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The Future of Education for All as a Global Regime of Educational Governance

Abstract
The article critically considers the future of Education for All (EFA) understood as a global regime of educational governance. The article sets out an understanding of global governance, world order, power and legitimacy within which EFA is embedded. It explains what is meant by EFA as a regime of global governance and as part of a ‘regime complex’ along with other regimes concerned with different areas of economic and social development that impact on education and development. The article traces the genealogy of EFA focusing on the development of key tensions and contradictions since the late 1980s. Here the emphasis will be on understanding the effects of different kinds of power that are in turn linked to broader global interests within a changing world order. The article concludes by considering the future of EFA. It is suggested that EFA since the adoption of the Incheon declaration and Framework for Action is giving way to a new global regime of educational governance in which education and in particular learning is linked to sustainable development, albeit in contradictory ways.

Introduction
The first aim of the article is to consider the future of Education for All (EFA) as a global regime of educational governance. The article will commence by setting out the underlying view of global governance. Central to this view is a consideration of the effects of different kinds of power that are linked to global interests and struggles for hegemony within a changing world order. In particular the article draws on Barnett and Duvall’s (Barnett and Duvall 2004b; Barnett and Duvall 2005) typology of power in international relations and politics. The second aim, related to the first is to consider the future of EFA through drawing on insights from regime theory, i.e. to develop an understanding of EFA as a global regime of educational governance. It will be argued that understanding EFA in this way allows for a consideration of the distinctive but changing nature of the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that have shaped the issue area of education and development since the late 1980s. It also allows for a consideration of the relative power of different discourses, governments, non-governmental organisations and networks in shaping EFA. It will also be argued, however, that EFA needs to be understood as part of a ‘regime complex’ that includes other global regimes governing different areas of economic and social development that have impacted on education and development in sometimes

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1 A first version of this paper was presented to the United Kingdom Forum for Education and Training (UKFIET) conference, 15-17 September, 2015, Examination’s School, Oxford. I would like to acknowledge the critical feedback given to earlier drafts by the journal reviewers as well as by colleagues including Angeline M. Barrett, Linda Chisholm, Joan DeJaeghere and Lizzi Milligan. This feedback has been tremendously helpful in shaping the final version of the paper.
contradictory ways. Considering EFA as a global regime allows for a consideration of the relative influence of different regimes with implications for future change.

The article will then set out the genealogy of EFA, focusing on the development of key tensions and contradictions both within EFA and between EFA and other regimes that arise from the effects of different forms of power. The article concludes by considering the possible future of EFA. It is suggested that since the adoption of the Incheon Declaration and Framework for Action EFA is giving way to a new regime characterised by a modified set of norms and principles related to the role of education, or more specifically learning in relation to sustainable development. The article is intended to be conceptual and exploratory in nature. At a methodological level, analysis is based on an abductive process of reasoning in which the existing literature on EFA has been re-interpreted against both Barnett and Duvall’s typology of power and insights from regime theory. Rather than seeking to provide a definitive account, the article is intended to provoke debate about the global governance of education and development and to provide a basis for further research.

Understanding of global governance
There exist several detailed accounts of how global governance is conceptualized within the field of international relations and how different theories of global governance have been applied within the field of international and comparative education (Phillip W Jones 2007b; Coleman and Jones 2004; Mundy and Manion 2014). The current analysis will seek to build on this rich scholarship through considering EFA from the point of view of recent developments in the understanding of global governance. In particular, the article will attempt to understand global governance in relation to the working of different kinds of power (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Barnett and Duvall 2004a) and as a regime of global governance operating within a regime complex (Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013; Barnett and Walker 2015; Young 2012; Hook and Rumsey 2015; Drezner 2009; Keohane and Victor 2011; Alter and Meunier 2009). In so doing the article will seek to bring together a liberal institutionalist concern with the nature of regimes and the role of regimes in developing consensus around a common set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures in a particular issue area with a more critical concern with the power dynamics within regimes and how regimes are shaped and in turn influence power relationships within the wider field of global governance. As Jones (Phillip W Jones 2007b) has suggested, one way of achieving such a rapprochement is to conceive of regimes and regime complexes in Gramscian terms, i.e. as global institutions that are fundamentally concerned with achieving consent for the institutions and laws of global governance as a basis for maintaining hegemony within an anarchic world order. Central to this way of thinking is the issue of the legitimacy of global regimes in relation to the institutions and networks that are part of the regime and that are affected by the regime.

Maintaining the legitimacy of governance

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2 Following Danermark et al (2002), the analysis has involved abductive reasoning, i.e. a process of interpreting and re-contextualizing individual phenomena within a conceptual framework or a set of ideas. In this case it is to understand the genealogy of EFA in relation to the working of different forms of power in relation to regime theory.

3 Here I draw on Keohane’s (Keohane 2011) understanding of the legitimacy of international regimes as residing in their moral acceptability, inclusiveness, epistemic quality (by which he means integrity and transparency, accountability, compatibility with governance norms at a national level and be of perceived
within a particular issue area such as education and development in the face of tension and contradictions within and between regimes provides a key motive for powerful actors in shaping regimes and a basis for regime change.

It is important to locate an understanding of regimes within a wider conceptualisation of global governance. Global governance is itself a contested concept. The view advanced here refers to the ‘political regulation of transboundary processes and actors’ (Stephen and Stephen 2014):

Global governance in this understanding is a capacious concept, encompassing a plethora of public and private authorities affecting transnational processes, from the promulgation of private regulations and standards, transnational networks and civil society organizations, transnational policy planning forums, and international law, through to international ‘regimes’ and the high tables of the United Nations organs (Stephen and Stephen 2014).

In the context of contemporary globalization, global governance is understood in relation to a dominant ‘hegemonic bloc’ that represents a contradictory fusion of the politics of states and empire, i.e. the US and its allies and the interests of dominant factions of capital including transnational corporations and finance capital (Robert and Timothy 1996; Rupert 2009; Harvey 2014; Harvey 2003; Tikly 2006a). It is a ‘liberal’ world order in the sense that it fosters a market-led view of human development. In these analyses, the spread of neoliberal orthodoxy instantiated in the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ during the 1980s reflected the dominance of Western powers and of representatives of global capital on the Boards of the major global financial institutions. The ‘liberal’ basis of world order has, however, shifted over time. This shift has been discussed at length elsewhere in relation to the field of international and comparative education (Robertson et al. 2007). In broad terms it has entailed a change in emphasis from a view of untrammelled market forces as the vehicle for delivering development that lay at the heart of the Washington consensus with a concern with a role for public private partnerships in eliminating poverty which formed the basis for the so-called ‘post-Washington consensus’ (Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011b; Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011a). More recently, and partly as a response to the global financial meltdown of 2008 what is beginning to emerge is a new underlying, hegemonic view of ‘sustainable development’ encapsulated in the Sustainable Development Goals. This involves on the one hand an increasing concern with sustainable economic development on the part of the World Bank and global financial institutions, i.e. that economic growth must be environmentally sustainable, inclusive as well as contributing to poverty alleviation and on the other hand, with the view championed by the other key UN agencies and dating back to the Bruntland Report of sustainable human development. As we will see, these two strands have potentially contradictory implications in issue areas such as education and development.

In this view global governance is centrally concerned with managing crisis within the global capitalist economy, securing the basis for future accumulation and growth and legitimising dominant interests. The Washington and post-Washington consensuses and the more

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comparative benefit for actors, e.g. through reducing the transaction costs associated with bilateral arrangements).
recent shift to sustainable development can be seen as a response to crisis in the global economy in the interests of the dominant hegemonic bloc. Global governance is also contested. As we will see in relation to EFA, it is contested ‘from within’ by actors who share alternative views of the goals of human development including organisations and networks that comprise global civil society. Global Western hegemony is, however, also increasingly challenged by the emergence of new ‘Rising Powers’ including the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) economies. The interests of these powers are realised on the one hand through negotiating international rules and terms to make them more compatible with their own more state-led development paths. This includes challenging the ‘liberal’ basis of Western rule (Stephen and Stephen 2014). In this case, international agencies become the site for these contestations and a barometer for assessing the balance of power. It also involves developing their own bilateral relationships with other low-income and emerging economies to secure trade and access to natural resources. An aspect of this is the exertion of their own ‘soft power’ through bilateral development assistance (King 2013; Bräutigam 2011).

Power in global governance
Whereas previous work has explored the discursive basis of global educational governance (Tikly 2006b), the spotlight of the present article falls on the political domain and particularly on the role of global institutions and an analysis of power. The paper is informed by the work of the international relations theorists Barnett and Duvall (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Barnett and Duvall 2004a) which has been found particularly valuable in understanding the tensions at the heart of EFA. These scholars argue that much work on global governance has not included a sustained consideration of power and that ‘this is paradoxical because governance and power are inextricably linked. Governance involves the rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and control social life, features that are fundamental elements of power. To account for how global activities are guided and how world orders are produced, therefore, requires careful and explicit analysis of the workings of power’ (Barnett and Duvall 2004b). The authors define power as ‘the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate’ (Barnett and Duvall 2004b). They distinguish between different kinds of power that operate within the sphere of international relations. They are each relatively autonomous, linked to different global structures and causal mechanisms with different loci and have causes and effects at different levels and scales.  

The four types of power fall within two broad categories. The first is concerned with the more observable forms of power that work through the interactions of specific actors. They define compulsory power as comprising the relations of interaction that allow one actor to have direct control over another. In the context of the present discussion this is most obvious it will be argued in the conditionalities that have been attached to aid. A second type of power is institutional in which states design international institutions in ways that work to their long-term advantage and to the disadvantage of others. In relation to the

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4 There work can, therefore, be described as ‘critical realist’ in that it seeks to make use of conceptions of power associated with different theoretical traditions in international relations but to bring these together to develop a more holistic ontological view of power in global governance. (Note, here ‘realist’ does not refer to the realist theoretical tradition within international relations so much as to the philosophy of science outlined by Roy Bhaskar).
development of EFA it is manifest in the historical dominance of the interests of powerful, Western nations and private sector interests in the governance structures of global financial institutions such as the World Bank (Philip W Jones 2006; Phillip W Jones 2007b; Mundy and Verger 2015). Extending the concept of institutional power somewhat beyond Barnett and Duvall’s original conception, it is also possible to conceive of institutional power in terms of the degree of influence of different international organisations on the nature of a specific regime and in terms of the degree and direction of influence between different regimes. In relation to the former, the World Bank has proved particularly influential in shaping EFA as will be argued. In relation to the latter, it will be suggested that the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) regime has historically proved more powerful in mobilising resources for education than has the EFA regime. Changing patterns of dominance between regimes in a regime complex can be explained as the outcome of differences in institutional power held by coalitions of institutions in specific regimes.

The second broad category relates to two forms that although less directly observable play a powerful role in constituting social relationships between actors. The first of these, structural power, concerns the constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation to one another. One expression of this form of power is the working of the global capitalist economy, in producing unequal social relations of production between capital and labour. Class relationships of dominance and subordination in international relationships also intersect in complex ways with those of gender, culture and race (e.g. Rupert 2009). Although less obvious to observe empirically in relation to the development of EFA, an understanding of structural power is nonetheless fundamental for understanding the nature of the wider political global economy against which the development of EFA must be understood.

Finally, productive power is the socially diffused production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification including the way that ‘development’ itself is defined and understood. Here the understanding of productive power owes much to Foucault’s conception of governmentality, i.e. a consideration of how the art and rationality underlying particular forms of global governance and the political technologies through which these become realised have their own constitutive effects. As with structural power, the workings of productive power are less obvious than those of compulsory and institutional power but no less important for understanding how the identities of different actors are constituted and the policies of different institutions are discursively framed. In the sections below, it will be argued that the underlying view of education and development informing EFA has been informed by dominant economistic discourses on the one hand and by rights based discourses on the other. Specifically, they have been elaborated by overlapping but distinctive ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas 2001; Haas 1993; Haas 1989). The term epistemic community is used here to describe ‘the roles played by networks of experts in international decision-making: how they agree upon and articulate causal linkages within complex issue spaces; how they frame issues and define salient discourse; how they define and limit potential solutions or outcomes; and how they define state interests within the issue space’ (Brown 2015 251).\(^5\) Both of the discourses we consider are also primarily Western in nature

\(^5\)This is to acknowledge that discourse has both a constitutive effect on the identities and world views of dominant actors for example, through the influence of specific disciplinary discourses such as mainstream
with their origins in the European enlightenment (de Sousa Santos 2012; de Sousa Santos 1999; Escobar 2014; Tikly 2006b) and this it will be suggested has implications for the future legitimacy of EFA as a global regime. Importantly for our analysis the different forms of power do not operate in isolation from each other but intersect. As we will see they come together in complex ways to shape the nature of global regimes such as EFA.

Characterising EFA as a global regime of educational governance

Global governance also needs to be understood at the level of global institutions. It is through the agency of different kinds of actors including governmental, non-governmental and multilateral organisations, regimes and regime complexes as well as global networks of different kinds that global governance is shaped. These institutions themselves emerge in relation to wider structural and discursive forms of power. To date, much attention has been focused on the changing role of multilateral organisations in relation to global governance including the World Bank (Bonal 2011; Klees, Samoff, and Stromquist 2012; Mundy and Verger 2015; Phillip W Jones 2007a; Philip W Jones 2006) and UNESCO (Coleman and Jones 2004). There is also an important literature on the role of global civil society in shaping global education policy including EFA (Verger and Novelli 2012; Verger, Altinyelken, and Novelli 2012).

There has been much more limited literature seeking to understand the global governance of education and development in terms of regime theory. In this regard EFA is commonly understood as a ‘global movement’ involving key institutions organized around a core set of principles encapsulated in key texts including the Jomtien Declaration, the Dakar Framework for Action as well as the education MDGs (Mundy and Manion 2015). In keeping with existing scholarship, understanding EFA as a regime also involves understanding of the changing relationships between key institutions that have shaped EFA. As is widely documented, several multilateral organisations have been instrumental in shaping EFA from inception including the World Bank, UNESCO, UNICEF (where the EFA idea originated) and the UNDP. The early days of EFA in the lead up and aftermath of both the Jomtien conference in 1990 (at which the first declaration on Education for All was agreed) and the Dakar conference in 2000 (that adopted the EFA Framework for Action) were marked by infighting between these organisations with the World Bank ultimately proving dominant (King 2007a). Global NGOs including the influential Global Campaign for Education were also influential in advocating a more rights based vision of EFA (Mundy and Murphy 2001; Mundy and Manion 2015; Verger and Novelli 2012). EFA has also been shaped by the actions and demands of key donors, for example in the establishment and development of the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) as a means of channeling bilateral funding for education in support of EFA (Bermingham 2011; Bermingham 2010). In 2012 the FTI itself morphed into economics or a view of human rights. In this view, however, discourses can in turn be deployed strategically in the production of policy by different epistemic communities representing a range of interests.

The term ‘institution’ is used in an inclusive sense here to encompass not only regimes and regime complexes but to also refer to international organisations including multilateral organisations and NGOs that are a component of regime complexes.

Whilst Mundy and Manion’s work provides a rich account of the emergence of the EFA within what they describe as the education and development regime, it does not draw out the implications of understanding the governance of education in terms of regime theory.
the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) with its own charter and governance structures. However, it is suggested below that the increasing prominence of the GPE as a major conduit for funding in the field of education and development along with the increasingly prominent role played by other institutions including the OECD can be seen as evidence for the emergence of a new regime at the heart of the field of education and development.

The article also makes use of the most well-known definition of regimes as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner 1982 185; see also; Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013) as a way of re-interpreting EFA as a regime. Understanding EFA in this way, it is suggested, whilst providing something of a departure for existing scholarship, is useful for deeper and more systematic understanding of EFA both in its own terms and in relation to other regimes impacting on education and development. It also allows for a consideration of how EFA has changed over time. For our purposes, principles are factors which guide the purpose of action of governments and institutions. In the case of EFA they comprise the underlying view of education and development including the rational for investment in education. Norms determine what general behaviour is legitimate in pursuing a particular regime’s goals. The rules are closely related to norms and particularise the actual rights and obligations of governments and institutions in a regime. In the case of EFA they include consideration of the specific funding mechanisms that have been used. Finally, decision-making procedures are also closely linked to norms and refer to the mechanisms within and between governments and institutions through which decisions are made. Extending the original formulation somewhat, ‘decision-making procedures’ is also used here to capture the organizational form of the regime which impacts on decision making.

For exponents of regime theory, a regime is primarily characterised by the principles and norms governing a regime. Despite some shifts in emphasis, the principles and norms governing EFA have remained fairly consistent over the past quarter of a century. It will be suggested that they have centred on a commitment to education as a human right and as an investment in human capital but that this has had contradictory implications for the way that EFA has been conceptualized, including the scope of EFA, the relative weight attached to issues of access versus quality, which groups EFA has been targeted at and the role of states and markets in the provision of education. They are rooted in turn in wider discourses of development from the Washington to the post-Washington consensus and more recently to sustainable development. As will be discussed in detail in the following sections, however, the more recent Incheon Declaration and Framework for Action (IDFA) (UNESCO, n.d.) sets out a new set of principles that are inclusive of EFA principles but are more explicitly linked to a holistic and single vision of sustainable development:

We commit with a sense of urgency to a single, renewed education agenda that is holistic, ambitious and aspirational, leaving no one behind. This new vision is fully captured by the proposed SDG 4 “Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all” and its corresponding targets. It is transformative and

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8 As has been pointed out, there are overlaps and it is not always easy to clearly distinguish between principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures (Haggard and Simmons 1987).
universal, attends to the ‘unfinished business’ of the EFA agenda and the education-related MDGs, and addresses global and national education challenges. It is inspired by a humanistic vision of education and development based on human rights and dignity; social justice; inclusion; protection; cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity; and shared responsibility and accountability. We reaffirm that education is a public good, a fundamental human right and a basis for guaranteeing the realization of other rights. (UNESCO 2015b).

The principles enshrined in the IDFA also explicitly acknowledge the importance of South-South collaboration as a modality for realising development assistance, which can be seen as evidence of the growing influence of the Rising Powers\(^9\) including China in the development of global regimes including the SDGs.

The norms associated with EFA are encapsulated in the various targets set out in key declarations and frameworks including the Jomtien Declaration, the Dakar Framework for Action and more recently the Muscat Agreement. These are summarised in the table below in relation to key topic areas within EFA. It is evident that there has been much continuity at the level of norms between Jomtien in 1990 and Muscat in 2015. It can also be seen, however, that when it comes to the IDFA there has been a subtle shift at the level of norms with a greater emphasis in the IDFA compared to previous documents on attitudes, skills and dispositions linked to sustainable development (although these have been evident to some extent since Jomtien). We also see a greater emphasis over the period as a whole on secondary, vocational and higher education and on learning (as compared to access) with the exception of higher education where the emphasis in the IDFA lies in expanding access, including through scholarships.\(^{10}\) These changes in the level of norms are suggestive of regime change.

There have been changes in the decision-making procedures over the years within the EFA regime linked to its changing organizational form. EFA originally evolved as a networked movement mobilized around a common set of principles and norms enshrined in the Jomtien Declaration and Dakar Framework for Action. At its centre was a secretariat and high level panel situated within UNESCO. Also significant, was the development of an epistemic community around the Global Monitoring Report (GMR) (recently transformed into the Global education Monitoring Report or GEMR) that draws on expertise from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. The GMR was established after Dakar as a means of monitoring progress towards the EFA goals enshrined in the Dakar Framework of Action. This has provided a powerful source of advocacy for advancing the EFA agenda and an alternative locus for conceptualising education developments to the epistemic community associated with the World Bank (see below). The development of the EFA Fast Track Initiative in 2002 as a vertical fund within the World Bank with its own decision-making processes added another layer of organisational complexity but did not fundamentally alter its networked nature (Bermingham 2011). The development of the FTI into the GPE as the main institution for delivering EFA with its own Board of Directors in 2012 has, it will be

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\(^9\) The rising powers is a category that includes the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, as well as regional powers such as Mexico and Indonesia.

\(^{10}\) There is also a more explicit concern with the inclusion of different marginalized groups as well as the historical concern (since Dakar at least) with gender equity. The Dakar framework was unique in specifying a target relating to financial allocations although these are covered in other SDGs relating to global partnerships.
suggested below provided an alternative locus of power away from UNESCO. The FTI/GPE has also been the central focus for rules within the regime, although these have had contradictory implications for donors on the one hand and for recipients of aid on the other.

A change from one regime to another within a specific issue area is associated with a change in the underlying principles and norms that are associated with changes in the underlying development paradigm. As Mundy and Manion explain, EFA emerged within the education and development issue area (Mundy and Manion 2015). Prior to EFA, education and development had been dominated by the funding modalities linked to World Bank structural adjustment lending and by forms of bilateral funding that had their origins in the
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<tr>
<td>Early childhood education</td>
<td>1. Expansion of early childhood care and development activities, including family and community interventions, especially for poor, disadvantaged and disabled children.</td>
<td>1. Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children.</td>
<td>1. By 2030, at least x% of girls and boys are ready for primary school through participation in quality early childhood care and education, including at least one year of free and compulsory pre-primary education, with particular attention to gender equality and the most marginalized.</td>
<td>4.2 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education so that they are ready for primary education.</td>
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<td>Access to basic, formal education</td>
<td>2. Universal access to, and completion of, primary education (or whatever higher level of education is considered as “basic”) by the year 2000.</td>
<td>2. Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality.</td>
<td>2. By 2030, all girls and boys complete free and compulsory quality basic education of at least 9 years and achieve relevant learning outcomes, with particular attention to gender equality and the most marginalized.</td>
<td>4.1 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes.</td>
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<td>Improving education quality and learning outcomes</td>
<td>3. Improvement in learning achievement such that an agreed percentage of an appropriate age cohort (e.g. 80% 14 year olds) attains or surpasses a defined level of necessary learning achievement.</td>
<td>6. Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills.</td>
<td>3. By 2030, all youth and at least x% of adults reach a proficiency level in literacy and numeracy sufficient to fully participate in society, with particular attention to girls and women and 4.6 By 2030, ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy.</td>
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<td>Increasing basic literacy/numeracy</td>
<td>4. Reduction in the adult illiteracy rate (the appropriate age cohort to be determined in each country) to, say, one-half its 1990 level by the year 2000, with sufficient emphasis on female literacy to significantly reduce the current</td>
<td>4. Achieving a 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults.</td>
<td>3. By 2030, all youth and at least x% of adults reach a proficiency level in literacy and numeracy sufficient to fully participate in society, with particular attention to girls and women and 4.6 By 2030, ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy.</td>
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<td>Disparity between the male and female illiteracy rates.</td>
<td>The most marginalized.</td>
<td>Gender equity</td>
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<td>Gender equity</td>
<td>5. Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls’ full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality.</td>
<td>4.5 By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations</td>
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| Inclusion/ reaching the most marginalised | 4.a Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, non-violent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all |

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<tr>
<th>Access to TVET/ HE</th>
<th>4. By 2030, at least x% of youth and y% of adults have the knowledge and skills for decent work and life through technical and vocational, upper secondary and tertiary education and training, with particular attention to gender equality and the most marginalized.</th>
<th>4.3 By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university</th>
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<tr>
<td>Access to TVET/ HE</td>
<td>5. Expansion of provision of basic education and training in other essential skills required by youth and adults, with programme effectiveness assessed in terms behavioral changes and impacts on health, employment and productivity.</td>
<td>4.b By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and</td>
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<td>Life skills/ sustainable development</td>
<td>6. Increased acquisition by individuals and families of the knowledge, skills and values required for better living and sound and sustainable development, made available through all educational channels including the mass media, other forms of modern and traditional communication, and social action, with effectiveness assessed in terms of behavioural change.</td>
<td>3. Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills programmes.</td>
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<td>Teachers</td>
<td>6. By 2030, all governments ensure that all learners are taught by qualified, professionally-trained, motivated and well-supported teachers.</td>
<td>4.c By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified teachers, including through international cooperation for teacher training in developing countries, especially least developed countries.</td>
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<td>Financial allocation</td>
<td>7. By 2030, all countries allocate at least 4-6% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or at least 15-20% of their public expenditure to education, prioritizing groups most in need; and strengthen financial cooperation for education, prioritizing countries most in need.</td>
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Cold War period. These were so disparate it is difficult to describe them as a ‘regime’ and indeed it was partly as a response to the un-coordinated nature of development assistance within the area of education and development that EFA emerged. The emergence of a distinct regime organised around EFA is also associated with a wider shift from the Washington to the post-Washington consensus (see also Mundy 2007; Mundy and Manion 2015). It will be suggested below that what we are currently witnessing is a further change in the underlying principles and norms governing the issue area linked to the wider shift towards a new sustainable development paradigm. A change from one regime to another can also be brought about, however, by the rise of a new hegemon, i.e. a new, dominant state or collection of nation states that challenge the principles and norms of existing regimes and/or introduce a new regime. In this respect, the emergence of a new regime can be considered in part at least as a response to the emergence of the Rising Powers, especially China and this is discussed further below.

**EFA as part of a regime complex**

As several commentators have observed global governance has become more ‘dense’ as the number of regimes impinging on different issue areas has increased (Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013). In this respect the number of regimes that have impinged on education and development has multiplied over time to the point where EFA can be said to exist within a ‘regime complex’. Here a regime complex is defined as ‘a network of three or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognised as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively’ (Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013 29).\(^{11}\) The development of the EFA regime for example, has been strongly influenced by changes in the nature and scope of existing regimes that impinge on education and development. The interactions of these regimes have at different points been

\(^{11}\) The understanding of regime complex is informed by recent scholarship by Orisini et al (Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013).
found to be problematic by different actors as will be discussed. The advantage of conceiving of EFA as part of the regime complex, is that it allows for a consideration of the direction of influence of interrelated regimes based on an assessment of how different kinds of power operate in and through the regime complex.

Diagram one below provides a schematic overview of the regime complex impinging on the education and development issue area. It is intended as a heuristic device for beginning to conceptualise the relationship between regimes impinging on education and development. The two-way arrows indicate the potential for reciprocal influences between regimes. The strength of the influence in either direction would need to be evaluated on the basis of empirical enquiry and is also likely to change over time. In the sections below, however, an initial discussion of the relationship between regimes is provided based on an evaluation of the existing evidence in the literature on EFA considered in relation to Barnett and Duvall’s typology of power.

**Diagram one: A schematic representation of EFA as part of a regime complex in the issue area of education and development**

The development of EFA has been affected by changes in the wider aid regime within which EFA is nested. Space does not allow for a detailed analysis. The aid regime has been described elsewhere (Hook and Rumsey 2015; Barnett and Walker 2015). The key institution in this regime is the OECD and specifically the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) which has often determined the nature and direction of policy within the aid regime as a whole. Changes in policy such as the introduction of time bound targets heralded by the *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation* report (Committee 1996) were influential in the development of targets that informed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Robertson et al. 2007; King 2007b). Similarly, the changing

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12 This might involve, for instance, a undertaking discourse analysis of different protocols and treaties relating to different regimes to find evidence of the nature and direction of influence of one regime over another.

13 Much of this rich history has been given elsewhere. See for example, (Philip W Jones 2006; Coleman and Jones 2004; Mundy 2007; King and Rose 2005; Mundy and Manion 2015)
discourse of aid effectiveness has provided a consistent theme in the development of EFA. For example, attempts were made to align the FTI from inception with the principles of aid effectiveness and donor harmonisation that were emerging from high-level donor meetings in Rome (OECD DAC 2003). Key documents associated with the FTI and now GPE reference the major conferences, protocols and agreements relating to aid effectiveness including the Paris declaration and the Busan agreement14 although as we will see, the broadening of the Busan aid effectiveness protocols to include concepts of South-South collaboration that encompass the Rising Powers has so far not been reflected in the governance of EFA or indeed the GPE. The OECD has also developed its own very powerful epistemic community that has exercised considerable productive power in the setting of global agendas. This includes the OECDs increasingly prominent role as a broker of education policy and linked to this the administration of the PISA international assessment regime. Most recently this has led to the development of the *PISA for Development* initiative15 as a means of drawing low income countries into the same framework of international assessments that is already inhabited by many high- and middle- income countries.

The World Bank has also been a powerful institution in the context of the aid regime in its role as the major channel through which development assistance has been provided to low-income countries in the form of loans and grants. The model of conditional lending has remained a consistent feature of World Bank lending in education as in other areas of development both in the context of the Washington and Post-Washington consensus (Bonal 2011) although more recently World Bank lending for basic education for the poorest low-income countries including those of sub-Saharan Africa has been superseded by the GPE with the Bank’s lending increasingly channeled towards supporting secondary and tertiary education in middle income countries (Mundy and Verger 2015). The strategy of drawing in a wider range of institutions and global networks in the development of the EFA agenda can be seen as part of a wider move to achieve legitimacy for its policies in the context of the Post-Washington consensus and following the success of the earlier Health for All initiative (Coleman and Jones 2004). The more recent establishment of vertical funds within the Bank as the preferred way to finance specific areas of health, education and other areas of development has been important for the way that the EFA regime has developed including the increasingly central role of the GPE (below). The World Bank has also evolved an extremely powerful epistemic community of its own that has played a significant role in shaping the principles and norms governing EFA (below).

The development of the MDG and subsequently the SDG regimes under the auspices of the UN and also nested within the wider aid regime has had significant implications for the

14 The GPE summarises the principles relating to aid effectiveness on its website as i) *Country ownership* (the GPE provides support to its developing country partners to design, implement, and monitor education plans and partner governments provide adequate domestic financing for education and improve their country systems); *Alignment* (funding by the GPE and the donors is aligned to the public financial management and procurement systems of the partner country); *Harmonization* (the GPE encourages donors, multilateral organizations, and civil society organizations to coordinate their work, and ensure that external funding is harmonized among the donors and aligned to the country systems); *Managing for results* (the GPE partnership encourages partners to track progress of the education plan implementation); *Mutual Accountability* (the GPE ensures that ‘mutual accountability’ principles are applied and that all partners in a country’s education sector are accountable for their actions) (see

15 See http://www.oecd.org/pisa/aboutpisa/pisa-for-development-background.htm
development and future of EFA. The process that led to the drafting and adoption of the MDGs did not centrally include UNESCO as the lead organisation in EFA, although UNICEF were involved as were the World Bank. The implication was the adoption of a narrower agenda than that represented by the Dakar Framework to reflect the World Bank’s historic emphasis on primary education and UNICEF’s concern with girls’ education. The implications of this narrower agenda have often been perceived as problematic by those committed to EFA (Mundy and Manion 2015). The two MDGs relating to education were:

**MDG 2**: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling  
**MDG 3**: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015

The more recent Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were arrived at through a wider process of decision-making than was the case with the MDGs including the establishment of the Open Working Group following the Rio+20 summit on sustainable development, member state negotiations and a series of global consultations. The targets associated with SDG 4 were fully incorporated into the IDFA and are outlined in table one above.

Of particular interest for our purposes was the effort on the UN’s part to achieve harmony between the IDFA on the one hand and the SDGs on the other. A key motive has been to avoid the same kind of differences in scope and focus between the IDFA and the SDGs as existed between the Dakar Framework and the education MDGs. Ensuring a common language between the IDFA and the education SDG demonstrates on the one hand the greater extent of inter-agency dialogue and co-ordination which can be seen as a response to a growing recognition by institutions themselves of the reality of regime complexity (Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013). It can also be seen as evidence of increasing efforts at inter-institutional co-ordination by a growing cadre of professionals linked to these institutions (Mundy and Manion 2015). It also serves, however, to underline the direction of power and influence within the regime complex. Just as the education targets within the MDGs proved more influential than those within EFA it was the wording of the education SDG rather than that of the Muscat agreement that had preceded Incheon (and developed under the auspices of EFA) that is included in the declaration. Indeed, the title of the IDFA takes a cue from the wording of the education SDG goal (above), i.e. *Education 2013: Towards Inclusive and Equitable Quality Education and Lifelong Learning for All*.

Since inception a key influence on EFA has been from the human rights regime. A consistent point of reference in the development of the principles of EFA have been the various UN conventions on human rights and especially on the rights of the child. These are also referenced quite clearly in the IDFA. The mandates for both UNESCO and UNICEF arise from their roles in advancing human rights in education and other spheres. The world trade regime has also provided an increasingly influential (if complex and contradictory)

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16 Here the analysis departs from the traditional view of EFA as a movement. Rather than the education MDGs and the education SDG being seen as integral to EFA they are seen as belonging to separate albeit related regimes governed by different principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes.

17 Thus although in diagram one above a double headed arrow is used to indicate a two-way influence, the net influence has been from the larger MDG/SDG regime complex to EFA.
regulatory framework including, for example, the General Agreement in Trade in Services (GATS), the more recent Trade in International Services Agreement (TiSA) and various Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) that are all aimed at liberalising cross-border trade in services including education. Careful analysis has shown (Verger 2009; Verger and Robertson 2012), the effect of these agreements is to create a regulatory and policy environment at national level that is conducive to the further privatization and marketization of education. The trade agreements have worked within the grain of the idea of public private partnerships that has been promoted by the World Bank in the context of the Washington and post-Washington consensuses. These effects are also contested by those working within a rights based framework and this has in turn affected the extent to which governments have included education as a service to be traded. The net effect, however, of these external and internal pressures for privatization has been to provide a supportive regulatory and policy environment for a growth in the number of private firms operating in low-income countries in the sphere of education including the establishment of chains of low fee private schools as well as privately run tertiary institutions. Connected to this broader shift in development thinking has been the growing influence of large philanthropic private sector organisations in their capacity as increasingly significant funders of education in global governance including, for example, on the board of the GPE. Finally, the global security regime has impacted on EFA through influencing efforts on the part of some donors to link funding for areas of development including education to the so-called ‘war on terror’. This has effectively reduced the amount of aid money for education in some of the poorest regions of the world (Novelli 2010). More recently, the UN Secretary General’s own Global Education First Initiative has specifically linked the issue of access to a good quality education to peace building including an emphasis on citizenship education18.

As commentators have pointed out, regime complexity can have its own causal effects. For example, some regimes have the power to demand greater compliance over governments than others. In Barnett and Duvall’s terms that is to say that they exercise greater compulsory power. Trade agreements linked to the trade regime, for example, once signed often become binding on governments. The development aid regime on the other hand does not force governments to comply in the same way. Although donor governments are encouraged to commit a certain proportion of their GDP to aid, they are not compelled to do so unless they adopt their own legislation to this effect. Neither are governments compelled by legally binding agreements to commit funding to a specific area of international development or to comply with aid effectiveness principles. By way of contrast low-income countries are often compelled to accept the conditions attached to conditional loans from the World Bank or to comply with the rules for receiving aid from vertical funds channeled through the World Bank such as the funds managed by the FTI/ GPE.

Regime complexity and the degree of compulsory power linked to different regimes allows donor governments latitude to link development assistance more closely to their own economic and political interests. For example, in the context of austerity politics in the wake of the 2008 financial crash, many governments can still choose to limit the amount of development assistance. They can also choose to channel aid to areas where there is

18 http://www.globaleducationfirst.org. The initiative also serves to underline the efforts by the Secretary General to highlight the important role of education within the overall aid regime.
greater evidence of value for money to appease internal critics of aid and to use aid strategically to support national security or, with respect to recent developments to seek to address the migration crisis facing European countries at source. The United Kingdom, whilst protecting its overall aid budget, is a good example of a country that is using aid strategically to serve wider purposes and this has been made explicit recently by the Chancellor of the Exchequer19. On the other hand, low-income countries are in a weaker position to make decisions that will potentially benefit their own economic and social development, reflecting their weaker position in relation to structural power within the global political economy. Given their structural position within the global economy, it is hard for them to resist the conditionalities associated with development assistance loans or grants from vertical funds such as the GPE. The great imbalance in compulsory power provides the basis for dependency and the major source of tension/contradiction within EFA and the aid regime more broadly as will be discussed below.

At an institutional level, regime complexity can be said to have affected UNESCO’s power and influence as the leading institution within education and development, a point that is taken up below. The dominance of the MDG and SDG regimes over EFA reflects an increasing locus for policy-making away from UNESCO to other more powerful institutions within the broader aid regime. UNESCO is also faced with an increasingly competitive institutional environment within the EFA regime itself linked to regime complexity. In particular, the development of the GPE as the ‘preferred’ institution through which to fund the education SDG can be seen to reflect the growing shift towards vertical funding within the wider aid regime as well as the more central involvement of the private sector under the influence of powerful institutions including the WTO, the OECD and the World Bank. In this regard, as well as in relation to levels of overall funding that it receives, UNESCO can be seen, like the World Health Organisation in the global health regime and the UNHCR in the refugee regime as an increasingly ‘threatened institution’ (Botts 2013; Heyneman 2011). Nonetheless, it will be suggested, both UNESCO and the World Education Forum continue to play a crucial legitimatory role within the area of education and development.

EFA as a global regime of governance: an analysis of key tensions
The aim of this section is to identify key tensions in the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that have characterised EFA as a regime of global educational governance and to relate these to the discussion of power in the introductory section. Specifically, analysis has involved a re-reading of the existing literature on EFA to identify key tensions as they have previously been described in the literature and then re-contextualising the discussion in relation to Barnett and Duvall’s typology of power. This has involved evaluating different kinds of evidence from the literature that show the effects of different forms of power including the existence of different causal mechanisms to explain how and why different kinds of power have served to shape issues and tensions.20

20 In relation to institutional and compulsory power, for instance, analysis has involved developing understanding the decision-making processes within the EFA regime and weighing up evidence for the dominance of different governments and international organizations to influence the actions of other actors. With regards to the more difficult to observe workings of structural and productive power, the emphasis was on seeking plausible explanations for the influence of these kinds of power. In the case of structural power this has
The principles underlying EFA

As has been suggested, the principles underlying EFA have been largely shaped by the productive power associated with two major discourses (Tikly and Barrett 2011). The first sees education principally as an investment in human capital which can support economic growth. In the context of the post-Washington consensus an investment in human capital was also seen as a basis for poverty reduction. More recently, the idea of human capital has been linked to a view of ‘sustainable’ and ‘inclusive’ growth (World Bank 2012). The other dominant discourse sees education as a basic human right and as a means for achieving further rights. It has increasingly been linked to a view of ‘sustainable human development’ that finds expression, for example in the IDFA and in the preamble to the SDGs. Each discourse has shaped and has in turn been developed by distinct but overlapping ‘epistemic communities’ clustered around the World Bank and around UNESCO and the Global Monitoring Report respectively. As suggested earlier, EFA has also been influenced by discourses relating to aid effectiveness and to the role of international assessments in monitoring and evaluating learning that have been largely propagated by epistemic communities associated with the OECD. The section below discusses key tensions in the development of principles underlying EFA. It will be suggested in the next section that the causes of the tensions and the way that they have been resolved/played out largely reflects changes in the balance of productive power.

Firstly, there has historically been a tension between investment in different levels of education. Although, from the beginning, there was agreement that EFA should focus on a notion of ‘basic education’ and on ‘basic learning needs’ there were differences in the way that these were interpreted. UNESCO, building on earlier conceptualisations of community education, championed an expanded understanding of basic education to embrace early childhood education, primary education, basic secondary and vocational education as well as adult literacy. For the World Bank and UNICEF the focus was very much on primary education and it was this focus that became increasingly dominant throughout the EFA period, reflected, for example, in the MDGs. The view was supported by the development of rates of return analyses that provided a powerful rationale for investment in basic education. The view persisted despite the preferences of many low-income country governments, and arguments about the importance of post-primary education (King 2007a; Tikly 2003).

More recently, there has been an assertion of a ‘systems approach’ on the part of the World Bank (and leading donors such as DfID) that has laid emphasis on basic skills in literacy and numeracy but also vocational skills and higher order skills for leveraging economic growth involved relating the discussion to the understanding of global governance presented above whilst in the case of productive power this has involved considering the workings of distinctive epistemic communities.

It is important to avoid reductionist view of epistemic communities in that members of both communities, despite different priorities and starting points may share overlapping views of basic principles, (e.g. a belief in human rights or the importance of education in elation to economic growth). Members of different communities might also share overlapping epistemological orientations, e.g. a commitment to empirical methodologies. It is also important to avoid a simplistic mapping of different epistemic communities onto agents in that members of different organisations may share similar overall commitments at the level of principle. Some agencies, e.g. some of the major donor agencies might also be influenced to lesser or greater degrees by different epistemic communities and different underlying views of education and development.
To some extent the move towards a more expansive view of the importance of different levels of skill can be seen as a rapprochement between the World Bank and UNESCO’s long standing advocacy of lifelong learning and for an expanded notion of basic skills that finds expression both in the IDFA and in the education SDG. The emphasis on scholarships for HEIs in the education SDG can be seen as an example of this shift in emphasis. It can also be interpreted, however, as a response to the increasing institutional power of the Chinese in influencing the field of education and development in this case through their influence over the SDGs. The Chinese government has historically emphasised scholarships to Chinese HEIs as a means of developing necessary skills and exerting ‘soft power’ (the promotion of the positive virtues of Chinese culture, language and civilisation) over recipients of such aid (King 2013). There remains an unresolved tension, however, between the emphasis on basic skills of literacy and numeracy supported by a range of important initiatives targeted at the early years and funded by the GPE, USAID, DfID and other donors and the concern with secondary, vocational and tertiary level skills where funding and investment for donors remains much more limited.

Secondly, there has been a distinct shift both within the EFA regime from a concern with access to an expanded notion of ‘access plus learning’ with the emphasis increasingly on ‘learning’. The new emphasis on learning is reflected in the titles of the World Bank’s current education strategy Learning for All, (which is also the title for DfID’s education strategy at the time of writing). The shift is associated with a growing recognition on the part of leading economists associated with the World Bank of the contribution of the quality of education to economic growth over and above years spent in school. A continued tension between access and quality remains evident in the education SDG and by implication the IDFA. The large number of sub-goals within the education SDG will mean strategic decisions will need to be taken about whether to invest, for example, in school construction or in improving the quality and status of teachers with the former being historically easier and cheaper to achieve. The emphasis on quality and learning has also been focused particularly on early years and basic education with less attention paid to ‘quality’ at higher levels. Tensions between issues of access and quality are also played out in current debates about gender in education. Here, the focus has often been on issues of improving access of girls to school rather than with a concern with the processes of schooling including forms of discrimination, stereotyping and sexualised violence that continue to militate against improved outcomes for girls and women (Aikman and Unterhalter 2005). These issues of process relate to the quality of education. They find expression in debates that have their origin in human rights discourses including those around the ‘child friendly’ and/or the ‘girl friendly school’ (Tikly and Barrett 2011).

The above also draws attention to competing notions of what a good quality education means. For many economists working within a human capital framework the understanding of ‘quality’ is often conflated with performance in standardised tests. This explains in part the importance attached to the participation of low-income countries in international assessments such as PISA. There is also advocacy for a range of skills linked to the

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22 Thus although the Chinese did not take part in Incheon, they did take part in the SDG process and it is the SDG targets that have taken precedence over earlier EFA ones including those outlined in the 2014 Muscat agreement which made no mention of scholarships.
development of the so-called ‘knowledge economy’ including entrepreneurial and problem-solving skills. Those working predominantly within a rights based framework have also emphasised the achievement of basic literacy and numeracy skills\(^{23}\) which are seen as important for achieving sustainable livelihoods. Here, however, there is also an emphasis on a range of ‘skills for global citizenship’ including knowledge, attitudes, values and behaviours and the protection of linguistic and cultural rights that can support a rights based view of sustainable development. These kinds of skills have long been advocated within a rights based framework and specifically by UNESCO. Differing conceptions of the nature of education quality are linked, at an ontological level to alternative underlying assumptions about the nature of teaching and learning and of the mind itself (Tikly 2015).\(^{24}\)

There has also been a tension, between a recognition of the rights of different groups of marginalised learners and the narrower focus of the education MDGs on gender equality. Within human capital theory the emphasis on expanding the pool of skills to support growth leads to a concern to invest in basic skills for boys and girls and for learners from all socio-economic backgrounds. There is also a concern to avoid the economic and social costs associated with youth unemployment (World Bank 2011). Within a rights based discourse on the other hand, the main focus is on realising the rights of the ‘most marginalised’ and this view finds expression in the Muscatt agreement and more recently in the education SDG\(^{25}\) and IDFA. This includes not only those from poor backgrounds and girls but also members of linguistic and cultural minorities, learners with disabilities, those affected by conflict etc.\(^{26}\) The changing emphasis on which groups to fund has had implications for which countries ought to be targeted by EFA. In this respect the FTI/ GPE and bilateral funding associated with EFA has not always targeted countries that contain large numbers of disadvantaged learners. This has included some low-income and post-conflict countries that have been unable to develop education sector plans (below) as well as middle income countries including those involved in conflict that despite being relatively prosperous contain significant numbers of disadvantaged young people. For example, the on-going crisis in Syria has led to an as yet unresolved debate within the GPE about its role in disaster management in these contexts (Winthrop and Steer 2015).

Finally, there has been an historical tension about the role of states and markets in the provision of education and training. Within a human capital framework the promotion of ‘choice’ in education through increasing the role of non-state actors in the provision of education is seen as the principle means for driving up the quality of provision of education with a limited role for the state in regulating provision. The World Bank’s last education

\(^{23}\) For example, performance in literacy and numeracy are measured by the Southern and East African Consortium on Monitoring Education Quality which is supported by the International Institute for Education Planning which is part of UNESCO.

\(^{24}\) For example, the emphasis on the achievement of a narrower set of largely cognitive skills by economists resonate closely with behaviourist views of learning whilst rights based discourses have traditionally favoured learner-centred approaches based on constructivist and situated theories of learning. Each have different and sometimes contradictory implications at the level of policy and practice.

\(^{25}\) The increasing emphasis on a more nuanced approach to meeting the needs of different kinds of marginalised groups is reflected in the SDGs through, for example, use of the term ‘most marginalised’.

\(^{26}\) Evidence suggests, however, that this emphasis is yet to translate into practice in terms of noticeable improvements in access to a good quality education for many of the most marginalised groups (UNESCO 2010).
strategy document (World Bank 2011) sets out a view of education systems as combining public and private provision and the private sector is increasingly funding chains of private schools with their own independent governance structures that fall outside of governance architecture both at a global and national level. Within a rights based framework, education is seen as principally a public good with the state playing a leading role in the provision of education. The tension is reflected in an increasingly vociferous debate about the role of private schools in the provision of basic education27.

Norms governing EFA
The significance of norms for a regime such as EFA are that they seek to shape the behaviour of actors including donors and recipients of aid. Of particular relevance here are the tensions associated with norms linked to the use of targets and discourses of aid effectiveness. Starting with targets, a key abiding tension has been between the targets and the capacity of different governments to meet those targets. Despite progress under the MDGs, success in meeting targets was partial and uneven (UNESCO 2015a). Given the larger number of targets associated with the education SDG it is likely that many governments will struggle to meet these without substantial increases in the budget for education and in their capacity to deliver on the targets (below). Part of the tension relates to the lack of financial resource available to low-income countries. The tension draws into sharp focus the position of low-income countries on the periphery of the global economy linked to disparities in structural power. It serves to highlight a fundamental contradiction within the wider aid regime between the focus on supporting social development through aid and the marginal position of low-income countries in relation to other regimes that directly impact on their position in the global economy including regimes governing trade and regulation of financial markets (Cohn 2015). That is to acknowledge the relative lack of influence that low-income countries have on determining the terms of trade in basic commodities and other exports and their vulnerability to financial shocks such as the 2008 global financial crisis. It also draws attention to the disparities in compulsory power between donor countries and recipient countries. As has been pointed out in relation to the education MDGs, the targets relating to the actions of low-income countries in realising the education SDG are time bound whilst those relating to the allocation of financial assistance by high income countries are not time bound (King and Rose 2005).

Part of the tension also relates to questions of governance at a national level including the proportion of national budgets committed to education, the effectiveness of tax collection, the extent of corruption, the efficiency of the bureaucracy etc. In terms of the analysis of power, it draws attention to the inability of compulsory power wielded by Ministries of Education and donors within the context of the EFA regime to influence these wider issues of governance beyond whatever influence they can have over capacity within the education sector itself, for example in relation to the development of education sector development plans (below). It also draws attention to the lack of vested interests that indigenous elites may have in state education systems given that their own children are likely to attend

prestigious private schools and the lack of institutional power held by actors within civil society to hold national governments to account.28

A further tension relates to differences between EFA targets and national development priorities. A study of the Rwandan education sector for example (Hayman 2007) has pointed to the real tensions between investing in basic education to fulfil the MDGs and in other sectors of education including higher education to realise other national development priorities (see also Tikly and Tikly 2003). This speaks to the effects of compulsory power on national governments. Of relevance here is the dependency that has been associated with EFA funding such that in many low income countries development assistance makes up a very large proportion of the overall education budget (King 2009). This dependency reinforces the compulsory power of donors over recipients, provides constraints on the capacity of local leadership to determine priorities and raises questions about the long term sustainability of EFA.

There are also tensions related to aid effectiveness. Central to contemporary discourses about aid effectiveness is the increasing emphasis on ‘results based aid’. However, it is often very difficult to measure the returns on aid to an issue area such as education and development, particularly with the focus on improvements in learning. This is because of the difficulties of scaling up innovations; the sometimes considerable length of time it can take for interventions to achieve measurable improvements in learning outcomes; as well as difficulties in attributing causality for improved outcomes to increases in aid, especially in the context where the majority of aid is in the form of sector wide support. Furthermore, the discourse of aid effectiveness is usually targeted at recipients of aid. In this sense ‘accountability’ is usually one way. There are no sanctions that low-income governments can use to ensure consistency in funding priorities on the part of donors for instance or to ensure donor harmonisation. At a structural level the Busan agreement and those preceding it including the Accra framework and Paris declaration are presented in terms of a consensus amongst donor and recipient countries around underling norms governing aid. There is a tension, however, in that whereas the Busan agreement included most low-income countries and the BRICS economies, these emerging donors increasingly pursue their own agendas in the education and development issue area, posing a threat to notions of donor harmonization (Mundy and Verger 2015).29 Finally, there is a tension between the concept of aid effectiveness and the way that EFA has up until now been implemented. For example, it has been suggested, that the principle of ‘ownership’ is compromised by the limited choice that low-income national governments have in accepting the conditionalities that go along with aid.

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28 Here initiatives such as Pratham in India and Uwezo in East Africa are designed specifically to improve levels of accountability of national governments to civil society through publishing externally collected performance data relating to basic literacy and numeracy can play an important role in seeking to make national governments more accountable. The difficulty here is that they do not necessarily develop capacity within government to effectively monitor and act on their own performance data (below).

29 In the case of China, much of China’s aid is in the form of support for higher education. Other forms of support including, for example, building schools and infrastructure is often not easy to characterise as traditional ‘aid’ in the way that the OECD would for instance.
It will be recalled that the rules governing EFA relate to the rights and obligations of donors and recipient countries. Rules are closely tied to and arise from norms. In the case of EFA these relate principally to the rules governing funding. The experience of the FTI/ GPE highlights two key tensions with respect to funding rules. A major historical tension has been in securing consistently adequate allocations from donors both under FTI and now GPE. As suggested above, this relates in part to the difficulties of exercising compulsory power over donor countries to ensure compliance with global targets. This has not yet translated into sustained and consistent increases in allocations with very large yearly fluctuation in the amounts allocated. This tension has persisted despite efforts to improve the efficiency and transparency of funding and to make the GPE fund more visible and attractive to a wider range of donors. Recently, overall education aid allocation has fallen by nearly 10 percent, and education aid to countries in sub-Saharan Africa has fallen by 21 percent (Winthrop and Steer 2015). Further, GPE has found it challenging to resist reduced donor support for education, and to overcome gaps created by those who have left the sector, like the Netherlands. Additionally, GPE’s fund is still small. Its first replenishment in 2011 included pledges from 60 organizations and a total of only $1.5 billion to the GPE fund over the 2011-2014 period—an amount that is a far cry from addressing the global financing gap that UNESCO estimates exists of $26 billion annually. Fluctuations in allocation have led to fluctuations in disbursement. This in turn has led to inconsistency in the levels of support available for education budgets year on year which in highly aid dependent countries has affected the capability to realise the goals set out in education plans.

The GPE fund also compares very unfavorably with the amounts committed to similar funds targeting other areas of social development. For example, the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria raised $12 billion from 25 countries, the European Commission, foundations, corporations and faith-based organizations for the 2014-2016 period, a 30 percent increase over the pledges of $9.2 billion secured for 2011-2013 (Winthrop and Steer 2015). Part of this relates to productive power and the relative ability of epistemic communities associated with the education and development issue area compared to other issue areas such as health to produce the kind of evidence that can convince donor governments to invest in education in a context where governments must convince their own political constituencies of the value for money of investing in one area of development as compared to another.

A further historical tension relates to the linking of funding to the ability of governments to produce a credible education sector development plan. For some low-income countries including those emerging from conflict, developing such a plan has historically proved

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30 EFA has been funded through a mix of multilateral and bilateral funding although it is the multilateral funding that has become most significant.

31 For example, according to Winthrop and Steer (Winthrop and Steer 2015) allocations varied between $153 million in 2011 to $490 million in 2012, rising to $1031 million in 2013 only to drop to $462 million in 2014.

32 As has been argued elsewhere this is partly because the outcomes from an investment in the prevention of communicable diseases are arguably more immediate and easier to quantify than the outcomes of something as complex and multicausal as learning (Tikly 2015).
challenging. The number and complexity of the education SDGs is likely to exacerbate rather than to simplify difficulties in writing sector development plans. The catalytic fund under the FTI was set up partly to address this tension and the GPE supports capacity development to produce education sector plans in fragile and post-conflict states and other low-income countries through its education sector plan and programme development grants. However, despite these efforts and those of other donors to support capacity development there often remains a dependency on external technical expertise in developing plans that potentially compromises norms relating to ‘ownership’ (above). Linked to this is the issue of matching sector development plans to changing national and donor priorities and the question of long term consistency in donor funding. Finally, there is often limited capacity for organisations within civil society to influence sector development plans (Education, n.d.). The above points relate to the challenges faced by national governments and civil society organisations to harness productive power to define indigenous rather than global interests and priorities.

Decision-making in EFA

The genealogy of EFA has been marked by tensions between the key institutions within EFA over decision-making reflecting differences in institutional power. For example, both Jomtien and Dakar were characterised by infighting between the key multilateral organisations with the World Bank dominating (King 2007b; Coleman and Jones 2004). More recently, however, the influence of the World Bank appears to have waned linked to a reduction in funding for basic education in low-income countries on the part of the World Bank (Mundy and Verger 2015). It was suggested in previous sections that the governance of EFA has been affected by regime complexity including the increasing ‘density’ of institutions and regimes influencing the education and development issue area. This has had the effect, it will be recalled of increasing the scope for gaming on the part of donor governments which impacts on allocations to EFA but also of creating competition for UNESCO as the locus for decision-making within the EFA regime and the wider regime complex.

What is emerging is a new decision-making architecture. Following Bermingham (Bermingham 2010; Bermingham 2011), the new architecture can still be described as ‘networked’ and diffuse although there has been an attempt to create greater coherence through the closer alignment of the IDFA with the SDGs. Within the new architecture the WEF continues to play an important legitimatory role in terms of the education and development issue area through providing a platform for multiple actors to potentially have a voice in global governance. The shift from the FTI to the GPE in 2012 can also be seen as an attempt at improving the legitimacy as well as the effectiveness of this funding mechanisms through providing a more inclusive and transparent governance structure. These shifts can be perceived as an attempt to reduce the ‘democratic deficit’ facing EFA and global governance more broadly. Significantly, the trajectory of the past decade has been towards a greater influence for the FTI/GPE and the MDGs/SDGs at the level of principles and norms as we have seen. Despite the realignment, tensions that have historically characterised EFA are likely to persist albeit in new forms.

An example is the dominance of international agencies over the voices of civil society in decision-making processes. Despite the achievements of organisations such as the Global
Campaign for Education and leading NGOs in challenging the hegemony of the multilateral organisations 33 it is the perspectives of dominant global institutions and especially the World Bank that have historically been more powerful in shaping the EFA agenda including the Jomtien Declaration and the Dakar Framework of action (King 2007b; Torres 2001; Mundy and Murphy 2001). Similarly, it is the global institutions that have dominated the formulation of the education SDG and the IDFA through their leadership and co-ordination roles. This is reflected for example, in the decision to use the SDG 4 as the basis for the IDFA which was taken behind closed doors and outside of the WEF.34

A further set of tensions relates to the opening up of the policy space represented by the GPE to a new set of donors including private philanthropic organisations such as the Open Societies Institute and the Hewlett and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Philanthropic organisations are represented on the Board of the GPE. On the one hand these Foundations share similar goals to traditional actors working in the area and provide valuable additional resources and new ideas including an emphasis on social innovation. In some cases, such as the OSI, they provide a radical space for critically evaluating developments in education and in global governance itself35. On the other hand, there is a tension between the increasingly prominent role of private foundations and the view expressed in the IDFA of education as fundamentally a public good. The tension is especially pronounced in relation to the growing number of chains of low fee private schools operated by international private companies such as Pearson. These chains have their own diffuse governance structures and operate outside of the EFA regime. In terms of the analysis of power, the increasing influence of the private sector on EFA reflects the structural power of sections of private, largely Western-based capital and the increasing institutional power that private capital has achieved within the regime complex.

Finally, there have also been tensions around the donor-led nature of EFA since its inception (King 2007b; Torres 2001; Mundy and Murphy 2001; Mundy and Manion 2014). This has been reflected in the dominance in key decision-making fora of Northern-based representatives of international agencies and donors. Decision-making processes between NGOs have also been characterised as Northern-led, for example in the lead up to the Dakar Forum (Mundy and Murphy 2001). There has been growing recognition of the threat to the legitimacy of the EFA regime posed by the dominance of Northern-based organisations and interests within the EFA regime. This is reflected, for example in the findings of the mid-term review of the FTI (Bermingham 2010; Bermingham 2011). As a result of the review

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33 For example, the International Consultation of NGOs that preceded Dakar and was at least partially successful in achieving some of its goals including advocating for the concept of ‘free’ basic education. Similarly, the Global Campaign for Education played a leading advocacy role in the establishment of the FTI. The Make Poverty History Campaign and the concerted civil society campaigns around the G8 summit at Gleneagles in 2005 were also influential in re-invigorating donor commitments to the FTI. Most recently, civil society organisations were successful in ensuring a key aspect of IDFA, namely that Education is fundamentally a public good although this is an increasing source of tension within EFA.

34 See the recent edition of NORRAG news in which the events leading up to and including the adoption of the Incheon declaration are discussed (available at: https://norrag.wordpress.com/2015/08/12/norrag-news-52-reflections-on-the-world-education-forum-financing-education-and-skills/)

35 See, for example, the privatisation in education research initiative funded by the OSI (http://www.periglobal.org) that provides a powerful critique of privatisation in education and especially of the increasing reliance on low cost private schools.
there has been an attempt to change the governance structure of the GPE with the board now made up of different donor, philanthropic and low income country constituencies. It has been argued, however, that given the nature of the compulsory and institutional power of Western donors within the regime, these moves towards greater legitimacy are unlikely to profoundly effect the Northern-led nature of the issue area. Where it may be possible to witness changes in the future is as a result of the growing influence of the Rising Powers.

**Conclusion: Towards a New Regime of Global Educational Governance?**
In the above sections an attempt has been made to describe the genealogy of the EFA regime focusing on key issues and tensions. Although EFA has been partial in its success in achieving its targets and realising its principles, it has proved resilient in the face of changing dynamics of global governance and increasing regime complexity. Nonetheless, it has been argued in the course of the article that what we are currently witnessing is a process of regime change. The new regime it is suggested is best described in terms of Learning for All or Education for Sustainable Development. The table below seeks to compare and contrast EFA with what went before it and with the emerging elements of a new regime.
It can be seen that although the new emerging regime provides continuity on EFA there are changes at the levels of principles and norms. Following Krasner’s original formulation (Krasner 1982)a, it is changes at the level of principles and norms that are most significant in terms of signaling regime change. These include an emphasis on sustainable development and on lifelong education as well as a shift to a more overt focus on access plus learning. The more expansive SDG four has replaced the EFA targets (although the goal itself incorporates previous EFA targets) and the IDFA acknowledges South-South collaboration as an aid modality reflecting the influence of the Busan agreement on aid effectiveness and of the Rising Powers. The nature of the rules governing the regime have changed very little. Decision-making within the regime continues to be networked and diffuse although there has been a shift of power within the regime away from UNESCO and towards the GPE. There is also evidence of increasing influence for the private sector (e.g. in the governance of the GPE) and of the Rising Powers through their influence over the SDG’s.

| Table two: Changing regimes of global governance in the education and development issue area |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Pre-EFA (no regime)** | **Education for All** | **Education for Sustainable Development** |
| **Principles** | Washington consensus | Post-Washington consensus | Sustainable development |
| **Dominant discourses** | Education for economic growth | Education for poverty reduction and economic growth | Education for sustainable economic growth |
| | Education as a human right | Rights to in and through education | Education for sustainable human development |
| **Scope** | Basic education | Expanded basic education | Lifelong education |
| **Focus** | Access | Access | Access plus learning |
| **Target** | All learners | All learners/ girls | Marginalised groups/ girls |
| **States versus markets** | Markets | States and markets | States and markets |
| **Norms** | Approach to aid effectiveness n/a | Paris declaration | Busan agreement |
| | Goals/ targets n/a | EFA targets/ education MDGs | SDG four |
| **Rules** | Donors No binding rules | No binding rules | No binding rules |
| | Recipients Credible Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes | Credible education sector development plans | Credible education sector development plans |
| **Decision-making** | Organisational form Centralised | Networked | Networked |
| | Donor-/ recipient-led Donor-led | Donor-led | Donor-led |
| | IO-led/ NGO-led IO-led | IO-led/ NGO input | IO-led/ NGO input |
| | Western-/ Rising power-led Western-led | Western-led | Western-led/ Increasing Rising Power influence |
It has also been suggested in the sections above that regime change can be seen as a response to ongoing tensions in the issue area of education and development and as a means to secure the legitimacy of global governance. Linking the principles and norms governing education and development to an overarching view of sustainable development that enjoys the support of all of the major institutions and the epistemic communities that support them; ensuring compatibility between the norms governing education and development and SDG four; and, seeking to normalise forms of South-South collaboration and introducing targets that reflect the priorities of the Rising Powers in development cooperation. Nonetheless, the emerging regime continues to be characterised by many of the tensions that have beset the EFA regime historically.

There continues to be a tension between the economistic human capital theory that underpins the World Bank's view of how education can contribute to sustainable development and the more expansive, rights-based view developed over the years by UNESCO. At present, the GPE is focused on a narrower set of priorities in terms of funding than is suggested by SDG four or the IDFA. This narrow set of priorities remains more consistent with a human capital approach as it has developed historically with a focus on the development of measurable cognitive skills particularly in the early years. It is unclear as to whether these existing priorities will be expanded to encompass higher levels of education and training and a range of affective as well as cognitive skills or, whether the implementation of this expanded agenda will remain fragmented with China investing in higher education, philanthropic organisations, UNESCO and NGOs investing in other skills linked to sustainable development. A major ongoing source of tension is likely to remain around the respective roles of states and markets. In this regard and on the basis of existing evidence, it would appear that the private sector will continue to exert ever-increasing influence both at the level of provision and the level of governance. On-going debates are likely to focus on the changing role of the state as a provider of education, in providing a regulatory framework governing private operators and as a locus for linking up the education regime with other regimes in the context of nationally determined development paths.

At the level of norms there remains a fundamental contradiction between the targets enshrined in the IDFA and the ability of governments to meet these given falling levels of aid, the lack of binding targets on donors and the continued marginal position of low-income countries in relation to the global economy which makes it very difficult for them to fund areas of social development such as education on a sustainable basis. In this context it may be that the approach adopted by the Chinese of linking aid overtly to trade through mutually binding agreements, may become increasingly attractive to low-income countries as they pursue their own state-led development trajectories with implications for the emerging regime. It has also been argued, however, that the issue area including the norms and principles that govern it, have historically been contested. For those within global civil society or who are operating within key institutions that continue to aspire towards a more expansive view of education and sustainable human development this poses particular challenges. On the one hand it requires being clear about the nature of the tensions and contradictions affecting the issue area and on the other to identify strategic opportunities to advance this more holistic view, for example through ensuring that this is reflected in the areas of education and development targeted by the GPE.
References


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