each pair of interlocutors, both of whom view it 'from the outside', as a 'totality', a 'single whole'.<sup>63</sup> By contrast, as we saw, *keleuthos* appears when the activity of travelling is placed before our eyes as an act in progress.

It is not enough, however, to observe that a *hodos* presents a journey in its totality as a single whole as if 'from the outside'. As the linkage with words derived from *telos*

<sup>59</sup> Since these examples feature participles or verbs in the infinitive, the topic of aspect is important.

<sup>60</sup> The correlation is stronger in the case of *hodos*, which is very rarely the patient of verbs in the imperfective.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. also *Od.* 6.261, 7.30; see Mourelatos (n. 53), 18–21.

<sup>62</sup> See further Porzig (n. 4), 89–90, 201, 306.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. also *Il.* 9.43; *Od.* 2.318 (discussed above), 12.57. Relevant, too, is the formulaic expression ἐπιγόμενός περ ὁδοῖο ('being eager for the journey', *Od.* 1.309, 3.284, 15.49) and the variants ληλαϊόμενός περ ὁδοῖο (*Od.* 1.315) and ἐσσύμενός περ ὁδοῖο (*Od.* 4.372). The phrase appears when someone is on the verge of setting out on some discrete journey which has not yet begun. Incidentally, when this journey is to be made overland—such as Telemachus' trips to Pylos and Sparta—the word *hodos* effectively encompasses both the activity of journeying and the physical object on which the journey takes place.




FIGURE 1: Modified Kenny-Vendler typology

suggests, and the affiliation with the complex of adjectives discussed, the purpose construction, and the direction-indicating lexemes  $-\delta\epsilon$  and  $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$  confirm, the single whole the *hodos* represents is teleological; that is to say, *it is constituted in relation to an end*, an end-as-destination and an end-as-purpose. As we have seen, a *hodos* is a *hodos* to somewhere in particular, a *hodos* one travels *for* a purpose.

One element of the ‘perfective’ can be examined further in relation to the ‘activity-concept’ sense of *hodos*—namely, that the perfective presents a situation as a single whole ‘without reference to its internal constituency’. In fact, the *hodos* as an ‘activity-like concept’ is intimately concerned with the internal structure of the whole it presents; it is simply interested in this internal structure in a different way from the depiction of the ‘internal temporal constituency’ effected by *keleuthos*. The second distinction, between ‘events’ and ‘processes’, can help clarify this difference.

The distinction emerges at the intersection of linguistics and philosophy. At its modern base is the Kenny-Vendler classification of ‘situations’ (see Fig. 1 above).<sup>64</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Examples from Mourelatos (n. 54 [1978]), 415, Graham (n. 54), 119. Because I am interested in ‘actions’ (undertaken by agents) rather than in the broader ‘occurrences’ (including events or

Crucial here is the distinction between ‘processes’ and ‘events’ (and ultimately between ‘processes’ and ‘accomplishments’). Unlike processes, events are ‘telic’: they ‘have the fuller integration implied by the posit of reaching a goal or giving closure to a process’.<sup>65</sup> By contrast, processes are ‘essentially atelic’;<sup>66</sup> as a result, ‘the time stretch of [processes] is inherently indefinite, for they involve no culmination or anticipated result’.<sup>67</sup> Accordingly, processes ‘can be protracted indefinitely or broken off at any point’ in a way that events cannot.<sup>68</sup>

‘Events’ can be further split into ‘accomplishments’ and ‘achievements’, distinguished by whether or not the action ‘is conceived of as lasting a certain period of time’.<sup>69</sup> While achievements ‘capture either the inception or the climax of an act’ but ‘cannot in themselves occur *over* or *throughout* a temporal stretch’, accomplishments ‘have duration intrinsically’.<sup>70</sup> This combination of the durative and the telic—the fusion of ‘a process leading up to the terminal point as well as the terminal point’—provides the essential qualities of the accomplishment.<sup>71</sup> It also gives us an important insight into the power and capaciousness of the *hodos* as an ‘activity-concept’ to encompass a wide range of phenomena and outcomes, experiences and upshots, processes and products within its basic conceptual framework. Little wonder that it should become such a ubiquitous presence in poetry, historiography and on the dramatic stage.

One final distinction between ‘processes’ and ‘accomplishments’ is relevant. Processes are ‘homogeneous’: ‘if “Jones is ... running for half an hour”, then it must be true that “he is ... running for every time stretch within that period”’.<sup>72</sup> By contrast, accomplishments are ‘heterogeneous’: “in case I wrote a letter in an hour, I did not write it, say, in the first quarter of that hour”’.<sup>73</sup> The homogeneity of processes is similar to that of ‘mass terms’ (as opposed to ‘count terms’); ‘bottle’ and ‘necklace’ can be identified as discrete countable items, whereas ‘wine’ and ‘gold’ are mass terms. Mass terms ‘generally do not have plural forms, or if they do there is a meaning shift: wines are *types* of wine’.<sup>74</sup> Closely related to this is a difference in the nature of the internal constitution of what the term in question denotes: a bottle is not made up of other bottles, nor a necklace of necklaces, in the way that gold is made up of more gold, or wine of more wine.

We may take the second point first. Recalling that the *hodos* Athena described for Telemachus was defined by its destinations (Pylos, Sparta, back home) and the purpose for which it was undertaken, we may speak of the *hodos* as being concerned with the inner constitution of the journey understood as a whole, consisting of distinct

processes in the natural world), I retain the Kenny-Vendler framework, with the exception of ‘process’ for ‘activity’ (despite Mourelatos [n. 54 (1978)]).

<sup>65</sup> Mourelatos (n. 54 [1993]), 386; events ‘involve a product, upshot, or outcome’ (Mourelatos [n. 54 (1978)], 417).

<sup>66</sup> Mourelatos (n. 54 [1993]), 386: ‘pushing-a-cart qualifies as an activity regardless of whether the cart is pushed to some destination’.

<sup>67</sup> Mourelatos (n. 54 [1978]), 416.

<sup>68</sup> Note the difference between, say, interrupted singing and interrupted house-building: if I had been singing but am interrupted, I can still say ‘I have sung’; but if I had been building a house and am interrupted, I cannot claim ‘I have built a house’: Comrie (n. 54), 44.

<sup>69</sup> Comrie (n. 54), 41.

<sup>70</sup> Mourelatos (n. 54 [1978]), 416.

<sup>71</sup> Comrie (n. 54), 47.

<sup>72</sup> Mourelatos (n. 54 [1978]), 416, quoting Kenny and Vendler, respectively.

<sup>73</sup> Mourelatos (n. 54 [1978]), 416, quoting Vendler.

<sup>74</sup> See Mourelatos (n. 54 [1978]), 424.

heterogeneous items that together constitute the skeleton of the route. Likewise, Leocritus uses the word *hodos* when he casts doubt on Telemachus' fundamental ability to undertake the journey (that is, as a whole) at all. At issue for Telemachus at this stage is not where he ought to go or mustering the will to do so, but rather marshalling the means to get from point A to point B (*Od.* 2.212–13):

ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι δότε νῆα θοὴν καὶ εἴκοσ' ἑταίρους,  
οἳ κέ μοι ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα διαπρήσσωσι κέλευθον.

But come, grant me a swift ship and twenty companions  
who can effect my passage from here to there.

As the indefinite 'from here to there' emphasizes, the specifics of the here and the there are irrelevant: the crux of *keleuthos* is the homogeneous process of travelling, the passage itself.<sup>75</sup> Similarly, while the discussion concerning the itinerary and the journey-as-a-whole repeatedly features the word *hodos* (*Od.* 2.253, 2.256, 2.273, 2.285, 2.318, 2.404), and *keleuthos* is used just this once, during the actual sailing itself, we find *keleuthos* twice in quick succession (*Od.* 2.429, 2.434), while *hodos* is entirely absent. In short, when the structure of the route or the entirety of the journey is in question, *hodos* is used; when the process of 'travelling' is in question, we find *keleuthos*.

If the non-homogeneity of accomplishments points to the importance of the internal structure of a journey to a *hodos*, the homogeneity of processes can also help clarify an aspect of the distinction between *keleuthos* and *keleuthoi* observed above. Mass terms regularly have a different meaning when used in the singular as opposed to the plural. So far, I have been rendering *keleuthos* as 'passage', largely because its deverbative form helps capture the action of travelling. But it may also provide a felicitous parallel. In the singular, the word pinpoints just the sense of the *keleuthos* 'from here to there' that Telemachus pleads for: passage as an action, a movement from one place or point to another. 'Passages', by contrast, refer to *places* where such movement can be undertaken, where 'passage can be effected', viz. a passageway—just as we saw that the *keleuthoi* in the Greek camp were all the places, the passages or passageways, where passage through the objects that comprised the camp could be effected.<sup>76</sup>

#### TOWARDS A *TELOS*

In the preceding analysis I have attempted to turn the use of the distinction between an 'object-concept' and an 'activity-concept' on its axis. Rather than differentiating between the meanings of the words *keleuthos* and *hodos*, respectively, the notions of the 'object-concept' and the 'activity-concept' distinguish two different meanings of each word; we thus end up with a quadrant of sorts constituted by (a) '*keleuthos*-as-activity' (*keleuthos*), (b) '*keleuthos*-as-object' (*keleuthoi*), (c) '*hodos*-as-object', (d) '*hodos*-as-activity'. Understood as an object (c), a *hodos* is a road, almost always built, that passes over land and often supports wheeled traffic (that is, a 'rut-road'); this is in contrast to *keleuthoi* (b), which designate passages or channels, almost always

<sup>75</sup> That there is a 'here' and a 'there' of some kind, however, is important; see Section I above.

<sup>76</sup> See n. 39 above.

in the natural world, that are regularly used but are rarely visible in their own right. The ‘action-level’ ([a] vs [d]) was clarified by parallels with discussions of verbal aspect and the Kenny-Vendler analysis of ‘situations’. As with the perfective, a *hodos* (often used with verbs with perfective aspect, viz. the aorist) signifies a journey viewed ‘from the outside’, that is, ‘as a single, unified whole’, while *keleuthos* (often used with the imperfective present and the imperfect) signifies the journeying, seen ‘from the inside’, either as a phenomenological experience or at the moment when blockage in the course of the journey becomes an issue. We find *keleuthos* used where the ‘process’-like durative element is emphasized (though still, unlike *poros*, always within a teleological framework), *hodos* where the emphasis is on the structural framework of the journey *qua* unified whole. Ultimately, the Homeric *hodos*-activity is an ‘accomplishment’—an activity with intrinsic duration but linked with a clear end, an end not only in time (in the sense of closure or finality) but also in space (in relation to a terminal destination) and in relation to a goal or purpose (in the sense of accomplishment or fulfilment). In Homer, the *hodos* as an activity is thus marked by a strong sense of teleology: a *hodos* is always a *hodos* to somewhere, undertaken for a purpose.

*University of Bristol*

BENJAMIN FOLIT-WEINBERG  
[b.folit-weinberg@bristol.ac.uk](mailto:b.folit-weinberg@bristol.ac.uk)